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INTRODUCTION
We are pleased to be joined by Law Review members Shannon
Rieke, Lindsey Mundt, and Daniel Lee and the rest of the Seattle
University Law Review staff, who performed the research required to
update this Article. Many sections of this Article were improved
through editing and revisions, clarifying the discussions and analysis
of cases. This marks the fifth publication of the Survey that was originally authored by Justice Robert F. Utter, Washington State Supreme Court (retired) in 1985, with updates published in 1988, 1998,
and 2005.
This Survey is intended to serve as a resource to which Washington lawyers, judges, law enforcement officers, and others can turn
as an authoritative starting point for researching Washington search
and seizure law. In order to be useful as a research tool, this Survey
requires periodic updates to address new cases interpreting the Washington constitution and the U.S. Constitution and to reflect the current state of the law. Many of these cases involve the Washington
State Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Washington constitution.
Also, as the U.S. Supreme Court has continued to examine Fourth
Amendment search and seizure jurisprudence, its decisions and reflections on Washington law are also discussed.
Often the rules and approaches in interpreting the Washington
constitution differ in certain areas from the analysis used by the U.S.
Supreme Court in its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Where that
occurs, this Survey has identified the independent approach adopted
by the Washington State Supreme Court.
Article I, section 7 of the Washington constitution is a counterpart to the Fourth Amendment. That section provides that “no person
shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without
authority of law.” The Washington State Supreme Court historically
applied the analytical framework outlined in State v. Gunwall, 106
Wn.2d 54, 61–62, 720 P.2d 808 (1986), in its case-by-case determination of the scope of protection afforded under article I, section 7,
and in situations where greater individual protection exists under the
Washington constitution than under the Fourth Amendment.
Gunwall adopted the following six neutral interpretive factors:
(1) the textual language of the state constitution; (2) the significant
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differences in the texts of parallel provisions of the federal and state
constitutions; (3) the state constitutional and common law history;
(4) the preexisting state law; (5) the differences in structure between
the federal and state constitutions; and (6) matters of particular state
interest or local concern. Id.
This analytical framework adopted in Gunwall provides the
structure and foundation from which Washington courts continue to
define the scope of article I, section 7. Recognizing the structural
approach to state constitutional interpretation, however, continues to
provide a reasoned method for resolving issues of state constitutional
law.
This Survey contains updated case comments and statutory references that are current through March 2013, and focuses primarily
on search and seizure law in the criminal context; it omits discussion
of many procedural issues, including those arising under court rules
that implement constitutional protections. In addition, all references
to Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth
Amendment, have been updated to the fifth edition, published in
2012.

CHAPTER 1
Triggering Article I, Section 7 and the Fourth
Amendment: Defining Searches and Seizures
This chapter addresses three questions: (1) what is a search; (2)
what is a seizure; and (3) who has standing to challenge a search or seizure? These questions represent the threshold inquiry in any search or
seizure problem. Unless a search or seizure has occurred within the
meaning of the federal or state constitution, constitutional protections
are not triggered. This chapter first discusses when a search has occurred, from entries into the home to the taking of blood samples. The
chapter then discusses when a seizure has occurred, be it an arrest, an
investigatory stop, or the detainment of property. The chapter concludes with a discussion of who may raise claims concerning article I,
section 7 or the Fourth Amendment.
1.0 DEFINING “SEARCH” PRE-KATZ:
“CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED AREAS”
Prior to 1967, the U.S. Supreme Court found Fourth Amendment
protections in “constitutionally protected areas.” Berger v. New York,
388 U.S. 41, 59, 87 S. Ct. 1873, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1040 (1967); Lopez v.
United States, 373 U.S. 427, 438–39, 83 S. Ct. 1381, 10 L. Ed. 2d 462
(1963). The Fourth Amendment’s guarantees applied only to those
searches that intruded into one of the “protected areas” enumerated
within the Fourth Amendment: “persons” (including the bodies and
clothing of individuals); “houses” (including apartments, hotel rooms,
garages, business offices, stores, and warehouses); “papers” (such as
letters); and “effects” (such as automobiles). See generally 1 Wayne R.
LaFave, Search and Seizure § 2.1(a), at 563–76 (5th ed. 2012).
This conception of the Fourth Amendment changed in 1967 when
the U.S. Supreme Court decided Katz v. United States. 389 U.S. 347,
88 S. Ct. 507, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576 (1967). In Katz, the Court found that
the Fourth Amendment protects “people, not places.” Id. at 350–52, 88
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S. Ct. 507. That is, “[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public,
even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment
protection. . . . [b]ut what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an
area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.” Id. at
351, 88 S. Ct. 507. The Court thus defined a search as that which invades an individual’s “reasonable expectation of privacy.” Id. at 360,
88 S. Ct. 507 (Harlan, J., concurring). The following sections examine
the nature of this “reasonable expectation of privacy” analysis as well
as the continued vitality of the “constitutionally protected area.” See 1
LaFave, supra, § 2.1, at 562–96.
1.1 DEFINING “SEARCH” POST-KATZ: THE “REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF
PRIVACY”
The concurring opinion in Katz, which has since come to be accepted as the Katz test, explained that the Fourth Amendment extends
search and seizure protections to all situations in which a defendant has
a “reasonable expectation of privacy.” Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 360, 88 S. Ct. 507, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring); see 1 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 2.1, at 562–96 (5th
ed. 2012). A reasonable expectation of privacy is measured by a twofold analysis. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361, 88 S. Ct. 507 (Harlan, J., concurring). First, a person must have “exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy.” Id. For example, a person has no expectation of privacy where illegal business is openly conducted. State v. Clark, 129
Wn.2d 211, 226, 916 P.2d 384 (1996); State v. Hastings, 119 Wn.2d
229, 232, 830 P.2d 658 (1992). Second, the individual’s expectation
must be “one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”
Katz, 389 U.S. at 361, 88 S. Ct. 507 (Harlan, J., concurring); see also
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31, 121 S. Ct. 2038, 150 L. Ed. 2d
94 (2001); State v. Carter, 151 Wn.2d 118, 127, 85 P.3d 887 (2004);
State v. Young, 123 Wn.2d 173, 189, 867 P.2d 593 (1994). This “legitimate” expectation of privacy “must have a source outside of the Fourth
Amendment, either by reference to concepts of real or personal property law or to understandings that are recognized and permitted by society.” Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143–44 n.12, 99 S. Ct. 421, 58 L.
Ed. 2d 387 (1978).
Similarly, article I, section 7 extends search and seizure protections to one’s “private affairs” and home. Const. art I, § 7. The focus is
on “those privacy interests which citizens of this state have held, and
should be entitled to hold, safe from governmental trespass absent a warrant.” State v. Rankin, 151 Wn.2d 689, 695, 92 P.3d 202 (2004) (quoting
State v. Myrick, 102 Wn.2d 506, 511, 688 P.2d 151 (1984)). In the re-

2013]

Chapter 1: Triggering Article I, Section 7

1585

mainder of this section, we discuss the protection of a person’s “private
affairs” under article I, section 7 and the reasonable expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment, as both have been applied to the
use of sensory-enhancing devices and techniques such as canine sniffs,
aerial surveillance, GPS trackers, and recording devices.
In applying article I, section 7, courts engage in a case-by-case
analysis concerning the use of sensory-enhancing techniques in the
course of police investigations. For example, whether a canine sniff
constitutes a search remains an unanswered question in Washington.
State v. Neth, 165 Wn.2d 177, 181, 196 P.3d 658 (2008). Specifically,
Washington courts have rejected a blanket rule that canine sniffs are
not searches, focusing instead on the intrusiveness of the sniff and the
individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy. State v. Boyce, 44 Wn.
App. 724, 730, 723 P.2d 28 (1986); see also State v. Hartzell, 156 Wn.
App. 918, 929–30, 237 P.3d 928 (2010) (dog sniff of exterior of car
door is not a search); State v. Stanphill, 53 Wn. App. 623, 631, 769
P.2d 861 (1989) (dog sniff of package at post office is not a search).
Furthermore, under article I, section 7, aerial surveillance at certain altitudes without the aid of enhancement devices does not constitute a search. State v. Cord, 103 Wn.2d 361, 365, 693 P.2d 81 (1985)
(aerial surveillance of defendant’s property at an altitude of 3,400 feet
without the aid of visual enhancement devices does not constitute a
search); Myrick, 102 Wn.2d at 514, 688 P.2d 151 (observation of defendant’s marijuana plants at an altitude of 1,500 feet with the unaided
eye is not a search); State v. Wilson, 97 Wn. App. 578, 581, 988 P.2d
463 (1999) (“Aerial surveillance is not a search where the contraband is
identifiable with the unaided eye, from a lawful vantage point, and
from a nonintrusive altitude.”); 1 LaFave, supra, § 2.3, at 712–803.
Regarding GPS devices, a search occurs when the device is installed
on an individual’s vehicle. State v. Jackson, 150 Wn.2d 251, 264, 76
P.3d 217, 224 (2003). However, the question remains whether GPS
tracking through means other than physical installation of a tracking
device constitutes a search.
Although it is not a violation of article I, section 7 to record a
conversation when a party consents, Clark, 129 Wn.2d at 221; State v.
Pulido, 68 Wn. App. 59, 63, 841 P.2d 1251 (1992), it is unlawful to
record any “[p]rivate communication transmitted by telephone, telegraph, radio, or other device between two or more individuals . . . without first obtaining the consent of all the participants in the communication.” RCW 9.73.030(1)(a) (emphasis added). An individual has “consented” to the recording of electronic communications, however, if the
individual has knowledge that the communications will be recorded.
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State v. Townsend, 147 Wn.2d 666, 676, 57 P.3d 255 (2002) (defendant
was deemed to have consented to the recording of the communications
because he constructively knew that his attempts to arrange sexual encounters with a minor over an Internet instant messaging service were
automatically recorded by the receiving computer); see also In re Marriage of Farr, 87 Wn. App. 177, 184, 940 P.2d 679 (1997) (because an
answering machine’s only purpose is to record messages, a defendant
who knowingly left messages on the answering machine has implicitly
consented to the recording and has no reasonable expectation of privacy as to the recording); State v. Hinton, 169 Wn. App. 28, 280 P.3d
476 (2012), review granted, 175 Wn.2d 1022, 291 P.3d 253 (2012)
(text messages sent to and received by another individual’s phone are
not constitutionally protected). Lastly, although an individual does not
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in a conversation with a police
officer recorded on a dashboard camera during a traffic stop, RCW
9.73.090 nevertheless requires that the officer inform the individual, on
camera, that the conversation is being recorded. Lewis v. State, Dep’t of
Licensing, 157 Wn.2d 446, 473, 139 P.3d 1078 (2006).
Under the Fourth Amendment, a canine sniff does not normally
constitute a “search” because “any interest in possessing contraband
cannot be deemed ‘legitimate,’ and thus, governmental conduct that
only reveals the possession of contraband ‘compromises no legitimate
privacy interest.’” Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409, 125 S. Ct.
834, 160 L. Ed. 2d 842 (2005) (quoting United States v. Jacobsen, 466
U.S. 109, 123, 104 S. Ct. 1652, 80 L. Ed. 2d 85 (1984)); Florida v.
Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 185 L. Ed. 2d 495 (2013). For a discussion
of the use of canine sniffs and probable cause, see Florida v. Harris,
133 S. Ct. 1050, 185 L. Ed. 2d 61 (2013); see also infra § 2.4(b).
Also, under the Fourth Amendment, aerial surveillance is not precluded merely because precautions are taken against ground surveillance. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213, 106 S. Ct. 1809, 90 L.
Ed. 2d 210 (1986) (aerial surveillance of marijuana growing in a fenced
backyard does not implicate Fourth Amendment because officer’s observations were merely from a public vantage point); see also Florida
v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 450, 109 S. Ct. 693, 102 L. Ed. 2d 835 (1989)
(surveillance of a residential backyard by a helicopter is not a search).
However, if highly sophisticated equipment is used in conducting the
aerial surveillance, the Fourth Amendment may be implicated. Dow
Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 238, 106 S. Ct. 1819, 90 L.
Ed. 2d 226 (1986).
There is also no legitimate expectation of privacy under the
Fourth Amendment when one party consents to the recording of a con-
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versation. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 726, 104 S. Ct. 3296,
82 L. Ed. 2d 530 (1984); see 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(c) (“It shall not be
unlawful . . . for a person acting under color of law to intercept a wire,
oral, or electronic communication, where such person is a party to the
communication or one of the parties to the communication has given
prior consent to such interception.” (emphasis added)). Therefore, a
defendant who utilized a telephone answering service whereby both he
and the caller were aware that a third party was taking messages had no
reasonable expectation of privacy in the recorded message, and thus, no
search occurred when the records were subsequently subpoenaed. Smith
v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740, 99 S. Ct. 2577, 61 L. Ed. 2d 220
(1979).
In 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court clarified the rule in Katz as adding to, not substituting for, the common-law trespassory test that predated Katz. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 952, 181 L. Ed. 2d
911 (2012). In Jones, the police attached a GPS device to the defendant’s vehicle without a warrant and tracked his movements for twentyeight days. Id. at 948, 181 L. Ed. 2d 911. Without addressing the defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy, the Court found that an
improper “search” occurred because, in attaching the GPS device to the
vehicle, the police had committed a common-law trespass. Id. at 952,
181 L. Ed. 2d 911. This trespass, combined with an attempt to find
something or obtain information, constituted a search. Id. at 951 n.5,
181 L. Ed. 2d 911. Accordingly, behavior possibly constituting a search
is analyzed under either the Katz “reasonable expectation of privacy”
test or the common-law trespass test resurrected in Jones.
1.2 DEFINING “SEARCH” POST-KATZ: “CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED
AREAS”
Although the concept of “constitutionally protected areas” does
not “serve as a talismanic solution to every Fourth Amendment problem,” Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 n.9, 88 S. Ct. 507, 19 L.
Ed. 2d 576 (1967), the concept retains considerable clout. The U.S. Supreme Court has referred to “constitutionally protected areas” since
Katz and has given special deference to the areas specifically enumerated within the Fourth Amendment. Because they are specifically enumerated in both article I, section 7 and the Fourth Amendment, houses
and homes can be understood as such constitutionally protected areas.
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1.3 SPECIFIC APPLICATIONS OF POST-KATZ ANALYSIS
1.3(a) Residential Premises
Article I, section 7 of the Washington constitution states that no
person shall have “his home invaded.” Const. art. I, § 7. The Washington State Supreme Court has held that article I, section 7 is more protective of the home than is the Fourth Amendment. State v. Groom, 133
Wn.2d 679, 685, 947 P.2d 240 (1997).
Similarly, the Fourth Amendment provides that “[t]he right of the
people to be secure in their . . . houses . . . shall not be violated.” U.S.
Const. amend. IV. The core of the Fourth Amendment is “the right of a
man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable
government intrusion.” Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511,
81 S. Ct. 679, 5 L. Ed. 2d 734 (1961); see also Kyllo v. United States,
533 U.S. 27, 34, 121 S. Ct. 2038, 150 L. Ed. 2d 94 (2001) (“[I]n the
case of the search of the interior of homes—the prototypical and hence
most commonly litigated area of protected privacy—there is a ready
criterion, with roots deep in the common law, of the minimal expectation of privacy that exists, and that is acknowledged to be reasonable.”). Accordingly, the Fourth Amendment prohibits police from making a warrantless and nonconsensual entry into a suspect’s home, absent exigent circumstances, to effect a routine felony arrest. Payton v.
New York, 445 U.S. 573, 576, 100 S. Ct. 1371, 63 L. Ed. 2d 639
(1980). In terms that apply equally to seizures of property and seizures
of persons, courts have drawn the Fourth Amendment line at the entrance to the house. Silverman, 365 U.S. at 511, 81 S. Ct. 679.
A search of a home can occur even when government officers do
not personally enter the home. State v. Young, 123 Wn.2d 173, 186,
867 P.2d 593 (1994) (“The constitutional line of privacy that encircles
the home is more than just a barrier to physical penetration.”). Specifically, a search can occur when the “[g]overnment uses a device that is
not in general public use, to explore details of the home that would previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion.” Kyllo, 533
U.S. at 40, 121 S. Ct. 2038 (search occurred when thermal imaging device monitored a home from a public street). Similarly, a search occurs
when the government monitors an electronic device to determine
whether a particular article or person is within an individual’s home at
a particular time. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714–15, 104 S.
Ct. 3296, 82 L. Ed. 2d 530 (1984); see also Clinton v. Virginia, 377
U.S. 158, 158, 84 S. Ct. 1186, 12 L. Ed. 2d 213 (1964) (Clark, J., concurring) (the Fourth Amendment is implicated when a microphone used
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by police officers “penetrate[s]” the petitioner’s premises in a manner
sufficient to constitute trespass).
In Washington, the use of infrared surveillance of a home constitutes a search under both article I, section 7 and the Fourth Amendment. Young, 123 Wn.2d at 186, 867 P.2d 593. In contrast, using a
flashlight to look through a window at night is no more invasive than
using natural eyesight to look through a window in daylight, and it is
therefore not a search. State v. Rose, 128 Wn.2d 388, 400, 909 P.2d
280 (1996).
The privacy interest in a home is not confined to houses, but it extends to other types of residences. See, e.g., Stoner v. California, 376
U.S. 483, 490, 84 S. Ct. 889, 11 L. Ed. 2d 856 (1964) (hotel rooms);
State v. Murray, 84 Wn.2d 527, 534, 527 P.2d 1303 (1974) (apartments); State v. Davis, 86 Wn. App. 414, 419, 937 P.2d 1110 (1997)
(motel rooms); State v. Ramirez, 49 Wn. App. 814, 818, 746 P.2d 344
(1987) (hotel rooms). However, there is a reduced expectation of privacy in motor vehicles that are readily mobile but can also be used for
sleeping. California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 389, 105 S. Ct. 2066, 85
L. Ed. 2d 406 (1985) (mobile motor home). Additionally, there is a
reduced privacy interest when several persons or families occupy
premises in common rather than individually, such as sharing common living quarters but maintaining separate bedrooms. State v. Alexander, 41 Wn. App. 152, 155–56, 704 P.2d 618 (1985).
Despite the heightened protection of the home, objects and activities that are exposed to the “plain view” of outsiders are not protected
because no intention to keep them private has been exhibited. State v.
Clark, 129 Wn.2d 211, 229–30, 916 P.2d 384 (1996). Accordingly, a
person may relinquish his or her privacy interest in an activity or
object in the home by making the activity or object observable to
persons outside. State v. Cardenas, 146 Wn.2d 400, 408, 47 P.3d
127 (2002). For example, a privacy expectation in an individual’s
home is not reasonable when the individual positions himself in front
of a window with the lights on and drapes open. State v. Drumhiller, 36
Wn. App. 592, 595, 675 P.2d 631 (1984). In contrast, drawing the curtains demonstrates a reasonable expectation of privacy, and the fact that
an individual failed to completely shut the curtains does not diminish
the reasonableness of that expectation. State v. Jordan, 29 Wn. App.
924, 927, 631 P.2d 989 (1981). Under this “open view” doctrine, no
search has occurred when an officer is lawfully present at a vantage
point and able to detect something by utilization of one or more of his
senses. State v. Ross, 141 Wn.2d 304, 313, 4 P.3d 130 (2000).
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A person may waive his or her right to privacy by willingly admitting a visitor; for example, waiver may occur where a person admits an
undercover police officer into the premises to conduct an illegal transaction. See State v. Carter, 127 Wn.2d 836, 848, 904 P.2d 290 (1995)
(defendant waived any right to privacy by willingly admitting plainclothes officer into a motel room to conduct a drug transaction); see
also State v. Dalton, 43 Wn. App. 279, 284–85, 716 P.2d 940 (1986)
(student invited officer into college dormitory to conduct an illegal
drug transaction; warrantless entry upheld as nonintrusive since police
were invited in and took nothing except what would have been taken by
a willing purchaser). A person does not, however, relinquish the privacy interest in the home by opening the door in response to a police officer’s knock. State v. Holeman, 103 Wn.2d 426, 429, 693 P.2d 89
(1985). For a discussion of the distinction between the plain view doctrine and the open view doctrine, see infra § 5.5.
Courts in some jurisdictions have held that common hallways of
multiple-dwelling buildings that are accessible to the public are not
protected areas. See, e.g., United States v. Acosta, 965 F.2d 1248,
1252–53 (3d Cir. 1992); 1 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure §
2.3(b), at 739–48 (5th ed. 2012). For example, even if a building is secure and not accessible to the public, some courts have found no reasonable expectation of privacy in the common hallways. See, e.g.,
United States v. Nohara, 3 F.3d 1239, 1240, 1242 (9th Cir. 1993)
(apartment dweller of “high security” apartment building has no reasonable expectation of privacy in the common areas of the building—
search is valid even though officer trespassed). See generally 1 LaFave,
supra, § 2.3(b), at 739–48. In addition, the Fourth Amendment is triggered when a housing inspector enters to conduct an administrative
search. See Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534, 87 S. Ct. 1727,
18 L. Ed. 2d 930 (1967); City of Seattle v. McCready, 124 Wn.2d 300,
309, 877 P.2d 686 (1994). Administrative searches are discussed infra
§ 2.9(a).
1.3(b) The Curtilage and Adjoining Lands
The “curtilage” of residential premises consists of “all buildings
in close proximity to a dwelling, which are continually used for carrying on domestic employment; or such place as is necessary and convenient to a dwelling, and is habitually used for family purposes.” United
States v. Potts, 297 F.2d 68, 69 (6th Cir. 1961). The curtilage has been
considered “part of [the] home itself for Fourth Amendment purposes,”
and thus receives Fourth Amendment protections. Oliver v. United
States, 466 U.S. 170, 180, 104 S. Ct. 1735, 80 L. Ed. 2d 214 (1984).
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The U.S. Supreme Court has identified four factors that should be
reviewed in determining the extent of a residence’s curtilage:
the proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to the home,
whether the area is included within an enclosure surrounding the
home, the nature of the uses to which the area is put, and the steps
taken by the resident to protect the area from observation by people passing by.

United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 301, 107 S. Ct. 1134, 94 L.
Ed. 2d 326 (1987). The Dunn Court expressly declined to adopt a
“bright-line” rule that the curtilage extends no farther than the
nearest fence surrounding a fenced house. Id. at 301 n.4, 107 S. Ct.
1134. Rather, a court is to use the factors identified above as a tool
in determining whether the area in question is so intimately tied to
the home as to fall within “the home’s ‘umbrella’ of Fourth
Amendment protection.” Id. at 301, 107 S. Ct. 1134; see, e.g., United
States v. Struckman, 603 F.3d 731, 739 (9th Cir. 2010) (small, enclosed
yard adjacent to a home in a residential neighborhood is “clearly
marked” area “to which the activity of home life extends,” and therefore within the curtilage); United States v. Davis, 530 F.3d 1069, 1079–
80 (9th Cir. 2008) (workshop not within the curtilage when nearly 200
feet from the house, not shielded from view, set apart from house by a
fence, and from which no domestic activity was observed); State v.
Niedergang, 43 Wn. App. 656, 662, 719 P.2d 576 (1986) (car parked
in cul-de-sac is not within curtilage).
The curtilage also includes lands adjacent to a dwelling in which
there is a reasonable expectation of privacy. Wattenburg v. United
States, 388 F.2d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 1968) (reasonable expectation of
privacy extends to backyard of lodge); see also Oliver, 466 U.S. at
178, 104 S. Ct. 1735, (individual may have legitimate expectation of
privacy in “area immediately surrounding the home”); 1 Wayne R.
LaFave, Search and Seizure § 2.3(f), at 780–92 (5th ed. 2012).
Under Washington law, there is no reasonable expectation of
privacy in areas of a home’s curtilage impliedly open to the public.
State v. Smith, 118 Wn. App. 480, 484–85, 93 P.3d 877 (2003). An
open curtilage is an area “apparently open to the public, such as the
driveway, the walkway, or any access route leading to the residence.” State v. Dodson, 110 Wn. App. 112, 123, 39 P.3d 324
(2002). A police officer with legitimate business, when acting in the
same manner as a reasonably respectful citizen, may lawfully enter
these open curtilage areas. State v. Ross, 141 Wn.2d 304, 312, 4
P.3d 130 (2000); see also State v. Rose, 128 Wn.2d 388, 392, 909
P.2d 280 (1996) (officer entitled to walk up onto a porch, which was
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the usual access route to the house); State v. Solberg, 122 Wn.2d
688, 698–99, 861 P.2d 460 (1993) (unenclosed front porch held to be
a public place, not a constitutionally protected area); State v. Gave, 77
Wn. App. 333, 337, 890 P.2d 1088 (1995) (driveway, walkway, or
access routes leading to residence or to porch of residence are all areas of “curtilage” impliedly open to the public); State v. Graffius, 74
Wn. App. 23, 24, 871 P.2d 1115 (1994) (driveway commonly used for
guests and members of the public not protected). Upon entering these
areas in the same manner as a reasonably respectful citizen, Ross,
141 Wn.2d at 312, 4 P.3d 130, the officer is free to use his or her
senses, State v. Thompson, 151 Wn.2d 793, 807, 92 P.3d 228 (2004).
When a police officer enters a property through an impliedly open
curtilage area and discovers evidence, a court will consider a combination of factors to analyze the admissibility of evidence, including
whether the officer (1) spied into the residence; (2) acted secretly; (3)
acted after dark; (4) used the most direct access route; (5) tried to contact the resident; (6) created an artificial vantage point; or (7) made the
discovery accidentally. State v. Myers, 117 Wn.2d 332, 345, 815 P.2d
761 (1991) (citing State v. Seagull, 95 Wn.2d 898, 905, 632 P.2d 44
(1981)); see State v. Thompson, 151 Wn.2d 793, 807, 92 P.3d 228
(2004) (quoting Seagull, 95 Wn.2d at 901, 632 P.2d 44 (“‘The mere
observation of that which is there to be seen does not necessarily constitute a search.’”)); Ross, 141 Wn.2d at 312, 4 P.3d 130 (reasonably
respectful citizen rule); State v. Boethin, 126 Wn. App. 695, 700, 109
P.3d 461 (2005) (evidence suppressed when, in traversing from the
stairs to the garage and putting their noses close to the garage door, officers deviated substantially from what a reasonably respectful citizen
would have done); State v. Jesson, 142 Wn. App. 852, 859, 177 P.3d
139 (2008) (“While the ‘No Trespassing’ signs alone are not sufficient
to remove implied consent to the access of the property via the driveway, the closed gate, the primitive road, the secluded location of the
home in addition to the posted signs are sufficient.”); State v. Mierz, 72
Wn. App. 783, 791, 866 P.2d 65 (1994), aff’d, 127 Wn.2d 460, 901
P.2d 286 (1995) (warrantless intrusion into a backyard, which was
enclosed by a six-foot fence and padlocked gate, violated the Fourth
Amendment).
1.3(c) “Open Fields”
The expectation of privacy in structures located and viewed from
outside the curtilage, but on private property, is the same as the expectation of privacy in those structures viewed from public places. United
States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 304, 107 S. Ct. 1134, 94 L. Ed. 2d 326
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(1987). Therefore, police officers standing in an open field could look
into a barn, even if the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the barn. Id.; see also 1 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure
§ 2.4(a)–(b), at 804–32 (5th ed. 2012). Under this “open fields” doctrine, an expectation of privacy in open fields is unreasonable. Oliver v.
United States, 466 U.S. 170, 179, 104 S. Ct. 1735, 80 L. Ed. 2d 214
(1984) (“[O]pen fields do not provide the setting for those intimate activities that the Amendment is intended to shelter from government interference or surveillance.”).
Moreover, a person in possession of land falling within the purview of the open fields doctrine cannot create a legitimate expectation
of privacy in the area by taking steps to conceal activities such as posting “no trespassing” signs or erecting fences around the secluded areas.
Id. at 182, 104 S. Ct. 1735 (issue was whether “government’s intrusion
infringes upon the personal and societal values protected by the Fourth
Amendment”); State v. Dodson, 110 Wn. App. 112, 123, 39 P.3d 324
(2002) (presence of “no trespassing” signs is not dispositive of the
homeowner’s reasonable expectation of privacy). In addition, the fact
that police commit a common law trespass while observing an object or
activity in an open field does not render the intrusion a search under the
federal constitution. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 183, 104 S. Ct. 1735. Thus, an
intrusion may be onto the land itself as well as by aerial surveillance,
and yet it still not be considered a search. See id.
Under article I, section 7, the relevant inquiry is not whether the
observed object was in a “protected place” or whether the defendant
had a legitimate and subjective expectation of privacy in the observed
location, but rather whether “the State unreasonably intruded into the
defendant’s ‘private affairs.’” State v. Myrick, 102 Wn.2d 506, 510,
688 P.2d 151 (1984); State v. Wilson, 97 Wn. App. 578, 581, 988 P.2d
463 (1999). The nature of the property may be a factor in determining
what constitutes “private affairs,” but the fact that the location of the
search is an open field is not conclusive. Myrick, 102 Wn.2d at 513,
688 P.2d 151.
1.3(d) Business and Commercial Premises
The Fourth Amendment privacy protections extend to most business and commercial premises. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476
U.S. 227, 235, 106 S. Ct. 1819, 90 L. Ed. 2d 226 (1986); Marshall v.
Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 311, 98 S. Ct. 1816, 56 L. Ed. 2d 305
(1978) (OSHA inspector’s entry into the nonpublic working areas of
electrical and plumbing business constituted a search). Some Washington courts have interpreted article I, section 7 to be coextensive with
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the Fourth Amendment in this context. See Seymour v. Wash. State
Dep’t of Health, Dental Quality Assur. Comm’n, 152 Wn. App. 156,
160, 216 P.3d 1039 (2009); Centimark Corp. v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 129 Wn. App. 368, 375, 119 P.3d 865 (2005). The expectation of
privacy in commercial properties, however, is less than in the home.
New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 699, 107 S. Ct. 2636, 96 L. Ed. 2d
601 (1987). As a result, unlike searches of private homes, warrantless
administrative searches of commercial property may be authorized by
the Legislature without violating the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 702,
107 S. Ct. 2636. The Fourth Amendment could be violated, however, if
the Legislature, in authorizing these warrantless administrative searches, failed to make rules governing the inspection procedure. Donovan v.
Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 599, 101 S. Ct. 2534, 69 L. Ed. 2d 262 (1981).
Courts often consider certain factors in determining whether warrantless administrative searches are allowed. One factor considered is
whether a business, such as the liquor or firearms business, has historically been extensively regulated. See, e.g., Burger, 482 U.S. at 707, 107
S. Ct. 2636 (automobile junkyards have historically been “closely regulated”). Due to such long histories of government oversight in these
industries, businesses do not enjoy a reasonable expectation of privacy.
Barlow’s, 436 U.S. at 313, 98 S. Ct. 1816 (distinguishing the liquor and
firearms industries from ordinary businesses on the basis of “a long
tradition of close government supervision”).
Whether a place is a personal residence or a business may also affect whether it constitutes curtilage or an open field. Dow Chem. Co.,
476 U.S. at 235, 106 S. Ct. 1819 (aerial photographs from navigable
airspace of open areas of an industrial plant complex with numerous
structures spread over 2,000 acres not a search because area not “curtilage”). Thus, the warrantless entry into the public lobby of a motel or
restaurant for the purpose of serving an administrative subpoena is
permitted although the “administrative subpoena itself [does] not authorize either entry or inspection of [the] premises.” Donovan v. Lone
Steer, Inc., 464 U.S. 408, 413–14, 104 S. Ct. 769, 78 L. Ed. 2d 567
(1984) (an employer may not insist on a warrant as a condition precedent to a valid administrative subpoena unless government inspectors
seek nonconsensual entry into “areas not open to the public”).
Courts have generally upheld police investigative entries into bus
terminals, pool halls, bars, restaurants, and general stores such as furniture stores and variety stores. 1 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure
§ 2.4(b), at 816–32 (5th ed. 2012). But the “‘implied invitation for customers to come in’ . . . extends only to those times when the premises
are . . . ‘open to the public’; the mere fact that certain premises are
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open to the public at certain times does not justify entry by the police
on other occasions.” Id.
Although an individual enjoys a reasonable expectation of privacy
in his or her commercial premises, the warrant requirements for administrative searches of commercial premises may differ from those for
searches in general. See infra § 6.4(b); see also 1 LaFave, supra, §
2.4(b), at 816–32.
1.3(e) Automobiles and Other Motor Vehicles
Under article I, section 7, the protection against governmental intrusion into one’s “private affairs” includes automobiles and their contents. State v. Parker, 139 Wn.2d 486, 494, 987 P.2d 73 (1999). Passengers in a vehicle also have a constitutionally protected privacy interest that does not diminish merely by virtue of entering a vehicle. Id.
This privacy interest is independent of the driver’s privacy interest. Id.
Thus, even when a driver is under arrest, “where officers do not have
articulable suspicion that an individual is armed or dangerous and have
nothing to independently connect such person to illegal activity,” a
search of a passenger in an automobile is invalid. Id. at 498, 987 P.2d
73.
Similarly, under the Fourth Amendment, automobiles constitute
“effects.” United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 12, 97 S. Ct. 2476, 53
L. Ed. 2d 538 (1977), overruled on other grounds by California v.
Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 111 S. Ct. 1982, 114 L. Ed. 2d 619 (1991). As
a result, constitutional protections against unreasonable searches apply
to automobiles and other motor vehicles. California v. Carney, 471
U.S. 386, 390, 105 S. Ct. 2066, 85 L. Ed. 2d 406 (1985); New York v.
Class, 475 U.S. 106, 112, 106 S. Ct. 960, 89 L. Ed. 2d 81 (1986) (“A
citizen does not surrender all the protections of the Fourth Amendment
by entering an automobile.”). Passengers and drivers in automobiles,
however, have a reduced expectation of privacy. Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 303, 119 S. Ct. 1297, 143 L. Ed. 2d 408 (1999); see
also Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 424, 124 S. Ct. 885, 157 L. Ed. 2d
843 (2004).
This reduced expectation of privacy derives from the pervasive
schemes of regulation and ready mobility unique to vehicles. See Carney, 471 U.S. at 392, 105 S. Ct. 2066. As a result, when a vehicle is
used as a home, its owner has a lesser expectation of privacy when that
vehicle is readily, mobile, and licensed to operate on public streets. Id.
at 393, 105 S. Ct. 2066 (mobile home in public lot was treated as a vehicle); cf. State v. Johnson, 128 Wn.2d 431, 449, 909 P.2d 293 (1996)
(lessened privacy interest for sleeper compartment of a tractor-trailer
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rig). Additionally, courts have held that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in things that are located on a vehicle’s exterior, in plain
view of passersby. State v. McKinney, 148 Wn.2d 20, 32, 60 P.3d 46
(2002) (computerized check of defendant’s license plate and driving
record did not constitute a search under article I, section 7); see also
United States v. Diaz-Castaneda, 494 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007) (no
search under Fourth Amendment).
Because closed containers are neither regulated nor intended to
facilitate mobility, the expectation of privacy in a closed container
within a vehicle is not automatically reduced. Chadwick, 433 U.S. at
13, 97 S. Ct. 2476. Nevertheless, a warrantless search of a container
does not violate the Fourth Amendment if officers have probable cause
to believe that the container is concealing contraband. Houghton, 526
U.S. at 300, 119 S. Ct. 1297. Under article I, section 7, additional privacy expectations result from locking the container. State v. Stroud,
106 Wn.2d 144, 152, 720 P.2d 436 (1986), overruled on other grounds
by State v. Valdez, 167 Wn.2d 761, 777, 224 P.3d 751 (2009).
1.3(f) Personal Characteristics
The Fourth Amendment provides no protection for what “a person
knowingly exposes to the public.” Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,
351, 88 S. Ct. 507, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576 (1967). Personal characteristics
such as facial features and voice tone are continually exposed to the
public and therefore not protected under the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 14, 93 S. Ct. 764, 35 L. Ed. 2d 67
(1973) (“No person can have a reasonable expectation that others will
not know the sound of his voice any more than he can reasonably expect that his face will be a mystery to the world.”). Like speech, handwriting is also often exposed to the public. Accordingly, an individual
has no more privacy in his handwriting than in the sound of his voice.
United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19, 21, 93 S. Ct. 774, 35 L. Ed. 2d 99
(1973). Article I, section 7 has been interpreted using this same analysis. In re Juveniles A, B, C, D, E, 121 Wn.2d 80, 91 n.6, 847 P.2d 455
(1993); see also Bedford v. Sugarman, 112 Wn.2d 500, 512, 772 P.2d
486 (1989) (no privacy with regard to one’s personality, appearance,
and behavior, which would normally be exposed in public).
In contrast to the seizure of facial characteristics, voice exemplars,
and handwriting samples, the taking of blood, urine, or DNA samples is
considered a search within the meaning of both the Fourth Amendment
and article I, section 7. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67,
76, 121 S. Ct. 1281, 149 L. Ed. 2d 205 (2001) (urine samples);
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767, 86 S. Ct. 1826, 16 L. Ed.
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2d 908 (1966) (blood samples); State v. Surge, 122 Wn. App. 448, 454,
94 P.3d 345 (2004), aff’d, 160 Wn.2d 65, 74, 156 P.3d 208 (2007)
(DNA samples); State v. Baldwin, 109 Wn. App. 516, 523, 37 P.3d
1220 (2001) (breath and blood sample); Robinson v. City of Seattle, 102
Wn. App. 795, 818–19, 10 P.3d 452 (2000) (urine samples).
In Washington, mandatory blood testing, although considered a
search, may still not violate article I, section 7 or the Fourth Amendment when testing an individual with a diminished privacy interest. See
State v. Meacham, 93 Wn.2d 735, 739, 612 P.2d 795 (1980) (putative
fathers); In re Juveniles A, B, C, D, E, 121 Wn.2d at 93–94, 847 P.2d
455 (sexual offenders); State v. Kalakosky, 121 Wn.2d 525, 535–36,
852 P.2d 1064 (1993) (suspected sexual offenders); Surge, 160 Wn.2d
at 74, 156 P.3d 208 (convicted felons). These searches may be justified
under the special needs doctrine. See infra § 6.2.
An individual may also unknowingly consent to a seizure of his or
her bodily fluids. For example, under RCW 46.20.308, any person who
operates a vehicle is deemed to have consented to a blood alcohol test.
See Baldwin, 109 Wn. App. at 525 (upholding constitutionality of implied consent statute). Further, a person retains no privacy interest in
his saliva when he licks an envelope and places it in the mail. State v.
Athan, 160 Wn.2d 354, 367, 158 P.3d 27 (2007).
1.3(g) Personal Effects and Papers
The Fourth Amendment expressly protects the right of privacy in
“papers . . . and effects.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. Although it is not explicitly stated, article I, section 7 protects personal effects in so far as
they constitute “private affairs.” Const. art. I, § 7. With regard to a person’s banking and home telephone records, garbage, and motel registry
information, article I, section 7’s protection is broader than the protection provided by the Fourth Amendment.
Under the Washington constitution, a person’s banking records
constitute “private affairs” that are protected from warrantless searches.
State v. Miles, 160 Wn.2d 236, 244, 156 P.3d 864 (2007). In accordance with the plain view doctrine, however, there may be no expectation of privacy when a person exposes evidence of bank transactions to
a third party, such as an insurance company. State v. Farmer, 80 Wn.
App. 795, 801, 911 P.2d 1030 (1996). Under the Fourth Amendment,
there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in a person’s bank records, checks, deposit slips, and other records relating to bank accounts.
United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442, 96 S. Ct. 1619, 48 L. Ed. 71
(1976).
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With regard to a telephone user’s privacy interests, the Washington constitution again provides broader protection than the U.S. Constitution. State v. Gunwall, 106 Wn.2d 54, 69, 720 P.2d 808 (1986). Under the U.S. Constitution, individuals using their home telephones have
no Fourth Amendment privacy interest in the phone numbers dialed.
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745–46, 99 S. Ct. 2577, 61 L. Ed. 2d
220 (1979). In State v. Gunwall, however, the Washington Supreme
Court declined to follow Smith v. Maryland, finding that article I, section 7 was violated when the police used a pen register—a device that
records or decodes electronic impulses transmitted on a home telephone
line, see RCW 9.73.260(1)(d), without lawful authority to make a record of the local and long distance telephone numbers dialed on the customer’s telephone. 106 Wn.2d at 68–69, 720 P.2d 808. An individual
does not, however, have a privacy interest in text messages sent to and
received by another person and stored on that person’s phone. State v.
Hinton, 169 Wn. App. 28, 43, 280 P.3d 476 (2012), review granted,
175 Wn.2d 1022, 291 P.3d 253 (2012).
Likewise, although the U.S. Constitution does not protect an expectation of privacy in one’s trash after it has been left outside to be
picked up, California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 43, 108 S. Ct. 1625,
100 L. Ed. 2d 30 (1988), the Washington constitution does, State v. Boland, 115 Wn.2d 571, 578, 800 P.2d 1112 (1990). This expectation of
privacy, however, can be lost depending on the circumstances. For example, one court has found that there is no reasonable expectation of
privacy in garbage bags left in front of a neighboring abandoned house.
State v. Hepton, 113 Wn. App. 673, 679, 54 P.3d 233 (2002). Another
court has found no reasonable expectation of privacy in stolen goods
hidden in a community garbage receptacle. State v. Rodriguez, 65 Wn.
App. 409, 418, 828 P.2d 636 (1992). Another court, however, has
found that a person’s privacy right in his or her garbage “is not limited
by the location of the garbage or the act of placing the garbage in the
can.” State v. Sweeney, 125 Wn. App. 881, 887, 107 P.3d 110 (2005).
Article I, section 7 also protects information contained in a motel
registry, including information as to where an individual is located
within the motel, as a “private affair” that the police may not search
without an individualized suspicion. State v. Jorden, 160 Wn.2d 121,
130, 156 P.3d 893 (2007). Under the Fourth Amendment, however,
courts have found that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in
motel guest registration records. United States v. Cormier, 220 F.3d
1103, 1108 (9th Cir. 2000).
With regard to information contained on personal computers, the
Ninth Circuit has held that an individual has a legitimate expectation of
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privacy in a personal computer. United States v. Heckenkamp, 482 F.3d
1142, 1146 (9th Cir. 2007). This privacy interest diminishes, however,
when a person installs and uses file-sharing software, thereby exposing
his or her computer to other people. U.S. v. Ganoe, 538 F.3d 1117,
1127 (9th Cir. 2008). The Ninth Circuit has also found that the use of
pen registers for computers—which identified the “to” and “from” addresses for e-mail messages, the IP addresses of websites visited, and
the total data transmitted—did not implicate the Fourth Amendment.
U.S. v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 510, 511 (9th Cir. 2008). Analogizing
to both physical mail and the telephone information obtained in Smith
v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 99 S. Ct. 2577, by means of a pen register,
the court found dispositive the fact that the police only obtained addressing information and not the contents of the messages. Forrester,
512 F.3d at 510.
Under both the Fourth Amendment and article I, section 7, a
search does not occur when the police search property that was voluntarily abandoned. State v. Reynolds, 144 Wn.2d 282, 287–88, 27 P.3d
200 (2001) (no expectation of privacy in contents of jacket that was
abandoned during an arrest). Whether property has been abandoned
depends on an individual’s actions and intent, which can be inferred
from the circumstances. State v. Dugas, 109 Wn. App. 592, 595, 36
P.3d 577 (2001) (no abandonment when defendant asked police if he
could take off his jacket because he felt hot and then placed the jacket
on the hood of his car); see also State v. Kealey, 80 Wn. App. 162, 173,
907 P.2d 319 (1995) (lost or mislaid property is not considered abandoned). In Washington, abandonment does not occur when the property
is located in an area that retains privacy protections, even if the individual denies ownership of the property. State v. Evans, 159 Wn.2d
402, 413, 150 P.3d 105 (2007) (briefcase found in defendant’s car that
defendant denied owning was not abandoned property).
Lastly, both the Fourth Amendment and article I, section 7 protect
a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of first-class mail
and sealed packages. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 114, 104
S. Ct. 1652, 80 L. Ed. 2d 85 (1984); State v. Hinton, 169 Wn. App. 28,
43, 280 P.3d 476 (2012), review granted, 175 Wn.2d 1022, 291 P.3d
253 (2012). However, senders of mail have no reasonable expectation
of privacy prohibiting a canine sniff of the package or protecting their
names and addresses on the exterior of a package. State v. Stanphill, 53
Wn. App. 623, 627, 769 P.2d 861 (1989) (release of information at request of police regarding arrival of package did not unreasonably intrude into private affairs). Analogizing text messages to letters, at least
one Washington court has found that there is no privacy interest in
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one’s received and stored text messages. Hinton, 169 Wn. App. at 44,
280 P.3d 476; see infra § 5.23.
1.4 DEFINING SEIZURES OF THE PERSON
The definition of a seizure is comparatively the same under both
article I, section 7 and the Fourth Amendment. A seizure occurs when
an officer, by physical force or by show of authority, restrains an individual’s freedom of movement. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S.
544, 553, 100 S. Ct. 1870, 64 L. Ed. 2d 497 (1980). More specifically,
a seizure occurs when a police officer’s behavior would communicate
to a reasonable, innocent person that he or she is not free to ignore the
officer’s presence and walk away. Kaupp v. Texas, 538 U.S. 626, 629,
123 S. Ct. 1843, 155 L. Ed. 2d 814 (2003); United States v. Drayton,
536 U.S. 194, 201, 122 S. Ct. 2105, 153 L. Ed. 2d 242
(2002); United States v. Guzman–Padilla, 573 F.3d 865, 884 (9th
Cir. 2009); State v. O’Neill, 148 Wn.2d 564, 574, 62 P.3d 489
(2003). If the individual’s movement was already restricted by
something independent from police behavior—for example, the individual was a passenger on a bus and wanted to remain on the bus,
or the individual was at work and thus obligated to the employer—
the appropriate test is whether the individual felt free to terminate
the encounter and ignore the officer’s questions. Florida v. Bostick,
501 U.S. 429, 436, 111 S. Ct. 2382, 115 L. Ed. 2d 389 (1991); see also
I.N.S. v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 216, 104 S. Ct. 1758, 80 L. Ed. 2d 247
(1984) (finding no seizure of the workplace or of the individual workers when INS agents moved systematically through the factory inquiring about the workers’ citizenship while other INS agents were stationed at the exits).
Whether a seizure occurs depends on both the police officer’s
conduct as well as the setting in which that conduct occurs. Michigan v.
Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 573, 108 S. Ct. 1975, 100 L. Ed. 2d 565
(1988). Under federal law, an individual is not seized until he or she
acquiesces to an officer’s show of force. California v. Hodari D., 499
U.S. 621, 629, 111 S. Ct. 1547, 113 L. Ed. 2d 690 (1991). Rejecting
this subjective element of the test, the Washington Supreme Court has
held that the standard under article I, section 7 is a “purely objective”
one. State v. Young, 135 Wn.2d 498, 510, 957 P.2d 681 (1998). Police
behavior that could amount to a show of authority constituting a seizure
includes “the threatening presence of several officers, the display of a
weapon by an officer, some physical touching of the person of the citizen, or the use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance
with the officer’s request might be compelled.” Id. at 512, 957 P.2d 681
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(quoting Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554–55, 100 S. Ct. 1870). Accordingly, a person cannot avoid seizure by failing to yield to an officer’s show
of authority. State v. Patton, 167 Wn.2d 379, 388, 219 P.3d 651 (2009)
(citing Young, 135 Wn.2d 498, 957 P.2d 681).
An arrest occurs when a police officer “manifests an intent to take
a person into custody and actually seizes or detains such person.” Id. at
387, 219 P.3d 651. Not every seizure, however, is considered an arrest.
Brief, investigative detentions, often called Terry stops, do not constitute arrests, see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed.
2d 889 (1968), because they are limited in scope and duration. State v.
Acrey, 148 Wn.2d 738, 747, 64 P.3d 594 (2003) (citing State v. Williams, 102 Wn.2d 733, 740, 689 P.2d 1065 (1984)). For an in-depth
discussion of Terry stops, see infra § 4.5. For a discussion of the level
of proof needed to make seizures of the person, see infra §§ 2.1 (arrest)
and 2.9(b) (Terry stop).
Both article I, section 7 and the Fourth Amendment may be triggered when a person is detained in his or her own home. Michigan v.
Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 696, 101 S. Ct. 2587, 69 L. Ed. 2d 340 (1981);
State v. Holeman, 103 Wn.2d 426, 429, 693 P.2d 89 (1985). Absent
exigent circumstances, the police are prohibited from arresting individuals in their homes without authority of law, usually an arrest warrant.
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 100 S. Ct. 1371, 63 L. Ed. 2d 639
(1980); State v. Hatchie, 161 Wn.2d 390, 402, 166 P.3d 698 (2007);
Holeman, 103 Wn.2d at 429, 693 P.2d 89; see also supra § 1.3(a). “After the police obtain a valid warrant they have lawful authority for a
limited intrusion to enter a residence, execute the arrest, and then
promptly leave.” Hatchie, 161 Wn.2d at 402, 166 P.3d 698. In executing a valid search warrant at a home, it is also reasonable for an officer
to “briefly detain occupants of that residence, to insure officer safety
and an orderly completion of the search.” State v. King, 89 Wn.
App. 612, 618–19, 949 P.2d 856 (1998). Further, because there is a
lesser expectation of privacy, the police may arrest someone without
a warrant when the person voluntarily exits the home to speak to
officers on an unenclosed front porch. State v. Solberg, 122 Wn.2d
688, 696, 861 P.2d 460 (1993); see also infra § 4.2.
1.4(a) Consensual Encounters
Not every encounter with a police officer amounts to a seizure.
Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Ct. of Nev., Humboldt Cnty., 542 U.S. 177,
185–86, 124 S. Ct. 2451, 159 L. Ed. 2d 292 (2004). A consensual encounter with an officer does not trigger the Fourth Amendment,
even when the individual has been approached by an officer and is
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aware of the officer’s identity as an officer. United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 200–01, 122 S. Ct. 2105, 153 L. Ed. 2d 242
(2002) (citing Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497, 103 S. Ct. 1319,
75 L. Ed. 2d 229 (1983)); see also State v. Belanger, 36 Wn. App.
818, 820, 677 P.2d 781 (1984).
There is no clear definition of a consensual social contact; it lies
somewhere between a cordial greeting and a detention for investigative
purposes. State v. Harrington, 167 Wn.2d 656, 664, 222 P.3d 92
(2009). A common example of behavior constituting a consensual encounter rather than a seizure is when an officer asks for someone’s
identification. See Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 185–86, 124 S. Ct. 2451; see also
State v. O’Neill, 148 Wn.2d 564, 577, 62 P.3d 489 (2003); State v.
Hansen, 99 Wn. App. 575, 578, 994 P.2d 855 (2000). A request for
identification may constitute a seizure, however, when it follows a
“considerable display of authority.” State v. Carney, 142 Wn. App.
197, 202, 174 P.3d 142 (2007).
Under article I, section 7, a social contact can evolve into a seizure. Harrington, 167 Wn.2d at 665–66; 222 P.3d 92. For example, in
Harrington, the Washington State Supreme Court found that although
the interaction between the officer and defendant may have begun as a
social contact on the street, it evolved into a seizure when another police officer arrived, and the first officer asked the defendant to remove
his hands from his pockets and subsequently frisked him. Id. at 669,
222 P.3d 92. Although the officers’ actions, when viewed individually,
may not have amounted to a seizure, the actions did constitute a seizure
when viewed cumulatively. Id. at 668, 222 P.3d 92; see also United
States v. Washington, 490 F.3d 765, 772 (9th Cir. 2007) (initial consensual encounter escalated into a seizure when late at night, uniformed
officers questioned defendant, without informing him of his right to
leave, and directed defendant to move to a location where the officers
were in between defendant and his car); cf. State v. Smith, 154 Wn.
App. 695, 700–02, 226 P.3d 195 (2010) (defendant’s interactions with
the police did not evolve into a seizure when police requested, but did
not order, defendant to exit hotel room, asked for identification, and
asked for consent to search defendant’s openly displayed wallet).
1.4(b) Seizures in Vehicles
A seizure of an automobile driver occurs as soon as an officer in a
police car switches on the flashing lights. State v. Gantt, 163 Wn. App.
133, 141, 257 P.3d 682 (2011); State v. DeArman, 54 Wn. App. 621,
624, 774 P.2d 1247 (1989). A vehicle that voluntarily stops in response
to emergency lights and police actions directed at other individuals,
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however, is not seized. United States v. Al Nasser, 555 F.3d 722, 731
(9th Cir. 2009). The analysis differs somewhat with regard to parked
vehicles because, once a vehicle is parked, its occupants are ostensibly
pedestrians. State v. O’Neill, 148 Wn.2d 564, 579, 62 P.3d 489
(2003); see also State v. Johnson 156 Wn. App. 82, 92, 231 P.3d 225
(2010) (no seizure when officer parked behind illegally parked car
and asked for, but did not demand, defendant’s identification); State
v. Cerrillo, 122 Wn. App. 341, 350, 93 P.3d 960 (2004) (no seizure
when officer knocked on window of parked car and asked for identification). Such an encounter, however, can still ripen into a seizure
when the police take additional actions. See State v. Beito, 147 Wn.
App. 504, 510, 195 P.3d 1023 (2008) (seizure of passenger occurred
when officer stood outside of passenger door, blocking passenger
from exiting, told driver she was not allowed to leave, and persisted
in asking passenger for identification).
Under article I, section 7, absent a reasonable basis for the inquiry, a request for identification from a passenger of a vehicle for investigatory purposes constitutes a seizure. State v. Rankin, 151 Wn.2d
689, 697, 92 P.3d 202 (2004). At least one Washington court, however, has narrowed this rule to only circumstances in which a police officer has stopped a moving car with cause to detain and question the
driver but not necessarily the passengers. State v. Mote, 129 Wn. App.
276, 291, 120 P.3d 596 (2005).
Under both article I, section 7 and the Fourth Amendment, a seizure also occurs when an officer stops automobiles pursuant to a systematic “spot check” or roadblock looking for drivers’ licenses, vehicle
registrations, drunk drivers, or illegal alien smuggling. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 41, 121 S. Ct. 447, 148 L. Ed. 2d 333
(2000); Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 449–50, 110
S. Ct. 2481, 110 L. Ed. 2d 412 (1990); United States v. MartinezFuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 555–56, 96 S. Ct. 3074, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1116
(1976); City of Seattle v. Mesiani, 110 Wn.2d 454, 457–60, 755 P.2d
775 (1988). These seizures are often justified under the “special needs”
doctrine and examined under a reasonableness standard. See infra § 6.3.
1.5 DEFINING SEIZURES OF PROPERTY
The Fourth Amendment protects both a person’s possessory interest in his or her “effects” and his or her privacy interest. United States
v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707, 103 S. Ct. 2637, 77 L. Ed. 2d 110 (1983).
“A ‘seizure’ of property occurs when there is some meaningful interference with an individual’s possessory interests in that property.”
United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113, 104 S. Ct. 1652, 80 L.
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Ed. 2d 85 (1984); State v. Jackson, 82 Wn. App. 594, 603, 918 P.2d
945 (1996). Put differently, an object is seized when government agents
exercise “dominion and control” over the object. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at
120, 104 S. Ct. 1652; Jackson, 82 Wn. App. at 603–04, 918 P.2d 945.
Thus, impounding a room or securing a home constitutes a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. State v. Ng, 104 Wn.2d 763, 770, 713 P.2d
63 (1985) (citing State v. Bean, 89 Wn.2d 467, 472, 572 P.2d 1102
(1978)). At least one Washington court has found that transferring
property within a home from one room to another could constitute a
seizure. State v. Cotten, 75 Wn. App. 669, 682, 879 P.2d 971 (1994)
(agents asserted dominion and control over a shotgun, even though that
control was temporary, by taking shotgun from the bedroom, unloading
it, and carrying it into another room).
In some circumstances, interference with an individual’s possessory interests may also implicate an individual’s liberty interests. For
example, in Place, the seizure of luggage at an airport was determined
to “effectively restrain the person since he is subjected to the possible
disruption of his travel plans in order to remain with his luggage or to
arrange for its return.” 462 U.S. at 708, 103 S. Ct. 2637; see also 4
Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 9.8(e), at 1006–27 (5th ed.
2012).
1.6 STANDING TO RAISE SEARCH AND SEIZURE CLAIMS
In Washington, standing to challenge police action under article I,
section 7 may take one of two forms: automatic standing or asserting a
violation of a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy in the object
or place searched or seized. State v. Carter, 127 Wn.2d 836, 841, 904
P.2d 290 (1995) (citing United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 86–
87, 100 S. Ct. 2547, 65 L. Ed. 2d 619 (1980)); see also State v. Williams, 142 Wn.2d 17, 23–24, 11 P.3d 714 (2000); State v. Libero,
168 Wn. App. 612, 277 P.3d 708 (2012); State v. Kypreos, 110 Wn.
App. 612, 39 P.3d 371 (2002) (discussing history of automatic
standing doctrine).
The first form of standing is automatic standing. Article I, section
7 of the Washington constitution confers automatic standing upon anyone charged with a possessory crime. State v. Evans, 159 Wn.2d 402,
407, 150 P.3d 105 (2007) (citing State v. Simpson, 95 Wn.2d 170, 179,
622 P.2d 1199 (1980) (plurality opinion) (upholding the use of automatic standing based on the state constitution)). Put another way, “a
defendant who has been charged with an offense that has possession as
an element has automatic standing to challenge the search that led to
the discovery of the substance the defendant is charged with pos-
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sessing.” State v. Chelly, 94 Wn. App. 254, 258, 970 P.2d 376 (1999);
State v. Johnston, 38 Wn. App. 793, 801, 690 P.2d 591 (1984). In order
to claim automatic standing, the defendant must show that (1) possession is an “essential” element of the offense for which the defendant is
charged and (2) the defendant was in possession of the seized property
at the time of the contested search. State v. Jones, 146 Wn.2d 328, 332,
45 P.3d 1062 (2002). The “fruits of the search” must directly relate to
the search the defendant is challenging. State v. Williams, 142 Wn.2d
17, 24, 11 P.3d 714 (2000).
The second form of standing analysis under article I, section 7
tracks the standing analysis under the Fourth Amendment, see State v.
Carter, 127 Wn.2d 836, 841, 904 P.2d 290 (1995) (citing Salvucci, 448
U.S. at 86–87, 100 S. Ct. 2547), and more often applies to persons
charged with non-possessory crimes, State v. Francisco, 107 Wn. App.
247, 249, 26 P.3d 1008 (2001). Under the Fourth Amendment, the concept of standing has been merged with the substantive law of the Fourth
Amendment’s privacy analysis. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 138–
40, 99 S. Ct. 421, 58 L. Ed. 2d 387 (1978). Accordingly,
in order to claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment, a defendant must demonstrate that he personally has an expectation of
privacy in the place searched, and that his expectation is reasonable; i.e., one that has “a source outside of the Fourth Amendment, either by reference to concepts of real or personal property
law or to understandings that are recognized and permitted by society.”

Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 87–88, 119 S. Ct. 469, 142 L. Ed.
2d 373 (1998) (quoting Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143 n.12, 99 S. Ct. 421);
see also Williams, 142 Wn.2d at 23, 11 P.3d 714; State v. Link, 136
Wn. App. 685, 692, 150 P.3d 610 (2007); Francisco, 107 Wn. App.
at 252, 26 P.3d 1008.
By merging the standing issue with the privacy analysis, the federal courts abandoned the concept of automatic standing. Salvucci, 448
U.S. at 92–93, 100 S. Ct. 2547. Hence, although the Fourth Amendment no longer applies to searches of stolen goods, it does apply to
searches of legally possessed items discovered in the search of stolen
goods. Accordingly, an “illegal search only violates the rights of those
who have ‘a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place.’”
Id. (quoting Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143, 99 S. Ct. 421) (holding that unlawful possession of stolen goods stored in the apartment of another does
not confer on thieves a reasonable expectation of privacy as to the interior of apartment). A person who resides in an apartment with the permission of the lessee and who has a key to the apartment may therefore
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assert a privacy interest in the interior of the apartment. Rakas, 439
U.S. at 141–42, 99 S. Ct. 421 (citing Jones v. United States, 362 U.S.
257, 267, 80 S. Ct. 725, 4 L. Ed. 2d 697 (1960)). In many instances, an
individual may be able to show both forms of standing because, generally, an individual “who owns or lawfully possesses or controls property will in all likelihood have a legitimate expectation of privacy by virtue of [his or her] right to exclude.” Id. at 143 n.12, 99 S. Ct. 421. Specific applications of this standing analysis often involve passengers in
vehicles and houseguests.
A mere passenger in a motor vehicle may not assert a personal
privacy interest in the interior of the vehicle, but may challenge his or
her own seizure. Id. at 148–50, 99 S. Ct. 421; United States v. Pulliam,
405 F.3d 782, 786 (9th Cir. 2005); State v. Byrd, 110 Wn. App. 259,
264, 39 P.3d 1010 (2002) (“[A] passenger in a vehicle stopped by police officers can contest the lawfulness of the stop.”). An unauthorized
driver, however, may have standing to challenge a search of the vehicle
if he or she has received permission to use the car. United States v.
Thomas, 447 F.3d 1191, 1199 (9th Cir. 2006).
With regard to a person’s presence in someone else’s home, an
overnight guest has standing to challenge a search of the
home. Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 96–97, 110 S. Ct. 1684, 109 L.
Ed. 2d 85 (1990). A defendant who was legitimately, but only casually,
on the premises, however, does not necessarily demonstrate a legitimate expectation of privacy in the home. State v. Boot, 81 Wn. App.
546, 551, 915 P.2d 592 (1996). Four relevant but nonexhaustive factors
for analyzing whether a social guest had standing are (1) the defendant’s relationship with the homeowner or tenant; (2) the context and
duration of the visit during which the search took place; (3) the frequency and duration of the defendant’s previous visits to the home; and
(4) whether the defendant kept personal effects in the home. Link, 136
Wn. App. at 693, 150 P.3d 610.

CHAPTER 2
Standards of Proof
2.0 THE NATURE OF PROBABLE CAUSE
This chapter summarizes the standards for probable cause for
searches and seizures conducted with or without a warrant. Sections 2.1
and 2.2 discuss the nature of the standard, while sections 2.3 through 2.8
discuss specific types of information considered in the probable cause
determination. Finally, section 2.9 summarizes the types of searches and
seizures for which probable cause is either not required or a lesser standard is applied.
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides
that “no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause.” U.S. Const.
amend. IV. Under article I, section 7 of the Washington constitution,
“[n]o person shall be disturbed . . . without authority of law.” Const. art I,
§ 7. As under the Fourth Amendment, this “authority of law” is fulfilled
by a warrant, issued upon probable cause that is established by sworn
affidavit. State v. Chenoweth, 160 Wn.2d 454, 465, 158 P.3d 595 (2007);
see also State v. Vickers, 148 Wn.2d 91, 108, 59 P.3d 58 (2002). The
probable cause analysis is thus substantively the same under article I,
section 7 and the Fourth Amendment. State v. Grande, 164 Wn.2d 135,
141, 187 P.3d 248 (2008).
The probable cause requirement is a fact-based determination representing a compromise between society’s competing interests of enforcing the law and protecting the individual’s right to privacy. State v. Neth,
165 Wn.2d 177, 182, 196 P.3d 658 (2008) (citing Brinegar v. United
States, 338 U.S. 160, 176, 69 S. Ct. 1302, 93 L. Ed. 1879 (1949)). Probable cause requires reasonable grounds to believe that a defendant is
guilty of a crime. Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371, 124 S. Ct.
795, 157 L. Ed. 2d 769 (2003). See generally 2 Wayne R. LaFave,
Search and Seizure § 3.2 (5th ed. 2012) (discussing the general nature of
probable cause). The police officer must be aware of reasonably trustworthy information that would cause a reasonable officer to believe that
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a crime has been committed. State v. Potter, 156 Wn.2d 835, 840, 132
P.3d 1089 (2006); State v. Gaddy, 152 Wn.2d 64, 70, 93 P.3d 872
(2004); State v. Reeb, 63 Wn. App. 678, 681–82, 821 P.2d 84 (1992) (information need only be reasonably trustworthy, not absolutely accurate).
The belief must be specific to the person to be searched or seized.
Grande, 164 Wn.2d at 144, 187 P.3d 248 (citing Ybarra v. Illinois, 444
U.S. 85, 91, 100 S. Ct. 338, 62 L. Ed. 2d 238 (1979)).
Probable cause is required for searches and seizures regardless of
whether a search warrant is required, see Wong Sun v. United States, 371
U.S. 471, 479–80, 83 S. Ct. 407, 9 L. Ed. 2d 441 (1963), or an arrest is
made, State v. Hudson, 124 Wn.2d 107, 112, 874 P.2d 160 (1994).
Where a valid search or seizure occurs without a warrant, police may
initially determine whether probable cause exists, but the grounds for the
search or seizure must be strong enough to obtain a warrant. Wong Sun,
371 U.S. at 480, 83 S. Ct. 407. A neutral and detached magistrate must
make the probable cause determination for a warrant to issue. Johnson v.
United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14, 68 S. Ct. 367, 92 L. Ed. 436 (1948). In
addition, a suspect arrested without a warrant may not be detained for an
extended period of time without a judicial determination of probable
cause. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 124–25, 95 S. Ct. 854, 43 L. Ed.
2d 54 (1975). See generally 2 LaFave, supra § 3.1.
When federal officers are working with and assisting state officials,
they must comply with the Washington constitution. State v. Johnson, 75
Wn. App. 692, 700, 879 P.2d 984 (1994). Conversely, when federal officers obtain evidence pursuant to federal law and independent of state
officials, the evidence may be used in a state criminal proceeding even if
the procedure involved would have violated the Washington constitution.
State v. Brown, 132 Wn.2d 529, 591, 940 P.2d 54, (1997); In re
Teddington, 116 Wn.2d 761, 772–73, 808 P.2d 156 (1991). Courts have
reasoned that the Washington constitution cannot control the independent
conduct of federal agents. State v. Bradley, 105 Wn.2d 898, 902–03, 719
P.2d 546 (1986). Accordingly, where a federal warrant is served, the federal standard for probable cause applies even though the evidence would
be used in state courts. See Johnson, 75 Wn. App. at 699, 879 P.2d 984.
Though the probable cause requirement is a fact-based determination, it may be satisfied even when police officers make a reasonable
mistake of fact. Vickers, 148 Wn.2d at 117, 59 P.3d 58 (incorrect date of
informant’s observations in affidavit did not affect the finding of probable cause); In re Yim, 139 Wn.2d 581, 597, 989 P.2d 512 (1999) (failure
to assert in affidavit that defendant lacked a license to sell explosives was
not critical when magistrate could reasonably infer that defendant was
probably engaged in the unlicensed manufacture and sale of explosives);
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State v. Seagull, 95 Wn.2d 898, 900, 908, 632 P.2d 44 (1981) (warrant
valid even though officer misidentified tomato plant as marijuana).
Likewise, negligent or innocent mistakes are insufficient to void a finding of probable cause. State v. Gore, 143 Wn.2d 288, 296, 21 P.3d 262
(2001), overruled on other grounds, State v. Hughes, 154 Wn.2d 118,
110 P.3d 192 (2005); In re Yim, 139 Wn.2d at 597, 989 P.2d 512;
Chenoweth, 160 Wn.2d at 479, 158 P.3d 595. Probable cause can exist
even where an incongruity is legal rather than factual: probable cause
may still exist at the time of arrest even if the statute under which an individual is being arrested is later declared unconstitutional. State v.
Afana, 169 Wn.2d 169, 183, 233 P.3d 879 (2010); State v. Potter, 129
Wn. App. 494, 497, 119 P.3d 877 (2005).
The probable cause requirement may not, however, be satisfied
when the police make an “inexcusable mistake of law” (in other words,
they incorrectly believe that certain conduct is unlawful), State v. Melrose, 2 Wn. App. 824, 828, 470 P.2d 552 (1970), or when probable cause
is based on a law “so grossly and flagrantly unconstitutional that any person of reasonable prudence would be bound to see its flaws,” Michigan
v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 38, 99 S. Ct. 2627, 61 L. Ed. 2d 343 (1979).
Additionally, if the defendant can show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the affidavit on which probable cause was based contained
“intentional material omissions or material omissions made with reckless
disregard for the truth,” then the omitted evidence must be considered in
the probable cause finding. Gore, 143 Wn.2d at 297, 21 P.3d 262. The
defendant, however, must make a substantial showing as to both materiality and intentionality for the omission. State v. Garrison, 118 Wn.2d
870, 872–73, 827 P.2d 1388 (1992) (per curiam) (mere showing of the
omission of material that is critical to a finding of probable cause is not a
sufficient preliminary showing that the omission was a reckless disregard
for the truth). See generally Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155–56,
98 S. Ct. 2674, 57 L. Ed. 2d 667 (1978).
2.1 PROBABLE CAUSE STANDARD: ARREST VERSUS SEARCH
Generally, probable cause requires the same sufficiency of evidence
regardless of whether it concerns a search or an arrest. State v. Grande,
164 Wn.2d 135, 142, 187 P.3d 248 (2008) (citing 2 Wayne R. LaFave,
Search and Seizure § 3.1(b) (4th ed. 2004)). In practice, however, the
standards are not necessarily identical: probable cause for a search does
not always constitute probable cause for an arrest, and probable cause for
an arrest does not necessarily justify a search. See State v. Dalton, 73
Wn. App. 132, 140, 868 P.2d 873 (1994) (“[P]robable cause to believe a
man has committed a crime on the street does not necessarily give rise to
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probable cause to search his home.”) (citing Commonwealth v.
Kline, 234 Pa. Super. 12, 17, 335 A.2d 361 (1975)).
For a search, the officer must have probable cause to believe that
the items to be seized are connected with criminal activity and will be
found in the place to be searched. State v. Thein, 138 Wn.2d 133, 145–
47, 151, 977 P.2d 582 (1999); State v. McReynolds, 104 Wn. App. 560,
570, 17 P.3d 608 (2001) (inscribed crow bar alone provided insufficient
nexus between alleged crimes and the defendant’s residence). Broad
generalizations of criminal activity alone, by themselves, may not be sufficient. Thein, 138 Wn.2d at 147, 977 P.2d 582 (rejecting generalization
that drug dealers keep drugs at home); State v. Jackson, 111 Wn. App.
660, 688, 46 P.3d 257 (2002) (rejecting generalization that criminals
commonly return to the scene of their crime); State v. Nordlund, 113 Wn.
App. 171, 182–84, 53 P.3d 520 (2002) (generalized statements about the
computer habits of sex offenders insufficient to justify search of defendant’s personal computer); State v. McGovern, 111 Wn. App. 495, 499–
501, 45 P.3d 624 (2002) (magistrate could infer that evidence of drug
dealing would be found in defendant’s home based on generalization that
drug dealers keep drugs at their home plus additional facts suggesting
that “this drug dealer probably keeps drugs at his or her residence”); see
also United States v. Rodgers, 656 F.3d 1023, 1030–31 (9th Cir. 2011)
(“[A]n assumption that most sixteen-year-old passengers have identification does not lead to probable cause to search every car carrying a teenager absent some individualized suspicion . . . .”). The item sought need
not be at the place to be searched at the time the warrant is issued, but the
magistrate must have reasonable grounds to believe it will be there at the
time of the search. State v. Maddox, 116 Wn. App. 796, 804, 67 P.3d
1135 (2003) (magistrate could reasonably infer that drugs or evidence of
drug dealing were in the defendant’s home based on evidence that the
defendant was dealing drugs from his home); State v. Perez, 92 Wn.
App. 1, 7–9, 963 P.2d 881 (1998) (sufficient facts supported inference of
large-scale drug dealing to support search of alleged safe house).
For an arrest, probable cause exists when the arresting officer has
information that would lead a reasonable person to conclude that the suspect has committed a crime. State v. Graham, 130 Wn.2d 711, 724, 927
P.2d 227 (1996); State v. Gaddy, 152 Wn.2d 64, 70, 93 P.3d 872 (2004);
State v. Cerrillo, 122 Wn. App. 341, 350–51, 93 P.3d 960 (2004). Probable cause to arrest is a nontechnical standard based on the facts and circumstances known to the officer at the time of arrest. State v. Baxter, 68
Wn.2d 416, 420, 413 P.2d 638 (1966); State v. Lewellyn, 78 Wn. App.
788, 797–98, 895 P.2d 418 (1995), aff’d, 130 Wn.2d 215, 922 P.2d 811
(1996) (officer’s observations, defendant’s driving, and field sobriety
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tests supported probable cause for DWI arrest); State v. Garcia, 63 Wn.
App. 868, 870–75, 824 P.2d 1220 (1992) (hotel maid’s observations of
folded papers in a drawer, diesel fuel smell, and telephone calls at all
hours were not sufficient by themselves, but when combined with the
police information of the suspect’s car on a drug trafficking tip sheet, did
constitute sufficient probable cause); State v. Griffith, 61 Wn. App. 35,
39, 808 P.2d 1171 (1991) (police had probable cause to arrest the defendant on a DWI charge when the defendant drove erratically, hit a
roadway construction sign, did not stop in response to police emergency
flashers, and proceeded to a home); State v. Fore, 56 Wn. App. 339,
343–44, 783 P.2d 626 (1989) (probable cause existed based on officer’s
observation of drug transactions in area with reported narcotics activity
and performed in a manner similar to undercover buys made by the officer); see also State v. Gregory, 158 Wn.2d 759, 824–825, 147 P.3d
1201 (2006) (probable cause existed for blood draw of suspect to compare with DNA samples from hospital rape-kit performed on victim);
State v. Mance, 82 Wn. App. 539, 541–42, 918 P.2d 527 (1996) (information obtained after defendant was arrested could not be used to establish probable cause for the arrest). Facts that arise after a warrant is issued are immaterial unless they were reasonably inferable when the warrant was issued. State v. Goble, 88 Wn. App. 503, 508, 945 P.2d 263
(1997). Finally, where a seizure does not amount to an arrest, varied
standards may apply. See infra § 2.9.
2.2 PROBABLE CAUSE STANDARD: CHARACTERISTICS
2.2(a) Objective Test
Under both the federal and state constitutions, the probable cause
standard is an objective one. State v. Gaddy, 152 Wn.2d 64, 70, 93 P.3d
872 (2004); Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96, 85 S. Ct. 223, 13 L. Ed. 2d
142 (1964). The officer’s subjective belief is not determinative. State v.
Huff, 64 Wn. App. 641, 645, 826 P.2d 698 (1992), review denied, 119
Wn.2d 1007, 833 P.2d 387 (1992). Accordingly, an officer’s good faith
is not enough to justify a search absent probable cause, and likewise, an
officer’s belief that probable cause was not present is also not determinative. Id.; see also State v. Gaddy, 114 Wn. App. 702, 706, 60 P.3d 116
(2002), aff’d on other grounds by 152 Wn.2d 64, 93 P.3d 872 (officer’s
good faith reliance on an agency “hot sheet” would not validate an arrest
if the “hot sheet” was not based upon probable cause); State v. Rodriguez-Torres, 77 Wn. App. 687, 693, 893 P.2d 650 (1995) (officer’s subjective belief that probable cause did not exist was not dispositive); Huff,
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64 Wn. App. at 645–46, 826 P.2d 698 (officer’s subjective belief that an
offense has been committed does not cure a lack of probable cause).
Additionally, the probable cause standard is determined with reference to a reasonable person with the expertise and experience of the officer in question. See United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 897–98, 95 S.
Ct. 2585, 45 L. Ed. 2d 623 (1975) (border patrol officers are entitled to
draw inferences in light of their prior experience with aliens and smugglers). As a result, an officer’s particular training and expertise is highly
important. State v. Cole, 128 Wn.2d 262, 289, 906 P.2d 925 (1995), abrogated on other grounds by In re Det. of Petersen, 145 Wn.2d 789, 42
P.3d 952 (2002) (acknowledging officer’s drug enforcement experience
and ability to identify marijuana smell); Rodriguez-Torres, 77 Wn. App.
at 693–94, 893 P.2d 650 (probable cause existed when an officer with
specialized training in narcotics enforcement observed exchange of money for hidden, cupped object in an area known for narcotics, and defendant fled upon notice of officer’s presence). The officer’s basis of
knowledge, specific training, and experience must be included in the affidavit so that the magistrate may make an independent determination of
probable cause and establish more than the officer’s personal belief.
State v. Jacobs, 121 Wn. App. 669, 678, 89 P.3d 232 (2004), reversed on
other grounds by 154 Wn.2d 596, 115 P.3d 281 (2005) (noting that an
affidavit’s failure to indicate an officer’s experience and education is not
fatal to the resulting warrant’s validity if other facts establish probable
cause); State v. Johnson, 79 Wn. App. 776, 780, 904 P.2d 1188 (1995).
Similarly, a dog’s training and experience is important for establishing
probable cause predicated on a canine sniff alert. See Florida v. Harris,
133 S. Ct. 1050, 1057, 185 L. Ed. 2d 61 (2013).
2.2(b) Quantum of Evidence Required
Probable cause is a quantum of evidence “less than . . . would justify . . . conviction,” yet “more than bare suspicion.” Brinegar v. United
States, 338 U.S. 160, 175, 69 S. Ct. 1302, 93 L. Ed. 1879 (1949). Although a single fact in isolation may not be sufficient, probable cause
may exist when that fact is read together with other facts stated in the
affidavit. State v. Vickers, 148 Wn.2d 91, 110, 59 P.3d 58 (2002); State
v. Tarter, 111 Wn. App. 336, 341, 44 P.3d 889 (2002).
Accordingly, to make an arrest, the officer need only have reasonable grounds for suspicion and evidence of circumstances sufficiently
strong enough to justify a cautious and disinterested person in believing
that the suspect is guilty. State v. Scott, 93 Wn.2d 7, 10–11, 604 P.2d 943
(1980) (officers possessing description of car used in robbery and license
number of similar car used in robbery involving similar modus operandi

2013]

Chapter 2: Standards of Proof

1613

had probable cause to arrest persons who were driving a similar vehicle
toward the address where the car’s license number was traced). The exact
quantum of evidence required is unclear and may depend in part on the
nature of the intrusion and the seriousness of the offense. See generally 2
Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 3.2(e) (5th ed. 2012).
2.2(c) Individualized Suspicion
Probable cause to arrest an individual exists only if police have reasonable grounds to believe that the particular individual has committed
the crime. Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91, 100 S. Ct. 338, 62 L. Ed.
2d 238 (1979); State v. Grande 164 Wn.2d 135, 145, 187 P.3d 248
(2008). Accordingly, Washington courts have required individualized
suspicion as to each occupant of a vehicle; the passenger cannot be arrested based solely on individualized suspicion as to the driver. Grande,
164 Wn.2d at 146–47, 187 P.3d 248. Under the Fourth Amendment,
however, a police officer may reasonably infer a “common enterprise”
among passengers in a vehicle. Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371–
73, 124 S. Ct. 795, 157 L. Ed. 2d 769 (2003).
Individualized suspicion may also be described as a sufficient nexus between the suspects to be searched and the criminal activity. State v.
Carter, 79 Wn. App. 154, 158, 901 P.2d 335 (1995). This was not the
case in Carter, where a police informant observed residents and nonresidents of a building buying, selling, and using illegal drugs, but the
informant was unable to identify any of the individuals by name. Id. at
156, 901 P.2d 335. Based upon the informant’s observations, the police
obtained a warrant to search “all ‘persons at the residence at the time the
warrant i[s] being served as well as persons arriving at and leaving the
residence at the time the warrant is being executed for controlled substances and papers of identification.’” Id. Upon execution of the warrant,
the police found the defendant asleep on a mattress in the living room
and discovered rock cocaine in his pants pocket. Id. at 157, 901 P.2d 335.
The court held that the warrant did not justify a search of the defendant’s
person because the observations of the informant did not support the
conclusion that only illegal conduct occurred within the apartment and
that any person present was likely to be involved with criminal activity
“in such a way as to have evidence of the criminal activity on his person.” Id. at 161, 901 P.2d 335 (quoting Stokes v. State, 604 So.2d 836,
838 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992)). However, the court carefully noted that it
was not deciding whether warrants with “all persons present” language
would be valid under different circumstances. Id. Washington courts also
require individualized suspicion before the police search motel registries
for outstanding warrants. See State v. Jorden, 160 Wn.2d 121, 130, 156
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P.3d 893 (2007); In re Nichols, 171 Wn.2d 370, 377, 256 P.3d 1131
(2011).
Individualized suspicion may not be required when the police are
conducting a valid vehicle roadblock or spot check. See infra § 5.18. Further, individualized suspicion may also not be required for some administrative searches. See generally infra § 6.4(b), (c).
2.3 INFORMATION CONSIDERED: IN GENERAL
A court reviewing a probable cause determination considers only
the information that was available to the magistrate at the time that the
warrant was issued to the officer. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371
U.S. 471, 481–82, 83 S. Ct. 407, 9 L. Ed. 2d 441 (1963); State v. Murray,
110 Wn.2d 706, 709–10, 757 P.2d 487 (1988). Probable cause must be
based on facts and not on mere conclusions. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S.
108, 113, 84 S. Ct. 1509, 12 L. Ed. 2d 723 (1964), abrogated on other
grounds by Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 76 L. Ed. 2d
527 (1983); State v. Thein, 138 Wn.2d 133, 145–47, 977 P.2d 582
(1999). In addition, probable cause must exist at the actual time of arrest
or search, and it cannot be stale. See State v. Lyons, 174 Wn.2d 354, 368,
275 P.3d 314 (2012) (no timely probable cause when affidavit failed to
state when the informant observed a marijuana grow operation); State v.
Maddox, 152 Wn.2d 499, 505–06, 98 P.3d 1199 (2004) (delay in executing a warrant “may render the magistrate’s probable cause determination
stale,” but common sense is the test for staleness based on the facts and
circumstances identified in the affidavit).
Affidavits for search warrants must be evaluated in a commonsense, non-hypertechnical manner. In re Yim, 139 Wn.2d 581, 597,
989 P.2d 512 (1999), abrogated on other grounds by In re Jagana, 170
Wn. App. 32, 282 P.3d 1153 (2012); State v. Fisher, 96 Wn.2d 962, 965,
639 P.2d 743 (1982); see infra § 3.3(b). “The support for issuance of a
search warrant is sufficient if, on reading the affidavits, an ordinary person would understand that a violation existed and was continuing at the
time of the application.” Fisher, 96 Wn.2d at 965, 639 P.2d 743 (quoting
State v. Clay, 7 Wn. App. 631, 637, 501 P.2d 603 (1972)). All doubts are
resolved in favor of the warrant’s validity. Maddox, 152 Wn.2d at 509,
98 P.3d 1199; State v. Young, 123 Wn.2d 173, 195, 867 P.2d 593 (1994);
State v. Olson, 73 Wn. App. 348, 354, 869 P.2d 110 (1994).
Information need not be admissible at trial in order to support probable cause. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 172–74, 69 S. Ct.
1302, 93 L. Ed. 1879 (1949); Bokor v. Dep’t of Licensing, 74 Wn. App.
523, 526, 874 P.2d 168 (1994). For example, marital privilege does not
prevent a spouse’s statements from being used to establish probable
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cause. State v. Bonaparte, 34 Wn. App. 285, 289, 660 P.2d 334 (1983).
See generally infra § 7.3.
Even if a search may have occurred illegally, “a search warrant
[will] not [be] rendered totally invalid if the affidavit contains sufficient
facts to establish probable cause independent of the illegally obtained
information.” State v. Coates, 107 Wn.2d 882, 887, 735 P.2d 64 (1987).
In Coates, for example, the police obtained a search warrant based partially on facts that were obtained in violation of the defendant’s right to
remain silent. Id. However, the court upheld the search warrant because
other facts in the affidavit supported a finding of probable cause. Id. at
888–89, 735 P.2d 64.
2.3(a) Hearsay
Hearsay from an informant can establish probable cause for a warrant as long as there is evidence that provides reason to believe that the
informant is reliable and has an adequate basis of knowledge. State v.
Jackson, 102 Wn.2d 432, 437–38, 688 P.2d 136 (1984) (“If the informant’s information is hearsay, the basis of knowledge prong can be satisfied if there is sufficient information so that the hearsay establishes a basis of knowledge.”); Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 416, 89 S.
Ct. 584, 21 L. Ed. 2d 637 (1969), abrogated on other grounds by Illinois
v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1983); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 113–14, 84 S. Ct. 1509, 12 L. Ed. 2d 723
(1964), abrogated on other grounds by Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S. Ct.
2317. As a result, a magistrate may rely on a police officer’s affidavit or
other testimony that relays hearsay information based on a fellow officer’s personal knowledge. State v. Lodge, 42 Wn. App. 380, 386, 711
P.2d 1078 (1985). The affidavit may also relate hearsay from informants
as long as there is a basis for crediting it. State v. Huft, 106 Wn.2d 206,
209–10, 720 P.2d 838 (1986); State v. Lund, 70 Wn. App. 437, 449–50
n.9, 853 P.2d 1379 (1993); see infra § 2.5. Multiple levels of hearsay
may also be considered if the requirements are met for each person in the
chain of information. See Huft, 106 Wn.2d at 209–10, 720 P.2d 838
(concerned citizen information not sufficient without basis of informant’s
knowledge); State v. Vanzant, 14 Wn. App. 679, 683, 544 P.2d 786
(1975) (information passed to second detective by detective with personal knowledge of informant’s reliability sufficient to establish probable
cause for arrest). See generally 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure
§ 3.2(d) (5th ed. 2012).
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2.3(b) Prior Arrests, Prior Convictions, and Reputation
A magistrate or police officer making a probable cause determination may consider prior convictions that have probative value to the specific probable cause inquiry. State v. Vickers, 148 Wn.2d 91, 111 n.51,
59 P.3d 58 (2002); State v. Clark, 143 Wn.2d 731, 749, 24 P.3d 1006
(2001) (defendant’s prior conviction was “helpful in establishing probable cause” when the conviction was of the same general nature as the
crime under investigation); State v. Sterling, 43 Wn. App. 846, 851, 719
P.2d 1357 (1986) (occupant’s two prior convictions for narcotics can be
a factor in determining probable cause). A prior criminal record—even
of the same type of criminal conduct—does not alone justify a warrantless search. State v. Hobart, 94 Wn.2d 437, 446, 617 P.2d 429 (1980);
State v. Duncan, 81 Wn. App. 70, 78, 912 P.2d 1090 (1996); see Beck v.
Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 97, 85 S. Ct. 223, 13 L. Ed. 2d 142 (1964); 2 Wayne
R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 3.2(d) (5th ed. 2012). While prior acts
may establish probable cause when the modus operandi is similar and
distinctive, see 2 LaFave, supra, § 3.2(d), a general assertion of criminal
reputation is insufficient, Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 416, 89
S. Ct. 584, 21 L. Ed. 2d 637 (1969), abrogated on other grounds by Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1983).
However, the U.S. Supreme Court has noted that an officer’s knowledge
of a suspect’s reputation is a “practical consideration of everyday life”
upon which an officer (or a magistrate) may rely in determining the reliability of an informant. United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 583, 91 S.
Ct. 2075, 29 L. Ed. 2d 723 (1971) (plurality opinion). Specific facts leading to a conclusion that a suspect has a bad reputation may also be considered. Id.; see 2 LaFave, supra, § 3.2(d).
2.3(c) Increased Electrical Consumption
Standing alone, an increase in electrical use does not constitute sufficient probable cause to issue a search warrant. State v. Olson, 73 Wn.
App. 348, 356, 869 P.2d 110 (1994); State v. Sterling, 43 Wn. App. 846,
851, 719 P.2d 1357 (1986); State v. McPherson, 40 Wn. App. 298, 301,
698 P.2d 563 (1985). Evidence of increased power consumption, absent
other information, is an innocuous fact and cannot corroborate an anonymous tip of suspected criminal activity. State v. Young, 123 Wn.2d 173,
196, 867 P.2d 593 (1994); see also State v. Huft, 106 Wn.2d 206, 211,
720 P.2d 838 (1986) (“[T]here are too many plausible reasons for increased electrical use to allow a search warrant to be issued based on increased consumption.”). When the increase in power consumption is
combined with other factors, however, the increase may be considered in
determining whether probable cause exists. State v. Cole, 128 Wn.2d
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262, 291, 906 P.2d 925 (1995), overruled on other grounds by In re Det.
of Petersen, 145 Wn.2d 789, 801, 42 P.3d 952 (2002) (increase in electrical consumption is a proper factor in determining probable cause when
combined with other suspicious factors); Sterling, 43 Wn. App. at 851–
52, 719 P.2d 1357 (400–500 percent increase in power usage combined
with suspicious facts supported probable cause for search warrant). For
example, Washington courts have considered evidence of power usage
three to four times greater than the previous occupant’s, in combination
with the absence of accumulated snow on the roof when neighboring
buildings had 20 to 30 inches, in determining that probable cause was not
established. State v. Rakosky, 79 Wn. App. 229, 239–40, 901 P.2d 364
(1995).
An individual has a protected privacy interest in power usage records such that a disclosure of this information is prohibited unless there
is written notice to the utility company that the person is suspected of
criminal activity. RCW 42.56.314 (formerly RCW 42.17.314, prohibiting
the inspection or copying of a person’s utility records by law enforcement unless the utility is provided a written statement that indicates the
person is suspected of committing a crime and there is a reasonable belief that the records could determine or help determine whether the suspicion is true). See generally Cole, 128 Wn.2d at 290, 906 P.2d 925 (a
search warrant satisfies the requirements of former RCW 42.17.314); In
re Maxfield, 133 Wn.2d 332, 341–42, 945 P.2d 196 (1997) (no reasonable suspicion of criminal activity because electrical service was new and
records showed high electrical consumption pottery kilns were to be used
at location); State v. Maxwell, 114 Wn.2d 761, 767–69, 791 P.2d 223
(1990) (telephonic request for utility record not admissible because verbal request was in violation of former RCW 42.17.314); In re Rosier,
105 Wn.2d 606, 613–16, 717 P.2d 1353 (1986) (recognizing the need to
balance the public’s interest in disclosure of information leading to arrests and the individual and societal interest in preventing “fishing expeditions” by the government).
2.3(d) Polygraph Results
The results of a polygraph test may be considered in a magistrate’s
probable cause determination, even though such results are inadmissible
at trial unless stringent conditions are satisfied. State v. Clark, 143
Wn.2d 731, 749–50, 24 P.3d 1006 (2001). Although the qualifications of
the FBI agent who administered the polygraph test in Clark were not set
forth in the affidavit, the court noted that information from a reliable informant has corroborative value even if the informant’s basis of
knowledge is not specified. Id. at 750, 24 P.3d 1006 (citing State v. Lair,
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95 Wn.2d 706, 712, 630 P.2d 427 (1981)). In Clark, the FBI agent’s basis of knowledge was “the administration of the polygraph test and his
clinical and common sense observation of Clark’s performance.” Id.
2.3(e) Taking of Blood Samples
The police have probable cause to believe that a person’s blood
sample will provide evidence of criminal activity justifying the seizure if
the facts and circumstances known to the officers justify their belief that
the person is intoxicated and has committed a crime of which intoxication is an element. State v. Curran, 116 Wn.2d 174, 184, 804 P.2d 558
(1991), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Berlin, 133 Wn.2d 541,
947 P.2d 700 (1997); see also State v. Schulze, 116 Wn.2d 154, 161,
804 P.2d 566 (1991) (no right to counsel prior to undergoing a mandatory blood draw); State v. Komoto, 40 Wn. App. 200, 208, 697 P.2d
1025 (1985) (police may enter the home of a suspected drunk driver if
police “have probable cause to believe that the suspect was under the
influence, that he has committed a felony of which being under the
influence of alcohol is an element, and that he is presently at home”).
2.4 LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS’ FIRST-HAND OBSERVATIONS
Because the existence of probable cause is dependent on a factbased inquiry, it is impossible to define when an officer’s observations
are sufficient to constitute probable cause. However, the following common factual situations provide some general guidance.
2.4(a) Particular Crimes: Stolen Property
Suspicious conduct suggesting that property is stolen does not always establish probable cause. For example, when officers saw two men
park a car in an alley, load it with cartons, drive away, and later return
and repeat their conduct, the officers did not have probable cause to believe that the cartons contained stolen property. Henry v. United States,
361 U.S. 98, 99, 103, 80 S. Ct. 168, 4 L. Ed. 2d 134 (1959).
The alternative outcome occurred in a case where officers stopped a
vehicle after learning that its owner had an outstanding warrant for a traffic violation. State v. Glasper, 84 Wn.2d 17, 18, 523 P.2d 937 (1974).
The police then saw an unpadded, unsecured television in the open trunk.
Id. A passenger in the car claimed ownership of the set, but was unable
to identify the brand. Id. The court held that the police had reasonable
cause to believe that the television was stolen. Id. at 21, 523 P.2d 937.
Similarly, items wrapped in a blanket on a street and thrown into bushes
when police approached were indicative of stolen property when police
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had previous experience with similar situations. State v. Barber, 118
Wn.2d 335, 337–38, 340, 823 P.2d 1068 (1992). However, in another
case, the existence of an expensive briefcase in a car that had not been
reported stolen was not sufficient to establish probable cause for a vehicle search. State v. Ozuna, 80 Wn. App. 684, 688–89, 911 P.2d 395
(1996). See generally 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 3.6(a),
(5th ed. 2012).
2.4(b) Particular Crimes: Illegal Substances
The odor of an illegal substance may establish probable cause as
long as the odor is detected by someone trained and experienced in detecting illegal substances. State v. Jacobs, 121 Wn. App. 669, 678, 89
P.3d 232 (2004), rev’d on other grounds, 154 Wn.2d 596, 115 P.3d 281
(2005); State v. Olson, 73 Wn. App. 348, 356, 869 P.2d 110 (1994)
(trained officer’s detection of marijuana odor); State v. Vonhof, 51 Wn.
App. 33, 41–42, 751 P.2d 1221 (1988) (odor combined with experience
in smelling the illegal substance constituted probable cause). The affidavit in support of a warrant must set forth the officer’s training and experience in identifying the odor. See State v. Remboldt, 64 Wn. App. 505,
510, 827 P.2d 282 (1992); State v. Graham, 130 Wn.2d 711, 724–725,
927 P.2d 227 (1996); State v. Solberg, 66 Wn. App. 66, 79, 831 P.2d 754
(1992), rev’d on other grounds, 122 Wn.2d 688, 861 P.2d 460 (1993)
(officer had experience in identifying marijuana grow operations); State
v. Fore, 56 Wn. App. 339, 343–44, 783 P.2d 626 (1989) (officer training
relevant to surveillance of drug transactions in park). However, even if
the officer’s experience and education is not in the affidavit, the omission
is not fatal to the search warrant’s validity if other facts in the affidavit
demonstrate probable cause. Jacobs, 121 Wn. App. at 678, 89 P.3d 232.
Absolute certainty as to the identity of a substance is not required.
Graham, 130 Wn.2d at 725, 927 P.2d 227 (quoting Fore, 56 Wn. App. at
345, 783 P.2d 626). Moreover, odor may be used in concert with other
suspicious activities to establish probable cause. See State v. Huff, 64
Wn. App. 641, 647–48, 826 P.2d 698 (1992) (odor of methamphetamine
combined with furtive gestures and lying to police during car stop created probable cause). Documentation purporting to authorize a defendant’s
use of marijuana will not negate an officer’s probable cause. State v. Fry,
168 Wn.2d 1, 6, 228 P.3d 1 (2010). The authorization creates only a potential affirmative defense that would excuse the criminal act. Id. at 7–8,
228 P.3d 1. However, the officer’s experience and training on the characteristics of those who cultivate illegal substances, without more, is not
enough to establish probable cause. Olson, 73 Wn. App. at 357, 869 P.2d
110 (officer’s experience that those who cultivate marijuana usually hide
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records and materials in a safe house under their control does not satisfy
probable cause for search warrant of the safe house premises); State v.
Perez, 92 Wn. App. 1, 7–8, 963 P.2d 881 (1998) (sufficient facts supported inference of large-scale drug dealing to support search of alleged
safe house); see State v. Thein, 138 Wn.2d 133, 150, 977 P.2d 582
(1999) (magistrate could not infer that evidence might be found in the
defendant’s home based solely on generalization that drug dealers likely
keep drugs at their home). See 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure §
3.6(b) (5th ed. 2012).
In the case of a drug enforcement dog sniff, an alert establishes
probable cause if the dog’s training and reliability are known to the officers and set forth in the affidavit for a warrant. State v. Jackson, 82 Wn.
App. 594, 606–07, 918 P.2d 945 (1996) (alert by police dog after temporary seizure of Federal Express package constituted probable cause);
State v. Flores-Moreno, 72 Wn. App. 733, 740–41, 866 P.2d 648 (1994)
(probable cause established from observations of drug deal combined
with positive canine sniff); State v. Stanphill, 53 Wn. App. 623, 632, 769
P.2d 861 (1989) (corroborating canine sniff overcame any deficiency in
the reliability of an informant). The U.S. Supreme Court has found that
“evidence of a dog’s satisfactory performance in a certification or training program can itself provide sufficient reason to trust [the dog’s]
alert[]” such that a court can initially presume that the alert provides
probable cause to search. Florida v. Harris, 133 S.Ct. 1050, 185 L. Ed.
2d 61 (2013). In Harris, however, the Court used the “totality of the circumstances” test established in Illinois v. Gates to determine that the absence of records establishing the dog’s track record in locating substances in the field did not invalidate probable cause. Id., at 1055, 185 L. Ed.
2d. 61. The Washington State Supreme Court, however, has declined to
follow the test set out in Illinois v. Gates, and therefore the applicability
of the totality of the circumstances test to probable cause predicated on a
canine sniff alert under article I, section 7 remains unclear. State v. Jackson, 102 Wn.2d 432, 688 P.2d 136 (1984); see Florida v. Jardines, 133
S. Ct. 1409, 185 L. Ed. 2d 495 (2013).
2.4(c) Association: Persons and Places
Because of the individualized suspicion requirement, mere association with a person whom police have grounds to arrest does not constitute probable cause for arrest. United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 587,
68 S. Ct. 222, 92 L. Ed. 210 (1948) (search of a car passenger unjustified
when the driver was arrested for possession of counterfeit ration coupons). Mere proximity to others suspected of criminal activity does not in
itself establish probable cause for a search of the associate. State v.
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Crane, 105 Wn. App. 301, 312, 19 P.3d 1100 (2001), overruled on other
grounds by State v. O’Neill, 148 Wn.2d 564, 62 P.3d 489 (2003); State v.
Dorsey, 40 Wn. App. 459, 466, 698 P.2d 1109 (1985) (probable cause
based on association with others engaged in criminal activity requires an
additional circumstance that reasonably implies knowledge of or participation in that activity). An officer must establish an individualized finding of probable cause to make a lawful arrest. State v. Grande, 164
Wn.2d 135, 140, 187 P.3d 248 (2008). In Grande, the court held that the
officer did not have probable cause to arrest and search a car passenger
based solely on the smell of marijuana emanating from the car. Id. at
146, 187 P.3d 248. Additionally, race or color alone, including “racial
incongruity” (“a person of any race being allegedly ‘out of place’ in a
particular geographic area”) can never constitute probable cause of criminal activity. State v. Barber, 118 Wn.2d 335, 346, 823 P.2d 1068
(1992); see also United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 885–87,
95 S. Ct. 2574, 45 L. Ed. 2d 607 (1975).
Neither is an individual’s presence in a high-crime area sufficient,
by itself, to establish probable cause. See Crane, 105 Wn. App. at 312,
19 P.3d 1100; see also Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52, 99 S. Ct. 2637,
61 L. Ed. 2d 357 (1979). Suspicion of dangerousness must relate to the
person searched, not to the area in which he is found. State v. Smith, 102
Wn.2d 449, 452–53, 688 P.2d 146 (1984) (general practice of frisking
individuals in particularly dangerous area of the city is not justified by
probable cause). See generally 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure §
3.6(g) (5th ed. 2012).
2.4(d) Furtive Gestures and Flight
A suspect’s furtive gestures or flight, without more, cannot establish probable cause; however, they may be a factor in determining
whether probable cause exists. State v. Graham, 130 Wn.2d 711, 725–26,
927 P.2d 227 (1996) (finding probable cause when the defendant quickly
concealed an object in his pants pockets, ignored the officers’ request to
stop, looked nervous, and sweated profusely on a cold night); State v.
Hobart, 24 Wn. App. 240, 243, 600 P.2d 660 (1979), rev’d on other
grounds, 94 Wn.2d 437, 617 P.2d 429 (1980) (defendant grabbed his
pocket and turned away from an officer after the officer asked if the defendant had cocaine in his pocket). This is because furtive gestures, evasive behavior, and flight from police are circumstantial evidence of criminal activity. Graham, 130 Wn.2d at 725–26, 927 P.2d 227 (concealing
item that looked like rock cocaine in hand, ignoring an officer’s request
to stop, and profusely sweating in cold temperature); State v. Glover, 116
Wn.2d 509, 512, 514–15, 806 P.2d 760 (1991) (defendant’s conduct of
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turning away from the officers, walking faster, playing with his ball cap,
and looking toward the officers and then looking away, coupled with
officer’s disbelief of defendant’s statement that he lived at housing complex constituted probable cause for criminal trespass); State v. Baxter, 68
Wn.2d 416, 421–22, 413 P.2d 638 (1966) (“[F]light is an element of
probable cause. . . .”); State v. Huff, 64 Wn. App. 641, 647, 826 P.2d 698
(1992) (furtive movements and lying to police about identity support
probable cause); see also Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 66–67, 88 S.
Ct. 1889, 20 L. Ed. 2d 917 (1968) (probable cause existed when
strangers tiptoed from apartment and fled from police officer); State v.
Larson, 93 Wn.2d 638, 645, 611 P.2d 771 (1980) (suspect’s leaving at
the time a police cruiser arrives does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that it is reasonable to suspect the person of committing a crime).
Probable cause, however, is not negated merely because it is possible to
imagine an innocent explanation for observed activities. Graham, 130
Wn.2d at 725, 927 P.2d 227 (quoting State v. Fore, 56 Wn. App. 339,
344, 783 P.2d 626 (1989)) (noting that absolute certainty as to the identity of a suspicious substance is not required).
2.4(e) Response to Questioning
A suspect’s response to police questioning can establish probable
cause when combined with other circumstances. State v. Huff, 64 Wn.
App. 641, 647, 826 P.2d 698 (1992) (lying to police about identity coupled with furtive gestures and identification of illegal substance odor established probable cause); State v. Glover, 116 Wn.2d 509, 514, 806 P.2d
760 (1991) (officer’s disbelief of defendant’s statement that he lived at
housing complex, combined with suspicious gestures, constituted probable cause for criminal trespass); see also United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S.
891, 897, 95 S. Ct. 2585, 45 L. Ed. 2d 623 (1975) (border patrol may
consider nature of responses to questioning to help establish probable
cause).
A suspect’s failure or refusal to answer an officer’s questions, however, may not be taken into account. State v. White, 97 Wn.2d 92, 106,
640 P.2d 1061 (1982); see Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 53 n.3, 99 S. Ct.
2637, 61 L. Ed. 2d 357 (1979). See generally 2 Wayne R. LaFave,
Search and Seizure § 3.6(f) (5th ed. 2012). Similarly, a suspect’s silence
after Miranda warnings have been given may not be considered in determining probable cause. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 617–18, 96 S.
Ct. 2240, 49 L. Ed. 2d 91 (1976). Nor may the suspect’s failure to challenge the officer’s actions be considered. United States v. Di Re, 332
U.S. 581, 594, 68 S. Ct. 222, 92 L. Ed. 210 (1948) (officers could not

2013]

Chapter 2: Standards of Proof

1623

infer probable cause from suspect’s failure to protest arrest or to proclaim innocence).
Although the U.S. Supreme Court has held that the Fourth Amendment cannot compel a suspect to answer questions, a state may criminalize a suspect’s refusal to identify herself if the request for identification
is reasonably related to the circumstances that justified the investigative
stop. Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Ct. of Nevada, Humboldt Cnty., 542 U.S.
177, 187–89, 124 S. Ct. 2451, 159 L. Ed. 2d 292 (2004); see State v.
Turner, 103 Wn. App. 515, 525–26, 13 P.3d 234 (2000) (holding the defendant’s refusal to provide his name combined with the defendant’s
lunging at the officer were sufficient to support an arrest for obstruction
of a law enforcement officer); State v. Contreras, 92 Wn. App. 307, 316,
966 P.2d 915 (1998) (recognizing the defendant’s right to refuse to answer questions, but including the defendant’s giving a false name as one
reason that supported a charge for obstruction of justice). See generally
RCW 9A.76.020(1) (Washington’s obstruction of justice statute).
2.5 INFORMATION FROM AN INFORMANT: IN GENERAL
Different sets of rules govern information received from an informant depending on whether the informant is a criminal informant, a citizen informant, a police informant, or an anonymous informant. This section discusses general rules that apply to all informants; section 2.6 focuses on citizen informants; section 2.7 covers the rules for when the
informant is a fellow police officer; and section 2.8 deals with anonymous informants.
Traditionally, under the Fourth Amendment, information from an
informant could establish probable cause only when the information
available to the police satisfied the two-prong Aguilar-Spinelli test,
which requires that an informant’s basis of knowledge and reliability be
established. Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 415–16, 89 S. Ct.
584, 21 L. Ed. 2d 637 (1969); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 114, 84 S.
Ct. 1509, 12 L. Ed. 2d 723 (1964); see 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and
Seizure § 3.3(a) (5th ed. 2012). While the Supreme Court has since rejected Aguilar-Spinelli in favor of a less stringent totality of the circumstances approach for determining when an informant’s tip may establish probable cause, see Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231–32, 103
S. Ct. 2317, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1983), the Washington State Supreme
Court has held that article I, section 7 requires adherence to the Aguilar-Spinelli test. State v. Vickers, 148 Wn.2d 91, 111–12, 59 P.3d 58
(2002) (citing State v. Jackson, 102 Wn.2d 432, 440, 688 P.2d 136
(1984)).
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The U.S. Supreme Court has since replaced the Aguilar-Spinelli test
with a less stringent totality of the circumstances approach for determining when an informant’s tip may establish probable cause. Gates, 462
U.S. at 230–32, 103 S. Ct. 2317. A Washington trial court, however, may
not use the Gates “totality of the circumstances” test. State v. Gaddy, 152
Wn.2d 64, 71 n.2, 93 P.3d 872 (2004); Jackson, 102 Wn.2d at 443, 688
P.2d 136; see 2 LaFave, supra, § 3.3(a). As a result, under article I, section 7, a strong showing as to an informant’s basis of knowledge cannot
overcome a deficiency in the informant’s credibility and vice versa.
Jackson, 102 Wn.2d at 441, 688 P.2d 136. But probable cause may still
be established despite such a deficiency if the police can support this
missing prong by sufficiently corroborating the informant’s tip. Id. at
445, 688 P.2d 136.
Under the “basis of knowledge” prong, the facts must enable the
person making the probable cause determination, such as a magistrate, to
decide whether the informant had a basis for the allegation of criminal
conduct. Id. at 444, 688 P.2d 136 (basis of knowledge not satisfied when
informant could not establish how he knew the defendant was a drug
dealer). Under the “veracity” prong, the facts must enable the magistrate
to determine either the informant’s inherent credibility or reliability on
the particular occasion. Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 415–16, 89 S. Ct. 584. An
informant’s tip may provide police with grounds to stop a person only if
there are some indicia of reliability. State v. Smith, 102 Wn.2d 449, 455,
688 P.2d 146 (1984) (officers’ reliance on street kids to lead them to
suspect is not permissible when the officers questioned the reliability
of children). If either the basis of knowledge or veracity prong is deficient, the police may cure the deficiency by corroborating the informant’s tip through an independent investigation. Vickers, 148
Wn.2d at 112, 59 P.3d 58.
2.5(a) Satisfying the “Basis of Knowledge” Prong by
Personal Knowledge
The best way to satisfy the “basis of knowledge” prong is to show
that the informant based his or her information on personal knowledge.
See, e.g., Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 114, 84 S. Ct. 1509, 12 L. Ed.
2d 723 (1964); State v. Vickers, 148 Wn.2d 91, 112, 59 P.3d 58 (2002);
State v. Jackson, 102 Wn.2d 432, 437, 688 P.2d 136 (1984); State v.
Bauer, 98 Wn. App. 870, 875, 991 P.2d 668 (2000). For example, an informant’s statement that he had observed a marijuana grow operation in
the defendant’s residence will satisfy the basis of knowledge prong. State
v. Wolken, 103 Wn.2d 823, 827, 700 P.2d 319 (1985). The affidavit need
only show that the informant had personal knowledge of the facts as-
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serted. Vickers, 148 Wn.2d at 113, 59 P.3d 58 (affidavit did not need to
establish that informant had actually seen the weapons or ammunition
used in a robbery, but did need to establish that the informant had personal knowledge of the facts asserted in the affidavit regarding the defendants’ conversations about committing an armed robbery). Personal
knowledge of only innocuous facts about the defendant, however, is insufficient. State v. Young, 123 Wn.2d 173, 196, 867 P.2d 593 (1994)
(phone number, address, and abnormally high electrical consumption
considered innocuous facts); State v. Huft, 106 Wn.2d 206, 211, 720 P.2d
838 (1986) (1986). Lastly, the basis of an informant’s knowledge may be
established by hearsay. See State v. Jackson, 102 Wn.2d at 437, 688 P.2d
136; State v. Casto, 39 Wn. App. 229, 233, 692 P.2d 890 (1984).
Under article I, section 7, a deficiency in the basis of knowledge
prong may be remedied by “independent police investigatory work that
corroborates the tip to such an extent that it supports the missing elements.” Jackson, 102 Wn.2d at 438, 688 P.2d 136; see also State v. Kennedy, 72 Wn. App. 244, 249–50, 864 P.2d 410 (1993); State v. Adame,
39 Wn. App. 574, 576–77, 694 P.2d 676 (1985). The corroborated information, like an informant’s first-hand knowledge, must itself suggest
criminal activity; “[m]erely verifying ‘innocuous details,’ commonly
known facts or easily predictable events should not suffice to remedy
[the] deficiency.” Jackson, 102 Wn.2d at 438, 688 P.2d 136; State v.
Maddox, 116 Wn. App. 796, 803, 67 P.3d 1135 (2003), aff’d, 152 Wn.2d
499, 98 P.3d 1199 (2004) (corroboration of alleged drug dealing sufficient when police searched informant before a controlled buy, observed
his entrance and exit, and then re-searched the informant after the controlled buy); State v. Maxwell, 114 Wn.2d 761, 769–70, 791 P.2d 223
(1990) (frequent visitors, tin foil on windows, and suspicious conversation not sufficient evidence of illegal activity).
Lastly, even if a deficiency in the information renders it insufficient
to establish probable cause, it may be used to corroborate other cognizable information. State v. Lund, 70 Wn. App. 437, 450 n.10, 853 P.2d
1379 (1993) (anonymous police informant’s tip of possible drug activity
in prison not enough to establish probable cause, but could be considered
in corroborating another police informant’s similar information and for
independent police investigation of tip); State v. Lair, 95 Wn.2d 706,
712, 630 P.2d 427 (1981) (statements by a reliable informant may establish probable cause when used to corroborate information provided by an
informant whose reliability has not yet been established). See generally 2
Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 3.3(f) (5th ed. 2012).
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2.5(b) Satisfying the “Veracity” Prong by Past Performance
The veracity prong of the Aguilar-Spinelli test is a measure of an
informant’s truthfulness. State v. Chamberlin, 161 Wn.2d 30, 41, 162
P.3d 389 (2007). This prong is met when the affidavit supporting the
search warrant shows the informant’s credibility or contains sufficient
facts from which a magistrate can independently determine the veracity
of the informant. State v. Vickers, 148 Wn.2d 91, 112, 59 P.3d 58 (2002);
State v. Garcia, 140 Wn. App. 609, 619, 166 P.3d 848 (2007) (quoting
State v. McCord, 125 Wn. App. 888, 893, 106 P.3d 832 (2005)); State v.
Maddox, 116 Wn. App. 796, 803, 67 P.3d 1135, aff’d, 152 Wn.2d 499,
98 P.3d 1199 (2004) (informant’s “track record” of two successful controlled buys sufficient to support an inference of veracity).
An informant’s reliability may be established if the informant has
previously provided information that was proven to be reliable, thereby
establishing a “track record” of reliability. State v. Jackson, 102 Wn.2d
432, 437, 688 P.2d 136 (1984); State v. Shaver, 116 Wn. App. 375, 380–
81, 65 P.3d 688 (2003) (confidential informant had provided reliable information to the officer in the past); State v. Lopez, 70 Wn. App. 259,
264, 856 P.2d 390 (1993) (informant’s successful assistance in prior controlled buys established a track record of reliability); see 2 Wayne R.
LaFave, Search and Seizure § 3.3(b) (5th ed. 2012). In the absence of
circumstances demonstrating unreliability, an officer need not have personal knowledge of the informant’s track record, but may rely on information from fellow officers. State v. Vanzant, 14 Wn. App. 679, 681–82,
544 P.2d 786 (1975); see infra § 2.7(b). Further, similar to an informant’s basis of knowledge, an informant’s credibility may be verified by
independent police investigation. See Shaver, 116 Wn. App. at 380–81,
65 P.3d 688 (confidential informant’s credibility corroborated by officer’s ongoing investigation of drug activity at a residence for many years
prior to informant’s tip and officer’s observations that residence was frequented by known drug users); State v. Emery, 161 Wn. App. 172, 202,
253 P.3d 413 (2011) (informant’s veracity confirmed by police investigation).
2.5(c) Satisfying the “Veracity” Prong with Admissions Against
Interest and Motive
The veracity prong may also be established when the informant has
a clear motive for being truthful, such as receiving a benefit in return for
good information. State v. Bean, 89 Wn.2d 467, 469–71, 572 P.2d 1102
(1978) (offer of a favorable sentence recommendation gave informant a
strong motive to provide accurate information); State v. Estorga, 60 Wn.
App. 298, 305, 803 P.2d 813 (1991) (offer to drop charges in exchange
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for accurate information established strong motive to be truthful); State
v. Smith, 39 Wn. App. 642, 647–48, 694 P.2d 660 (1984) (offer of reduction in charge from felony to misdemeanor gave informant strong motive
to be truthful). An informant’s statement against penal interest, or recitation of another person’s statement against interest, particularly when
supported by other indicia of reliability, may also demonstrate a motive
for being truthful and thereby establish credibility. State v. Chamberlin,
161 Wn.2d 30, 42, 162 P.3d 389 (2007) (informant’s confession of driving under the influence of narcotics, supported by his willingness to be a
named informant, established reliability); State v. Merkt, 124 Wn. App.
607, 613−14, 102 P.3d 828 (2004); State v. Shaver, 116 Wn. App. 375,
380–81, 65 P.3d 688 (2003) (confidential informant relayed comments
against penal interest made by suspected drug dealer).
2.6 CITIZEN INFORMANTS: VICTIM/WITNESS INFORMANTS IN GENERAL
The Aguilar-Spinelli test also applies to the use of information from
a citizen informant. State v. Wible, 113 Wn. App. 18, 22, 51 P.3d 830
(2002); State v. Tarter, 111 Wn. App. 336, 340, 44 P.3d 899 (2002)
(Aguilar-Spinelli test applied where informants were named citizens).
Again, multiple levels of hearsay are acceptable as long as each instance
in the chain meets the two-prong test. See, e.g., State v. Vanzant, 14 Wn.
App. 679, 683, 544 P.2d 786 (1975) (information passed to second detective by detective with personal knowledge of informant’s reliability sufficient to establish probable cause for arrest). See generally 2 Wayne R.
LaFave, Search and Seizure § 3.4 (5th ed. 2012). Lastly, a demonstration
of reliability may not be required if a citizen provides noncriminal,
nonaccusatory information that strongly suggests that the informant is
relating personal observations. State v. Nordlund, 113 Wn. App. 171,
181, 53 P.3d 520 (2002); State v. Stone, 56 Wn. App. 153, 156, 782 P.2d
1093 (1989).
2.6(a) Satisfying the “Basis of Knowledge” Prong
The basis for the citizen informant’s knowledge must be established. See State v. Huft, 106 Wn.2d 206, 211, 720 P.2d 838 (1986). Information showing that the informant has personally seen the facts asserted and is passing on firsthand information satisfies the basis of the
knowledge prong. State v. Smith, 110 Wn.2d 658, 663, 756 P.2d 722
(1988); State v. Jackson, 102 Wn.2d. 432, 437, 688 P.2d 136 (1984);
State v. Wible, 113 Wn. App. 18, 23, 51 P.3d 830 (2002). However, if the
informant was not the eyewitness, or when the information requires some
expertise, such as the identification of the odor of marijuana, the basis of
the informant’s knowledge must be demonstrated. State v. Boyer, 124
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Wn. App. 593, 606, 102 P.3d 833 (2004) (affidavit failed to establish
citizen informant’s expertise in identifying cocaine); see 2 Wayne R.
LaFave, Search and Seizure § 3.4(b) (5th ed. 2012).
2.6(b) Satisfying the “Veracity” Prong by Partial Corroboration of
Informant’s Tip and by Self-Verifying Detail
Washington courts require a showing of reliability for citizen informants. State v. Gaddy, 152 Wn.2d 64, 72–73, 93 P.3d 872 (2004);
State v. Ibarra, 61 Wn. App. 695, 698–99, 812 P.2d 114 (1991) (noting
the different types of informants). Accordingly, the police must present
the issuing magistrate with sufficient facts to determine the informant’s
inherent credibility or reliability, unless the police corroborate the informant’s tip. State v. Duncan, 81 Wn. App. 70, 76, 912 P.2d 1090
(1996); State v. Huff, 33 Wn. App. 304, 307–08, 654 P.2d 1211 (1982);
State v. Bauer, 98 Wn. App. 870, 876–77, 991 P.2d 668 (2000) (credibility established when informant was a concerned citizen, had been a
Washington citizen for more than nine years, was a registered voter, and
feared retaliation).
With an identified citizen informant, however, the burden for establishing credibility is generally lower, and the court will presume the citizen informant’s reliability. Gaddy, 152 Wn.2d at 72–73, 93 P.3d 872;
Ibarra, 61 Wn. App. at 699, 812 P.2d 114; State v. Franklin, 49 Wn.
App. 106, 109, 741 P.2d 83 (1987) (noting that the standard is relaxed
but the information must support an inference of truthfulness and must
establish a basis of knowledge); State v. McReynolds, 104 Wn. App. 560,
572–73, 17 P.3d 608 (2001) (citizen informant was readily identifiable
from affidavit and provided information in “entirely unsuspicious circumstances”). This is because a citizen informant is unlikely to have an
established “track record” of providing information to the police, such
that the citizen informant’s veracity may be otherwise difficult to establish. Ibarra, 61 Wn. App. at 699, 812 P.2d 114. Naming an informant is
not alone a sufficient ground on which to credit an informant, but it is
considered in the determination of whether the informant is actually a
citizen informant. State v. McCord, 125 Wn. App. 888, 893, 106 P.3d
832 (2005) (citing Duncan, 81 Wn. App. at 78, 912 P.2d 1090); see also
State v. Atchley, 142 Wn. App. 147, 162, 173 P.3d 323 (2007) (credibility of citizen informant established when the informant provided his or
her name and contact information, received no compensation for the tip,
and a background check made no indication of untrustworthiness). The
standard is generally not relaxed, however, when the citizen informant
remains unidentified to the magistrate. State v. Huft, 106 Wn.2d 206,
211, 720 P.2d 838 (1986); State v. Garcia, 140 Wn. App. 609, 619, 166

2013]

Chapter 2: Standards of Proof

1629

P.3d 848 (2007); Ibarra, 61 Wn. App. at 699, 812 P.2d 114. Lastly, an
informant is presumed reliable if the circumstances that establish personal knowledge are sufficiently detailed. State v. Gaddy, 114 Wn. App.
702, 707, 60 P.3d 116 (2002), aff’d on other grounds by 152 Wn.2d 64,
93 P.3d 872; State v. Wible, 113 Wn. App. 18, 24, 51 P.3d 830 (2002)
(no independent corroboration required); State v. Tarter, 111 Wn. App.
336, 340, 44 P.3d 899 (2002) (State’s burden is “relaxed” with regard to
the veracity of citizen informants).
2.6(c) Sufficiency of Information Supplied
Factors that have been considered in determining whether sufficient
information has been provided by a victim informant or witness informant include (1) the particularity of the description of the offender or the
vehicle; (2) the size of the area in which the perpetrator might be found;
(3) the number of persons in the area; (4) the direction of flight; (5) the
activity or condition of the person arrested; and (6) the person’s
knowledge that his vehicle has been involved in other similar criminal
activity. See 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 3.4(c) (5th ed.
2012).
When a citizen can identify a suspect by photograph, the information is sufficient to establish probable cause. See Simmons v. United
States, 390 U.S. 377, 384, 88 S. Ct. 967, 19 L. Ed. 2d 1247 (1968). Witness descriptions of the attire, vehicle, and physical build of the suspect
may also provide probable cause when used in combination. State v.
Palmer, 73 Wn.2d 462, 464–65, 438 P.2d 876 (1968) (probable cause for
arrest was established when 45 minutes after robbery the victim identified an automobile by make, year, color, and dirty white top, and described suspect by hair color and attire); State v. Kohler, 70 Wn.2d 599,
605, 424 P.2d 656 (1967) (probable cause established when two witnesses provided descriptions of vehicle, clothing, and build of suspects,
and when probability was slight that two similar cars would be traveling
within limited area of Seattle at 12:30 a.m.); State v. Baker, 68 Wn.2d
517, 520, 413 P.2d 965 (1966) (probable cause established when robbery
victims identified make, color, and license number of suspect vehicle).
2.7 POLICE AS INFORMANTS
2.7(a) Satisfying the “Veracity” and “Basis of Knowledge” Prongs
As with citizen informants’ veracity under federal law, the veracity
of police informants’ statements may be presumed. See United States v.
Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 110, 85 S. Ct. 741, 13 L. Ed. 2d 684 (1965);
State v. Gaddy, 152 Wn.2d 64, 71–73, 93 P.3d 872 (2004). Generally,
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there must be a showing that the officer had a basis for his or her
knowledge. Gaddy, 152 Wn.2d at 72, 93 P.3d 872. Conclusory allegations will suffice in limited, complex situations, when explaining the
grounds for the belief may be difficult. Jaben v. United States, 381 U.S.
214, 223–24, 85 S. Ct. 1365, 14 L. Ed. 2d 345 (1965) (in tax evasion
case, affidavit need not explain every basis of the allegation).
2.7(b) Multiple Hearsay
An arresting officer need not have personal knowledge of the facts
establishing probable cause, but may rely on another officer’s assessment. State v. Gaddy, 152 Wn.2d 64, 70–71, 93 P.3d 872 (2004) (officer
may rely on information from a police bulletin or “hot sheet” if the issuing agency has probable cause); Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 568,
91 S. Ct. 1031, 28 L. Ed. 2d 306 (1971) (“fellow officer rule”). However,
probable cause must actually exist for the arrest to be valid. Gaddy, 152
Wn.2d at 70–71, 93 P.3d 872; Whiteley, 401 U.S. at 568–69, 91 S. Ct.
1031; see 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 3.5(b) (5th ed.
2012). An arresting officer’s good faith reliance is irrelevant. State v.
Gaddy, 114 Wn. App. 702, 706, 60 P.3d 116 (2002), aff’d, 152 Wn.2d
64, 93 P.3d 872.
Although determining probable cause on the basis of collective information in an agency is generally permissible, the chain of communication must be shown. See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 12 Wn. App. 309, 310,
529 P.2d 873 (1974). See generally 2 LaFave, supra, § 3.5(c). Whether
the State must prove the reliability of the agency’s records may depend
on whether the court considers the agency to be a citizen informant. See
Gaddy, 152 Wn.2d at 71–74, 93 P.3d 872 (treating Department of Licensing as a citizen informant and finding Department’s information presumptively reliable regarding defendant’s driving record); State v.
Sandholm, 96 Wn. App. 846, 848, 980 P.2d 1292 (1999) (no evidence
provided to show reliability of information from WACIC radio).
2.8 INFORMATION FROM ANONYMOUS OR UNKNOWN INFORMANTS:
SATISFYING THE “VERACITY” PRONG
Generally, an anonymous informant’s tip fails to meet the AguilarSpinelli requirements of basis of knowledge and veracity unless the tip is
corroborated. Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 413, 89 S. Ct. 584,
21 L.Ed. 2d 637 (1969); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 114, 84 S. Ct.
1509, 12 L.Ed. 2d 723 (1964); State v. Young, 123 Wn.2d 173, 195, 867
P.2d 593 (1994). Even a named but unknown informant is not entitled to
a presumption of reliability. See State v. Sieler, 95 Wn.2d 43, 48, 621
P.2d 1272 (1980) (reliability of named but unknown telephone informant
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not significantly different from anonymous telephone informant). If the
informant is a citizen informant and wishes to remain anonymous, “the
affidavit must contain background facts to support a reasonable inference
that the information is credible and without motive to falsify.” State v.
Wilke, 55 Wn. App. 470, 477, 778 P.2d 1054 (1989); see also State v.
Cole, 128 Wn.2d 262, 287−88, 906 P.2d 925 (1995); State v. Ibarra, 61
Wn. App. 695, 700, 812 P.2d 114 (1991).
If, however, a police investigation corroborates the informant’s information and constitutes more than mere public or innocuous facts, the
Aguilar-Spinelli test will be satisfied. Young, 123 Wn.2d at 195, 867 P.2d
593; State v. Jackson, 102 Wn.2d 432, 438, 688 P.2d 136 (1984); State v.
Kennedy, 72 Wn. App. 244, 249, 864 P.2d 410 (1993). The fact that the
anonymous informant accurately describes a vehicle is insufficient. State
v. Lesnick, 84 Wn.2d 940, 943–44, 530 P.2d 243 (1975) (citing Whiteley
v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 91 S. Ct. 1031, 28 L. Ed. 2d 306 (1971)).
2.9 SPECIAL SEARCHES AND SEIZURES REQUIRING
LESSER OR GREATER LEVELS OF PROOF
Although a majority of searches will fall under the general rubric
discussed above, three types of searches are either conducted on less than
probable cause or, in contrast, require additional constitutional safeguards. Administrative searches, discussed in section 2.9(a), and Terry
investigatory stops, covered in section 2.9(b), are permissible under relaxed standards. Searches that intrude into an individual’s body require a
greater level of proof and are discussed in section 2.9(c).
2.9(a) Administrative Searches
The protections of the Fourth Amendment and article I, section 7 of
the Washington constitution extend to administrative and regulatory
searches. Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528–34, 87 S. Ct. 1727,
18 L. Ed. 2d 930 (1967); Rental Owners Ass’n v. Thurston Cnty., 85 Wn.
App. 171, 183, 931 P.2d 208 (1997). Therefore, such searches must either be conducted pursuant to a warrant or fall within one of the narrowly
drawn exceptions to the warrant requirement. See Camara, 387 U.S. at
534, 87 S. Ct. 1727. To obtain an administrative warrant to search commercial or residential premises, law enforcement officers must either offer specific proof of a violation, or show that “reasonable legislative or
administrative standards for conducting an . . . inspection are satisfied
with respect to a particular [establishment].” Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc.,
436 U.S. 307, 320–21, 98 S. Ct. 1816, 56 L. Ed. 2d 305 (1978) (brackets
in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Camara, 387 U.S. at 538, 87 S.
Ct. 1727). Administrative searches excepted from the warrant require-
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ment must be reasonable in light of the individual’s expectation of privacy and the asserted government interest. Murphy v. State, 115 Wn. App.
297, 307–08, 62 P.3d 533 (2003). For a discussion of administrative
searches in general, see infra § 6.4.
When officers seek a warrant based on a general administrative
program, they must set forth sufficient details of the program to enable
the magistrate to determine whether the program is reasonable. Seattle v.
Leach, 29 Wn. App. 81, 85, 627 P.2d 159 (1981). Inventory searches are
one type of search based on a general administrative program that can be
justified without probable cause. State v. White, 135 Wn.2d 761, 766,
958 P.2d 982 (1998) (inventory searches pursuant to standard police procedures are “reasonable”).
2.9(b) Terry Stops and Frisks
Police may stop an individual for investigation with less than probable cause if they have reasonable and articulable facts that point toward
criminal activity. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed.
2d 889 (1968); State v. Rankin, 151 Wn.2d 689, 698−99, 92 P.3d 202
(2004) (police may request identification from a passenger for investigatory purposes with an articulable suspicion of criminal activity by the
passenger); State v. Kennedy, 107 Wn.2d 1, 8, 726 P.2d 445 (1986).
However, the stop must not exceed the scope and purpose of a Terry
stop—the stop must be reasonably limited in scope to “whatever reasonable suspicions legally justified the stop in the first place.” State v.
Arreola, 176 Wn.2d 284, 293–94, 290 P.3d 983 (2012) (citing State v.
Ladson, 138 Wn.2d 343, 350, 979 P.2d 833 (1999)). If the officer has
reasonable grounds to believe the person is armed and currently dangerous, he or she may perform a limited frisk of the suspect for weapons.
Terry, 392 U.S. at 29, 88 S. Ct. 1868; State v. Hudson, 124 Wn.2d 107,
112, 874 P.2d 160 (1994). For a complete discussion of Terry stops and
frisks, see generally infra Chapter 4.
2.9(c) Intrusions into the Body
Under article I, section 7 and the Fourth Amendment, taking a
blood sample is a search and seizure that must be supported by probable
cause. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 616, 109 S. Ct.
1402, 103 L. Ed. 2d 639 (1989); State v. Garcia-Salgado, 170 Wn.2d
176, 184, 240 P.3d 153 (2010). If probable cause exists, neither an adversarial hearing nor notice to defense counsel is required before a search
warrant to obtain a blood sample may be issued. State v. Kalakosky, 121
Wn.2d 525, 534−36, 852 P.2d 1064 (1993). However, due to the invasive
nature of intrusions into the body, the U.S. Supreme Court has iterated
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three additional requirements beyond the probable cause requirement. In
order for the search to be lawful, there must be (1) a “clear indication”
that the desired evidence will be found if the search is performed, (2) the
method of searching must be reasonable, and (3) the search must be performed in a reasonable manner. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757,
769–70, 86 S. Ct. 1826, 16 L. Ed. 2d 908 (1966) (finding that the “interests in human dignity and privacy which the Fourth Amendment protects
[sic]” require a heightened standard). One question that remains unanswered is whether the police may obtain and test an individual’s DNA
before he or she is charged with a crime. See King v. State, 425 Md. 550,
42 A.3d 549 (2012), cert. granted, 133 S.Ct. 594, 184 L.Ed.2d 390
(2012).
More intrusive procedures may be permitted in special environments. For example, in prisons and jails, strip searches and cavity
searches may be done without a warrant. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520,
560, 99 S. Ct. 1861, 60 L. Ed. 2d 447 (1979) (finding full body cavity
searches of prison inmates following contact visits not unreasonable);
State v. Harris, 66 Wn. App. 636, 642, 833 P.2d 402 (1992) (finding exigent circumstances justified strip search of juvenile before placement in
holding cell when police had prior experience with gang members taping
razor blades to their skin). For a full discussion of forced intrusions into
the body, see infra § 3.13(b).

CHAPTER 3
Search Warrants
3.0 INTRODUCTION
Article I, section 7 of the Washington State Constitution requires
that a search warrant be supported by probable cause to be valid. State v.
Neth, 165 Wn.2d 177, 182−83, 196 P.3d 658 (2008); State v. Thein, 138
Wn.2d 133, 140, 977 P.2d 582 (1999) (citing State v. Cole, 128 Wn.2d
262, 286, 906 P.2d 925 (1995)). Likewise, the Fourth Amendment provides that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported
by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” U.S. Const. amend. IV.
In part, these provisions were enacted as a response to the evils of
general warrants and writs of assistance. See Boyd v. United States, 116
U.S. 616, 626−27, 6 S. Ct. 524, 29 L. Ed. 746 (1886). General warrants
and writs had provided law enforcement officers virtually unlimited discretion to search whenever, wherever, and whomever they chose. With
the Fourth Amendment, the Framers sought to curb the abuses of unconstrained searches. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 760−61, 89 S.
Ct. 2034, 23 L. Ed. 2d 685 (1969). Despite this, there are a number of
situations in which searches and seizures may be made without warrants.
See infra, Chapter 5.
This chapter focuses on a valid search warrant and its execution
under article I, section 7 of the Washington State Constitution. The chapter addresses general requirements for a valid warrant, the description of
the place to be searched and the items to be seized, the scope and intensity of the search, the “knock and announce” requirement, detentions of
persons on the premises, and challenges to an affidavit. For the most part,
the standards discussed below apply to arrest warrants as well as to
search warrants. Issues pertaining specifically to arrests are discussed in
Chapter 4.
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3.1 TYPES OF ITEMS THAT MAY BE SEARCHED AND SEIZED
Most commonly, warrants are issued to recover contraband or instrumentalities of a crime. See State v. Fry, 168 Wn.2d 1, 4−6, 228 P.3d
1 (2010) (procuring warrant to search a suspected marijuana grow operation); State v. Reep, 161 Wn.2d 808, 811, 167 P.3d 1156 (2007) (issuing
warrants to search for a possible methamphetamine lab and evidence of
child pornography). However, warrants may also be issued for “mere
evidence” of a crime. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 307, 87 S. Ct.
1642, L. Ed. 2d 782 (1967); State v. Bullock, 71 Wn.2d 886, 890−91, 431
P.2d 195 (1967) (adopting Warden and admitting a letter found with marijuana in an apartment search). When the State seeks a warrant for
“mere evidence,” it must show probable cause to believe that the evidence will aid in apprehending or convicting a suspect. See CrR 2.3(b);
Bullock, 71 Wn.2d at 890−91, 431 P.2d 195.
In addition to “mere evidence” and instrumentalities, warrants may
be issued for evidence containing incriminating statements without violating the Fifth Amendment because the Fifth Amendment provides protection only where the act of producing evidence is, itself, testimonial. In
re Teddington, 116 Wn.2d 761, 776, 808 P.2d 156 (1991) (citing Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 96 S. Ct. 2737, 49 L. Ed. 2d 627
(1976)) (finding that a letter written voluntarily by the defendant to his
friend did not violate his Fifth Amendment rights).
3.2 WHO MAY ISSUE WARRANTS: REQUIREMENT OF A NEUTRAL AND
DETACHED MAGISTRATE
Warrants provide protection against abuse because the determination of probable cause is made by a neutral and detached magistrate rather than by a police officer. The requirement provides protection from
“overzealous police officers” because “the judicial officer will more objectively balance the interests of privacy against the interests of criminal
investigations than will the investigating police officer, who might distort
the independent judgment of probable cause required by the Fourth
Amendment.” State v. Smith, 16 Wn. App. 425, 427, 558 P.2d 265
(1976). Thus, the requirement removes the determination from the police
officer who is “engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting
out crime.” Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14, 68 S. Ct. 367, 92
L. Ed. 436 (1948).
In Washington, a district court’s territorial jurisdiction is within the
boundaries of the county. RCW 3.66.060. Thus, after a showing of probable cause, a district court judge may issue a warrant for the search and
seizure of controlled substances within the county, even outside the
court’s district. RCW 69.50.509. The judge may do this without the ap-
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proval of the prosecutor. Id.; State v. Uhthoff, 45 Wn. App. 261, 264, 724
P.2d 1103 (1986). Even after felony information has been filed in superior court, the district court may still issue a warrant relating to the case.
State v. Stock, 44 Wn. App. 467, 475, 722 P.2d 1330 (1986); see generally 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 4.2(a)−(f) (5th ed. 2012).
3.2(a) Qualifications of a “Magistrate”
Washington State has limited those empowered to issue warrants to
judges in the state supreme court, court of appeals, superior court, and
district court, as well as “all municipal officers authorized to exercise the
powers and perform the duties of district judges.” RCW 2.20.020(4). But
the magistrate need not be an attorney or a judge so long as he or she is
“neutral and detached” and “capable of determining whether probable
cause exists for the requested arrest or search.” State v. Porter, 88 Wn.2d
512, 515, 563 P.2d 829 (1977). Thus, case law has also specifically included court commissioners. State v. Gross, 78 Wn. App. 58, 62, 895
P.2d 861 (1995) (citing State v. Porter, 88 Wn.2d at 514, 563 P.2d 829).
However, this power does not extend to court clerks. State v. Walker, 101
Wn. App. 1, 7−8, 999 P.2d 1296 (2000) (finding that a court clerk, acting
alone, was not empowered to issue a bench warrant); see also 2 Wayne R.
LaFave, Search and Seizure § 4.2(c), at 620−24 (5th ed. 2012).
Even when the person issuing the warrant is a magistrate in title, he
or she must make an independent probable cause determination and may
not act as a “rubber stamp for the police.” Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108,
111, 84 S. Ct. 1509, 12 L. Ed. 2d 723 (1964); State v. Lyons, 174 Wn.2d
354, 360, 275 P.3d 314 (2012).
3.2(b) Neutrality
Most importantly, the magistrate issuing the warrant must be neutral. This requires that the warrant be issued by a judge who is divorced
from law enforcement investigation and activities. State v. Neslund, 103
Wn.2d 79, 88, 690 P.2d 1153 (1984). If a state officer acts as prosecutor
in a case, that officer is automatically disqualified from acting as a magistrate in the same case. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 450,
91 S. Ct. 2022, 29 L. Ed. 2d 564 (1971). Similarly, the magistrate’s involvement in the execution of a warrant may constitute a violation of the
neutrality requirement. Id. at 450, 91 S. Ct. 2022. For example, an administrative “warrant” signed by the parole officer conducting the search
is invalid. Hocker v. Woody, 95 Wn.2d 822, 825−26, 631 P.2d 372
(1981) (holding that a search of a third party’s residence was unlawful
because the warrant was not signed by a neutral and detached magistrate).
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A pro-tempore judge that is also a part-time prosecutor is not automatically disqualified if he or she has not been involved in the prosecution of that particular case and there is no evidence of bias. State v. Hill,
17 Wn. App. 678, 683, 564 P.2d 841 (1977). Similarly, there is no per se
disqualification for a judge who issued a search warrant in a case that
was before him on special inquiry. Neslund, 103 Wn.2d at 88, 690 P.2d
1153. In Neslund, the court did not per se disqualify the judge from issuing warrants because the warrants were not issued in subsequent court
proceedings “arising” from the inquiry. Id. at 82−83, 690 P.2d 1153; see
RCW 10.27.180. A search warrant has been upheld when the issuing judicial officer was aware from the affidavit that he might be a witness
against the defendant. State v. Smith, 16 Wn. App. 425, 427−28, 558
P.2d 265 (1976); 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 4.2(b), at
619 (5th ed. 2012).
Lastly, a magistrate is no longer neutral when he or she receives a
fee for each search warrant issued. Connally v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 245,
250, 97 S. Ct. 546, 50 L. Ed. 2d 444 (1977) (having a pecuniary interest
in issuing warrants compared with denying them renders a magistrate
neither neutral nor detached).
3.2(c) Presentation of Evidence to a Second Magistrate
Washington courts have not yet squarely addressed the question of
whether or under what circumstances a prosecuting authority may, in an
attempt to obtain a search warrant, present the same evidence to a second
magistrate after one denial. However, commentators appear to agree that
a magistrate’s initial probable cause determination is not a final order
and that principles of collateral estoppel or res judicata do not preclude
the government from presenting the same evidence to a second judicial
officer, so long as the government notifies the second officer that the application was previously denied. See 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and
Seizure § 4.2(e), at 631−33 (5th ed. 2012); see also United States v.
Rettig, 589 F.2d 418, 422 (9th Cir. 1978) (finding the second warrant
valid but expressing disapproval that the second judge had not been informed of the prior attempt).
The presentation of the same evidence to a second magistrate is not
tantamount to forum shopping unless the government visits numerous
magistrates before convincing one to issue the disputed warrant. United
States v. Czuprynski, 8 F.3d 1113, 1115 (6th Cir. 1993), on reh’g en banc,
46 F.3d 560 (6th Cir. 1995), supplemented, 65 F.3d 169 (6th Cir. 1995)
(condemning prosecutor who took the case to two district court judges
before taking it to a magistrate who he knew had hard feelings for the
defendant).
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3.2(d) Burden of Proof
Unless a magistrate is disqualified under the per se rule of Coolidge
v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 91 S. Ct. 2022, 29 L. Ed. 2d 564
(1971), the defendant bears the burden of proving a magistrate’s lack of
neutrality. See State v. Hill, 17 Wn. App. 678, 683, 564 P.2d 841 (1977).
3.3 CONTENT OF THE WARRANT
3.3(a) Oath or Affirmation; Pseudonym Affiants
The person presenting the supporting affidavit must swear to the information that the affidavit contains. U.S. Const. amend. IV; CrR 2.3(c).
However, the Washington State Supreme Court has upheld a warrant
when the affidavit was not sworn to, but was signed in the presence of
the magistrate. State v. Douglas, 71 Wn.2d 303, 309−10, 428 P.2d 535
(1967). Washington courts have yet to rule on whether an incorrect name
or pseudonym on the affidavit makes it defective. However, a handful of
federal circuits have found the warrant still effective in this circumstance.
See 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 4.3(f), at 663−65 (5th ed.
2012); see also United States v. Causey, 9 F.3d 1341 (7th Cir. 1993)
(finding the affidavit effective when “the issuing judge has an opportunity to question the affiant, the judge is in fact not deceived, and there is
sufficient probable cause notwithstanding the false information”).
3.3(b) Insufficient Information, Omissions, and Staleness
A warrant is most commonly defective for one of three reasons: (1)
there is insufficient information to establish probable cause; (2) the information in the affidavits is stale; or (3) material information was omitted during the warrant process.
First, an affidavit establishes probable cause to support a search
warrant if the affidavit sets forth facts sufficient to allow a reasonable
person to conclude both that the defendant is involved in criminal activity and that evidence of the crime can be found at the place to be searched.
See State v. Maddox, 152 Wn.2d 499, 509, 98 P.3d. 1199 (2004); In re
Yim, 139 Wn.2d 581, 594−95, 989 P.2d 512 (1999); see also State v. Fry,
168 Wn.2d 1, 6, 228 P.3d 1 (2010) (finding probable cause when the officer smelled marijuana wafting from the house, even when the defendant produced a marijuana permit). Evidence from a prior warrantless
search conducted under an exception to general search and seizure rules
may be used by the issuing magistrate in determining probable cause. A
magistrate may also rely on hearsay statements from a police officer’s
affidavits. State v. Chenoweth, 160 Wn.2d 454, 465, 158 P.3d 595
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(2007); see CrR 2.3(c). See generally 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and
Seizure § 3.5(b) (5th ed. 2012).
A prima facie showing of criminal activity is not required, although
the affidavit must go beyond mere suspicion or personal belief that evidence of a crime will be found on the premises to be searched. Maddox,
152 Wn.2d at 505, 98 P.3d. 1199; see State v. Neth, 165 Wn.2d 177, 196
P.3d 658 (2008) (holding that empty baggies and prior criminal history
are insufficient to support probable cause). For example, generalizations
about the behavior of drug dealers concerning where they keep controlled substances are insufficient. See State v. Thein, 138 Wn.2d 133,
147, 977 P.2d 582 (1999); see also Albrecht v. United States, 273 U.S. 1,
5, 47 S. Ct. 250, 71 L. Ed. 505 (1927). At the same time, however, affidavits for search warrants must be tested in a commonsense, not
hypertechnical, manner. State v. Jackson, 150 Wn.2d 251, 265, 76 P.3d
217 (2003).
The court must determine if the warrant is valid by “consider[ing]
only the information that was brought to the attention of the issuing judge
or magistrate at the time the warrant was requested.” State v. GarciaSalgado, 170 Wn.2d 176, 187, 240 P.3d 153 (2010). Thus, if the warrant
is invalid due to insufficient information, it cannot be made valid later by
adding further information, even if that information was known at the
time of issuance but not presented to the magistrate. See Whiteley v.
Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 565 n.8, 91 S. Ct. 1031, 28 L. Ed. 2d 306 (1971)
(holding that permitting the record to be expanded with information
known to the police, but not disclosed to the magistrate, would “render
the warrant requirements of the Fourth Amendment meaningless”).
Second, if the warrant is facially valid⎯if there is sufficient information to find probable cause⎯but there is an omission in the affidavit,
under article I, section 7, the warrant is valid so long as the omission is
neither intentional nor made with a reckless disregard for the truth. See
Chenoweth, 160 Wn.2d at 478, 158 P.3d 595. Thus, an incorrect date on
an affidavit is immaterial. State v. Vickers, 148 Wn.2d 91, 109, 59 P.3d
58 (2002). Similarly, in In re Yim, the court found the warrant valid even
though the affidavit failed to expressly state that the defendant did not
have an explosives license, a necessary element of the crime. 139 Wn.2d
581, 595−96, 989 P.2d 512 (1999). In State v. Chenoweth, the court
found that the warrant was valid even though the prosecutor had failed to
do a complete search of the informant’s criminal history. See 160 Wn.2d
at 458−62, 158 P.3d 595. Had she run a search, she would have turned up
a large criminal history, including crimes implicating veracity. Id. However, the court found that the prosecutor, “who prosecutes more than 200
cases a year, did not intentionally hide any information from the magis-
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trate and did not act in bad faith in failing to gather relevant information,”
and she was therefore not reckless. Id. at 481, 158 P.3d 595.
Lastly, the information establishing probable cause must not be
stale at the time it is presented to the judge. State v. Lyons, 174 Wn.2d
354, 275 P.3d 314 (2012) (finding the warrant stale when there was no
date on the affidavit detailing when the informant had witnessed the
grow operation). The information is not stale so long as “the facts and
circumstances in the affidavit support a commonsense determination that
there is continuing and contemporaneous possession of the property intended to be seized.” Maddox, 152 Wn.2d at 505−06, 98 P.3d. 1199
(holding that information discovered in the interim does not render the
first probable cause determination stale so long as it does not negate
probable cause).
In evaluating the staleness of facts underlying a warrant, courts examine the totality of the circumstances; the period of time between the
issuance and execution of the warrant is only one factor to be considered.
Id. Other relevant factors include the “nature of the criminal, the character of the evidence to be seized, and the nature of the place to be
searched.” State v. Hosier, 124 Wn. App. 696, 715, 103 P.3d 217 (2004).
The facts and circumstances taken together must establish that “criminal
activity is occurring at or about the time the warrant is issued.” State v.
Perez, 92 Wn. App. 1, 8−9, 963 P.2d 881 (1998); see also State v. AgueMasters, 138 Wn. App. 86, 101, 156 P.3d 265 (2007) (information was
not stale after two days when it appeared there could be continued manufacture of controlled substances).
3.3(c) Oral Testimony
In Washington, a search warrant may be based on a single affidavit,
on several affidavits, or on oral testimony. CrR 2.3(c). Oral testimony
includes situations in which an affiant makes a sworn telephonic statement to a judge. Id.; see also State v. Reep, 161 Wn.2d 808, 818, 167
P.3d 1156 (2007); State v. Ringer, 100 Wn.2d 686, 701, 674 P.2d 1240
(1983) (overruled on other grounds) (finding that the availability of telephonic warrants increased the quality of police work). However, after the
magistrate has taken a sworn telephonic statement, the magistrate must
produce a record of the conversation. State v. Myers, 117 Wn.2d 332,
338, 815 P.2d 761 (1991); State v. Ettenhofer, 119 Wn. App. 300,
304−06, 79 P.3d 478 (2003). And the judge must record a summary of
any additional evidence on which the warrant was based. Ettenhofer, 119
Wn. App. at 303 n.2, 79 P.3d 478 (quoting CrR 2.3(c)).
If the affiant’s sworn testimony was not recorded during the telephonic process, the State is not allowed to reconstruct the affidavit with-
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out corroboration of the magistrate. Myers, 117 Wn.2d at 338, 815 P.2d
761 (finding the warrant invalid when the affiant made a summary of
their own statement but the magistrate did not summarize the statement
and could not recall the conversation); see also State v. Smith, 87 Wn.
App. 254, 257−59, 941 P.2d 691 (1997) (discussing the types of evidence that may be used to reconstruct a telephonic affidavit). In State v.
Garcia, the court found the lack of a recording did not invalidate the
warrant when the magistrate testified that the affidavit he was presented
with matched his recollection of the conversation. 140 Wn. App. 609,
619−20, 166 P.3d 848 (2007). For a discussion of various objections to
this procedure, see 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 4.3(c), at
650−54 (5th ed. 2012).
3.3(d) Administrative Warrants
Administrative warrants are subject to Fourth Amendment protection, but may be issued on less than probable cause when authorized by a
statute. City of Seattle v. McCready (McCready III), 131 Wn.2d 266, 931
P.2d 156 (1997); see Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 87 S. Ct.
1727, 18 L. Ed. 2d 930 (1967) (holding that administrative searches to
enforce local codes must be supported by “reasonable legislative or administrative standards”). Additionally, involvement in a heavily regulated industry can give authority to issue warrants. Marshall v. Barlow’s,
Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 320, 98 S. Ct. 1816, 56 L. Ed. 2d 305 (1978).
Although a court may issue a warrant on less than probable cause
pursuant to an authorizing statute, if there is no authorizing statute, then
the magistrate does not have authority to issue warrants for civil infractions, even with probable cause. City of Seattle v. McCready (McCready
II), 124 Wn.2d 300, 309, 877 P.2d 686 (1994). See generally infra § 6.4
(administrative searches). When a magistrate issues a warrant without
authority, it is no more valid than a warrant signed by a private citizen.
Bosteder v. City of Renton, 155 Wn.2d 18, 117 P.3d 316 (2005) (finding
that under article I, section 7, magistrate had no authority to issue search
warrants for civil infractions without statutory authorization); see also
State v. Lansden, 144 Wn.2d 654, 663, 30 P.3d 483 (2001) (observing
that courts of limited jurisdiction have no inherent authority to issue administrative search warrants). Notably, a statute giving a right of entry is
not sufficient authorization to issue warrants. McCready II, 124 Wn.2d at
309, 877 P.2d 686. But if, under city ordinance, willful or knowing violation of the city code is a misdemeanor, the court may issue a warrant for
a civil violation. Exendine v. City of Sammamish, 127 Wn. App. 574, 582,
113 P.3d 494 (2005).
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3.4 PARTICULAR DESCRIPTION OF PLACE TO BE SEARCHED
Both article I, section 7 of the Washington State Constitution and
the Fourth Amendment require a particular description of the places to be
searched and the items to be seized. The purposes of this requirement are
the “prevention of general searches, prevention of the seizure of objects
on the mistaken assumption that they fall within the issuing magistrate’s
authorization, and prevention of the issuance of warrants on loose, vague,
or doubtful bases of fact.” State v. Perrone, 119 Wn.2d 538, 545, 834
P.2d 611 (1992). The requirement also serves to leave nothing to the discretion of the officers executing the warrant. See id.; State v. Rivera, 76
Wn. App. 519, 522, 888 P.2d 740 (1995); see also Marron v. United
States, 275 U.S. 192, 196, 48 S. Ct. 74, 72 L. Ed. 231 (1927).
3.4(a) General Considerations
The description of the place to be searched must be sufficiently detailed such that “the officer with a search warrant can with reasonable
effort ascertain and identify the place intended.” State v. Fisher, 96
Wn.2d 962, 967, 639 P.2d 743 (1982) (internal quotations omitted) (citing State v. Rood, 18 Wn. App. 740, 743−44, 573 P.2d 1325 (1977)).
This need not be a brick and mortar location; in State v. Jackson, the
court found that the “place” to be searched in attaching a GPS to a car
was the travel pattern of the vehicle. 150 Wn.2d 251, 268, 76 P.3d 217
(2003). However, if there is a possibility that a mistaken search could
occur, the warrant is not sufficiently particular. Fisher, 96 Wn.2d at 967,
639 P.2d 743; see also State v. Bohan, 72 Wn. App. 335, 339−40, 864
P.2d 26 (1993) (inquiring into possibility that incorrect location might be
searched).
When a warrant contains errors, the burden is on the party challenging the warrant to show that errors could have resulted in a search of the
wrong premises. Fisher, 96 Wn.2d at 967, 639 P.2d 743; see also State v.
Smith, 39 Wn. App. 642, 649, 694 P.2d 660 (1984) (upholding search
where incorrect town was identified in warrant because defendant made
no showing that a similar address existed that could have been mistakenly searched). The test is not whether an officer could hypothetically or
theoretically search the wrong premises, but whether, under the circumstances presented, an officer could reasonably determine the correct
premises to be searched. Bohan, 72 Wn. App. at 339, 864 P.2d 26. Clerical or ministerial errors will invalidate a warrant only if prejudice is
shown. State v. Wible, 113 Wn. App. 18, 25, 51 P.3d 830 (2002); see
State v. Busig, 119 Wn. App. 381, 388, 81 P.3d 143 (2003) (finding a
warrant that did not match the pleading paper for the affidavit to be valid).
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In urban areas, places are usually identified by a street address. The
address is unnecessary, however, if other facts make it clear that a particular place is intended. State v. Trasvina, 16 Wn. App. 519, 522−23, 557
P.2d 368 (1976) (finding sufficient a warrant describing premises as twostory, white-frame house located directly behind particular address); see
also State v. Chisholm, 7 Wn. App. 279, 283, 499 P.2d 81 (1972) (holding that a warrant that failed to specify street location was sufficiently
clear when officers could identify premises with reasonable certainty and
when reason for failure to specify street was included in affidavit for
warrant). Rural areas may be identified by a legal description of the
property. See State v. Cockrell, 102 Wn.2d 561, 570, 689 P.2d 32 (1984).
In the execution of the search, carelessness on the part of the officers executing the warrant will not render the warrant insufficient regarding the place to be searched. It is only required that the officers executing
a warrant could have confined their search to the areas delineated in the
warrant with a “reasonable effort.” See id. (warrant identified place to be
searched but did not list an address; officers attempted to serve warrant
on persons outside the described area); see also Fisher, 96 Wn.2d at 967,
639 P.2d 743 (finding that with a “reasonable effort” the officers could
have confined themselves to the place listed in the warrant).
3.4(b) Inadequacy and Severability
If a warrant fails to sufficiently describe the place to be searched,
the warrant is invalid even if the magistrate made a probable cause determination. Three types of information may be considered in determining a warrant’s adequacy: (1) physical descriptions of the premises contained in the warrant or in the attached affidavit; (2) information based
on the officer’s personal knowledge of the location or its occupants; and
(3) the officer’s personal observations at the time of execution. State v.
Fisher, 96 Wn.2d 962, 967, 639 P.2d 743 (1982) (citing State v. Rood, 18
Wn. App. 740, 743−44, 573 P.2d 1325 (1977)). See generally 2 Wayne R.
LaFave, Search and Seizure § 4.5(a)−(e) (5th ed. 2012). The initial determination of whether a description is adequate is made with reference
only to the warrant itself, including any attached documents. See State v.
Stenson, 132 Wn.2d 668, 691−93, 696, 940 P.2d 1239 (1997). A description may appear adequate on its face, but upon execution be found to be
ambiguous or erroneous. Id.
If a warrant is inadequate with respect to one location, the adequate
portion may still be valid if the inadequacy can be severed from the warrant. For example, if a warrant separately and distinctly describes two
targets and it is determined afterward that probable cause existed for issuance of the warrant for one target only, the warrant may be treated as
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severable and upheld as to the one target. State v. Cockrell, 102 Wn.2d
561, 571, 689 P.2d 32 (1984) (finding portions of the warrant that identified outbuildings severable from the rest of the warrant that was for the
residence); see also 2 LaFave, supra, § 4.5(c), at 743−49.
3.4(c) Particular Searches and Exceptions
Generally, unless there is probable cause to search all living units of
a multiple-occupancy building, the description must single out a particular subunit. State v. Alexander, 41 Wn. App. 152, 704 P.2d 618 (1985).
See generally 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 4.5(b) (5th ed.
2012). But if the building looks like a single occupancy structure from
the outside and the officers have no reason to know that it is a multipleunit structure, the warrant is not defective for failing to specify a subunit.
State v. Chisholm, 7 Wn. App. 279, 282, 499 P.2d 81 (1972). The Ninth
Circuit has recognized that a warrant may authorize a search of an entire
street address if the premises are occupied in common rather than individually or if a multiunit building is used as a single entity. United States
v. Gillman, 684 F.2d 616, 618 (9th Cir. 1982); see also 2 LaFave, supra,
§ 4.5(b), at 734−43. Additionally, the “community living unit” rule will
generally apply when several people occupy the entire premises in common, but have separate bedrooms. Under the community living unit rule,
a single warrant describing the entire premises is valid and justifies a
search of the entire premises. Alexander, 41 Wn. App. at 156, 704 P.2d
618 (adopting the community living unit rule in Washington).
A warrant authorizing the search of an apartment may also include
the search of a padlocked locker located in a storage room next to the
defendant’s apartment. State v. Llamas-Villa, 67 Wn. App. 448, 453, 836
P.2d 239 (1992) (concluding that because the storage locker did not constitute a separate building and was not intentionally excluded from the
warrant, the officers did not exceed the scope of the warrant when they
searched the locker). In State v. Boyer, the court upheld a search of a
storage room belonging to a different apartment because “the fact that
the outside door was labeled apartment B implied to the casual visitor
that the hallway and its doorways were all part of apartment B.” 124 Wn.
App. 593, 604, 102 P.3d 833 (2004).
However, this exception does not extend to outbuildings. The officers’ search of “outbuildings” exceeded the scope of a search warrant that
authorized the search of a residence and the attached carport, but did not
authorize the search of “outbuildings,” which included a barn and a garage. State v. Kelley, 52 Wn. App. 581, 586, 762 P.2d 20 (1988). Further,
probable cause to search a house does not provide probable cause to
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search outbuildings when the outbuildings are under the control of other
persons. State v. Gebaroff, 87 Wn. App. 11, 16−17, 939 P.2d 706 (1997).
A warrant issued to search a defendant’s premises may include the
defendant’s automobile if it is located on the premises. State v. Claflin,
38 Wn. App. 847, 853, 690 P.2d 1186 (1984) (a search warrant authorizing search of defendant’s house and premises includes search of his car
located on the premises). However, a warrant to search a house does not
include a search of a vehicle that is not within the curtilage—the area
contiguous to the occupant’s home. State v. Graham, 78 Wn. App. 44,
51−52, 896 P.2d 704 (1995). For a more detailed description, see infra, §
3.9.
3.4(d) Particular Searches: Persons
Search warrants may be issued for persons, as well as for places, if
there is probable cause to believe that a specific individual has evidence
on his or her person. CrR 2.3(c); State v. Rollie M, 41 Wn. App. 55,
58−59, 701 P.2d 1123 (1985). When a search warrant is issued for a person, the general rule requiring particularity still applies. State v. Martinez,
51 Wn. App. 397, 399−400, 753 P.2d 1011 (1988) (holding that a warrant is sufficient if it provides a detailed description of the person to be
searched, including the person’s place of residence); Rollie M, 41 Wn.
App. at 58−59, 701 P.2d 1123 (finding insufficient a warrant that authorized search of a person found in general vicinity of a specified place); see
also 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 4.5(e), at 755−63 (5th ed.
2012).
For a discussion of when a premises search warrant authorizes the
search of persons not named in the warrant, see infra § 3.8(b). Generally,
when a premises search warrant is executed, police may conduct a warrantless search of a person only if they have individualized probable
cause to search that person. See State v. Rivera, 76 Wn. App. 519, 524,
888 P.2d 740 (1995); Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91, 100 S. Ct. 338,
62 L. Ed. 2d 238 (1979). Nonetheless, a warrant authorizing the search of
“all persons present” at a location to be searched might be upheld in
Washington if the warrant establishes a nexus between all persons present, the place, and the criminal activity. State v. Carter, 79 Wn. App.
154, 161, 901 P.2d 335 (1995) (assuming without deciding that such
warrants may pass muster).
3.5 PARTICULAR DESCRIPTION OF THINGS TO BE SEIZED
As with the location to be searched, article I, section 7 requires that
the courts “never authorize general, exploratory searches.” York v. Wahkiakum Sch. Dist. No. 200, 163 Wn.2d 297, 315, 178 P.3d 995 (2008).
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Instead, article I, section 7 requires that “warrants describe with particularity the things to be seized.” State v. Riley, 121 Wn.2d 22, 28, 846 P.2d
1365 (1993). The requirement “eliminates the danger of unlimited discretion in the executing officer’s determination of what to seize.” State v.
Reep, 161 Wn.2d 808, 814, 167 P.3d 1156 (2007) (citing State v.
Perrone, 119 Wn.2d 538, 546, 834 P.2d 611 (1992)). Courts look to the
purposes of the “particular description” requirement to determine whether the description is valid. These purposes include (1) preventing general
exploratory searches; (2) protecting against “seizure of objects on the
mistaken assumption that they fall within” the warrant; and (3) ensuring
that probable cause is present. Perrone, 119 Wn.2d at 545, 834 P.2d 611;
see also Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196, 48 S. Ct. 74, 72 L.
Ed. 231 (1927).
In the Ninth Circuit, three factors are relevant to the existence of
sufficient particularity: (1) whether probable cause exists for all classes
of items in the warrant; (2) whether the warrant sets out objective standards that allow the executing officer to decide what may be seized and
what may not; and (3) whether the government was able to describe the
things to be seized with any greater particularity. United States v. Mann,
389 F.3d 869, 878 (9th Cir. 2004). For a discussion of searches requiring
heightened protection, see infra 3.13.
Because the facts in each case differ greatly, the fact patterns of
prior cases generally are not referenced when determining whether a
warrant is sufficiently particular. See State v. Thein, 138 Wn.2d 133, 149,
97 P.2d 582 (1999) (citing State v. Helmka, 86 Wn.2d 91, 93, 542 P.2d
115 (1975)). Instead, the degree of specificity required depends on the
circumstances and the type of items involved. State v. Jackson, 150
Wn.2d 251, 268, 76 P.3d 217 (2003). See generally 2 Wayne R. LaFave,
Search and Seizure § 4.6 (a)−(f) (5th ed. 2012).
The officers may also seize objects pursuant to a warrant that establishes the defendant’s dominion and control over the premises. State v.
Weaver, 38 Wn. App. 17, 22, 683 P.2d 1136 (1984); see Ewing v. City of
Stockton, 588 F.3d 1218 (9th Cir. 2009) (warrant for articles establishing
identity of persons in control of premises not overbroad). In State v.
Weaver, the court held that although a cardboard box bearing defendant’s
name would not generally be considered “paper,” police could seize the
box because the obvious purpose of the warrant was seizure not only of
controlled substances, but also of evidence enabling the state to demonstrate defendant’s dominion and control over the premises. 38 Wn. App.
at 22, 683 P.2d 1136.
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3.5(a) General Rules
While there is no bright-line rule, a few general principles can be
gleaned from case law that indicate when a warrant is sufficiently definite to allow the executing officer to identify the property with reasonable certainty.
First, more ambiguity is tolerated when the police have acquired the
most complete description that could reasonably be expected. See State v.
Clark, 143 Wn.2d 731, 754, 24 P.3d 1006 (2001) (finding warrant for
“trace evidence” valid when it would be impossible to know what type of
trace evidence could be present beforehand). Thus, a description need not
be detailed, and the warrant is valid if it is “as specific as the circumstances and the nature of the activity, or crime, under investigation permits.” State v. Stenson, 132 Wn.2d 668, 692, 940 P.2d 1239 (1997).
However, a warrant is overbroad if the affidavit is much more specific
and the warrant fails to reflect the affidavit’s specificity. State v. Higgins,
136 Wn. App. 87, 92, 147 P.3d 649 (2006) (finding warrant overbroad
when it allowed search for “Assault 2nd DV” when the affidavit listed
Glock pistol, spent casings, and entry and exit points).
The use of a generic term or general description in a warrant is not
a per se violation if a more specific description is impossible and if probable cause is shown. See State v. Perrone, 119 Wn.2d 538, 547, 834 P.2d
611 (1992). “When the nature of the underlying offense precludes a descriptive itemization, generic classifications such as lists are acceptable.”
State v. Riley, 121 Wn.2d 22, 28, 846 P.2d 1365 (1993); see also Stenson,
132 Wn.2d at 692, 940 P.2d 1239. However, in such instances, “the
search warrant must [also] be circumscribed by reference to the crime
under investigation.” Riley, 121 Wn.2d at 29, 846 P.2d 1365. In State v.
Reid, the “phrase ‘any other evidence of homicide’ specifically limited
the warrant to the crime under investigation [and] specific items listed,
such as a shotgun and shotgun shells provided guidelines for the officers
conducting the search.” 38 Wn. App. 203, 212, 687 P.2d 861 (1984). The
warrant must also be definite enough to allow the searching officer to
identify the objects sought with reasonable certainty. State v. Nordlund,
113 Wn. App. 171, 180, 53 P.3d 520 (2002) (citing Stenson, 132 Wn.2d
at 691−92, 940 P.2d 1239).
Second, greater care and particularity are required when property
sought is inherently innocuous as opposed to property that is inherently
illegal. State v. Wible, 113 Wn. App. 18, 28, 51 P.3d 830 (2002) (citing
State v. Chambers, 88 Wn. App. 640, 644, 945 P.2d 1172 (1997)). Thus,
a less precise description is adequate for controlled substances. See
Chambers, 88 Wn. App. at 647−48, 945 P.2d 1172 (finding that a search
for “any and all controlled substances” is sufficient in a search for mari-
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juana under the circumstances); State v. Olson, 32 Wn. App. 555,
557−58, 648 P.2d 476 (1982) (same).
Third, failure to provide all available descriptive facts is not fatal
when the omitted facts could not have assisted the officer in a more circumscribed search. See Chambers, 88 Wn. App at 647−48, 945 P.2d
1172 (holding that a warrant authorizing search for “all controlled substances” when the affidavit recited probable cause for a marijuana grow
operation did not fail to be particular). In State v. Christiansen, the court
held that “[t]he fact the warrant could have been more precise in terms of
identifying marijuana as the focus of the search does not affect its validity, since reasonable particularity is all that is required.” 40 Wn. App. 249,
254, 698 P.2d 1059 (1985).
Lastly, an error is not fatal if the officer was able to determine what
was intended from the other facts provided in the warrant. State v. Dodson, 110 Wn. App. 112, 121, 39 P.3d 324 (2002) (holding that police
officer merely corrected clerical error in changing warrant to specify a
search for methamphetamine instead of marijuana where court had determined probable cause to search for methamphetamine); see also Wible,
113 Wn. App. at 25−26, 51 P.3d 830 (warrant only invalid for clerical
errors upon a showing of prejudice).
3.5(b) Severability
As with the place to be searched, discussed in section 3.4(b) above,
when one part of the warrant is insufficiently particular regarding the
items to be seized, the portion sometimes may be severed. However, the
severability doctrine must not be applied when doing so would render the
particularity standards meaningless. State v. Perrone, 119 Wn.2d 538,
556−57, 834 P.2d 611 (1992) (holding that a warrant authorizing a general search of materials protected by the First Amendment was impermissibly broad and invalid in its entirety).
A court may examine five factors when determining whether invalid portions of a warrant may be severed from valid portions: (1) whether
the warrant lawfully authorized entry into the premises; (2) whether the
warrant includes at least one particularly described item for which there
is probable cause; (3) whether the portion of the warrant that is valid is
significant when compared to the warrant as a whole; (4) whether the
searching officers found and seized any disputed items while executing
the valid part of the warrant; and (5) whether the officers conducted a
general search in flagrant disregard of the warrant’s scope. State v. Maddox, 116 Wn. App. 796, 807−09, 67 P.3d 1135 (2003), aff’d, 152 Wn.2d
499 (2004).
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3.7 “KNOCK AND ANNOUNCE” REQUIREMENT
Absent exigent circumstances, officers executing a valid warrant
must identify themselves as police officers and announce their purpose
prior to entering private premises. RCW 10.31.040 (“To make an arrest
in criminal actions, the officer may break open any outer or inner door,
or windows of a dwelling house or other building, or any other enclosure,
if, after notice of his office and purpose, he be refused admittance.”); see
Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 37−40, 83 S. Ct. 1623, 10 L. Ed. 2d 726
(1963) (announcing the rule but leaving the states to administer the
standard of reasonableness). Importantly, this rule applies to both outer
and inner doors. RCW 10.31.040. It also applies to the execution of both
arrest and search warrants. State v. Richard, 87 Wn. App. 285, 289, 941
P.2d 710 (1997); State v. Shelly, 58 Wn. App. 908, 910, 795 P.2d 187
(1990).
The purposes of the knock and announce rule are (1) to reduce the
potential for violence; (2) to prevent the physical destruction of property;
and (3) to protect privacy. State v. Cardenas, 146 Wn.2d 400, 411, 47
P.3d 127 (2002) (citing State v. Myers, 102 Wn.2d 548, 554, 689 P.2d 38
(1984) (overruled on other grounds)). “[C]ompliance with the knock and
announce rule is required unless exigent circumstances exist or compliance would be futile. Id. at 411−12, 47 P.3d 127; State v. Richards, 136
Wn.2d 361, 374, 962 P.2d 118 (1998) (holding that the “knock and wait”
rule gives way when police officers have a reasonable belief that strict
compliance would be futile). In some situations, when there is substantial
compliance with the statute, the entry is valid. State v. Reid, 38 Wn. App.
203, 210, 687 P.2d 861 (1984) (finding substantial compliance when the
police loudly announced themselves after opening a door that they
thought was an outer hallway).
The U.S. Supreme Court, like the Washington State Supreme Court,
has held that a “no-knock” entry is permissible where the police have a
reasonable suspicion that knocking and announcing their presence, under
the particular circumstances, would be dangerous or futile, or would inhibit the effective investigation of the crime by allowing the destruction
of evidence. Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 394, 117 S. Ct. 1416,
137 L. Ed. 2d 615 (1997).
3.7(a) Types of Entry Requiring Notice
The phrase “break open” in Washington’s knock and announce
statute refers to all nonconsensual entries, not simply to those involving
forcible breaking. See State v. Richards, 136 Wn.2d 361, 373, 962 P.2d
118 (1998) (citing State v. Coyle, 95 Wn.2d 1, 5−6, 621 P.2d 1265
(1980)). A consensual entry, however, is not “breaking open,” and so the
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officers have no duty to announce themselves in this situation. See State
v. Williamson, 42 Wn. App. 208, 211, 710 P.2d 205 (1985). But the circumstances must reasonably indicate that the occupant has actually consented to the officer’s entry. See State v. Sturgeon, 46 Wn. App. 181, 183,
730 P.2d 93 (1986) (holding that the knock and announce statute was
violated when the police knocked, the defendant shouted “yeah,” and the
police entered the apartment). If officers are attempting to gain entry to
the residence without a warrant through a “knock and talk” procedure,
and the officer attempts to gain consent for a search, the officer must announce his office and inform the suspect that he or she has the right to
refuse entry. State v. Ferrier, 136 Wn.2d 103, 960 P.2d 927 (1998)
(holding that entry into suspect’s home was unlawful when the officers
did not have a warrant and failed to inform the defendant of her right to
refuse entry); see also State v. Schultz, 170 Wn.2d 746, 248 P.3d 484
(2011).
Even if the police are able to freely enter the residence, they must
still announce themselves. The most common example is entry through
an unlocked or open door. In State v. Miller, the court found the entry
unlawful when the officer entered through an open door and did not announce his presence. 7 Wn. App. 414, 416, 499 P.2d 241 (1972) (discussing Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 38−41, 83 S. Ct. 1623, 10 L. Ed.
2d 726, (1963)); see also Coyle, 95 Wn.2d at 6, 621 P.2d 1265 (holding
that officer entering dwelling must give notice of his office and purpose
even though door to apartment was partially open). Notice is also required for entry by use of a pass key. See Ker, 374 U.S. at 38−41, 83 S.
Ct. 1623.
However, an officer’s failure to knock and announce himself before
entering a fenced backyard through an unlocked gate does not violate
RCW 10.31.040 when the officer can observe that the backyard is unoccupied. State v. Schimpf, 82 Wn. App. 61, 65, 914 P.2d 1206 (1996).
This is because “a knock and announcement at the gate in these circumstances would serve none of the purposes of the rule and statute.” Id. No
one was present in the backyard, so there was little risk of violence; the
unlocked gate allowed the deputy to enter without any property damage;
and the low fence meant that the deputy could already see into the backyard, suggesting there were no significant privacy interests involved. Id.
3.7(b) Entry Obtained by Deception
The Washington State Supreme Court has held that consent obtained by deception may still be effective consent. State v. Myers, 102
Wn.2d 548, 552−53, 689 P.2d 38 (1984), modified on other grounds,
State v. Lively, 130 Wn.2d 1, 19−21, 921 P.2d 1035 (1996). Moreover,
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such an entry is approved because the interests underlying the statute are
well served by a consensual entry. The occupant’s right to privacy is still
protected because the occupant may not deny entry to police who possess
a valid search warrant, there is no damage to property as the entry was
consensual, and the possibility for violence is lower with consent. State v.
Richards, 136 Wn.2d 361, 373, 962 P.2d 118 (1998). Thus, an officer
who deceives a suspect into allowing him or her to enter need not announce his office and purpose because—as the suspect has given consent—no “breaking” occurs within the terms of the statute. State v. Williamson, 42 Wn. App. 208, 211, 710 P.2d 205 (1985).
In State v. Myers, the police were aware that the doors and windows
to the defendant’s house were covered by iron bars and that the defendant kept a handgun. 102 Wn.2d at 549, 689 P.2d 38. The police prepared
a fictitious warrant for the defendant’s arrest for a traffic offense. Id. at
550, 689 P.2d 38. Upon being permitted to enter his house to execute the
arrest warrant, the police executed the search warrant. Id. The court held
that even though the officers failed to announce their purpose to search,
the occupant of the house had granted “valid permission” for them to
enter. Id. at 554, 689 P.2d 38; see also State v. Coyle, 95 Wn.2d 1, 5, 621
P.2d 1265 (1980). In State v. Huckaby, the court found the knock and
announce statute inapplicable when undercover officers gained entry into
the suspect’s home with the suspect’s consent and for the apparent purpose of conducting a drug transaction. 15 Wn. App. 280, 290, 549 P.2d
35 (1976). See generally William D. Bremer, Annotation, What Constitutes Compliance with Knock-and-Announce Rule in Search of Private
Premises—State Cases, 85 A.L.R. 5th 1 (2001).
3.7(c) Identification and Waiting Period
The police must wait only a reasonable period of time after they
announce their presence before entering the residence if no one answers
their knock. State v. Cardenas, 146 Wn.2d 400, 411, 47 P.3d 127 (2002);
see 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 4.8(c), at 854−62 (5th ed.
2012). However, the waiting period is over once “the door of the premises is open, attended by an occupant, and the police have announced their
identity and purpose while face-to-face with the occupant.” State v.
Alldredge, 73 Wn. App. 171, 177, 868 P.2d 183 (1994). The announcement of office and purpose may be made to the person answering the
door even when that person is not in possession of the premises. See
State v. Sainz, 23 Wn. App. 532, 537 n.3, 596 P.2d 1090 (1979).
Whether the officer waited a reasonable amount of time is a question of law and is determined with regard to the particular circumstances
of the case. State v. Richards, 136 Wn.2d 361, 374, 962 P.2d 118 (1998);

2013]

Chapter 3: Search Warrants

1653

State v. Johnson, 94 Wn. App. 882, 890, 974 P.2d 855 (1999). If it is
clear that the inhabitants are aware of the police presence, the police may
enter immediately. See Richards, 136 Wn.2d at 374, 962 P.2d 118 (holding that officers did not violate the knock and wait rule when they entered the apartment immediately after announcing their identity because
they were visible through sliding screen door); State v. Woodall, 32 Wn.
App. 407, 411, 647 P.2d 1051 (1982) (holding three to four second wait
reasonable when someone inside the clubhouse had seen the officers long
before they reached the door and announced their presence).
So long as the police wait a reasonable amount of time after announcing their presence, they need not wait for an affirmative denial.
United States v. Bustamante–Gamez, 488 F.2d 4, 10–11 (9th Cir. 1973);
Richards, 136 Wn.2d at 374, 962 P.2d 118. Denial of admittance may be
implied from the occupant’s lack of response. See State v. Schmidt, 48
Wn. App. 639, 644–45, 740 P.2d 351 (1987).
Because the length of a “reasonable” wait depends on the situation,
courts have held that short waiting periods are appropriate if the suspect
may be armed or the evidence is easily disposable. In State v. Berlin, the
court held that the defendant’s possession of weapons and his history of
violence did “bear upon the reasonableness of the length of time that the
police waited after announcing themselves.” 46 Wn. App. 587, 593−94,
731 P.2d 548 (1987). In State v. Schmidt, the court found that a threesecond wait was reasonable when there was the possibility that the occupants had been alerted to police presence by barking dogs, the suspect
had a history of gun possession, and the place to be searched was a very
small shed, meaning the knock could have been quickly answered. 48
Wn. App. at 646, 740 P.2d 351.
3.7(d) Exceptions: Useless Gesture and Exigent Circumstances
Police are excused from compliance with the knock and announce
rule when it would be a useless gesture or when the police face exigent
circumstances. Although Washington courts have not addressed this situation, law enforcement officers may be excused from the knock and announce requirement when covert entry of the premises is the only way to
effectively execute the warrant. Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238,
247−48, 99 S. Ct. 1682, 60 L. Ed. 2d 177 (1979).
Under the “useless gesture” exception, compliance with the knock
and announce rule is excused if the officers are “virtually certain” that
the occupants are aware of their presence and purpose on the premises.
State v. Coyle, 95 Wn.2d 1, 11, 621 P.2d 1265 (1980); State v. Shelly, 58
Wn. App. 908, 911, 795 P.2d 187 (1990). See generally 2 Wayne R.
LaFave, Search and Seizure § 4.8(f), at 879–81 (5th ed. 2012). This is
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because once the defendant has opened the door and the police officers
have identified themselves and their purpose, waiting for a grant or denial of entrance by the defendant is a useless gesture. See Shelly, 58 Wn.
App. at 911, 795 P.2d 187. The useless gesture exception has also been
applied to justify a police officer’s forcible entry when the officer identified himself but was unable to state his purpose before the suspect tried
to close the door. State v. Neff, 10 Wn. App. 713, 717, 519 P.2d 1328
(1974).
Officers may enter immediately and with force when exigent circumstances are present. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 37−41, 83 S. Ct.
1623, 10 L. Ed. 2d 726 (1963); State v. Cardenas, 146 Wn.2d 400, 412,
47 P.3d 127 (2002); State v. Young, 76 Wn.2d 212, 216, 455 P.2d 595
(1969). This occurs most commonly when the evidence can be disposed
of easily, the defendant may escape, or the defendant poses a threat to
public safety.
Washington has rejected the blanket rule, favored by some courts,
that permits an unannounced entry when the warrant is for easily disposed of items, such as drugs. State v. Jeter, 30 Wn. App. 360, 362, 634
P.2d 312 (1981). In Washington, the police must possess specific information indicating that the items are in imminent danger of destruction or
removal. See Young, 76 Wn.2d at 215−16, 455 P.2d 595 (holding that
belief of exigent circumstances cannot be based on suspicion or ambiguous acts); State v. Dugger, 12 Wn. App. 74, 81, 528 P.2d 274 (1974) (destruction of evidence exigency not established because prior to their entry police had heard nothing to suggest such destruction was in progress).
See generally 2 LaFave, supra, § 4.8(d). Likewise, evidence that suggests that the suspect may escape constitutes an exigency. Cardenas, 146
Wn.2d at 400, 47 P.3d 127.
A police officer’s reasonable belief that announcing his or her office and purpose would jeopardize police or public safety is another type
of exigent circumstance. See id. at 412, 47 P.3d 127; State v. Reid, 38
Wn. App. 203, 210, 687 P.2d 861 (1984). A mere good faith concern for
safety, however, is not sufficient. Jeter, 30 Wn. App. at 363, 634 P.2d
312 (finding no exigent circumstances existed when officer had prior
knowledge of defendant’s possession of gun but not of any propensity
for defendant to use it to resist arrest). Police must know from prior information or from direct observation that the suspect both keeps weapons
and has a propensity to use them. Cardenas, 146 Wn.2d at 400, 47 P.3d
127 (holding that the police were justified in entering with the
knowledge that the defendants had firearms and had used them against
the robbery victims); State v. Allyn, 40 Wn. App. 27, 31, 696 P.2d 45
(1985) (exigent circumstances found when the police knew from under-
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cover agent that the defendant had several firearms in his dwelling and a
strong propensity to use them).
3.8 SEARCH AND DETENTION OF PERSONS ON THE PREMISES BEING
SEARCHED
3.8(a) Detention of Persons on Premises Being Searched
A valid search warrant carries with it the authority to detain the occupants of the premises while the search is being conducted. Michigan v.
Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705, 101 S. Ct. 2587, 69 L. Ed. 2d 340 (1981);
State v. Flores-Moreno, 72 Wn. App. 733, 739, 866 P.2d 648 (1994).
However, this authority is narrower than either a detention supported by
probable cause or a Terry stop. State v. King, 89 Wn. App. 612, 618–19,
949 P.2d 856 (1998) (citing Summers, 452 U.S. at 702–03, 705, 101 S.
Ct. 2587). To detain a person not listed in a search warrant, the police
must have a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the person has committed or is about to commit a crime or that she is a threat to safety. State v.
Reichenbach, 153 Wn.2d 126, 135, 101 P.3d 80 (2004) (citing State v.
Parker, 139 Wn.2d 486, 497, 987 P.2d 73 (1999)).
The police may ascertain whether any individual arriving on the
scene might interfere with the search and may determine what business,
if any, the individual has at the premises. State v. Galloway, 14 Wn. App.
200, 202, 540 P.2d 444 (1975). Such a limited stop, however, is not a
license to detain and frisk all persons approaching within 100 feet of the
location of the search. State v. Melin, 27 Wn. App. 589, 592, 618 P.2d
1324 (1980).
3.8(b) Search of Persons on Premises Being Searched
Generally, a premises search warrant justifies a search of personal
effects of the owner found therein [that] “are plausible repositories for
the objects named in the warrant.” State v. Hill, 123 Wn.2d 641, 643, 870
P.2d 313 (1994). Officers have only the power to detain other persons
who are present; they may not conduct personal searches of the persons
other than the occupant. State v. Worth, 37 Wn. App. 889, 892, 683 P.2d
622 (1984); see also State v. Galbert, 70 Wn. App. 721, 727, 855 P.2d
310 (1993) (rejecting “mere presence” of contraband as a justification to
search persons who are merely located at the search scene). Additionally,
protection extends to “readily recognizable personal effects . . . which an
individual has under his control and seeks to preserve as private.” State v.
Lohr, 164 Wn. App. 414, 423, 263 P.3d 1287 (2011) (internal quotations
omitted) (citing Worth, 37 Wn. App. at 893, 683 P.2d 622); see also 2
Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 4.9(b)−(c), at 894−902 (5th ed.
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2012). Thus, if the police can identify the item as belonging to a person
other than the occupant, they may not search it. See Worth, 37 Wn. App.
at 893, 683 P.2d 622; see also State v. Jackson, 107 Wn. App. 646, 649,
27 P.3d 689 (2001) (holding that police properly searched a jacket where
there was confusion over whether it was owned by the lawfully arrested
driver or the non-arrested passenger).
In State v. Worth, the court rejected a distinction between personal
effects worn on or held by the person and those effects nearby the person
at the time of the search: “A narrow focus on whether a person is holding
or wearing a personal item would tend to undercut the purpose of the
Fourth Amendment and leave vulnerable readily recognizable effects,
such as [a] purse, which an individual has under [her] control and seeks
to preserve as private.” 37 Wn. App. at 893, 683 P.2d 622. However, the
Washington State Supreme Court has held that one has no privacy interest in items left at another’s house. See State v. Reynolds, 144 Wn.2d 282,
287, 27 P.3d 200 (2001).
However, in limited instances, the police may conduct a search of a
person on the premises but not named in the warrant. State v. Broadnax,
98 Wn.2d 289, 301, 654 P.2d 96 (1982). For searches conducted incident
to arrest, see infra § 5.1. If the search is not incident to a lawful arrest,
then police may only detain or search an individual other than the occupant if there is “presence plus.” Broadnax, 98 Wn.2d at 301, 654 P.2d 96.
First, a person not named in the warrant but present on the premises
may be searched if the police “have reasonable cause to believe [that the
person] has the articles for which the search is instituted upon his person.”
State v. Halverson, 21 Wn. App. 35, 38, 584 P.2d 408 (1978) (citations
omitted). “Reasonable cause” requires that the person engage in some
type of suspicious activity. Broadnax, 98 Wn.2d at 301, 654 P.2d 96.
Thus, in the execution of a search warrant for narcotics, police were justified in searching a person’s fists when, at the time of the officer’s entry,
the person was observed kneeling in front of a weighing scale and then
rising with his fists clenched. Halverson, 21 Wn. App. at 36−37, 584
P.2d 408. Police were not justified in searching a purse, however, when
the owner of the purse gave no evidence of suspicious behavior. Lohr,
164 Wn. App. at 423, 263 P.3d 1287.
Second, police may conduct a limited search for weapons to protect
themselves during the execution of the warrant. Ybarra v. Illinois, 444
U.S. 85, 93, 100 S. Ct. 338, 62 L. Ed. 2d 238 (1979); Broadnax, 98
Wn.2d at 301, 654 P.2d 96; State v. Allen, 93 Wn.2d 170, 172, 606 P.2d
1235 (1980). The police must, however, have a reasonable suspicion that
the person searched is armed. State v. Lennon, 94 Wn. App. 573, 580−81,
976 P.2d 121 (1999) (objective, reasonable belief that the suspect is
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armed and dangerous may not be based on a generalized suspicion that
people present during narcotic searches are often armed). Moreover, the
search must be limited to ascertaining whether the individual is armed.
Allen, 93 Wn.2d at 172, 606 P.2d 1235 (holding that an officer conducting a pat-down may not examine the contents of a wallet found on the
individual “after satisfying himself that the ‘bulge’ [wallet] was not a
weapon”). For a more detailed discussion, see infra, § 4.5.
3.9 PERMISSIBLE SCOPE AND INTENSITY OF SEARCH
Assuming that a search warrant describes the area and items with
the requisite particularity, the remaining question is the permissible
scope and intensity of the search. The nature of the items to be seized
governs the permissible degree of intensity for the search. State v. Lair,
95 Wn.2d 706, 717, 630 P.2d 427 (1981) (holding that a search for marijuana may be very intense). And “[a]ny express or implied limitations or
qualifications may reduce the scope of consent in duration, area, or intensity.” State v. Reichenbach, 153 Wn.2d 126, 133, 101 P.3d 80 (2004).
Once the purpose of the warrant has been carried out, the authority to
search ends. See State v. Legas, 20 Wn. App. 535, 541, 581 P.2d 172
(1978) (holding that a warrant permitting a search in a bedroom for papers linking defendant to the premises did not justify a search of a small
box after such papers had been discovered).
Generally, a premises search warrant “justifies a search of personal
effects of the owner found therein [that] are plausible repositories for the
objects specified in the warrant.” State v. Worth, 37 Wn. App. 889, 892,
683 P.2d 622 (1984) (citing State v. White, 13 Wn. App. 949, 538 P.2d
860 (1975)); see also State v. Anderson, 41 Wn. App. 85, 96, 702 P.2d
481 (1985) (holding that a warrant to search for clothing used in a robbery extended to the entire residence where clothing might be found, including the inside of a garbage-can-sized commercial vacuum cleaner).
Similarly, a valid search warrant supported by probable cause may be
sufficient to obtain a blood test; the court need not issue a separate order
calling for a blood test. State v. Kalakosky, 121 Wn.2d 525, 532, 852
P.2d 1064 (1993) (finding that the initial warrant provided probable
cause to issue warrant for blood draw when van and defendant matched
description provided by rape victims and the defendant was seen cruising
the neighborhood).
In a search for documents, courts have recognized that officers
searching for documents must, out of necessity, examine documents not
specifically listed in the warrant. Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463,
482 n.11, 96 S. Ct. 2737, 49 L. Ed. 2d 627 (1976); State v. Stenson, 132
Wn.2d 668, 695, 940 P.2d 1239 (1997) (finding that officers did not ex-
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ceed the scope of the search warrant when they examined and seized
documents not specifically listed in the warrant). In the course of such a
search, officers may also seize evidence found that is not specifically
described in the warrant if “it will aid in a particular apprehension or
conviction, or [if it] has a sufficient nexus with the crime under investigation.” Stenson, 132 Wn.2d at 695, 940 P.2d 1239.
3.9(a) Area
Police “must execute a search warrant strictly within the bounds set
by the warrant.” State v. Cheatam, 112 Wn. App. 778, 783, 51 P.3d 138
(2002), aff’d, 150 Wn.2d 626 (2003) (citing State v. Kelley, 52 Wn. App.
581, 585, 762 P.2d 20 (1988)). But a search of the premises and outbuildings extends to the curtilage of the house as well. State v. Rivera, 76
Wn. App. 519, 525, 888 P.2d 740 (1995) (citing State v. Claflin, 38 Wn.
App. 847, 853, 690 P.2d 1186 (1984)). Police may enter areas not explicitly named in the warrant when such entry is necessary to execute the
warrant. See, e.g., Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 257, 99 S. Ct.
1682, 60 L. Ed. 2d 177 (1979) (holding that a warrant explicitly authorizing planting of hidden microphone implicitly authorized covert entry onto premises). Additionally, officers may search for items thrown outside
of the premises if knowledge of police presence at the premises provoked
that action. State v. Dearinger, 73 Wn.2d 563, 567, 439 P.2d 971 (1968)
(finding that officers acted within ambit of warrant in seizing a sack and
its contents thrown by occupant into the adjoining yard during the
search).
As discussed further in section 3.4(c), above, a warrant that authorizes the search of a house with no mention of outbuildings does not include a search of outbuildings not under defendant’s control. State v.
Kelley, 52 Wn. App. 581, 586, 762 P.2d 20 (1988) (suppressing evidence
located in a barn and garage that were not specified in the warrant); see
also State v. Gebaroff, 87 Wn. App. 11, 16, 939 P.2d 706 (1997) (holding that warrant application describing drug buy at a mobile home did
not give rise to probable cause to search travel trailer located on same
property but not under suspect’s control). Generally, where it is reasonable for an officer to believe that a storage area is appurtenant to the area
covered by a valid search warrant, the officers may search the storage
area. See State v. Boyer, 124 Wn. App. 593, 602, 102 P.3d 833 (2004).
It has been suggested that police may also enter adjacent areas if
they reasonably fear for their safety. See 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and
Seizure § 4.10(a), at 942−45 (5th ed. 2012). However, in Washington,
the protective sweep has not been extended to search warrants because
no court has yet considered this question. Boyer, 124 Wn. App. at 602,
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102 P.3d 833. In City of Walla Walla v. $401,333.44, the court stated that
the police entered a house without a search warrant and conducted a
“protective sweep” of the residence. 150 Wn. App. 360, 363, 208 P.3d
574 (2009).
3.9(b) Personal Effects
Personal effects found on the premises and belonging to the occupant may be searched if the effects can reasonably be expected to contain
the described items. See, e.g., State v. Hill, 123 Wn.2d 641, 643, 870
P.2d 313 (1994); State v. Worth, 37 Wn. App. 889, 892, 683 P.2d 622
(1984). Ordinarily, however, the police may not search effects that they
know belong to other persons. See Worth, 37 Wn. App. at 893, 683 P.2d
622; see also supra § 3.9(b). Even when a warrant authorizes a search of
the entire premises, it does not justify the search of another person residing on the premises who was not mentioned in the affidavit, nor does it
justify a search of a purse belonging to another person if she was holding
the purse or in proximity to it. Worth, 37 Wn. App. at 893, 683 P.2d 622.
An individual has no privacy interest in abandoned personal property,
see State v. Reynolds, 144 Wn.2d 282, 287, 27 P.3d 200 (2001), but the
court has held that even if the defendant has disclaimed ownership of the
personal item, if the defendant has a privacy interest in the item, the officers must have a search warrant to search or seize it. State v. Evans,
159 Wn.2d 402, 150 P.3d 105 (2007).
Additionally, if officers have a warrant to search a person, they may
conduct a strip search of the defendant to procure evidence if such search
is conducted in a reasonable manner and place as prescribed by statute.
State v. Colin, 61 Wn. App. 111, 114−15, 809 P.2d 228 (1991). In Colin,
the court utilized RCW 10.79.080 and RCW 10.79.100 by analogy in
determining standards of reasonableness. Id. In State v. Hampton, the
court held that the strip search pursuant to a search warrant was reasonable because it was conducted in a reasonably private place, a police van
with tinted windows, without unnecessary touching, and by persons of
the defendant’s gender. 114 Wn. App. 486, 494−95, 60 P.3d 95 (2002).
3.9(c) Vehicles
Officers with authority to search a residence for illegal drugs also
have authority to search vehicles that are under the control of the defendant and located on the premises to be searched. State v. Claflin, 38 Wn.
App. 847, 853, 690 P.2d 1186 (1984). But a trailer that is used as a residence is treated as a residential outbuilding rather than as a vehicle. State
v. Gebaroff, 87 Wn. App. 11, 16, 939 P.2d 706 (1997) (holding that because the trial court found that Gebaroff treated the trailer as his resi-
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dence, the reviewing court treated it like a residential outbuilding). And
police have no authority to search vehicles that are not within the curtilage of the home. See, e.g., State v. Graham, 78 Wn. App. 44, 51−52,
896 P.2d 704 (1995) (holding that a truck parked next to, and slightly in,
a public street is not within the curtilage of the house where there was no
fence or other barrier between the occupant’s yard and the street).
In State v. Pourtes, the court held that the street and the shoulder of
the roadway were not within the curtilage of a residence. 49 Wn. App.
579, 581, 744 P.2d 644 (1987). Likewise, in State v. Niedergang, the
court held that a vehicle is not within the curtilage of a house when it is
parked in a space that lawfully could be used by anyone coming to the
adjoining house on legitimate business. 43 Wn. App. 656, 662, 719 P.2d
576 (1986).
3.10 SEIZURE OF UNNAMED ITEMS: REQUIREMENTS IN GENERAL
Items not listed in the search warrant may be seized when the seizure falls within one of the general exceptions to the warrant requirement.
See, e.g., State v. Hendrickson, 129 Wn.2d 61, 70, 917 P.2d 563 (1996)
(search incident to arrest). See generally infra Chapter 5. Most commonly, officers see an incriminating object that was not listed in the warrant
during a search. Under the plain view and open view exceptions, this
evidence may sometimes be seized. State v. Rose, 128 Wn.2d 388, 392,
909 P.2d 280 (1996) (open view); State v. Myers, 117 Wn.2d 332, 346,
815 P.2d 761 (1991) (plain view). In addition, items may be seized in
order to show dominion and control of the premises even if those items
are not listed in the search warrant. State v. Weaver, 38 Wn. App. 17, 22,
683 P.2d 1136 (1984).
3.11 DELIVERING WARRANT AND INVENTORY: REQUIREMENTS FOR
EXECUTION OF WARRANTS
Statutes or court rules may impose requirements on the execution of
warrants beyond those mandated by the U.S. Constitution. Washington
court rules provide that the officer shall give a copy of the warrant to the
person who controls the premises being searched. CrR 2.3(d). If no one
is present, the officer must post a copy of the warrant. Id. In addition, an
inventory of articles taken must be made in the presence of at least one
person other than the searching officer. Id. This requirement is designed
to prevent error in the inventory and is satisfied by the presence of another police officer. State v. Temple, 170 Wn. App. 156, 161, 285 P.3d
149 (2012) (citing State v. Wraspir, 20 Wn. App. 626, 628, 581 P.2d 182
(1978)).
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Washington follows the majority rule that defects relating to the delivery of a search warrant are ministerial and do not compel invalidation
of the warrant absent a showing of prejudice. Temple, 170 Wn. App. at
161, 285 P.3d 149. In State v. Aase, the court held that a several minute
delay in the provision of the warrant to the defendant did not require
suppression under either the federal or the state constitution. 121 Wn.
App. 558, 567, 89 P.3d 721 (2004). Even a warrant that by error was unsigned did not invalidate the search without a showing of prejudice. State
v. Parker, 28 Wn. App. 425, 426, 626 P.2d 508 (1981).
3.12 CHALLENGING THE CONTENT OF AN AFFIDAVIT
A defendant is generally entitled to examine an affidavit in order to
challenge whether there was probable cause to issue the warrant. Most
commonly, issues arise with disclosure of the informant’s identity and
misrepresentations or omissions in the affidavit.
3.12(a) Informant’s Identity
The court may excise portions of the affidavit that identify a confidential or unnamed informant to protect the State’s interest in maintaining the confidentiality of such informants. See State v. Moen, 150 Wn.2d
221, 230, 76 P.3d 721 (2003); see CrR 4.7(f)(2) (“Disclosure of an informant’s identity shall not be required where the informant’s identity is
a prosecution secret and a failure to disclose will not infringe upon the
constitutional rights of the defendant.”).
When the informant is undisclosed, the defendant lacks access to
the very information he or she needs to challenge the veracity of an affidavit. State v. Casal, 103 Wn.2d 812, 818, 699 P.2d 1234 (1985). Courts
have held that when the “informant provided information relating to
probable cause only, rather than the defendant’s guilt or innocence, disclosure of the identity of an informant is not required.” State v. Atchley,
142 Wn. App. 147, 156, 173 P.3d 323 (2007); see also Casal, 103 Wn.2d
at 815−16, 699 P.2d 1234 (citing Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53,
61, 77 S. Ct. 623, 1 L. Ed. 2d 639 (1957)). However, “fundamental fairness” may require the disclosure of an informant’s identity to assess the
affiant’s credibility or accuracy. State v. White, 50 Wn. App. 858, 865,
751 P.2d 1202 (1988). In such cases, the court must balance the risks of
disclosure against the risk that nondisclosure may conceal police perjury.
State v. Wolken, 103 Wn.2d 823, 829, 700 P.2d 319 (1985). The discretionary nature of the rule recognizes the possibility that search warrant
affidavits may contain some false allegations. In re Rosier, 105 Wn.2d
606, 615, 717 P.2d 1353 (1986).
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A defendant under these circumstances is entitled to an in camera
hearing on whether to disclose the informant’s identity if the defendant
“casts a reasonable doubt on the veracity of material representations
made by the affiant.” White, 50 Wn. App. at 865, 751 P.2d 1202 (quoting
Casal, 103 Wn.2d at 820, 699 P.2d 1234). This hearing is available on
only a “minimal showing of inconsistency.” Id. Even so, “a Casal hearing is required only whe[n] a search warrant affidavit contains no other
independent basis for establishing probable cause.” Id. at 865 n.4, 751
P.2d 1202. If the informant verifies the affiant’s story and the judge is
convinced that probable cause existed, the informant’s identity is not to
be disclosed. Id. at 822, 751 P.2d 1202. But if the judge finds a substantial showing of falsehood, an open evidentiary hearing is required. Id.
3.12(b) Misrepresentations and Omissions in an Affidavit
A defendant may challenge the validity of a warrant based on a
misrepresentation of fact in the supporting affidavit. Franks v. Delaware,
438 U.S. 154, 155−56, 98 S. Ct. 2674, 57 L. Ed. 2d 667 (1978); State v.
Chenoweth, 160 Wn.2d 454, 158 P.3d 595 (2007). The Franks test also
applies to allegations of material omissions. State v. Cord, 103 Wn.2d
361, 367, 693 P.2d 81 (1985).
Under article I, section 7, the defendant must first make a substantial showing that a false statement in the affidavit (1) was made either
knowingly and intentionally or in reckless disregard for the truth, and (2)
was necessary or material to the finding of probable cause. State v. Garrison, 118 Wn.2d 870, 872, 827 P.2d 1388 (1992) (per curiam); see also
Chenoweth, 160 Wn.2d at 478−79, 158 P.3d 595. An omission or misrepresentation that was made in a negligent or grossly negligent manner
will not give rise to a Franks hearing; the omission or misrepresentation
must be made recklessly. Chenoweth, 160 Wn.2d at 478−79, 158 P.3d
595; State v. Seagull, 95 Wn.2d 898, 908, 632 P.2d 44 (1981) (quoting
Franks, 438 U.S. at 171, 98 S. Ct. 2674). The showing must be based on
specific facts and offers of proof rather than on conclusory assertions.
Garrison, 118 Wn.2d at 872, 827 P.2d 1388.
If the defendant fails to meet these formidable preconditions, the
inquiry ends. Chenoweth, 160 Wn.2d at 479−81, 158 P.3d 595; State v.
Jackson, 111 Wn. App. 660, 677, 46 P.3d 257 (2002). But if the defendant is successful in proving the truth of his allegations and the false
statements or omitted material is relevant to the establishment of probable cause, the affidavit must be examined with the false statements deleted and the omissions inserted. State v. Atchley, 142 Wn. App. 147, 158,
173 P.3d 323 (2007). If the modified affidavit is insufficient to support a
finding of probable cause, the defendant is entitled to an evidentiary
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hearing under the Fourth Amendment. Franks, 438 U.S. at 171−72, 98 S.
Ct. 2674; Garrison, 118 Wn.2d at 873, 827 P.2d 1388. As with the exclusionary rule, close cases should be assessed in favor of the defendant
when the misstatements are removed from the affidavit. United States v.
Kelley, 482 F.3d 1047 (9th Cir. 2007).
3.13 SPECIAL SITUATIONS
Three situations appearing frequently in searches require additional
limitations. These are searches and seizures of materials protected by the
First Amendment, intrusions into the body, and warrants directed at nonsuspects.
3.13(a) First Amendment Materials
“Where a search warrant authorizing a search for materials protected by the First Amendment is concerned, the degree of particularity
demanded is greater than in the case where the materials sought are not
protected by the First Amendment.” State v. Reep, 161 Wn.2d 808, 815,
167 P.3d 1156 (2007). The particularity requirement is afforded its most
exacting enforcement for these materials, including warrants for books,
pictures, films, or recordings. State v. Perrone, 119 Wn.2d 538, 547, 834
P.2d 611 (1992); see Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 564, 98 S.
Ct. 1970, 56 L. Ed. 2d 525 (1978). Computers themselves are not subject
to heightened protection just because they frequently store material protected by the First Amendment. United States v. Giberson, 527 F.3d 882
(9th Cir. 2008). These warrants must “follow the Fourth Amendment’s
particularity requirement with ‘scrupulous exactitude.’” Reep, 161
Wn.2d at 815, 167 P.3d 1156 (internal citations omitted). When the First
Amendment is involved, nothing should be “left to the discretion of the
officer executing the warrant.” Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 485, 85
S. Ct. 506, 13 L. Ed. 2d 431 (1965).
If the objects to be seized are books or films, and are being seized
because of their content, the requirement of particularity is especially
important.” Perrone, 119 Wn.2d at 548, 834 P.2d 611; see also 2 Wayne
R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 4.6(e) (5th ed. 2012). The seizure of
protected materials happens most frequently with regards to allegedly
obscene material. 2 LaFave, supra, § 4.6(e), at 811–12 (for allegedly obscene material, “a description of these materials by title or similar identifying characteristic, or by a specific statement as to the type of contents
which would render the materials presumptively obscene” is required). In
State v. Perrone, the court held that a warrant for “child pornography”
was insufficiently particular because pornography implicates “obscenity,”
a term that is presumptively protected by the First Amendment. 119
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Wn.2d at 547, 834 P.2d 611. In State v. Reep, the court held that “the
fictitious crime of ‘child sex’ is even broader and more ambiguous than
the term ‘child . . . pornography.’” 161 Wn.2d at 815, 167 P.3d 1156
(striking down warrant for “child sex”). However, in the Ninth Circuit, a
warrant for “computers, compact disks, floppy disks, hard drives,
memory cards, printers, and other portable digital devices, DVDs, and
video tapes” was not too broad, as the computer-related equipment was
described in the narrowest terms reasonably likely to contain the images.
States v. Brobst, 558 F.3d 982 (9th Cir. 2009).
However, the scrupulous exactitude standard has not been extended
to all searches and seizures involving the First Amendment. State v. Walter, 66 Wn. App. 862, 869, 833 P.2d 440 (1992) (per curiam) (citing New
York v. P.J. Video, Inc., 475 U.S. 868, 875, 106 S. Ct. 1610, 89 L. Ed. 2d
871 (1986)) (determining that greater scrutiny was not required merely
because photographs were involved). Additionally, the U.S. Supreme
Court has upheld a search warrant that listed specific documents pertaining to a particular crime but then added the catchall phrase “together with
other fruits, instrumentalities, and evidence of crime.” Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 479, 96 S. Ct. 2737, 49 L. Ed. 2d 627 (1976). In Andresen, the search was constitutional because the catchall phrase was to
be read as authorizing a search for only evidence relating to the defined
crime. Id. at 480−82, 96 S. Ct. 2737. In U.S. v. Heredia, the Ninth Circuit
found a warrant for “any and all” records related to a certain organization
too broad because the organization had not been shown to be pervasively
criminal. 483 F.3d 913 (9th Cir. 2007).
3.13(b) Intrusions into the Body
Under both the Fourth Amendment and article I, section 7 of the
Washington State Constitution, a forced intrusion into the body is a
search. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 616, 109 S. Ct.
1402, 103 L. Ed. 2d 639 (1989); State v. Garcia-Salgado, 170 Wn.2d
176, 184, 240 P.3d 153 (2010). This includes, among other things, DNA
sampling, tests of a defendant’s blood for alcohol content, breathalyzer
tests, cavity searches, and strip searches. Importantly, if the defendant
voluntarily discards bodily fluids, no warrant is necessary. State v. Athan,
160 Wn.2d 354, 367, 158 P.3d 27 (2007) (finding no privacy interest in
saliva on envelope mailed to the defendant by a police officer posing as
an attorney). A trial court may also order samples to be taken from the
defendant’s body; however, the court’s power to do so is subject to constitutional limitations. CrR 4.7(b)(2)(vi); see Garcia-Salgado, 170 Wn.2d
at 185−86, 240 P.3d 153. Thus, intrusion into the body is covered by the
warrant requirement.
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For an intrusion into the body, the regular requirements under article I, section 7 and the Fourth Amendment apply. State v. Kalakosky, 121
Wn.2d 525, 532, 852 P.2d 1064 (1993) (holding that valid search warrant
based on probable cause is constitutionally sufficient to obtain blood
sample from suspect). However, in addition, three more showings must
be made. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770–72, 86 S. Ct. 1826,
16 L. Ed. 2d 908 (1966) (finding that the “interests in human dignity and
privacy which the Fourth Amendment protects” require a heightened
standard); Garcia-Salgado, 170 Wn.2d at 184−85, 240 P.3d 153. In order
for the search to be lawful, (1) there must be a “clear indication” that the
desired evidence will be found if the search is performed, (2) the method
of searching must be reasonable, and (3) the search must be performed in
a reasonable manner. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770−72, 86 S. Ct. 1826.
However, if the alcohol content of the defendant’s blood is an element of the crime, the police may take a blood sample without a warrant
if the test used to measure blood alcohol content is reasonable and performed in a reasonable manner. State v. Curran, 116 Wn.2d 174, 185,
804 P.2d 558 (1991), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Berlin, 133
Wn.2d 541, 947 P.2d 700 (1997). Thus, for example, taking a blood
sample from a defendant charged with negligent homicide is valid when
the police have probable cause to believe that evidence of intoxication
will be found and that the test used to measure blood alcohol content is
reasonable and performed in a reasonable manner. State v. Judge, 100
Wn.2d 706, 712, 675 P.2d 219 (1984) (citing Schmerber, 384 U.S. at
770–71, 86 S. Ct. 1826 (finding that it was impracticable to seek a warrant for a blood draw because the defendant’s body was constantly eliminating the evidence of alcohol in his blood)). But see Missouri v.
McNeely, No. 11–1425, slip op. (U.S. Apr. 17, 2013) (dissipation of
blood alcohol not sufficient per se to conduct warrantless draw).
Washington has also upheld mandatory blood testing in cases of putative fathers, see State v. Meacham, 93 Wn.2d 735, 739, 612 P.2d 795
(1980), and has upheld mandatory HIV and DNA testing of convicted
sexual offenders. Kalakosky, 121 Wn.2d at 536, 852 P.2d 1064 (holding
that mandatory HIV testing of sexual offenders presents a minimal
Fourth Amendment intrusion for which the State’s reasons are compelling); State v. Olivas, 122 Wn.2d 73, 93, 856 P.2d 1076 (1993) (holding
that a statute requiring mandatory DNA testing of convicted sexual offenders in order to establish DNA databank is constitutionally permissible). It is also permissible to take DNA samples from convicted felons.
State v. Surge, 160 Wn.2d 65, 156 P.3d 208 (2007) (upholding RCW
43.43.754 and finding that mandatory DNA testing of felons without a
warrant is constitutional). In addition, once the police have the DNA
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sample in their possession, they may compare it to unrelated cases without a warrant. State v. Gregory, 158 Wn.2d 759, 826–27, 147 P.3d 1201
(2006).
More intrusive procedures may be permitted in special environments. In prisons and jails, strip searches and cavity searches may be
done without a warrant. State v. Harris, 66 Wn. App. 636, 642, 833 P.2d
402 (1992) (finding exigent circumstances justified strip search of juvenile before placement in holding cell when police had prior experience
with gang members taping razor blades to their skin); Bell v. Wolfish,
441 U.S. 520, 560, 99 S. Ct. 1861, 60 L. Ed. 2d 447 (1979) (finding full
body cavity searches of prison inmates following contact visits not unreasonable). Similar intrusive procedures may be allowed at borders. See
United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 537, 105 S. Ct.
3304, 87 L. Ed. 2d 381 (1985) (holding that suspect fitting the profile for
a drug smuggler may be subjected to rectal cavity search when search
warrant was based on profile and suspect’s unwillingness to eat, drink, or
defecate during 16 hour confinement). See generally infra §§ 6.2 (prisons), 6.3 (borders).
The U.S. Supreme Court is currently hearing a challenge to a state
law that allows DNA sampling for persons arrested for, but not convicted
of, a crime. King v. State, 425 Md. 550, 42 A.3d 549 (2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 594, 184 L. Ed. 2d 390 (U.S. Nov. 9, 2012).
3.13(c) Warrants Directed at Nonsuspects
In 1978, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment
also applies to non-suspects. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547,
559−60, 98 S. Ct. 1970, 56 L. Ed. 2d 525 (1978). Critics have argued
that a search warrant of a third party is per se unreasonable and that a
subpoena duces tecum can adequately protect law enforcement interests.
See Note, The Reasonableness of Warranted Searches of Nonsuspect
Third Parties, 44 Alb. L. Rev. 212, 232–35 (1979) (criticizing Zurcher
for failing to adopt a less drastic alternative or less intrusive practice test
in Fourth Amendment cases). In response to Zurcher, Congress enacted
the Privacy Protection Act of 1980 (PPA), which prohibits the government from searching or seizing any work product material “possessed by
a person reasonably believed to have a purpose to disseminate to the public a newspaper, book, broadcast, or other similar form of public communication” without first issuing a subpoena duces tecum. 42 U.S.C. §§
2000aa–2000aa-12 (1994).
These protections have not been extended outside the media, and
Washington has not yet addressed the issue. See generally 2 Wayne R.
LaFave, Search and Seizure §§ 4.2(c), 4.1(f)−(i) (5th ed. 2012). Most
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commonly, disputes occur with the searching of non-suspect attorneys’
offices. O’Connor v. Johnson, 287 N.W.2d 400, 405 (Minn. 1979) (finding that the protections of client confidentiality, attorney-client privilege,
attorney work product, and a criminal defendant’s constitutional right to
counsel cannot keep enforcement officers from rummaging through documents in search of items to be seized when such officers possess a warrant to search an attorney’s office). Colorado, one of the only states to do
so, has struck down a third party search under its heightened First
Amendment provision. Tattered Cover, Inc. v. City of Thornton, 44 P.3d
1044, 1056, 30 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1656 (Colo. 2002), as modified on
denial of reh’g (Apr. 29, 2002).

CHAPTER 4
Seizure of the Person: Arrests and Stop-and-Frisks
This chapter covers principles that are unique to seizure of the person. Related issues include probable cause discussed in chapter 2, knock
and announce discussed in section 3.7, and searches incident to arrest
discussed in section 5.1. This chapter first discusses the basics of arrests,
both with and without warrants, for felony charges and misdemeanor
charges. Second, this chapter discusses the specifics of arrests, such as
force, custodial arrests for minor offenses, judicial review, and booking
charges. Lastly, this chapter covers Terry stops, including the reasonable
suspicion standard, frisks, investigative questioning, and the dimensions
of a reasonable stop.
4.0 SEIZURE: AN INTRODUCTION
The Washington constitution has generally been interpreted as
providing greater protections for individual privacy interests than the
Fourth Amendment provides. State v. Winterstein, 167 Wn.2d 620,
631, 220 P.3d 1226 (2009). Under article I, section 7, a seizure occurs
when a reasonable person under the totality of the circumstances would
not feel free either to leave or to decline an officer’s requests due to the
officer’s use of force or display of authority. State v. Rankin, 151 Wn.2d
689, 695, 92 P.3d 202 (2004); State v. O’Neill, 148 Wn.2d 564, 574, 62
P.3d 489 (2003). Unlike the Fourth Amendment, Washington’s “standard
is ‘a purely objective one, looking to the actions of the law enforcement
officer.’” State v. Harrington, 167 Wn.2d 656, 663, 222 P.3d 92 (2009);
see also California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626−29, 111 S. Ct. 1547
(1991) (requiring submission to the show of force in order to constitute a
seizure). Specifically, a determination of whether a reasonable person
would feel free to leave is based on the officer’s conduct. See O’Neill,
148 Wn.2d at 574, 62 P.3d 489; see also Harrington, 167 Wn.2d at 663,
222 P.3d 92. The relevant question is whether, under the circumstances,
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police conduct would have communicated to a reasonable person that he
or she was not free to leave. O’Neill, 148 Wn.2d at 574, 62 P.3d 489;
State v. Avila-Avina, 99 Wn. App. 9, 14, 991 P.2d 720 (2000), abrogated
on other grounds by Winterstein, 167 Wn.2d 620, 220 P.3d 1226.
Coercive conduct that constitutes a seizure is established by a series
of acts, rather than a single act. See State v. Soto-Garcia, 68 Wn. App. 20,
25, 841 P.2d 1271 (1992). The state supreme court has embraced a nonexclusive list of factors that likely result in a seizure: “‘the threatening
presence of several officers, the display of a weapon by an officer, some
physical touching of the person of the citizen, or the use of language or
tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer’s request might
be compelled.’” State v. Young, 135 Wn.2d 498, 512, 957 P.2d 681
(1998) (quoting United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554–55, 100
S. Ct. 1870, 64 L. Ed. 2d 497 (1980)).
If the officers merely ask the defendant a few questions or ask for
identification, they have initiated a social contact, not a seizure. See Harrington, 167 Wn.2d at 664–65, 222 P.3d 92 (finding a social contact
when only one officer was present, the defendant had use of the sidewalk,
and the police officer was on foot); State v. Hansen, 99 Wn. App. 575,
576, 994 P.2d 855 (2000) (per curiam) (holding that handing defendant’s
identification from one officer to another for the purpose of identification
does not amount to a seizure); see supra Chapter 1.
A seizure was found when the defendant voluntarily entered a police car that could not be opened from inside. Avila-Avina, 99 Wn. App.
at 14, 991 P.2d 720. In situations where there is more than one police
officer or the officers use a threatening tone, the court has found seizures
as well. See Harrington, 167 Wn.2d at 660, 222 P.3d 92 (arrival of second police officer and request to pat down instigated a seizure); State v.
Gleason, 70 Wn. App. 13, 17, 851 P.2d 731 (1993) (seizure found when
two officers were present, and one officer yelled “[c]an I talk to you a
minute?” to the suspect, approached him, and requested identification).
4.1 ARREST
A defendant is placed under arrest when “a duly authorized officer
of the law manifests an intent to take a person into custody and actually
seizes or detains such person.” State v. Patton, 167 Wn.2d 379, 387, 219
P.3d 651 (2009). The moment of arrest occurs when the officer manifests
this intent, not when the officer actually restrains the defendant. Id.
(holding that a defendant was under arrest at the point when officer told
him he was under arrest even though the defendant ran).
The relevant inquiry to determine whether a person has been arrested is “whether a reasonable person in the suspect’s position at the time
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would have thought so.” State v. Rivard, 131 Wn.2d 63, 75, 929 P.2d 413
(1997). The subjective intent of the arresting officer is irrelevant. State v.
Radka, 120 Wn. App. 43, 50, 83 P.3d 1038 (2004). In State v. Rivard, the
court found that no arrest occurred because the defendant was not physically apprehended, restrained, handcuffed, or placed in a police vehicle.
131 Wn.2d at 75, 929 P.2d 413. In State v. Radka, the court found no
arrest even though the defendant was told he was under arrest and placed
in a patrol car because he was neither frisked nor handcuffed, and he was
allowed to make calls on his cell phone. 120 Wn. App. at 50, 83 P.3d
1038.
Although a seizure restrains an individual’s freedom of movement,
not all seizures amount to arrests. See State v. Lyons, 85 Wn. App. 267,
270, 932 P.2d 188 (1997) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct.
1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968) (finding investigative detention was not
transformed into an arrest when the investigating officer physically restrained a suspect and stated that he was under arrest)). For instance, a
seizure, but not necessarily an arrest, has taken place when a police officer asks an individual to step out of his or her car during a stop. See
State v. O’Neill, 148 Wn.2d 564, 581−82, 62 P.3d 489 (2003).
It is not a defense in a criminal prosecution that a defendant was illegally arrested. Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 444, 7 S. Ct. 225, 30 L. Ed.
421 (1886); State v. Waters, 93 Wn. App. 969, 976, 971 P.2d 538 (1999).
However, the legality of the arrest affects the legality of any search or
confession that takes place after the arrest, as well as the admissibility of
evidence derived from the arrest. See generally infra Chapter 7.
4.2 ARRESTS WITHOUT WARRANTS
Arrests are not subject to the same strict warrant requirements as
searches; therefore, officers have more leeway to arrest without a warrant
than they do to search without a warrant. First, this section will delineate
the general rules for warrantless arrests in public places and in the home.
Then, this section will examine the standards for warrantless arrests for
felony offenses and warrantless arrests for misdemeanors.
4.2(a) Public Arrests
An officer may make a warrantless felony arrest in a public place
even though the officer had time to obtain a warrant. State v. Solberg,
122 Wn.2d 688, 696, 861 P.2d 460 (1993) (citing United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 422−24, 96 S. Ct. 820, 46 L. Ed. 2d 598 (1976)).
Nonetheless, such arrests must be supported by probable cause. Id.; 3
Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 5.1(b), at 15−21 (5th ed.
2012). “‘Probable cause exists when the arresting officer is aware of
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facts or circumstances . . . sufficient to cause a reasonable officer to believe a crime has been committed.’” State v. Moore, 161 Wn.2d 880, 887,
169 P.3d 469 (2007) (emphasis removed) (citing State v. Gaddy, 152
Wn.2d 64, 70, 93 P.3d 872 (2004)); see Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S.
366, 371, 124 S. Ct. 795, 157 L. Ed. 2d 769 (2003). Additionally, the
probable cause must be specific to the individual arrested; thus, if an officer smells marijuana emanating from a vehicle and two individuals are
present, the officer may not arrest both if he cannot discern where the
odor is coming from. State v. Grande, 164 Wn.2d 135, 146, 187 P.3d 248
(2008).
Probable cause, however, is not subject to calculation by formula or
by mathematical certainty. See State v. Morgan, 78 Wn. App. 208, 212,
896 P.2d 731 (1995); see also supra Chapter 2. Therefore, a defendant is
entitled to a prompt judicial determination of probable cause following a
warrantless arrest. Westerman v. Cary, 125 Wn.2d 277, 295, 892 P.2d
1067 (1994); see Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114, 95 S. Ct. 854, 43
L. Ed. 2d 54 (1975) (“Once the suspect is in custody . . . the reasons that
justify dispensing with the magistrate’s neutral judgment evaporate.”);
see also infra § 4.5(c).
4.2(b) Home Arrests
Although officers may make a warrantless arrest in a public area,
they may not make a warrantless arrest after a nonconsensual entry into a
suspect’s home. State v. Eserjose, 171 Wn.2d 907, 912, 259 P.3d 172
(2011) (citing Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 589−90, 100 S. Ct.
1371, 63 L. Ed. 2d 639 (1980)). If the officers have a warrant, they may
enter the home if they reasonably believe the defendant resides therein.
State v. Hatchie, 161 Wn.2d 390, 395−96, 166 P.3d 698 (2007); see infra
§ 4.3 (discussing Hatchie). The defendant’s home includes trailers even
when the “trailer home [is] so small that [the defendant] could open the
front door while lying in his bed.” United States v. Quaempts, 411 F.3d
1046, 1047 (9th Cir. 2005). Washington courts have not extended the
protections provided by Payton beyond the home. See State v. White, 129
Wn.2d 105, 109, 915 P.2d 1099 (1996).
In Washington, the arrest of a suspect who is standing in the doorway of his or her home is treated the same as an arrest in the home. See
State v. Solberg, 122 Wn.2d 688, 697, 861 P.2d 460 (1993) (citing State
v. Holeman, 103 Wn.2d 426, 429, 693 P.2d 89 (1985)). As such, the location of the suspect, not the location of the officer, is material to the
issue of whether an arrest occurs in the home. Holeman, 103 Wn.2d at
429, 693 P.2d 89; see Solberg, 122 Wn.2d at 697, 861 P.2d 460 (officer
prohibited from arresting suspect standing in the doorway of home with-
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out warrant). And if the officers force the suspect out of his home, the
arrest is considered as taking place inside the home. United States v. AlAzzawy, 784 F.2d 890 (9th Cir. 1985). However, an arrest of a suspect
who is on a front porch, as opposed to in the doorway, is considered a
public arrest. See Solberg, 122 Wn.2d at 700, 861 P.2d 460 (“[T]he protections afforded in Payton clearly do not apply outside the physical
boundaries of the home as the theoretical basis of the Payton decision is
that an arrest within a home violates the sanctity of the home whereas
outside the boundaries of the home, no such violation is present.”).
In interpreting the Washington constitution, state courts have not
adopted the bright-line rule applied under the Fourth Amendment that an
officer may, in all circumstances, accompany an arrestee into the arrestee’s home after the arrest. See State v. Chrisman, 100 Wn.2d 814,
820−21, 676 P.2d 419 (1984); see also State v. Kull, 155 Wn.2d 80, 86,
118 P.3d 307 (2005). Under article I, section 7, when a person is arrested
for a minor violation, the arresting officer may not follow the arrestee
into his or her home unless the officer can reasonably conclude that the
officer’s safety is endangered, evidence might be destroyed, or escape is
a strong possibility. Kull, 155 Wn.2d at 88−89, 118 P.3d 307 (finding
that the officer could not follow the defendant into her house because he
did not fear for his safety and had no other justification). If the officer
knows of specific, articulable facts that indicate a threat to the officer’s
safety, the officer may follow the defendant inside. State v. Wood, 45 Wn.
App. 299, 308−09, 725 P.2d 435 (1986) (finding that sufficient reason
existed to accompany the arrestee into residence for security purposes
when officer was executing an arrest warrant for a felony parole violation). An officer may also enter a home without a warrant under exigent
circumstances or in response to a medical emergency. Eserjose, 171
Wn.2d at 912, 259 P.3d 172; State v. Kinzy, 141 Wn.2d 373, 386, 5 P.3d
668 (2000); see infra §§ 5.12−5.14 (exigent circumstances).
A warrantless search based on the emergency exception is valid only if “(1) the officer subjectively believed that someone likely needed
assistance for health or safety reasons; (2) a reasonable person in the
same situation would similarly believe that there was a need for assistance; and (3) there was a reasonable basis to associate the need for assistance with the place searched.” Kinzy, 141 Wn.2d at 386, 5 P.3d 668;
State v. Gibson, 104 Wn. App. 792, 796−97, 17 P.3d 635 (2001) (upholding arrest of defendant under emergency exception when officers
entered house to secure the safety of the children before arresting defendant).
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4.2(c) Felony Arrest
Under the common law standard and the Fourth Amendment, the
authority to arrest without a warrant applies to felonies. United States v.
Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 422−23, 96 S. Ct. 820, 46 L. Ed. 2d 598 (1976);
Kellogg v. State, 94 Wn.2d 851, 854, 621 P.2d 133 (1980). The officer
may arrest for a felony committed outside of his presence if “he has reasonable grounds to believe that (1) the offense committed is a felony, and
(2) the person apprehended committed the felony.” RCW 10.31.100; see
also Watson, 423 U.S. at 422−23, 96 S. Ct. 820. In deciding whether an
officer had a reasonable belief that a felony was committed, the court
must consider all of the information known to the officer at the time of
the arrest, as well as the officer’s expertise. State v. Rose, 175 Wn.2d 10,
22, 282 P.3d 1087 (2012) (holding that plain view of pipe with residue,
coupled with the detective’s training, provided cause to make a warrantless arrest).
4.2(d) Misdemeanor Arrest
To make a warrantless misdemeanor arrest, an officer must have
probable cause to believe that a misdemeanor is being committed in his
presence. RCW 10.31.100; State v. Green, 150 Wn.2d 740, 742, 82 P.3d
239 (2004) (per curiam). For more detail on custodial arrests for misdemeanor offenses, see infra § 4.4(d). Under common law, an officer can
make a warrantless arrest of a person who breaches the peace. See
Kalmas v. Wagner, 133 Wn.2d 210, 218, 943 P.2d 1369 (1997); 3 Wayne
R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 5.1(b), at 17 (5th ed. 2012). But an
officer’s authority to make such an arrest under the common law is not
restricted to offenses involving a breach of the peace. Atwater v. City of
Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 327, 121 S. Ct. 1536, 149 L. Ed. 2d 549
(2001). If the misdemeanor is committed in the presence of the officer,
the officer may arrest without a warrant. Green, 150 Wn.2d at 742, 82
P.3d 239.
The common law presence rule is not constitutionally mandated,
and consequently, Washington allows an officer to make a warrantless
misdemeanor arrest in a few instances even where the offense is not
committed in the officer’s presence. RCW 10.31.100; see United States v.
Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 418–21, 96 S. Ct. 820, 46 L. Ed. 2d 598 (1976).
An officer may make a warrantless misdemeanor arrest if the offense (1)
involves criminal trespass, physical harm, or the threat of physical harm
to persons or property; (2) is for possession of marijuana, or possession
or consumption of alcohol by a minor; (3) is for violation of a restraining
order; (4) is witnessed by another officer; or (5) is for one of a number of
specified traffic offenses. RCW 10.31.100. Also, when a suspect is ar-
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rested for a misdemeanor not committed in the officer’s presence, the
arrest is not illegal if the arresting officer has knowledge of a felony for
which the suspect could have been arrested. See State v. Stebbins, 47 Wn.
App. 482, 485, 735 P.2d 1353 (1987).
The “in the presence” requirement of RCW 10.31.100 is satisfied
whenever the officer directly perceives facts permitting a reasonable inference that a misdemeanor is being committed. See Tacoma v. Harris,
73 Wn.2d 123, 126, 436 P.2d 770 (1968). See generally 3 LaFave, supra
§ 5.1(c) (discussing what constitutes “in the presence”). Questions arise
regarding whether the officer must view all the elements of a crime and
what types of information may be used to fill in “gaps.” See Tacoma, 73
Wn.2d at 126, 436 P.2d 770. However, the arresting officer must be the
one who observed the misdemeanor. State v. Ortega, 297 P.3d 57 (Wash.
2013). The Washington State Supreme Court has held that the fellowofficer rule does not extend to the context of misdemeanors; thus, information known to one officer will not be imputed to other members of the
team. Id.
Originally, the misdemeanor offense of possessing or consuming
alcohol by a person under 21 years of age, RCW 66.44.270, was not considered committed in an officer’s presence if the officer did not witness
the person’s ingestion of the alcohol. State v. Allen, 63 Wn. App. 623,
625, 821 P.2d 533 (1991). However, the Washington legislature realized
that such a requirement was problematic. Thus, in 1987, the legislature
amended RCW 66.44.270 to allow an officer to arrest a person under the
age of 21 for possessing or consuming alcohol if the officer had probable
cause to believe that the person had alcohol or other drugs in his or her
system. See RCW 10.31.100(1); State v. Preston, 66 Wn. App. 494,
497−98, 832 P.2d 513 (1992) (citing State v. Hornaday, 105 Wn.2d 120,
129, 713 P.2d 71 (1986)).
4.3 ARRESTS WITH WARRANTS
Unlike arrests without warrants, an officer with a valid warrant may
enter the home without permission to make the arrest. See State v.
Hatchie, 161 Wn.2d 390, 395–97, 166 P.3d 698 (2007) (holding that a
misdemeanor warrant allowed the officers to enter the residence). But the
court has “recognized that the presence of an officer, which is initially
lawful, can be rendered unlawful by his movement.” State v. Chrisman,
100 Wn.2d 814, 820, 676 P.2d 419 (1984). The valid arrest warrant gives
police “only the limited ability to enter the residence, find the suspect,
arrest him, and leave.” Hatchie, 161 Wn.2d at 400, 166 P.3d 698.
In general, the principles governing the procurement and execution
of search warrants also apply to arrest warrants. See supra Chapter 3.
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Thus, an invalid warrant will not support an arrest. State v. Nall, 117 Wn.
App. 647, 651, 72 P.3d 200 (2003) (holding that an invalid Oregon warrant will not support arrest in Washington); see Whiteley v. Warden, 401
U.S. 560, 568−69, 91 S. Ct. 1031, 28 L. Ed. 2d 306 (1971); 3 Wayne R.
LaFave, Search and Seizure § 5.1(h), at 87−88 (5th ed. 2012). Even if
the arrest is based on a mistaken “hot sheet” and the arresting officer acts
in goodwill, the arrest is unlawful. State v. Mance, 82 Wn. App. 539, 542,
918 P.2d 527 (1996).
With a valid warrant, an arrest is lawful if the officer has reasonably
articulable grounds to believe that the suspect is the intended arrestee
named in the warrant. State v. Smith, 102 Wn.2d 449, 453−54, 688 P.2d
146 (1984). If doubt arises as to identity, the officer is expected to immediately take reasonable steps to confirm or deny that the warrant applies to the person being held. Id. at 454, 688 P.2d 146. The initial arrest,
however, must be based on more than the individual’s similarity to the
general physical description set forth in the warrant. See id. (applying
Sanders v. United States, 339 A.2d 373, 379 (D.C. Cir. 1975), and finding the seizure unlawful because the defendant only fit the general description and the officer failed to take steps to verify the specific information).
Under statutory law in Washington, a person arrested under the authority of a warrant must first be read the warrant, but the rules surrounding the execution of an arrest warrant are ministerial, and substantial
compliance with RCW 10.31.030 is all that is required for a valid arrest.
State v. Simmons, 35 Wn. App. 421, 423, 667 P.2d 133 (1983). After arrest, if the person wishes to deposit bail, he or she must be taken without
delay before a judge. RCW 10.31.030; State v. Caldera, 84 Wn. App.
527, 528, 929 P.2d 482 (1997) (per curiam) (finding illegal a search of
two defendants when the search occurred prior to being read the warrant
or being taken before a judge to deposit bail). However, the plain language of RCW 10.31.030 does not require the officer to take the defendant to the nearest detention station. State v. Ross, 106 Wn. App. 876, 881,
26 P.3d 298 (2001).
4.4 ARRESTS: MISCELLANEOUS REQUIREMENTS
Even with a warrant, the officer may not make an arrest in any
manner that he or she chooses. There are further limitations on the use of
deadly force, booking charges, judicial review, and custodial arrest for
minor offenses. This section introduces these various rules in more detail.
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4.4(a) Use of Force
Under traditional common law, an officer was permitted to use reasonable force to make an arrest, and the officer could use deadly force if
such force reasonably appeared necessary to prevent a suspect’s escape
from a felony arrest. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 13−15, 105 S.
Ct. 1694, 85 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1985). If the defendant does not pose a threat to
the officer, the officer is restricted in the force he can use. Bryan v. MacPherson, 630 F.3d 805, 826−31 (9th Cir. 2010) (taser following stop for
failure to wear seat belt was excessive when arrestee did not pose immediate threat to officer and officer did not warn arrestee taser would be
used). Deadly force is restricted even further and is appropriate only
when “the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a
significant threat of death or serious physical injury to the officer or others.” Garner, 471 U.S. at 3, 105 S. Ct. 1694 (holding that police were not
permitted to shoot an unarmed, fleeing burglary suspect).
In Washington, the amount of force an officer may use is governed
by statute to the extent that the statute is consistent with Garner. See
RCW 10.31.050 (“If after notice of the intention to arrest the defendant,
he or she either flee or forcibly resist, the officer may use all necessary
means to effect the arrest.”); RCW 9A.16.040 (listing specific situations
in which officer is justified in using deadly force). The legislature specifically limited the use of deadly force under RCW 9A.16.040(1)(c) to instances in which the officer has “probable cause to believe that the suspect, if not apprehended, poses a threat of serious physical harm to the
officer or . . . others.” RCW 9A.16.040(2). The use of deadly force by a
public officer is justified “[w]hen necessar[y] . . . to overcome actual resistance to the execution of the legal process . . . or in the discharge of a
legal duty.” RCW 9A.16.040(1)(b).
In construing RCW 9A.16.040’s predecessor, the Supreme Court of
Washington held that deadly force may be used even when a felony has
not in fact occurred if the officer reasonably believes that a felony has
been committed. See Reese v. Seattle, 81 Wn.2d 374, 379−80, 503 P.2d
64 (1972). In Reese, the court stated that “great caution must be exercised by an officer in the use of deadly force and it must be resorted to by
an officer only when all other reasonable efforts to apprehend a person
fleeing from a Lawful arrest for a felony have failed.” Id. at 382−83, 81
Wn.2d 374.
4.4(b) Significance of Booking and Crime Charged
Courts differ about whether a suspect being booked for one offense
may be formally charged with another offense. Conflicting considerations underlie the decisions. On the one hand, if the booking and formal
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charges do not need to be similar, police can use an arrest as a pretext for
detaining a suspect for questioning about an unrelated crime for which
the police lack probable cause. On the other hand, at the time police first
establish probable cause for one crime, they may not possess sufficient
information to establish probable cause for another. See generally 3
Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 5.1(e) (5th ed. 2012).
In Washington, the formal charge may differ from the booking
charge. See State v. Teuber, 19 Wn. App. 651, 655−56, 577 P.2d 147
(1978). The booking charge has no significance after a formal charge has
been lodged, and booking “for investigation” is permissible provided that
probable cause for an arrest on any charge is present. See State v.
Thompson, 58 Wn.2d 598, 606−07, 364 P.2d 527 (1961).
4.4(c) Judicial Review
A person arrested without a warrant is entitled to a post-arrest probable cause determination. Westerman v. Cary, 125 Wn.2d 277, 295, 892
P.2d 1067 (1994); see Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114, 95 S. Ct. 854,
43 L. Ed. 2d 54 (1975) (“Once the suspect is in custody . . . the reasons
that justify dispensing with the magistrate’s neutral judgment evaporate.”). A neutral and detached magistrate must make the probable cause
determination, but the hearing may be ex parte. See Gerstein, 420 U.S. at
119–23, 95 S. Ct. 854. Courts have not resolved the issue of whether a
violation of the Gerstein rule requires suppression of evidence seized
after the arrest. See 3 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 5.1(g),
at 62−64 (5th ed. 2012).
4.4(d) Custodial Arrests for Minor Offenses
“If an officer has probable cause to believe that an individual has
committed even a very minor criminal offense in his presence, he may,
without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender.” Atwater v.
City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354−55, 121 S. Ct. 1536, 149 L. Ed. 2d
549 (2001) (upholding the arrest of an individual for failing to secure
herself and her children with safety belts). The Washington Court of Appeals has noted Atwater’s bright-line rule but stated that because of the
state’s additional protection of privacy rights, Washington courts must
draw the line differently than the U.S. Supreme Court. State v. Pulfrey,
120 Wn. App. 270, 283, 86 P.3d 790 (2004), aff’d, State v. Pulfrey, 154
Wn.2d 517, 528, 111 P.3d 1162 (2005) (affirming but not deciding the
constitutional issue).
Under RCW 46.64.015, custodial arrests for minor traffic violations
are limited to situations involving specific statutory violations, a defendant’s refusal to sign a promise to appear, and nonresident arrestees. RCW
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46.64.015; see State v. Radka, 120 Wn. App. 43, 48, 83 P.3d 1038
(2004); see also State v. Reding, 119 Wn.2d 685, 689, 835 P.2d 1019
(1992). “[A]s a matter of public policy . . . custodial arrest for minor traffic violations is unjustified, unwarranted, and impermissible if the defendant signs [a] promise to appear” in court. State v. Hehman, 90 Wn.2d
45, 47, 578 P.2d 527 (1978); see 3 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 5.2(g), at 162−164 n.149 (5th ed. 2012). In Hehman, the Supreme
Court of Washington held that an officer was prohibited from making a
custodial arrest for a minor traffic violation unless the officer had “other
reasonable grounds [for the arrest] apart from the minor traffic violation
itself.” 90 Wn.2d at 50, 578 P.2d 527.
Custodial arrests are permissible, however, for non-minor traffic offenses such as reckless driving and driving with a suspended license.
Pulfrey, 154 Wn.2d at 528, 111 P.3d 1162; State v. Carner, 28 Wn. App.
439, 444, 624 P.2d 204 (1981) (finding arrest proper when minor tried to
evade police on his motorcycle). Also, the officer may make a custodial
arrest when the circumstances surrounding the arrest dictate transferring
the violator to another location for completion of the arrest process. See
State v. LaTourette, 49 Wn. App. 119, 125, 741 P.2d 1033 (1987) (finding that the officers’ decision to move arrestee to another location to
complete arrest for reckless driving was proper when a hostile crowd
gathered in parking lot).
When civil proceedings are involved, custodial arrests may be improper. The Supreme Court of Washington has held a statute unconstitutional that authorized the custodial arrest of any person against whom a
paternity complaint is filed. See State v. Klinker, 85 Wn.2d 509, 524, 537
P.2d 268 (1975). Thus, in the absence of a contrary showing, the usual
summons and complaint procedure for civil cases is deemed adequate for
securing the defendant’s presence at trial. See id. at 522.
4.5 INTRODUCTION TO TERRY STOPS
In some situations, police may make investigatory stops that fall
short of arrests and are based on proof less than probable cause. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968); State
v. Snapp, 174 Wn.2d 177, 197−98, 275 P.3d 289 (2012). Although these
brief detentions, known as “Terry stops,” fall within the scope of the
Fourth Amendment, the public interests in crime detection and the relative non-intrusiveness of the stop permit a lower standard of proof. See
Terry, 392 U.S. at 20−27, 88 S. Ct. 1868. Thus, the investigatory stop is
tested against the Fourth Amendment’s general proscription of unreasonable searches and seizures rather than the Amendment’s probable cause
requirement. See id. at 21, 88 S. Ct. 1868.
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For a seizure to be permissible, an officer must have a reasonable
suspicion that the person stopped is engaged in criminal conduct. State v.
Doughty, 170 Wn.2d 57, 62−63, 239 P.3d 573 (2010). The question is
“whether the officer had ‘specific and articulable facts, which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant [the]
intrusion.’” State v. Kennedy, 107 Wn.2d 1, 5, 726 P.2d 445 (1986)
(quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 21, 88 S. Ct. 1868); see also Doughty, 170
Wn.2d at 62−63, 239 P.3d 573. Under article I, section 7 of the Washington constitution, reasonable suspicion requires consideration of the totality of the circumstances, including the officer’s subjective belief. See
State v. Ladson, 138 Wn.2d 343, 358−59, 979 P.2d 833 (1999). See generally supra § 2.9(b). For a discussion of the use of the reasonable suspicion standard in special environments, see infra §§ 6.1 (schools) and 6.3
(borders). See also 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure §§ 9.3(b)
(routine traffic stops), 9.7 (roadblocks), 9.8 (other brief detentions) (5th
ed. 2012).
Once an officer possesses a reasonable suspicion, he or she may
forcibly stop the suspect, but the stop must be a more limited intrusion
than an arrest. See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 209, 99 S. Ct.
2248, 60 L. Ed. 2d 824 (1979). The stop must be reasonably limited in
scope to “whatever reasonable suspicions legally justified the stop in the
first place.” See State v. Arreola, 176 Wn.2d 284, 293−94, 290 P.3d 983
(2012) (citing Ladson, 138 Wn.2d at 350, 979 P.2d 833). Article I, section 7, provides more protection than the Fourth Amendment in that the
investigative stop may not be a pretext for a search in any situation. Ladson, 138 Wn.2d at 358−59, 979 P.2d 833. See generally Whren v. United
States, 517 U.S. 806, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 135 L. Ed. 2d 89 (1996).
During a Terry stop, the officer may ask a moderate number of
questions regarding identity and the purpose of the stop without rendering the suspect “in custody” for the purposes of Miranda. State v. Heritage, 152 Wn.2d 210, 219, 95 P.3d 345 (2004). Once an intrusion is substantial enough to constitute an arrest, probable cause is necessary. See
State v. Rose, 175 Wn.2d 10, 18−19, 282 P.3d 1087 (2012); see also infra § 6.3. However, reasonable suspicion justifying an investigatory stop
may ripen into probable cause for arrest. State v. McIntosh, 42 Wn. App.
579, 583−84, 712 P.2d 323 (1986) (holding that a suspect’s inability to
give rational account of appearance and presence in a high burglary area
late at night, absence of identification, and presence of what appeared to
be burglar’s tools gave rise to probable cause to arrest). If the “suspect’s
freedom of action is curtailed to a ‘degree associated with formal arrest,’”
then a Miranda warning must be given. State v. Lorenz, 152 Wn.2d 22,
37, 93 P.3d 133 (2004); State v. Harris, 106 Wn.2d 784, 789−90, 725
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P.2d 975 (1986) (adopting Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440, 104
S. Ct. 3138, 82 L. Ed. 2d 317 (1984)).
4.6 NATURE OF THE OFFENSE
“It is generally recognized that crime prevention and crime detection are legitimate purposes for investigative stops or detentions.” State v.
Kennedy, 107 Wn.2d 1, 5−6, 726 P.2d 445 (1986). Thus, Terry stops
have been upheld for offenses ranging from aggravated robbery, United
States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 105 S. Ct. 675, 83 L. Ed. 2d 604 (1985),
to possession of narcotics, Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 92 S. Ct.
1921, 32 L. Ed. 2d 612 (1972). In Washington, a non-traffic, civil infraction is insufficient to justify a Terry stop. State v. Duncan, 146 Wn.2d
166, 175, 43 P.3d 513 (2002) (declining to extend Terry to general, nontraffic civil infractions); State v. Day, 161 Wn.2d 889, 897, 168 P.3d
1265 (2007) (declining to extend Terry to parking infractions). Normal
traffic infractions, however, are sufficient to support a Terry stop. State v.
Snapp, 174 Wn.2d 177, 198, 275 P.3d 289 (2012) (failure to illuminate
headlights).
For arguments that Terry stops should be limited to investigations
of serious offenses, see Adams, 407 U.S. at 151−53, 92 S. Ct. 1921
(Brennan, J., dissenting). See generally 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and
Seizure § 9.2(c) (5th ed. 2012).
4.7 SATISFYING THE REASONABLE SUSPICION STANDARD
To satisfy the reasonable suspicion standard, the officer’s belief
must be based on objective facts. State v. Acrey, 148 Wn.2d 738, 747, 64
P.3d 594 (2003); State v. Seitz, 86 Wn. App. 865, 869−70, 941 P.2d 5
(1997). The facts must be specific and articulable; thus, an “inarticulate
hunch[]” is insufficient. State v. Doughty, 170 Wn.2d 57, 63, 239 P.3d
573 (2010) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed.
2d 889 (1968)). Courts consider the experience of the officer when determining if there was reasonable suspicion. See Acrey, 148 Wn.2d at
747, 64 P.3d 594. Consequently, an experienced officer may be able to
detect something suspicious where a layperson would not. See State v.
Glover, 116 Wn.2d 509, 514, 806 P.2d 760 (1991) (concluding that officers’ familiarity with the neighborhood allowed them to lawfully detain
man they did not recognize who claimed to live in an apartment). Generally, the level of suspicion required for an investigative stop of a pedestrian is the same as that required for a vehicle. See State v. Kennedy, 107
Wn.2d 1, 6, 726 P.2d 445 (1986).
This section will examine the reasonable suspicion standard in
greater depth. Issues include individualized suspicion, information from
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informants as the basis for the reasonable suspicion, and the standard as
it is applied to different offenses. For a discussion of stops not requiring
individualized suspicion, see infra §§ 6.3 (stops at or near borders) and
5.18 (vehicle spot checks).
4.7(a) Individualized Suspicion
For an officer to make an investigative Terry stop, the officer must
have an individualized suspicion that the particular defendant is engaging in unlawful conduct. State v. Kennedy, 38 Wn. App. 41, 45−46, 684
P.2d 1326 (1984); see State v. Penfield, 106 Wn. App. 157, 162−63, 22
P.3d 293 (2001) (finding that officer who stopped vehicle without any
articulable suspicion of criminal activity on the part of the male driver
could not lawfully ask male driver to identify himself when basis for stop
was license suspension of female who was the vehicle’s registered owner).
Generally, individualized suspicion is required. “[I]n the absence of
individualized suspicion of wrongdoing, the search is a general search.
[W]e never authorize general, exploratory searches . . . .” York v. Wahkiakum Sch. Dist. No. 200, 163 Wn.2d 297, 315, 178 P.3d 995 (2008)
(alterations in original) (internal quotations omitted). Thus, under article
I, section 7, sobriety checkpoints are unconstitutional if lacking individualized suspicion. Seattle v. Mesiani, 110 Wn.2d 454, 460, 755 P.2d 775
(1988).
There are, however, several exceptions. For example, a school official may detain and search a student with only reasonable suspicion and
not individualized suspicion. York, 163 Wn.2d at 308–09, 178 P.3d 995.
Border checkpoints may also constitute such a circumstance. See infra §
6.3. When individualized suspicion is lacking, officer discretion must be
limited. State v. Marchand, 104 Wn.2d 434, 441, 706 P.2d 225 (1985)
(finding spot checks of licenses unconstitutional because the discretion
of the officers was not checked in any way). For example, officers stopping vehicles for driver license and vehicle registration checks may not
select the vehicles at random. See State v. Thorp, 71 Wn. App. 175,
181−82, 856 P.2d 1123 (1993) (holding that officers who lack probable
cause or a reasonable suspicion may not randomly stop moving vehicles
for questioning).
4.7(b) Information from Informants
When Terry stops are based on information provided by informants,
the information does not have to meet the same criteria required for
probable cause. State v. Lee, 147 Wn. App. 912, 916−17, 199 P.3d 445
(2008) (citing Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330, 110 S. Ct. 2412, 110
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L. Ed. 2d 301 (1990)). See generally supra § 2.5. However, “[a]n informant’s tip cannot constitutionally provide police with such a suspicion
unless it possesses sufficient ‘indicia of reliability.’” State v. Sieler, 95
Wn.2d 43, 47, 621 P.2d 1272 (1980) (quoting Adams v. Williams, 407
U.S. 143, 147, 92 S. Ct. 1921, 32 L. Ed. 2d 612 (1972)). To determine
whether the informant possesses the requisite “indicia of reliability,” the
court will consider (1) whether the informant is reliable; (2) whether the
information was obtained in a reliable fashion; and (3) whether the officers can corroborate any details of the informant’s tip. State v. Kennedy,
107 Wn.2d 1, 7, 726 P.2d 445 (1986); Sieler, 95 Wn.2d at 47, 621 P.2d
1272; State v. Lesnick, 84 Wn.2d 940, 944, 530 P.2d 243 (1975).
Generally, citizen-informants that witnessed the crime firsthand are
reliable. See State v. Vandover, 63 Wn. App. 754, 759, 822 P.2d 784
(1992). Indeed, citizen-informants are given greater credence than professional informants because they act with only an intent to aid the police
and are thus more reliable. Lee, 147 Wn. App. at 918−19, 199 P.3d 445
(tip from eyewitness citizen-informant sufficient when corroborated by
officer’s observations); see State v. Garcia, 125 Wn.2d 239, 242, 883
P.2d 1369 (1994) (holding that information provided by a citizen does
not require a showing of the same degree of reliability as an informant
because a citizen is not a “professional” informant); 2 Wayne R. LaFave,
Search and Seizure § 3.4(a), at 265−70 (5th ed. 2012).
Some surrounding circumstances may decrease the required level of
reliability. For example, the Supreme Court of Washington has suggested
that when the tip involves a serious crime or potential danger, less reliability is required for a stop than is required in other circumstances. Sieler,
95 Wn.2d at 50, 621 P.2d 1272; Lesnick, 84 Wn.2d at 944−45, 530 P.2d
243; see 4 LaFave, supra § 9.5(i), at 806−11. However, the informant
must still be reliable, either by the circumstances of the tip or by police
corroboration. Vandover, 63 Wn. App. at 760, 822 P.2d 784.
Police may also make a Terry stop based on information provided
by other divisions or agencies. See State v. Mance, 82 Wn. App. 539, 542,
918 P.2d 527 (1996); see also United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221,
230−31, 105 S. Ct. 675, 83 L. Ed. 2d 604 (1985). The collective
knowledge of law enforcement agencies that gives rise to a dispatch will
be imputed to the officers who act on it. State v. O’Cain, 108 Wn. App.
542, 544−45, 31 P.3d 733 (2001). However, if the issuing agency lacked
the authority to make a Terry stop on the information, so did the officer.
State v. Gaddy, 152 Wn.2d 64, 71, 93 P.3d 872 (2004). Further, the
length and intrusiveness of the detention may not exceed that which
would have been effected by the police agency providing the information.
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State v. Dorsey, 40 Wn. App. 459, 470, 698 P.2d 1109 (1985) (citing
Hensley, 469 U.S. at 233, 105 S. Ct. 675).
4.7(c) Situations that Satisfy or Fail to Satisfy the Reasonable Suspicion
Standard
The mere fact that a suspect is in a high-crime area will not justify a
Terry stop. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52, 99 S. Ct. 2637, 61 L. Ed. 2d
357 (1979); State v. Seitz, 86 Wn. App. 865, 867−70, 941 P.2d 5 (1997)
(holding that officers lacked reasonable suspicion to stop when they saw
occupants of a car speaking to a man on the sidewalk but did not observe
drugs, money, or anything else change hands); State v. Soto-Garcia, 68
Wn. App. 20, 25, 841 P.2d 1271 (1992) (stating that merely walking in
the street in a known drug area late at night does not suggest that someone has committed a crime), abrogated by State v. Thorn, 129 Wn.2d
347, 917 P.2d 108 (1996). Similarly, officers may not stop an individual
merely because the individual is in proximity to others who are suspected
of criminal activity. State v. Thompson, 93 Wn.2d 838, 841, 613 P.2d
525 (1980). See generally 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure §
4.9(d) (5th ed. 2012); see also supra § 4.7(b).
A person who simply acts suspiciously is not the proper subject of a
stop in the absence of other circumstances implicating a crime. State v.
Walker, 66 Wn. App. 622, 629, 834 P.2d 41 (1992) (finding that an officer investigating a report of suspicious behavior in a neighborhood inappropriately stopped a man who appeared startled when he saw the officer and turned onto another street to avoid him); State v. Henry, 80 Wn.
App. 544, 552, 910 P.2d 1290 (1995) (nervousness is not sufficient for a
Terry stop). In addition, being “out of place” in a particular location because of race is not suspicious. State v. Barber, 118 Wn.2d 335, 346, 823
P.2d 1068 (1992) (holding that a person of a specific race being “out of
place” in a particular geographic area can never amount to a reasonable
suspicion).
Taken together, the suspect’s actions, whether they are furtive gestures or flight, may satisfy the reasonable suspicion standard. State v.
Graham, 130 Wn.2d 711, 725−26, 927 P.2d 227 (1996); State v. Little,
116 Wn.2d 488, 496, 806 P.2d 749 (1991) (flight from the police may be
considered). Crouching down or dropping an object upon seeing the officer may also give rise to reasonable suspicion. State v. Jones, 117 Wn.
App. 721, 728, 72 P.3d 1110 (2003) (holding that suspect in an area
known for narcotics crouching down with item consistent with the appearance of crack cocaine was reasonably suspicious when the suspect
quickly began to leave the area upon noticing the presence of the officer).
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However, it is not sufficient if the officer does not see what the suspect is
hiding. State v. Gatewood, 163 Wn.2d 534, 540, 182 P.3d 426 (2008).
Where the officers are either very familiar with the location or are
familiar with the narcotics involved, reasonable suspicion may be found.
State v. Garcia, 125 Wn.2d 239, 242, 883 P.2d 1369 (1994) (per curiam)
(finding that information given to police, combined with an officer’s experience in narcotics and knowledge of location as high-crime area, justified investigative restraint). Likewise, in State v. Little, the court found
sufficient suspicion to conduct a Terry stop where officers were generally familiar with residents of a complex and did not recognize the suspects,
and the defendant subsequently fled from the officers. 116 Wn.2d at
497−98, 806 P.2d 749.
4.8 DIMENSIONS OF A PERMISSIBLE STOP
A valid Terry stop “must be temporary, lasting no longer than is
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop,” and “the investigative
methods employed must be the least intrusive means reasonably available to verify or dispel the officer’s suspicion in a short period of time.”
State v. Williams, 102 Wn.2d 733, 738, 689 P.2d 1065 (1984) (discussing
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 75 L. Ed. 2d 229
(1983)); see also State v. Smith, 115 Wn.2d 775, 784−85, 801 P.2d 975
(1990). To determine whether the stop was valid, the court examines (1)
the purpose of the stop; (2) the amount of physical intrusion upon the
suspect’s liberty; and (3) the length of time the suspect is detained. State
v. Wheeler, 108 Wn.2d 230, 235, 737 P.2d 1005 (1987). This section examines duration, investigative techniques, transporting the suspect, and
seizure of persons in proximity to the suspect.
4.8(a) Duration
The U.S. Supreme Court has declined to set an absolute limit on the
permissible duration of a Terry stop in terms of minutes or hours. The
duration of a stop is evaluated by asking “whether the police diligently
pursued a means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel
their suspicions quickly, during which time it was necessary to detain the
[suspect].” United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686, 105 S. Ct. 1568,
84 L. Ed. 2d 605 (1985); see also Liberal v. Estrada, 632 F.3d 1064,
1080−82 (9th Cir. 2011) (45-minute detention permissible). If the “investigation should have taken no more than a few minutes,” and the officers
unnecessarily delayed it, the stop is unlawful. Ctr. for Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cnty. Sheriff Dept., 533 F.3d 780, 795 (9th Cir.
2008) (the fact that officers needed a supervisor to clarify the law for
them was not a sufficient basis to extend the stop).
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“‘[A]n officer may briefly stop an individual based upon reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity if necessary to maintain the status quo
while obtaining more information.’” State v. Duncan, 146 Wn.2d 166,
172, 43 P.3d 513 (2002) (quoting State v. Miller, 91 Wn. App. 181, 184,
955 P.2d 810 (1998)). In Washington, the court has found a 45-minute
wait permissible when it was caused by the defendant’s refusal to provide identification. State v. Cunningham, 116 Wn. App. 219, 228−29, 65
P.3d 325 (2003). Similarly, officers may temporarily detain a suspect
pending results of a police radio check. State v. Perea, 85 Wn. App. 339,
342, 932 P.2d 1258 (1997). This also includes detaining a suspect in a
room for approximately 20 minutes while the robbery victim was
brought to the room for identification. State v. Moon, 45 Wn. App. 692,
695, 726 P.2d 1263 (1986), abrogated on other grounds by State v.
Cheatam, 150 Wn.2d 626, 81 P.3d 830 (2003).
4.8(b) Investigative Techniques
During a Terry stop, the police may request both identification from
the suspect and a description of the suspect’s purpose in the area. State v.
Little, 116 Wn.2d 488, 495, 806 P.2d 749 (1991) (citing State v. White,
97 Wn.2d 92, 105, 640 P.2d 1061 (1982)); see also Brown v. Texas, 443
U.S. 47, 51, 99 S. Ct. 2637, 61 L. Ed. 2d 357 (1979). “An officer making
a Terry stop may ask a moderate number of questions to determine the
identity of the suspect and to confirm or dispel the officer’s suspicions . . . .” State v. Heritage, 152 Wn.2d 210, 219, 95 P.3d 345 (2004).
However, the officers must use the least intrusive means reasonably
available. United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 687, 105 S. Ct. 1568,
84 L. Ed. 2d 605 (1985); State v. Johnston, 38 Wn. App. 793, 798−99,
690 P.2d 591 (1984) (ordering three juveniles out of the house at gunpoint was not the least intrusive means possible to confirm suspicion of
burglary). The officer may expand the stop and use greater force such as
frisking, secluding, gun drawing, or cuffing if the officer perceives a reasonable threat to his or her safety. State v. Mitchell, 80 Wn. App. 143,
145−46, 906 P.2d 1013 (1995); see infra § 4.10.
Police may not subject the suspect to custodial interrogation during
a Terry stop. See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 211, 99 S. Ct.
2248, 60 L. Ed. 2d 824 (1979); Heritage, 152 Wn.2d at 219, 95 P.3d 345.
The police also may not transport the suspect to the police station for the
purposes of interrogation or fingerprinting, although it may be permissible to fingerprint the suspect in the field. Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811,
816−18, 105 S. Ct. 1643, 84 L. Ed. 2d 705 (1985).
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4.8(c) Transporting the Suspect
“Transportation to the police station is usually impermissible because it is not reasonably related to the investigation.” State v. Gardner,
28 Wn. App. 721, 727−28, 626 P.2d 56 (1981); see also Dunaway v.
New York, 442 U.S. 200, 212–13, 99 S. Ct. 2248, 60 L. Ed. 2d 824
(1979). Thus, if probable cause to arrest has not ripened, such transportation is illegal. State v. Gonzales, 46 Wn. App. 388, 396, 731 P.2d 1101
(1986) (handcuffing and transporting a suspect to a police station before
probable cause to arrest arises constitutes an illegal arrest under the
Fourth Amendment and article I, section 7).
However, if the transportation is reasonably related to the investigative purpose of the initial detention, it may be permissible. See State v.
Wheeler, 108 Wn.2d 230, 237, 737 P.2d 1005 (1987) (transporting the
suspect a short distance for identification purposes); Gardner, 28 Wn.
App. at 728, 626 P.2d 56 (finding it lawful to transport the suspect a
short distance to the crime scene). An unrelated emergency occurring
nearby or other exceptional circumstances may also warrant transportation. See State v. Sweet, 44 Wn. App. 226, 232−33, 721 P.2d 560 (1986)
(radio call summoning the investigating officers to an apparently unrelated crime scene a block away allowed the officers to transport the suspect
with them after the suspect told them he was a lookout).
4.8(d) Detention of Persons in Proximity to Suspect
The Supreme Court of Washington has held that the mere fact of an
individual’s proximity to one independently suspected of criminal activity is insufficient to justify a Terry stop. State v. Horrace, 144 Wn.2d 386,
398, 28 P.3d 753 (2001) (citing State v. Broadnax, 98 Wn.2d 289, 295,
654 P.2d 96 (1982), abrogated on other grounds by Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 113 S. Ct. 2130, 124 L. Ed. 2d 334 (1993)). See generally 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 9.2(b) (5th ed. 2012).
This includes asking the passenger for identification. State v. Rankin, 151
Wn.2d 689, 697, 92 P.3d 202 (2004) (citing State v. Larson, 93 Wn.2d
638, 642, 611 P.2d 771 (1980)).
Instead, the passenger or individual must give some indication of
suspicious activity. Horrace, 144 Wn.2d at 394, 28 P.3d 753 (holding
reasonable suspicion existed to frisk passenger because the driver was
making furtive gestures as if handing the passenger something even
though the passenger did not move). In State v. Chelly, the court found
that the fact the passenger was not wearing a safety belt provided the officer with the authority to detain him for a reasonable period of time in
order to identify him. 94 Wn. App. 254, 260, 970 P.2d 376 (1999).
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4.8(e) Pretextual Traffic Stops
Pretextual traffic infraction stops made for the purpose of conducting warrantless investigations of matters unrelated to a person’s driving
violate article I, section 7 of the Washington constitution. State v. Ladson,
138 Wn.2d 343, 353, 979 P.2d 833 (1999). In this respect, Washington’s
constitution provides greater protection than the Fourth Amendment because the U.S. Supreme Court has held that pretextual traffic stops do not
violate the Fourth Amendment. Compare Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S.
260, 266, 94 S. Ct. 488, 38 L. Ed. 2d 456 (1973) (holding search incident
to arrest valid even though it followed an admittedly pretextual traffic
stop), with State v. Hehman, 90 Wn.2d 45, 50, 578 P.2d 527 (1978) (declining to limit protection that provided under federal law). For further
discussion of the Fourth Amendment requirements concerning pretextual
stops and a critique of U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence on the matter,
see generally Lewis R. Katz, “Lonesome Road”: Driving Without the
Fourth Amendment, 36 Seattle U. L. Rev. 1413 (2013).
Under article I, section 7, “‘the reasonable articulable suspicion
that a traffic infraction has occurred which justifies an exception to the
[search] warrant requirement for an ordinary traffic stop does not justify
a stop for criminal investigation.’” State v. Myers, 117 Wn. App. 93, 98,
69 P.3d 367 (citing Ladson, 138 Wn.2d at 349, 979 P.2d 833). “A stop
for a traffic infraction can be extended only when an officer has articulable facts from which the officer could reasonably suspect criminal activity.” State v. Lemus, 103 Wn. App. 94, 101, 11 P.3d 326 (2000) (internal
quotations omitted). If the initial traffic stop is unlawful, “‘the subsequent search and fruits of that search are inadmissible.’” State v.
Gatewood, 163 Wn.2d 534, 542, 182 P.3d 426 (2008) (citing State v.
Kennedy, 107 Wn.2d 1, 4, 726 P.2d 445 (1986)). See generally infra
Chapter 7 (exclusionary rule).
When determining if a particular traffic stop is pretextual, the court
should consider the totality of the circumstances, including both the subjective intent of the officer and the objective reasonableness of the officer’s behavior. State v. Snapp, 174 Wn.2d 177, 199, 275 P.3d 289
(2012); State v. Hoang, 101 Wn. App. 732, 742−43, 6 P.3d 602 (2000).
In State v. Snapp, the court found a stop was not pretextual because the
officer could not see how many occupants were inside the vehicle, the
officer testified that he routinely pulled people over who did not have
their headlights illuminated, and the car began moving in the opposite
direction when his police car came into view. 174 Wn.2d at 199−201,
275 P.3d 289. In contrast, in State v. Ladson, the court held that the stop
was pretextual because the officer admitted the reason for the stop was
rumored drug use by one of the occupants. See 138 Wn.2d at 359−60,
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979 P.2d 833. Likewise, in State v. DeSantiago, the court found a stop
pretextual because the officer believed the suspect had just bought or
sold drugs and he deliberately followed the suspect for ten blocks looking for a reason to pull him over. 97 Wn. App. 446, 448, 983 P.2d 1173
(1999).
4.9 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON COMPELLED RESPONSES TO
INVESTIGATORY QUESTIONS
Even when a police officer possesses a reasonable suspicion and
makes a valid Terry stop, the officer may not compel the suspect to answer. Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 727 n.6, 89 S. Ct. 1394, 22 L.
Ed. 2d 676 (1969); State v. White, 97 Wn.2d 92, 105−06, 640 P.2d 1061
(1982). Furthermore, a suspect’s refusal to answer an investigating officer’s questions cannot provide the basis for an arrest. White, 97 Wn.2d
at 106, 640 P.2d 1061.
To remedy this limitation, Washington has enacted a stopand-identify statute to facilitate police investigations of ongoing or imminent crimes. RCW 9A.76.020; State v. Lalonde, 35 Wn. App. 54, 57,
665 P.2d 421 (1983), review denied, 100 Wn.2d 1014 (1983) (finding the
statute constitutional as amended). However, refusing to identify oneself,
when viewed in isolation, is still insufficient to support a charge of obstructing a law enforcement officer. State v. Steen, 164 Wn. App. 789,
265 P.3d 901 (2011), review denied as amended, 173 Wn.2d 1024 (2012).
4.10 GROUNDS FOR INITIATING A FRISK DURING A TERRY STOP
An officer conducting a valid Terry stop may conduct a limited
search for weapons in order to protect himself or herself or persons nearby from physical harm. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20
L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968); State v. Garvin, 166 Wn.2d 242, 250, 207 P.3d
1266 (2009) (citing State v. Day, 161 Wn.2d 889, 895, 168 P.3d 1265
(2007)). After the officer has made a valid stop supported by reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity, a frisk may then be undertaken if the officer reasonably believes that the “suspect is armed and ‘presently’ dangerous.” State v. Xiong, 164 Wn.2d 506, 513−14, 191 P.3d 1278 (2008)
(officers did not have right to frisk the defendant because he cooperated
with police, made no attempt to flee, and could not reach his pockets).
“Reasonable belief that the suspect is armed and presently dangerous
means, some basis from which the court can determine that the detention
was not arbitrary or harassing.” State v. Setterstrom, 163 Wn.2d 621, 626,
183 P.3d 1075 (2008) (emphasis removed) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (finding no reasonable belief when the suspect was under the
influence, lied about his name, and was nervous and fidgety). Once the
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officer dispels his belief that the suspect is armed, the frisk must end.
Garvin, 166 Wn.2d at 254−55, 207 P.3d 1266 (officer exceeded the
scope of the search when he continued to squeeze the defendant’s pocket
after concluding there was no weapon).
Washington requires the following for a valid frisk: (1) the initial
stop is legitimate; (2) there is a reasonable safety concern justifying a
protective frisk for weapons; and (3) the scope of the frisk is limited to
protective purposes. State v. Duncan, 146 Wn.2d 166, 172, 43 P.3d 513
(2002). The fact that a detention occurs in a high-crime area is not in itself sufficient to justify a search. See State v. Smith, 102 Wn.2d 449,
452−53, 688 P.2d 146 (1984) (holding that the inquiry must focus on the
defendant and his actions, not the area where he was found). Thus, police
may not frisk when they cannot articulate a reason for believing that a
suspect is dangerous other than that the suspect was seen leaving in his
car from the scene of a possible burglary. State v. Williams, 102 Wn.2d
733, 740−41, 689 P.2d 1065 (1984). The most common situation is
where the suspect makes a furtive gesture or appears to be concealing
something. State v. Chang, 147 Wn. App. 490, 496, 195 P.3d 1008
(2008) (holding the search of the passenger compartment of the car was
valid when the suspect appeared to be concealing something when police
approached).
For certain crimes in which the offender is likely to be armed, the
right to conduct a protective search is much more accepted, but for other
crimes, such as possession of marijuana, additional circumstances must
be present. See United States v. Flatter, 456 F.3d 1154, 1158–59 (9th Cir.
2006) (absent other circumstances, a frisk was not proper for a postal
employee suspected of mail theft because it “is not a crime that is frequently associated with weapons”); 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and
Seizure § 9.6(a), at 852−62 (5th ed. 2012). Consequently, in State v.
Guzman-Cuellar, an officer was justified in initiating a frisk where the
suspect matched the description of a murder suspect. 47 Wn. App. 326,
332, 734 P.2d 966 (1987). Likewise, in State v. Harvey, a frisk was justified when the crime under investigation was burglary because it is well
known that burglars often carry weapons. 41 Wn. App. 870, 875, 707
P.2d 146 (1985).
The time of day can also contribute to the reasonableness of a protective search. State v. Horrace, 144 Wn.2d 386, 398–99, 28 P.3d 753
(2001) (considering “early morning darkness” as a factor justifying a
protective search). Not only does “[t]he darkness ma[k]e it more difficult
for [the officer] to get a clear view into the car,” but “an individual who
has been stopped may be more willing to commit violence against a po-
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lice officer at a time when few people are likely to be present to witness
it.” State v. Collins, 121 Wn.2d 168, 174–75, 847 P.2d 919 (1993).
Under certain circumstances, officers may seize evidence pursuant
to a Terry stop even in the absence of grounds for believing that the suspect is armed and dangerous. For example, a police officer may seize
property from a suspect if the suspect’s actions give rise to a reasonable
suspicion that evidence of a crime is in danger of being destroyed. State v.
Pressley, 64 Wn. App. 591, 598, 825 P.2d 749 (1992) (holding officer’s
actions in asking the suspect to remove her hand from her pocket after
seeing a bag in her palm was proper given his experience with disposal
of narcotics and her furtive gesture); see also State v. Dorsey, 40 Wn.
App. 459, 472, 698 P.2d 1109 (1985). However, some courts have expressly rejected this rationale for a search. State v. Rodriguez–Torres, 77
Wn. App. 687, 693, 893 P.2d 650 (1995) (rejecting Pressley and stating
that a Terry frisk may be conducted only based on protective purposes).
4.10(a) Scope of a Permissible Frisk
A frisk must be justified in its inception and scope. State v. Hudson,
124 Wn.2d 107, 112, 874 P.2d 160 (1994). The scope of a valid frisk is
strictly limited to protective purposes. State v. Garvin, 166 Wn.2d 242,
250, 207 P.3d 1266 (2009); see also State v. Alcantara, 79 Wn. App. 362,
366, 901 P.2d 1087 (1995) (holding that a search exceeded the scope of a
Terry stop because the officer gave no indication that the search was
based on concerns for the officer’s safety). Thus, the officer may only
conduct a search of the suspect’s outer clothing for weapons that might
be used to harm the officer or others nearby. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,
29−30, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968); Hudson, 124 Wn.2d at
112, 874 P.2d 160. However, a frisk need not conform to the conventional pat down. Hudson, 124 Wn.2d at 112, 874 P.2d 160 (if pat down is
inconclusive, the officer may reach into the clothing); see also Adams v.
Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147−49, 92 S. Ct. 1921, 32 L. Ed. 2d 612 (1972)
(finding an officer was justified in reaching through a window and removing a revolver from the suspect’s waistband when officer knew that
the suspect carried a gun in his waistband and he refused to step out of
the car); 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 9.5(b), at 477−79
(5th ed. 2012).
When in the course of a frisk an officer feels what may be a weapon,
the officer may only take such action as is necessary to examine the object. Hudson, 124 Wn.2d at 113, 874 P.2d 160 (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at
30, 88 S. Ct. 1868). See generally 4 LaFave, supra § 9.6(c). Once police
ascertain that no weapon is involved, their authority to conduct even a
limited search ends. Garvin, 166 Wn.2d at 254, 207 P.3d 1266 (continu-
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ing squeeze of pocket after the officer determined no weapon was present was not permissible under the “plain feel” doctrine); Hudson, 124
Wn.2d at 113, 874 P.2d 160.
4.10(b) Frisks of Persons in Proximity to Suspect
Police may not frisk persons merely because they are present on the
premises of a place being lawfully searched. See Ybarra v. Illinois, 444
U.S. 85, 94, 100 S. Ct. 338, 62 L. Ed. 2d 238 (1979); see also supra §
3.8(a). Thus, a passenger frisk is justified “only [when] the officer is able
to point to specific, articulable facts giving rise to an objectively reasonable belief that the passenger [may] be armed and dangerous.” State v.
Horrace, 144 Wn.2d 386, 399−400, 28 P.3d 753 (2001); State v. Parker,
139 Wn.2d 486, 489, 987 P.2d 73 (1999) (officers may not search purse
of passenger); see also State v. Larson, 93 Wn.2d 638, 641−42, 611 P.2d
771 (1980). One commentator suggests that the appropriate inquiry is
whether the officer is under a reasonable apprehension of danger—a determination that depends on the nature of the crime, the time and place of
the arrest, and the number of officers and suspects, and on whether the
companion has made any threatening movements. See 4 Wayne R.
LaFave, Search and Seizure § 9.6(a), at 871−73 (5th ed. 2012).
4.10(c) Protective Measures Other Than Frisks
An officer may take self-protective measures other than a frisk. For
instance, a police officer may order a driver who has been validly
stopped to get out of his or her car, regardless of whether the driver is
suspected of being armed or dangerous or whether the offense under investigation is serious. Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111, 98 S.
Ct. 330, 54 L. Ed. 2d 331 (1977) (noting that intrusion is de minimis
while risks confronting an officer are substantial); State v. Kennedy, 107
Wn.2d 1, 12, 726 P.2d 445 (1986). The Supreme Court of Washington,
however, has declined to extend Mimms to passengers of the vehicle under article I, section 7, unless the officer has an objective reason based on
safety concerns. State v. Mendez, 137 Wn.2d 208, 220, 970 P.2d 722
(1999) (declining to follow Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 117 S. Ct.
882, 137 L. Ed. 2d 41 (1997)), abrogated in part on other grounds by
Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 127 S. Ct. 2400, 168 L. Ed. 2d 132
(2007); see 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 9.6(a), at 885
n.192 (5th ed. 2012).
If the officer is merely controlling the scene and not detaining the
passenger for investigatory reasons, he must meet the standard set out in
Mendez. Namely, he must be “able to articulate an objective rationale
predicated specifically on safety concerns . . . for ordering a passenger to
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stay in the vehicle or to exit the vehicle.” Mendez, 137 Wn.2d at 220, 970
P.2d 722. However, if the purpose of the officer’s interaction with the
passenger is investigatory, then the interaction must meet the standard set
out in Terry, and the officer must have a reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity. State v. Horrace, 144 Wn.2d 386, 393, 28 P.3d 753 (2001).
4.10(d) Search of Area: Measures Beyond Frisks
Officers may extend a Terry search for weapons to the passenger
compartment of a detained person’s vehicle “‘if there is a reasonable
suspicion that the suspect is dangerous and may gain access to a weapon
in the vehicle.’” State v. Glossbrener, 146 Wn.2d 670, 680–81, 49 P.3d
128 (2002) (quoting State v. Terrazas, 71 Wn. App. 873, 879, 863 P.2d
75 (1993)) (officer did not have concern for safety when he allowed suspect to sit in the car while he checked for warrants and search was an
afterthought); see also Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049−50, 103 S.
Ct. 3469, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1201 (1983). The search must be confined to the
area within the suspect’s immediate control. State v. Kennedy, 107
Wn.2d 1, 12, 726 P.2d 445 (1986). However, that includes immediate
control once the suspect has returned to the vehicle. Thus, the officer
may still search the compartment if both occupants of the vehicle are
outside the car and do not have access to the passenger compartment so
long as the officer intends to return them to the car following the stop.
State v. Chang, 147 Wn. App. 490, 496, 195 P.3d 1008 (2008).
In State v. Kennedy, the court upheld a search where the officer observed the suspect leaning forward as if to place something under his seat
while the officer was stopping the suspect’s vehicle for investigation of a
possible drug buy. 107 Wn.2d at 12, 726 P.2d 445. Likewise, in State v.
McIntosh, the search of the passenger compartment was lawful when the
driver of a vehicle was armed with a knife and a weapon-like object was
visibly protruding from under the passenger seat. 42 Wn. App. 579,
582−84, 712 P.2d 323 (1986).
A police officer may also search a container carried by a suspect
who is detained for questioning if the officer reasonably believes that the
suspect possesses a weapon. State v. Miller, 91 Wn. App. 181, 185−86,
955 P.2d 810 (1998) (officer could search a tin found with defendant that
was capable of holding a gun after officer found knife on the defendant);
State v. Franklin, 41 Wn. App. 409, 415, 704 P.2d 666 (1985) (finding
search of backpack proper when the defendant told the officer it contained a firearm). For a discussion of whether an officer may search
items carried by a suspect, see generally 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search
and Seizure § 9.5(f) (5th ed. 2012).

CHAPTER 5
Warrantless Searches and Seizures:
Exceptions to the Warrant Requirement
5.0 INTRODUCTION
Warrantless searches are per se unreasonable unless justified by a
limited set of carefully drawn exceptions. State v. Snapp, 174 Wn.2d
177, 187–88, 275 P.3d 289 (2012); State v. Duncan, 146 Wn.2d 166,
171, 43 P.3d 513 (2002). Article I, section 7 of the Washington State
Constitution not only “prohibits . . . unreasonable searches, but also provides no quarter for ones which, in the context of the Fourth Amendment, would be deemed reasonable searches and thus constitutional.”
State v. Valdez, 167 Wn.2d 761, 772, 224 P.3d 751 (2009). This creates
an “almost absolute bar to warrantless arrests, searches, and seizures.”
State v. Ringer, 100 Wn.2d 686, 690, 674 P.2d 1240 (1983).
The State bears the burden of proving that a warrantless search or
seizure falls within one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement.
State v. Acrey, 148 Wn.2d 738, 746, 64 P.3d 594 (2003). Even when a
search or seizure falls within one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement, the search or seizure may be invalid if it infringes upon other
rights. See generally State v. Reep, 161 Wn.2d 808, 167 P.3d 1156
(2007) (holding that search warrants for documents protected under the
First Amendment must have a higher standard of particularity).
The following sections examine the various exceptions to the warrant requirement, including searches incident to a lawful arrest, the plain
view and open view doctrines, consent, exigent circumstances, Terry
stops, and inventory searches.
5.1 SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST
Generally, police may conduct a warrantless search incident to a
lawful arrest. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762−63, 89 S. Ct.
2034, 23 L. Ed. 2d 685 (1969). Under article I, section 7, a custodial ar-

1695

1696

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 36:1581

rest provides the necessary “authority of law” to search, so long as the
arrest is lawful. State v. Grande, 164 Wn.2d 135, 139, 187 P.3d 248
(2008); State v. Moore, 161 Wn.2d 880, 885, 169 P.3d 469 (2007). The
rationale behind this rule is to ensure officer safety and to prevent the
concealment or destruction of evidence. State v. MacDicken, 171 Wn.
App. 169, 174–75, 286 P.3d 413 (2012). The search, however, may only
extend to the area within the arrestee’s “immediate control”—the area in
which an arrestee may be able to obtain a weapon or destroy evidence.
Chimel, 395 U.S. at 762−63, 89 S. Ct. 2034. Thus, “searching any room
other than that in which an arrest occurs” or “searching through all the
desk drawers or other closed or concealed areas in that room itself” is not
justified absent a search warrant. Id.
This exception to the warrant requirement applies, however, only
when (1) there was a lawful arrest and (2) the search incident to the arrest
was “restricted in time and place in relation to the arrestee and the arrest,” as opposed to being “a wide-ranging exploratory, rummaging, ransacking” search. State v. Smith, 88 Wn.2d 127, 135, 559 P.2d 970 (1977).
For a discussion of automobile searches incident to arrest, see infra §
5.1(c).
As the following sections demonstrate, while Washington’s search
incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement is similar to the
federal exception, it is subject to a different analysis under the Washington constitution.
5.1(a) Lawful Arrest
Chapter 4 discusses the criteria for a lawful arrest. If the arrest is
invalid, then the search incident to the arrest is invalid as well. State v.
Moore, 161 Wn.2d 880, 885, 169 P.3d 469 (2007); State v. Hehman, 90
Wn.2d 45, 50, 578 P.2d 527 (1978); State v. Terrazas, 71 Wn. App. 873,
878, 863 P.2d 75 (1993). If an arrest is lawful, then a search incident to
that arrest may be permissible. State v. Pulfrey, 154 Wn.2d 517, 523, 111
P.3d 1162 (2005).
In Washington, however, even when an arrest is valid, a search is
not properly “incident” to the arrest if the arrest is merely a pretext for
conducting a search to obtain evidence of a different offense. State v.
Ladson, 138 Wn.2d 343, 353, 979 P.2d 833 (1999) (declining to interpret
article I, section 7 according to federal law, under which pretextual traffic stops did not violate the Fourth Amendment). Furthermore, additional
searches of the same individual that are made in retaliation for the defendant’s previous criminal behavior are unreasonable. State v. Carner,
28 Wn. App. 439, 445, 624 P.2d 204 (1981). For discussion of the need
for the search to be contemporaneous with the arrest, see infra § 5.3.
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The search incident to arrest exception requires a custodial arrest.
See Hehman, 90 Wn.2d at 50, 578 P.2d 527; State v. Radka, 120 Wn.
App. 43, 50, 83 P.3d 1038 (2004) (search of vehicle not valid as incidental to arrest because driver’s detention at a traffic stop was noncustodial); see also State v. McKenna, 91 Wn. App. 554, 564, 958 P.2d 1017
(1998) (search was unreasonable because noncustodial arrest had already
ended at time of search). Under article I, section 7, a custodial arrest provides the “authority of law” for the search. State v. O’Neill, 148 Wn.2d
564, 585, 62 P.3d 489 (2003). In Washington, a custodial arrest for minor traffic violations is generally not permitted. See RCW 46.64.015;
State v. Reding, 119 Wn.2d 685, 689−90, 835 P.2d 1019 (1992). Rather,
officers are required to cite and release motorists stopped for minor traffic offenses if the motorist gives a signed promise to appear in court. See
RCW 46.64.015; Reding, 119 Wn.2d at 689–90, 835 P.2d 1019. Moreover, officers explicitly lack authority to arrest after witnessing only a minor traffic infraction. RCW 46.63.020. Thus, a search is generally unlawful if it is incident to a stop for a minor traffic violation. See Terrazas, 71
Wn. App. at 875, 863 P.2d 75.
Police officers are authorized to make a custodial arrest for a traffic
violation if (1) the violation is one of the “nonminor” traffic violations
specifically designated in RCW 10.31.100 or (2) the motorist is a nonresident arrestee. See RCW 46.64.015(1)–(2). Absent either of these conditions, police need other reasonable grounds to arrest and conduct a valid
search incident to arrest if a motorist is stopped for a “minor” traffic violation. See Reding, 119 Wn.2d at 691–92, 835 P.2d 1019 (upholding custodial arrest for the nonminor offense of reckless driving); Terrazas, 71
Wn. App. at 875–78, 863 P.2d 75 (an officer may arrest a defendant for
driving without a valid driver’s license only if facts suggest the defendant will not appear in court if cited and released).
Property seized incident to a lawful arrest may be used to prosecute
the arrested person for a crime other than the one for which the person
was initially arrested so long as the initial arrest was not merely a pretext
to conduct a search for evidence of some other offense. State v. Smith,
119 Wn.2d 675, 681, 835 P.2d 1025 (1992); State v. Cormier, 100 Wn.
App. 457, 463, 997 P.2d 950 (2000) (evidence from a search of the defendant was admissible after the defendant’s lawful arrest for assaulting
an officer, even though the defendant assaulted the officer after being
illegally stopped). In Smith, after the police lawfully arrested the defendant for consuming liquor in public, the court held that the drug paraphernalia found in the defendant’s fanny pack during the search was admissible. Smith, 119 Wn.2d at 684, 835 P.2d 1025; see also State v. Gammon,
61 Wn. App. 858, 863, 812 P.2d 885 (1991); State v. LaTourette, 49 Wn.
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App. 119, 127–29, 741 P.2d 1033 (1987); State v. White, 44 Wn. App.
276, 278, 722 P.2d 118 (1986).
5.1(b) “Immediate Control”
There is no hard and fast rule for determining whether the area
searched or the object seized was within the “immediate control” of the
defendant under the Fourth Amendment. The court has considered various factors, including: (1) whether the arrestee was physically restrained;
(2) the position of the officer in relation to the defendant and the place
searched; (3) the difficulty of gaining access into the container or enclosure searched; and (4) the number of officers present as compared with
the number of arrestees or other persons. See 3 Wayne R. LaFave,
Search and Seizure § 6.3(c), at 462−75 (5th ed. 2012); see also id. §
7.1(b), at 676–79. For the purposes of a search incident to an arrest, an
object or container is considered within the control of an arrestee if the
object was within the arrestee’s reach immediately prior to arrest or at
the moment of arrest. State v. Smith, 119 Wn.2d 675, 681, 835 P.2d 1025
(1992) (upholding search of a fanny pack that was within one or two
steps of the defendant at the time of the arrest); see also United States v.
Turner, 926 F.2d 883, 888 (9th Cir. 1991) (plastic baggies under arrestee’s pillow were within immediate control of arrestee who was on the
bed when he was arrested); United States v. Andersson, 813 F.2d 1450,
1455 (9th Cir. 1987) (closed suitcase on the bed next to arrestee was
searchable incident to arrest).
Article I, section 7 places greater restraints on a search incident to
arrest in someone’s home. Entry into rooms beyond the immediate control of the suspect requires that police have a reasonable fear for their
safety or a belief that the arrestee is about to destroy evidence or escape.
State v. Chrisman, 100 Wn.2d 814, 815, 821, 676 P.2d 419 (1984); see
also State v. Boyer, 124 Wn. App. 593, 602, 102 P.3d 833 (2004) (protective sweep of basement rooms that belonged to an upstairs apartment
not justified when search was done incident to execution of a search warrant for a basement apartment); 3 LaFave, supra §§ 6.3(c), at 468,
6.4(a)−(c), at 476−510, 7.1(b), at 693.
Conversely, under the Fourth Amendment, and in certain limited
situations, some courts have permitted police to extend a search incident
to an arrest in the home into an area that is beyond the arrestee’s immediate control. If the police permit an arrestee to move into other rooms to
gather clothing, for example, the police may accompany the arrestee and
search the rooms and any areas, such as closets or bureau drawers, where
the arrestee has been. See id. § 6.4(a), at 477−80. Federal courts have
also permitted police to search premises to determine whether accom-
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plices who could aid the arrestee are present, see id. § 6.4(b), at 484, and
to conduct a protective sweep of the premises when the officers fear that
third parties may offer resistance, id. § 6.4(c), at 488–90. See also Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 333–36, 110 S. Ct. 1093, 108 L. Ed. 2d 276
(1990).
Under the Fourth Amendment, an officer may search an arrestee in
custody even when the officer does not believe that the arrestee is armed
or in possession of evidence of the crime for which the suspect was arrested. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235, 94 S. Ct. 467, 38 L.
Ed. 2d 427 (1973). The lawful arrest establishes the authority to search
the arrestee; the arresting officer need not have a subjective fear that an
arrestee is armed or will destroy evidence. Gustafson v. Florida, 414
U.S. 260, 263–64, 94 S. Ct. 488, 38 L. Ed. 2d 456 (1973). The rule applies even when the custodial arrest follows a stop for a minor traffic violation, unless such an arrest would be illegal. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235,
94 S. Ct. 467; see State v. Reding, 119 Wn.2d 685, 691−92, 835 P.2d
1019 (1992). However, if a police officer merely cites a driver for speeding without making an arrest, a search is impermissible. Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 118−19, 119 S. Ct. 484, 142 L. Ed. 2d 492 (1998).
Under article 1, section 7, an arrestee’s diminished expectation of
privacy permits an officer to search an arrestee’s clothing, including
small containers found on the arrestee. See, e.g., Smith, 119 Wn.2d at
681−82, 835 P.2d 1025 (upholding search of fanny pack following lawful arrest); State v. Gammon, 61 Wn. App. 858, 864, 812 P.2d 885 (1991)
(upholding search of prescription pill bottle found on defendant following lawful arrest); State v. White, 44 Wn. App. 276, 278, 722 P.2d 118
(1986) (upholding police examination of cosmetic case found in arrestee’s coat pocket). In addition, an arrestee does not have to be in actual physical possession of a container at the time of the search so long as
the container is within the arrestee’s reach. Smith, 119 Wn.2d at 681, 835
P.2d 1025. Further, evidence seized pursuant to the search of an arrestee’s person does not need to relate to the crime for which the defendant was arrested, nor must the grounds for the initial search encompass
the evidence seized. See id. (allowing admission of drug paraphernalia
found in a fanny pack during a search subsequent to a lawful arrest for
consuming liquor in public); see also Gammon, 61 Wn. App. at 863, 812
P.2d 885; State v. LaTourette, 49 Wn. App. 119, 127−28, 741 P.2d 1033
(1987); White, 44 Wn. App. at 278, 722 P.2d 118. A greater expectation
of privacy is extended, however, to possessions that are not closely related to the person’s clothing, such as “purses, briefcases[,] or luggage,”
and some additional reason must be present to justify the search of those
items. White, 44 Wn. App. at 279, 722 P.2d 118; see also State v. Kealey,
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80 Wn. App. 162, 170, 907 P.2d 319 (1995) (stating that “a purse is inevitably associated with an expectation of privacy”). For a discussion of the
search of purses in conjunction with automobile searches, see infra §
5.3(b).
An intrusion into a suspect’s body, such as a draw of blood samples, is a search and seizure under both article I, section 7 and the Fourth
Amendment. State v. Dunivin, 65 Wn. App. 501, 507, 828 P.2d 1150
(1992). It may be justified under the exigent circumstances exception
rather than the search incident to arrest exception. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770−71, 86 S. Ct. 1826, 16 L. Ed. 2d 908 (1966); see
3 LaFave, supra § 5.3(c), at 215. See generally infra § 5.13(b) and supra
§ 3.13(b). For example, in Washington, bodily intrusions are authorized
by statute in order to allow police to take blood samples of motorists arrested for certain serious traffic violations. See RCW 46.20.308(3). If the
suspect is attempting to swallow apparent contraband, less intrusive
physical measures, such as a choke-hold, are permissible. See State v.
Taplin, 36 Wn. App. 664, 666−67, 676 P.2d 504 (1984); State v. Williams, 16 Wn. App. 868, 871−72, 560 P.2d 1160 (1977). Officers attempting to prevent a suspect from swallowing evidence may not, however, prevent the suspect from breathing or obstruct the suspect’s blood
supply to the head, although they may pinch his mouth shut. Williams, 16
Wn. App. at 872, 560 P.2d 1160. For a brief discussion of post-detention
body searches, see infra § 6.2(c).
5.1(c) Vehicles and Containers
Under both article I, section 7 and the Fourth Amendment, police
may not search the passenger compartment of an automobile as a search
incident to the arrest of the occupant except in certain circumstances.
Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 351, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 173 L. Ed. 2d 485
(2009); State v. Snapp, 174 Wn.2d 177, 197, 275 P.3d 289 (2012). Washington’s application of the search incident to arrest exception in the context of vehicles is much narrower than the Fourth Amendment application. Snapp, 174 Wn.2d at 197, 275 P.3d 289 (declining to adopt federal
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment for article I, section 7). In Washington, an officer may search the vehicle only when there are (1) concerns for officer safety or (2) concerns for destruction of the evidence.
Id.; State v. Valdez, 167 Wn.2d 761, 772, 224 P.3d 751 (2009); State v.
Patton, 167 Wn.2d 379, 397, 219 P.3d 651 (2009). Once the defendant is
in custody, fears for officer safety or destruction of the evidence evaporate. Patton, 167 Wn.2d at 397, 219 P.3d 651. Thus, once the defendant
is handcuffed, removed from the vehicle, or placed in a police vehicle,
there can be no vehicle search. Id. Under the Fourth Amendment, an of-
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ficer may also search if the officer believes that evidence relevant to the
crime of arrest will be found in the vehicle. Gant, 556 U.S. at 351, 129 S.
Ct. 1710. For a more detailed explanation of vehicle searches, see infra §
5.15.
5.2 PRE-ARREST SEARCH
If a warrantless search is closely related in time and place to a lawful arrest, the search may be considered incidental to the arrest and valid
as long as probable cause to arrest exists at the time of the search, even if
the search occurs before the arrest. Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98,
111, 100 S. Ct. 2556, 65 L. Ed. 2d 633 (1980); State v. Harrel, 83 Wn.
App. 393, 400, 923 P.2d 698 (1996). If probable cause does not exist at
the time of the search, a search that provides probable cause is not considered a valid search incidental to the arrest. Smith v. Ohio, 494 U.S.
541, 543, 110 S. Ct. 1288, 108 L. Ed. 2d 464 (1990) (warrantless search
of the defendant’s paper bag could not be justified as a search incidental
to the arrest when the bag contained drug paraphernalia and the search
was followed by the arrest of the defendant for drug abuse). See generally 3 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 5.5(a) (5th ed. 2012).
Under limited circumstances, pre-arrest searches are permitted even
when the arrest does not closely follow the search. See generally 3
LaFave, supra § 5.4(b). A search may be considered incidental to the
arrest of a suspect in the following circumstances: (1) the police have
probable cause; (2) the police believe the suspect is in the process of destroying highly evanescent evidence; and (3) the evidence can be preserved by a limited search. Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 296, 93 S. Ct.
2000, 36 L. Ed. 2d 900 (1973). See generally 3 LaFave, supra § 5.4(b).
Pre-arrest searches are Terry searches, see supra § 2.9(b), and should be
subject to the same standard applied and discussed in sections 4.5
through 4.9.
5.3 POST-DETENTION SEARCHES: SEARCHES INCIDENT TO ARREST AND
INVENTORY SEARCHES
5.3(a) Post-Detention Searches Incident to Arrest
The search incident to arrest exception can apply to a search at both
the place of detention as well as the place of arrest. See generally 3
Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 5.3(a) (5th ed. 2012). However,
a significant delay between the arrest and the search may render the
search unreasonable if the search is no longer contemporaneous with the
arrest. State v. Smith, 119 Wn.2d 675, 683, 835 P.2d 1025 (1992) (delay
of 17 minutes between arrest and search of a fanny pack was not unrea-
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sonable under the circumstances). Whether a delay is sufficient to render
a search unreasonable under the search incident to arrest exception depends on the facts of the individual case. Id. at 683 n.4, 835 P.2d 1025;
see State v. Boursaw, 94 Wn. App. 629, 635, 976 P.2d 130 (1999) (a 10
minute delay between arrest and arrival of dog to complete search by
sniffing behind vehicle’s ashtray was reasonable). Likewise, any postarrest search is unlawful if probable cause to arrest dissipates by the time
the suspect is taken into custody. State v. Hehman, 90 Wn.2d 45, 50, 578
P.2d 527 (1978); State v. Lemus, 103 Wn. App. 94, 105, 11 P.3d 326
(2000) (search of vehicle was invalid because no probable cause existed
to arrest driver prior to police performing a positive field test for cocaine
powder found from vehicle search).
Under article I, section 7, when an arrestee is searched upon booking, officers may later conduct a warrantless “second look” into the arrestee’s belongings. State v. Cheatam, 150 Wn.2d 626, 642, 81 P.3d 830
(2003); see also United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 805, 94 S. Ct.
1234, 39 L. Ed. 2d 771 (1974) (a search of the defendant’s clothing long
after the defendant had been searched and placed in a jail cell was a permissible search incident to an arrest). An arrestee no longer has a reasonable expectation of privacy in his personal items once state officials have
viewed them during a valid inventory search. Cheatam, 150 Wn.2d at
642, 81 P.3d 830. The same is true for a pretrial detainee transferred to a
hospital for a competency evaluation. State v. Puapuaga, 164 Wn.2d
515, 523, 192 P.3d 360 (2008). Additionally, the police do not need a
warrant when comparing an individual’s DNA profile already in the
State’s possession with evidence from a new crime scene. State v. Gregory, 158 Wn.2d 759, 828, 147 P.3d 1201 (2006).
A difficult question arises when police detain a suspect only because the police have failed to comply with laws allowing release. See
generally 3 LaFave, supra § 5.3(d). A search conducted after police have
decided to release a suspect is improper when there is no probability that
the suspect possesses relevant evidence or weapons. State v. Carner, 28
Wn. App. 439, 445, 624 P.2d 204 (1981). Similarly, a search based on
consent from someone who was illegally detained is invalid. State v. Avila-Avina, 99 Wn. App. 9, 14−15, 991 P.2d 720 (2000); State v. O’Day,
91 Wn. App. 244, 253, 955 P.2d 860 (1998).
5.3(b) Post-Detention Inventory Search
Under article I, section 7 and the Fourth Amendment, police officers may search containers or packages as part of an inventory of the arrestee’s possessions prior to storing the items for safekeeping. Illinois v.
Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 643−48, 103 S. Ct. 2605, 77 L. Ed. 2d 65
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(1983); State v. Smith, 76 Wn. App. 9, 16, 882 P.2d 190 (1994). However, an inventory search that is “a ruse for a general rummaging in order to
discover incriminating evidence” is unreasonable. Florida v. Wells, 495
U.S. 1, 4, 110 S. Ct. 1632, 109 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1990); State v. Mireles, 73
Wn. App. 605, 871 P.2d 162 (1994).
Consistent with the greater protection provided under article I, section 7, inventory searches in Washington must be conducted “in good
faith for the purposes of (1) finding, listing, and securing from loss during detention property belonging to a detained person; (2) protecting police from liability due to dishonest claims of theft; and (3) protecting
temporary storage bailees against false charges.” Smith, 76 Wn. App. at
16, 882 P.2d 190. Thus, it is reasonable for police, as part of routine procedure before incarcerating an arrestee, to search any container or article
in the arrestee’s possession according to inventory procedures. Id. at
15−16, 882 P.2d 190 (upholding the search of defendant’s purse upon
arrival to jail). But see State v. Smith, 56 Wn. App. 145, 150−52, 783
P.2d 95 (1989) (holding that a booking search of an arrestee’s purse was
unlawful because she was not given timely opportunity to post bail, and
police were not concerned that she was carrying weapons). Officers may
also conduct an inventory search of a validly impounded automobile and
its containers. See Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 374−75, 107 S. Ct.
738, 93 L. Ed. 2d 739 (1987); State v. McFadden, 63 Wn. App. 441, 448,
820 P.2d 53 (1991), overruled on other grounds by State v. Adel, 136
Wn.2d 629, 640, 965 P.2d 1072 (1998); see also infra § 5.19.
Inventory searches, however, are not unlimited in scope, and “must
be restricted to effectuating the purposes that justify their exception to
the Fourth Amendment.” State v. Dugas, 109 Wn. App. 592, 597–98, 36
P.3d 577 (2001) (holding that while police could inventory arrestee’s
jacket, they could not search the closed container within the jacket when
there was no indication of dangerous contents or illegal drugs). See generally 3 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 5.5(b) (5th ed. 2012).
5.4 SEARCHES CONDUCTED IN GOOD FAITH AND WITHOUT PURPOSE OF
FINDING EVIDENCE: COMMUNITY CARETAKING AND MEDICAL
EMERGENCY
The police also do not need a warrant to assist persons who are seriously injured or threatened with such injury. Brigham City, Utah v.
Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403, 126 S. Ct. 1943, 164 L. Ed. 2d 650 (2006);
State v. Guevara, 172 Wn. App. 184, 288 P.3d 1167 (2012). This “community caretaking” exception is “totally divorced from the detection,
investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a
criminal statute,” Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441, 93 S. Ct.
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2523, 37 L. Ed. 2d 706 (1973), and is distinct from the “exigent circumstances” exception to the warrant requirement. State v. Leupp, 96 Wn.
App. 324, 330, 980 P.2d 765 (1999). Both exceptions involve instances
in which the police must act immediately, but for distinctly different purposes. State v. Kinzy, 141 Wn.2d 373, 387 n. 39, 5 P.3d 668 (2000). Unlike the exigent circumstances exception, “community caretaking” arises
from a police officer’s responsibility to come to the aid of persons in
danger. Id. Additionally, if officers undertake a search as part of their
“community caretaking” function, any evidence discovered may be admissible. See State v. Thompson, 151 Wn.2d 793, 802−03, 92 P.3d 228
(2004) (community caretaking function does not include simply retrieving a guest’s jacket from defendant’s home).
Whether a search or seizure made for such “noncriminal
noninvestigatory purposes is reasonable depends on a balancing of the
individual’s interest in freedom from police interference against the public’s interest in having the police perform this ‘community caretaking
function.’” Kalmas v. Wagner, 133 Wn.2d 210, 216−17, 943 P.2d 1369
(1997). Thus, even when police lack probable cause to believe a crime
has been committed, they may conduct a warrantless search of the premises when the premises contains any of the following: (1) persons in imminent danger of death or harm; (2) objects likely to burn, explode, or
otherwise cause harm; or (3) information that will disclose the location
of a threatened victim or the existence of such a threat. State v. Downey,
53 Wn. App. 543, 545, 768 P.2d 502 (1989); see also State v. Menz, 75
Wn. App. 351, 353−56, 880 P.2d 48 (1994) (police entry was justified in
response to a domestic violence call).
The emergency, or “community caretaking” exception, however,
must be motivated by a need to render assistance, and cannot be used as
simply a “pretext for conducting an evidentiary search.” State v.
Schlieker, 115 Wn. App. 264, 270, 62 P.3d 520 (2003) (held search invalid when officers failed to inquire about the defendants’ safety, and proceeded to search for drugs). See generally 3 Wayne R. LaFave, Search
and Seizure § 5.5(d) (5th ed. 2012). Consequently, the officer must be
able to articulate specific facts and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom that justify the warrantless entry. State v. Davis, 86 Wn. App. 414,
420, 937 P.2d 1110 (1997) (entry was proper when, after check-out time,
the motel occupant did not respond to repeated telephone calls and
knocks at the door). Finally, however, no court has yet fully articulated
the precise contours of this exception, including whether and to what
extent it applies to a search of a home. See Feis v. King County Sheriff’s
Dep’t., 165 Wn. App. 525, 545−47, 267 P.3d 1022 (2011).
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5.4(a) Minors
The community caretaking exception may apply when officers are
attempting to protect children. State v. Acrey, 148 Wn.2d 738, 64 P.3d
594 (2003). When determining whether police have exceeded their scope
of authority in trying to protect children under community caretaking,
courts consider various circumstances, including whether a minor is
found late at night, unaccompanied by a parent. See State v. Kinzy, 141
Wn.2d 373, 5 P.3d 668 (2000). In Kinzy, police physically detained a 16
year-old girl after seeing her walking in downtown Seattle at 10 p.m. on
a weeknight with an adult male known to be involved with narcotics. Id.
at 378, 5 P.3d 668. The court held that under the community caretaking
exception, police could approach Kinzy and ask if she needed help, but
without articulable suspicion that she had committed a criminal offense,
police could not physically detain her. Id. at 395, 5 P.3d 668. In contrast,
in State v. Acrey, the court upheld the detention of 12 year-old Acrey,
whom the officers found while responding to a 911 call on a weeknight,
after midnight, in an isolated area with no adult supervision. Acrey, 148
Wn.2d at 742−43, 64 P.3d 594. Police contacted Acrey’s mother, who
asked police to give the boy a ride home. Id. at 743, 64 P.3d 594. Before
transporting the boy in the police car, police conducted a pat-down frisk
for safety purposes and found drugs. Id. The court affirmed the appellate
court’s holding that the police acted reasonably in this instance because
there was a heightened concern that the boys may be engaging in conduct
that could bring harm to themselves or others. Id. at 751, 64 P.3d 594.
The court found persuasive the young age of the defendant, the late hour,
and his presence in an isolated area without adults. Id. at 752, 64 P.3d
594. Most importantly, the officers had initially made a Terry stop of the
defendant to investigate a possible crime. Id.
5.4(b) Rendering Aid to Victims
Courts of appeal have recognized that police may make a warrantless entry into a residence in response to a report of ongoing domestic
violence. State v. Menz, 75 Wn. App. 351, 353−56, 880 P.2d 48 (1994).
“Police officers responding to a domestic violence report have a duty to
ensure the present and continued safety and wellbeing of the occupants”
of a residence. State v. Raines, 55 Wn. App. 459, 465, 778 P.2d 538
(1989). In deciding whether police entry was lawful, the court can consider the specific instance and likelihood of domestic violence as it relates to the requirements of the emergency-aid exception. State v.
Schultz, 170 Wn.2d 746, 750, 248 P.3d 484 (2011) (a report of a couple
yelling, the presence of “loud voices,” and an agitated woman answering
the door was not enough to uphold a warrantless entry).
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When the medical emergency is a homicide, officers may enter to
aid the victim and make a quick check to see if the perpetrator or other
victims are present. See Flippo v. West Virginia, 528 U.S. 11, 14, 120 S.
Ct. 7, 145 L. Ed. 2d 16 (1999) (noting that, while officers may enter a
murder scene to aid victims or to see if the perpetrator is present, there is
no general “murder scene” warrant exception). Thus, the police may
seize any evidence observed in plain view during the course of legitimate
police emergency activities. State v. Stevenson, 55 Wn. App. 725, 729–
30, 780 P.2d 873 (1989); see infra § 5.5. Any such search must be brief;
a general exploratory search lasting several hours is not permissible.
Thompson v. Louisiana, 469 U.S. 17, 21, 105 S. Ct. 409, 83 L. Ed. 2d
246 (1984).
In the course of rendering aid, police may conduct a warrantless
search of a victim’s personal effects so long as the search is motivated by
a need to render assistance. State v. Loewen, 97 Wn.2d 562, 568, 647
P.2d 489 (1982) (the search of the defendant’s tote bag for identification
was improper when the defendant regained consciousness prior to the
search). The scope of the search must remain limited to whatever is reasonable to conduct the community caretaking function, and the necessity
must exist at the time of the search. Id. at 568, 647 P.2d 489; State v.
Schroeder, 109 Wn. App. 30, 45, 32 P.3d 1022 (2001) (searching coat
pocket for identification of suicide victim was beyond scope of community caretaking function because the deceased no longer needed emergency medical attention, and the object of the search was not in plain
view); State v. Dempsey, 88 Wn. App. 918, 922, 947 P.2d 265 (1997),
abrogated on other grounds by State v. Neeley, 113 Wn. App. 100, 52
P.3d 539 (2002).
5.4(c) Property Damage
Similarly, police may make a warrantless entry to protect property,
and in doing so, may seize evidence in plain view. State v. Bakke, 44
Wn. App. 830, 839−41, 723 P.2d 534 (1986). Firefighters may enter a
house to extinguish a fire and immediately thereafter conduct a limited
warrantless investigation to determine the fire’s cause. Michigan v. Taylor, 436 U.S. 499, 510, 98 S. Ct. 1942, 56 L. Ed. 2d 486 (1978). Once a
fire has been extinguished, however, a warrant is required for arson investigators to search the premises to investigate a possible criminal cause
of the fire. Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287, 294−95, 104 S. Ct. 641,
78 L. Ed. 2d 477 (1984); Taylor, 436 U.S. at 511, 98 S. Ct. 1942.

2013]

Chapter 5: Warrantless Searches and Seizures

1707

5.4(d) Second Entry
Police officers may enter a private residence without a warrant
when officials of another government agency have validly entered the
residence and discovered contraband. State v. Bell, 108 Wn.2d 193, 201,
737 P.2d 254 (1987) (marijuana-growing operation discovered in plain
view by firefighters justified a warrantless entry and seizure by police),
abrogated on other grounds by Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 110
S. Ct. 2301, 110 L. Ed. 2d 112 (1990). However, the entry of the initial
party must of course be valid. State v. Browning, 67 Wn. App. 93, 97,
834 P.2d 84 (1992) (contraband sighted during building inspector’s entry
could not be used as the basis for later police entry under warrant because inspector’s initial entry was unlawful).
5.5 THE “OPEN VIEW” AND “PLAIN VIEW” DOCTRINES DISTINGUISHED
Courts have used the “plain view” and “open view” doctrines interchangeably to describe a variety of situations, but the two doctrines are
distinct. See State v. Seagull, 95 Wn.2d 898, 901–02, 632 P.2d 44
(1981); State v. Barnes, 158 Wn. App. 602, 243 P.3d 165 (2010). “Open
view” often describes one of two situations: (1) a search in which an officer observes an item that is exposed to public view in a public place or
in a location that is not constitutionally protected; or (2) a search in
which an officer, standing in an unprotected area, observes an object that
is located inside a constitutionally protected area. Barnes, 158 Wn. App.
at 612, 243 P.3d 165; State v. Perez, 41 Wn. App. 481, 483, 704 P.2d
625 (1985); see also State v. O’Herron, 153 N.J. Super. 570, 574, 380
A.2d 728 (1977) (discussing the “chameleon-like quality of the phrase
‘plain view’”); 1 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 2.2(a), at
596−97 (5th ed. 2012). The “open view” doctrine is characterized by the
defendant’s lower expectation of privacy because in both cases the officer views the contraband from an unprotected place. See supra § 1.3.
The plain view doctrine, as opposed to the open view doctrine, may justify the seizure of objects without a warrant. See generally LaFave, supra
§ 2.2(a). This doctrine usually applies to the discovery and seizure of an
object after entry into a constitutionally protected area. See generally id.
5.6 “OPEN VIEW”
In the first situation, the discovery of an object in a public place or
in a location that is not constitutionally protected is not a true search because the defendant has no reasonable expectation of privacy in objects
exposed to public view. State v. Rose, 128 Wn.2d 388, 392, 909 P.2d 280
(1996). Thus, this situation is referred to as “open view” and not “plain
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view.” State v. Dykstra, 84 Wn. App. 186, 191 n.4, 926 P.2d 929 (1996);
see supra § 1.3.
Likewise in the second instance, an officer viewing contraband in a
protected area while standing in an unprotected place also constitutes an
“open view” situation. State v. Ross, 141 Wn.2d 304, 312, 4 P.3d 130
(2000). This is because a search does not occur when an object, located
in a protected area, is merely observed from an unprotected point in an
unprotected area. See id. at 312–13, 4 P.3d 130. However, even if observations from an unprotected vantage point do not constitute a search,
privacy rights are implicated when police enter a constitutionally protected area to seize an object. See State v. Dyreson, 104 Wn. App. 703,
713−14, 17 P.3d 668 (2001). In other words, “[w]herever the eye may
go, the body of the policeman may not necessarily follow.” Charles E.
Moylan, Jr., The Plain View Doctrine: Unexpected Child of the Great
“Search Incident” Geography Battle, 26 Mercer L. Rev. 1047, 1096
(1975); see also Dykstra, 84 Wn. App. at 192−93, 926 P.2d 929.
Therefore, although the “open view” doctrine may justify observing
an object located in a constitutionally protected area, it will not justify
seizing the object, but may serve as the basis for a search warrant. See
Dykstra, 84 Wn. App. at 191, 926 P.2d 929; State v. Mierz, 72 Wn. App.
783, 791, 866 P.2d 65 (1994), aff’d, 127 Wn.2d 460, 901 P.2d 286
(1995) (view of prohibited coyote pups from legal vantage point outside
of the defendant’s fence did not justify an officer’s warrantless entry onto property); State v. Ferro, 64 Wn. App. 181, 182, 824 P.2d 500 (1992).
In limited instances, seizure of an object may be permissible under
the “open view” doctrine if an officer is reasonably certain that a container holds contraband based on the container’s appearance. State v.
Courcy, 48 Wn. App. 326, 330, 739 P.2d 98 (1987) (a paper “bindle”
containing cocaine was observed by an officer during a lawful investigative stop). This is because “‘some containers . . . by their very nature
cannot support any reasonable expectation of privacy because their contents can be inferred from their outward appearance.’” Id. (quoting Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 764 n.13, 99 S. Ct. 2586, 61 L. Ed. 2d
235 (1979)). Consequently, the suspect does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy that would prevent opening the container or fieldtesting its contents. Courcy, 48 Wn. App. at 330, 739 P.2d 98.
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5.7 CRITERIA FOR FALLING WITHIN THE “PLAIN VIEW” EXCEPTION
5.7(a) Discovery of Object in Plain View Following
Entry into a Constitutionally Protected Area: Requirements
In contrast to “open view,” “plain view” often involves an officer
lawfully entering a constitutionally protected area and unexpectedly discovering incriminating evidence. See, e.g., State v. Rodriguez, 65 Wn.
App. 409, 416, 828 P.2d 636 (1992); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403
U.S. 443, 466, 91 S. Ct. 2022, 29 L. Ed. 2d 564 (1971). For a warrantless
seizure to fall within this “plain view” exception, the following two requirements must be met: (1) the police must have a prior justification for
the intrusion into the constitutionally protected area, and (2) the police
must immediately realize that the object they observe is evidence—the
incriminating character of the evidence must be immediately apparent.
State v. Hatchie, 161 Wn.2d 390, 395, 166 P.3d 698 (2007); see also
State v. Cotten, 75 Wn. App. 669, 683, 879 P.2d 971 (1994) (shotgun did
not come within the plain view doctrine when it was not immediately
apparent to FBI officers that the gun was evidence of a crime). Previously, courts imposed a third requirement: the discovery of the incriminating
evidence must be inadvertent. See Cotten, 75 Wn. App. at 683, 879 P.2d
971. However, neither article I, section 7, nor the Fourth Amendment
still require inadvertent discovery to justify a seizure under the plain
view exception. See Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 130, 110 S. Ct.
2301, 110 L. Ed. 2d 112 (1990); State v. Hudson, 124 Wn.2d 107, 114
n.1, 874 P.2d 160 (1994) (noting the Horton revision to the plain view
test).
5.7(a)(1) Prior Justification for Intrusion
The plain view doctrine applies only when police are lawfully occupying the position from which they observe the illegal object or activity. State v. McKague, 143 Wn. App. 531, 539, 178 P.3d 1035 (2008).
Thus, if an initial entry into a residence or onto property is illegal, confiscation of evidence will constitute an illegal seizure. Id.; see also State
v. Kull, 155 Wn.2d 80, 85, 118 P.3d 307 (2005). Similarly, when the initial stop of a vehicle is unlawful—the police therefore having no right to
be in a position to observe the vehicle’s interior—the observation of contraband within the vehicle constitutes an unlawful search. State v.
Lesnick, 84 Wn.2d 940, 942−43, 530 P.2d 243 (1975); see also Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1, 9, 102 S. Ct. 812, 70 L. Ed. 2d 778 (1982),
on remand, 100 Wn.2d 814, 676 P.2d 419 (1984).
Because the plain view exception to the warrant requirement rests
on the lawfulness of the officer’s presence, plain view cases will have
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different outcomes under the federal and state constitutions when the two
constitutions differ as to the underlying lawfulness. For example, when
the arresting officer follows the arrestee into his or her home, the inspection of objects within the room may be lawful under the Fourth Amendment, yet unlawful under article I, section 7. Chrisman, 455 U.S. at 9,
102 S. Ct. 812 (determining that Fourth Amendment permits officer to
accompany arrestee wherever arrestee goes), on remand, 100 Wn.2d at
822 (concluding that article I, section 7 prohibits an officer from entering
misdemeanor arrestee’s home unless officer can demonstrate threat to
own safety, possibility of destruction of evidence of misdemeanor
charged, or strong likelihood of escape). Essentially, any application of
the plain view exception in confluence with article I, section 7 requires
“a close examination of the facts and not a bright line rule” for determining when officers exceed their lawful presence. Id. at 820, 102 S. Ct.
812; see State v. Link, 136 Wn. App. 685, 697, 150 P.3d 610 (2007).
5.7(a)(2) Immediate Knowledge: Incriminating Character Immediately
Apparent
The plain view exception applies only when the police immediately
recognize the incriminating nature of the object seized. State v. Cotten,
75 Wn. App. 669, 683, 879 P.2d 971 (1994) (shotgun not valid under the
plain view doctrine because it was not immediately apparent to the FBI
officers that the shotgun was evidence of a crime). Although the officer
need not have absolute knowledge that the object is related to a crime,
the officer cannot tamper with the evidence in order to come to this belief, and the object must have a nexus to the crime under investigation or
lead to an arrest. Id.
It is sufficient that the officer have probable cause to believe that
the object is evidence of a crime. State v. Sistrunk, 57 Wn. App. 210,
214, 787 P.2d 937 (1990). For example, in State v. Gonzales, a clear vial
of capsules and pills, “viewed in context” of other items of drug paraphernalia, was properly seized. 46 Wn. App. 388, 400−01, 731 P.2d 1101
(1986). On the other hand, a closed paper bag containing marijuana was
improperly seized because the marijuana was clearly not visible. Id. at
400, 731 P.2d 1101; see also Sistrunk, 57 Wn. App. at 214, 787 P.2d 937
(no probable cause to seize empty beer cans in open view when the condition of cans was consistent with driver’s explanation that they had been
picked up for recycling).
If an object is moved or tampered with in any way to determine
whether it is evidence of a crime, the “immediately apparent” prong of
the plain view test will fail. State v. King, 89 Wn. App. 612, 622 n.31,
949 P.3d 856 (1998) (citing State v. Murray, 84 Wn.2d 527, 527 P.2d
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1303 (1974)). Police officers must connect items to a crime based solely
on what is exposed to their view; they cannot move the object even a few
inches. Murray, 84 Wn.2d at 527, 527 P.2d 1303 (holding that the police
may not move a TV to view the serial number).
Officers may seize objects only if the objects are connected with the
crime under investigation or will lead to an arrest. State v. Terrovona,
105 Wn.2d 632, 648, 716 P.2d 295 (1986) (officers may only seize evidence that is not described in the warrant if “it will aid in a particular
apprehension or conviction, or if it has a sufficient nexus with the crime
under investigation”). This nexus may include documents providing the
motive for a crime or evidence of the crime itself. See State v. Stenson,
132 Wn.2d 668, 695, 940 P.2d 1239 (1997) (insurance documents were
“related to the crime” because they could provide a motive for the murder).
An officer’s knowledge and experience are also relevant to determining whether an object is legally seized under the plain view doctrine.
State v. Kennedy, 107 Wn.2d 1, 13, 726 P.2d 445 (1986) (“Adams could
immediately conclude, based on his own prior experience investigating
narcotics and the information he had about the Smith household and
about Kennedy, that the bag contained contraband.”). Baggies may be
considered evidence of a crime if other factors are present, such as the
baggies’ appearance of having contained illicit substances or presence in
an area of high drug crime. State v. Neth, 165 W.2d 177, 185 n.3, 196
P.3d 658 (2008).
Article I, section 7 provides the same protection as the Fourth
Amendment in this respect. State v. O’Neill, 148 Wn.2d 564, 582, 62
P.3d 489 (2003). Under the Fourth Amendment, officers must also immediately recognize the illicit nature of the object. See generally 2
Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 4.11(d) (5th ed. 2012). But they
may not move the object to uncover its illicit nature. Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 466, 91 S. Ct. 2022, 29 L. Ed. 2d 564 (1971);
Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 328, 107 S. Ct. 1149, 94 L. Ed. 2d 347
(1987) (the scope of plain view was exceeded when police lifted stereo
components to read serial numbers). Officers may also, however, be informed in their determination by their expertise. Andresen v. Maryland,
427 U.S. 463, 483, 96 S. Ct. 2737, 49 L. Ed. 2d 627 (1976) (use of specially trained investigators supported the seizure of business records).
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5.8 EXTENSIONS OF THE PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE
5.8(a) Plain Hearing
Some circuit courts have recognized a “plain hearing” analog to the
plain view doctrine based on the premise that defendants have no reasonable expectation of privacy in conversations that are overheard with unaided ears. See United States v. Jackson, 588 F.2d 1046, 1051−52 (5th
Cir. 1979); see also United States v. Baranek, 903 F.2d 1068, 1071 (6th
Cir. 1990) (inadvertently intercepted nontelephonic conversations were
authorized under “plain view” exception to the warrant requirement).
Use of hearing enhancement devices may “raise very different and far
more serious questions” from visual enhancement devices when determining the reasonable expectation of the privacy of defendants and, consequently, when determining whether a warrant is required. Dow Chem.
Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 238−39, 106 S. Ct. 1819, 90 L. Ed.
2d 226 (1986).
In Washington, eavesdropping by means of an electronic device or
the interception of private telephone, telegraph, radio, or other electronic
communications is governed by Washington’s Violating Right of Privacy
Act. RCW 9.73. Tape recordings made by federal agents pursuant to the
federal wiretap statute are inadmissible in state court when the recordings
are made in violation of the Washington statute. State v. Williams, 94
Wn.2d 531, 541, 617 P.2d 1012 (1980). Police testimony about such recorded conversation is also inadmissible. See infra § 7.3(a) (discussing the
use of illegally obtained evidence at probable cause hearings); see also
Tara McGraw Swaminatha, The Fourth Amendment Unplugged: Electronic Evidence Issues & Wireless Defenses, 7 Yale J. L. & Tech. 51
(2005).
5.8(b) Plain Smell
Courts have generally accepted the “plain smell” exception as a
branch of the plain view doctrine. See generally 1 Wayne R. LaFave,
Search and Seizure § 2.2(a), at 596−97 (5th ed. 2012). Thus, police officers have used odor to justify warrantless entries and seizures so long
as the officer was lawfully in the location where the odor was detected.
See, e.g., Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 125 S. Ct. 834, 160 L. Ed. 2d
842 (2005) (warrantless search of car trunk valid when dog sniff of exterior of car detected drugs inside trunk and when police lawfully pulled
car over for traffic stop).
Washington has permitted the warrantless seizure of an object
based on its odor when the odor established probable cause or when the
odor was in “open view.” See State v. Myers, 117 Wn.2d 332, 345, 815
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P.2d 761 (1991) (odor of marijuana was in “open view”); State v.
Huckaby, 15 Wn. App. 280, 290−91, 549 P.2d 35 (1976); see also State
v. Hammone, 24 Wn. App. 596, 599, 603 P.2d 377 (1979) (marijuana
odor emanating from vehicle). Odor can also support a warrantless entry
and can serve as probable cause for a search warrant. See State v. Gave,
77 Wn. App. 333, 336, 890 P.2d 1088 (1995) (odor of marijuana supported warrant probable cause requirement); State v. Gocken, 71 Wn.
App. 267, 278, 857 P.2d 1074 (1993) (odor of decaying flesh justified
warrantless entry at homicide scene).
5.8(c) Plain Feel
The court has recognized the “plain feel” or “plain touch” doctrine
as a corollary of the plain view doctrine. Under the plain touch exception
to the warrant requirement, police may seize nonthreatening contraband
detected through the officer’s sense of touch during a legitimate pat
down search. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375−76, 113 S. Ct.
2130, 124 L. Ed. 2d 334 (1993); State v. Garvin, 166 Wn.2d 242, 251,
207 P.3d 1266 (2009). The object will be admissible only if its “contour
or mass makes its identity immediately apparent.” Dickerson, 508 U.S. at
365−76, 113 S. Ct. 2130; State v. Hudson, 124 Wn.2d 107, 115, 874 P.2d
160 (1994). Any “squeezing, sliding or otherwise manipulating” the object extends the search beyond the scope of Terry, thus rendering the
search constitutionally invalid. Garvin, 166 Wn.2d at 250, 207 P.3d 1266
(excluding evidence when officer continued to squeeze defendant’s
pocket after feeling no weapon); Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334,
337−39, 120 S. Ct. 1462, 146 L. Ed. 2d 365 (2000) (border patrol agent’s
exploratory manipulation of bus passenger’s opaque bag violated the
Fourth Amendment).
5.9 INTRODUCTION TO CONSENSUAL SEARCHES
A warrantless search is constitutional when valid consent is granted. Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1, 9−10, 102 S. Ct. 812, 818, 70
L. Ed. 2d 778, 787 (1982), on remand to 100 Wn.2d 814, 676 P.2d 419
(1984); State v. Cantrell, 124 Wn.2d 183, 187, 875 P.2d 1208 (1994). A
valid consensual search requires that (1) the consent be “voluntary,” (2)
the consent be granted by a party having the authority to consent, and (3)
the search be limited to the scope of the consent granted. State v. Hastings, 119 Wn.2d 229, 234, 830 P.2d 658 (1992). See generally 4 Wayne
R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 8.1 (5th ed. 2012). Furthermore, while
the Fourth Amendment does not require targets of searches to be told
they have the right to refuse the search, United States v. Drayton, 536
U.S. 194, 207, 122 S. Ct. 2105, 153 L. Ed. 2d 242 (2002), article I, sec-
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tion 7 provides heightened protection against unreasonable searches.
Thus, “where the State seeks to justify a search on the basis of consent, it
has the burden of showing that the consent was voluntary, an essential
element of which is knowledge of the right to refuse consent.” State v.
Ferrier, 136 Wn.2d 103, 116, 960 P.2d 927 (1998) (quoting State v.
Johnson, 68 N.J. 349, 353−54, 346 A.2d 66 (1975) (alteration in original)).
The State has the burden of proving that consent to a search was
voluntary. State v. Ferrier, 136 Wn.2d 103, 116, 960 P.2d 927 (1998)
(citing State v. Smith, 115 Wn.2d 775, 789, 801 P.2d 975 (1990)). The
level of proof required is “clear and convincing evidence.” Smith, 115
Wn.2d at 789, 801 P.2d 975. For a discussion of the distinctions between
voluntary consent and waiver of constitutional rights, see generally 4
LaFave, supra § 8.1(a), at 10−17.
5.9(a) Factors Considered in Determining Voluntariness
The court analyzes the validity or voluntariness of consent to a
search in a similar manner as the voluntariness of a confession. See
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248−49, 93 S. Ct. 2041, 36 L.
Ed. 2d 854 (1973). However, consent to search is distinguishable from
testimonial admissions since the former is consistent with innocence.
State v. Wethered, 110 Wn.2d 466, 471, 755 P.2d 797 (1988). In Washington, the issue “is clearly an interest of local concern . . . due to ‘[t]he
heightened protection afforded state citizens against unlawful intrusion
into private dwellings [that] places an onerous burden upon the government to show a compelling need to act outside our warrant requirement.’” State v. Ferrier, 136 Wn.2d 103, 114, 960 P.2d 927 (1998)
(quoting Washington v. Chrisman, 100 Wn.2d 814, 822, 676 P.2d 419
(1984) (alteration in original)).
In Washington, if the police officers conduct a “knock and talk” for
the purpose of gaining consent, they must “inform the person[s] from
whom consent is sought that [they] may lawfully refuse to consent to the
search and that they can revoke, at any time, the consent that they give,
and can limit the scope of the consent to certain areas of the home.” Ferrier, 136 Wn.2d at 118−19, 960 P.2d 927; see supra § 3.7. Failure to do
so vitiates any consent given afterwards. Id. The Washington Supreme
Court has declined to extend the Ferrier rule to situations where police
seek entry to (1) question a resident in the course of investigating a
crime, State v. Khounvichai, 149 Wn.2d 557, 559, 69 P.3d 862 (2003);
(2) execute arrest warrants, State v. Thang, 145 Wn.2d 630, 636−37, 41
P.3d 1159 (2002); and (3) identify residents of the home, State v. Williams, 142 Wn.2d 17, 27, 11 P.3d 714 (2000). In other words, police
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need not give a Ferrier warning when the purpose of the visit is something other than searching for contraband or evidence of a crime. Thus,
in State v. Tagas, the court concluded that under article I, section 7, the
validity of defendant’s consent to the search of her purse did not depend
on the officer advising her of her right to refuse consent to search. 121
Wn. App. 872, 878, 90 P.3d 1088 (2004).
A prior voluntary confession or other type of cooperation with the
police will weigh in favor of a finding that the consent to search was voluntary. See State v. Raines, 55 Wn. App. 459, 462, 778 P.2d 538 (1989).
A prior refusal to consent to a search will suggest that a subsequent consent was not voluntary. See generally 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and
Seizure § 8.2(f) (5th ed. 2012).
A suspect’s behavior may also indicate consent even when verbal
consent is withheld. See Raines, 55 Wn. App. at 462, 778 P.2d 538 (failure to expressly object after police requested permission to enter “to look
around” amounted to implied waiver of right to exclude them); State v.
Sabbot, 16 Wn. App. 929, 938, 561 P.2d 212 (1977) (although the undercover investigator followed the defendant into the defendant’s home after
the defendant had told him to wait outside, the investigator’s presence in
house was with the defendant’s tacit acquiescence).
5.9(b) Police Claim of Authority to Search
An express or implied claim by the police that they will proceed
immediately to conduct the search even without the individual’s consent
is likely to indicate that the subsequent consent was involuntary. See
Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 550, 88 S. Ct. 1788, 1792, 20
L. Ed. 2d 797, 803 (1968); State v. Browning, 67 Wn. App. 93, 97−98,
834 P.2d 84 (1992) (acquiescence to a claim of authority is not equivalent to free and voluntary consent to a search). See generally 4 Wayne R.
LaFave, Search and Seizure § 8.2(a) (5th ed. 2012).
A threat to seek a warrant if the person refuses to allow a search
does not, however, automatically invalidate consent. See State v. Smith,
115 Wn.2d 775, 790, 801 P.2d 975 (1990) (no coercion where the defendant was told officers would seek a search warrant if consent was not
given to search the trunk of car); see generally 4 LaFave, supra § 8.2(c).
On the other hand, police misrepresentation regarding the existence of a
search warrant may invalidate consent to a search or seizure under the
Fourth Amendment. See Bumper, 391 U.S. at 548, 88 S. Ct. 1788; Rental
Owners Ass’n v. Thurston Cnty., 85 Wn. App. 171, 183, 931 P.2d 208
(1997) (threats to obtain a search warrant may invalidate consent when
grounds for obtaining a warrant do not exist); State v. McCrorey, 70 Wn.

1716

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 36:1581

App. 103, 112 n.8, 851 P.2d 1234 (1993), abrogated on other grounds,
State v. Head, 136 Wn.2d 619, 964 P.2d 1187 (1998).
5.9(c) Coercive Surroundings
If the officers make a show of force while seeking consent, or if the
surroundings are coercive in other respects, the consent will generally
not be considered voluntary. See McNear v. Rhay, 65 Wn.2d 530, 537,
398 P.2d 732 (1965); State v. Dresker, 39 Wn. App. 136, 139, 692 P.2d
846 (1984). For example, where officers placed a defendant under physical restraint, searched her home illegally without consent, and had
searched her home illegally without consent two days prior, the defendant did not voluntarily consent. State v. Werth, 18 Wn. App. 530,
535−36, 571 P.2d 941 (1977); see supra § 1.4(a). However, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that surroundings were not coercive when police
officers boarded a bus and obtained permission to search where “[t]here
was no application of force, no intimidating movement, no overwhelming show of force, no brandishing of weapons, no blocking of exits, no
threat, no command, [and] not even an authoritative tone of voice.” United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 203−04, 122 S. Ct. 2105, 153 L. Ed.
2d 242 (2002). See generally 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure §
8.2(b) (5th ed. 2012). Coercive effects can, however, “be mitigated by
requiring officers who conduct [knock and talk searches] to warn home
dwellers of their right to refuse consent to a warrantless search.” State v.
Ferrier, 136 Wn.2d 103, 116, 960 P.2d 927 (1998).
The fact that a defendant is in custody when he consents to a search
does not by itself establish coercion or involuntary consent. McNear, 65
Wn.2d at 538, 398 P.2d 732; United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 424,
96 S. Ct. 820, 46 L. Ed. 2d 598 (1976). Custodial restraint is, however, a
significant factor in assessing voluntariness. See State v. Avila-Avina, 99
Wn. App. 9, 14−15, 991 P.2d 720 (2000). In Avila-Avina, the court concluded that consent was invalid where the defendant was illegally detained and held in a patrol car for four hours after the initial purpose of
the detainment was satisfied. Id. at 16, 991 P.2d 720; see also Werth, 18
Wn. App. at 535−36, 571 P.2d 941; State v. Rodriguez, 20 Wn. App.
876, 881, 582 P.2d 904 (1978).
Consent is likely voluntary even if, after arrest, the officers will not
allow the defendant to return inside his dwelling unaccompanied to retrieve necessary belongings. In State v. Nelson, the court held the consent
was voluntary and uncoerced where the defendant, arrested on the porch
of his home in midwinter wearing only pants and a t-shirt, consented to
officers accompanying him into his home; the arresting officers had given the defendant the alternative of proceeding to the police station as he
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was, but indicated that if he returned inside, they would have to accompany him. State v. Nelson, 47 Wn. App. 157, 163−64, 734 P.2d 516
(1987). There, the court did not consider the defendant’s fear that his
behavior might appear “crazy” if he accepted arrest without his jacket
and keys equal to coercion. Id. at 163, 734 P.2d 516.
5.9(d) Awareness of the Constitutional Right to Withhold Consent
Although courts consider an individual’s knowledge of the right to
refuse a search when determining whether consent is voluntary, the State
may prove that consent was voluntary without establishing such
knowledge. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227, 93 S. Ct.
2041, 36 L. Ed. 2d 854 (1973); State v. Shoemaker 85 Wn.2d 207, 212,
533 P.2d 123 (1975); State v. Rodriguez, 20 Wn. App. 876, 880−81, 582
P.2d 904 (1978) (consent was voluntary despite the defendant’s assertion
that he was not told and did not know of the right to refuse consent). See
generally 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 8.2(i) (5th ed.
2012). Where police seek to justify a warrantless search of a private
home, however, knowledge of the right to refuse consent is an essential
element. State v. Ferrier, 136 Wn.2d 103, 116, 960 P.2d 927 (1998)
(“[T]he only sure way to give such a protection substance is to require a
warning of its existence.”). But informing occupants of their right to refuse might not be required when the officers are simply providing backup for another investigatory agency. State v. Bustamante-Davila, 138
Wn.2d 964, 984, 983 P.2d 590 (1999) (no Ferrier warning required
when officers were simply providing backup to a requesting INS agent
and suspect permitted agent and officers into home in which officers saw
rifle in plain sight).
5.9(e) Prior Illegal Police Action
A prior illegal act by the police may suggest that the defendant’s
consent was involuntary. See, e.g., State v. Werth, 18 Wn. App. 530, 535,
571 P.2d 941 (1977) (“In view of the additional circumstance that two
days before, Werth’s home had been searched illegally without her consent, it is apparent that overall, the situation was rife with coercion.”).
See generally generally 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 8.2(d)
(5th ed. 2012). Thus, a prior illegal search or arrest may taint the subsequent consent and thereby render the consent invalid. See generally State
v. McCrorey, 70 Wn. App. 103, 111−12, 851 P.2d 1234 (1993) (prior
illegal police activity is one factor when considering the totality of the
circumstances); 4 LaFave, supra § 8.2(d).
The State has the burden of proving that consent was not obtained
by the exploitation of a prior illegal search. State v. Bustamante-Davila,
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138 Wn.2d 964, 981, 983 P.2d 590 (1999). In State v. Jensen, the court
found that the State had met this burden when it showed that although
only two hours intervened between the search and the consent, the consent was valid because, in the intervening period, the defendant was advised of his right to refuse consent, had verbally consented twice, and
was allowed to call his sister, and there was no evidence that police did
anything to frighten or intimidate defendant. 44 Wn. App. 485, 488, 723
P.2d 443 (1986); see also State v. Tijerina, 61 Wn. App. 626, 629, 811
P.2d 241 (1991); Taylor v. Alabama, 457 U.S. 687, 690, 102 S. Ct. 2664,
73 L. Ed. 2d 314 (1982).
5.9(f) Maturity, Sophistication, and Mental or Emotional State
In assessing the voluntariness of the consent, the court always considers the sophistication and the emotional state of the defendant.
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248, 93 S. Ct. 2041, 36 L. Ed.
2d 854 (1973) (“The traditional definition of voluntariness we accept
today has always taken into account evidence of minimal schooling [and]
low intelligence.”); State v. Shoemaker, 85 Wn.2d 207, 212, 533 P.2d
123 (1975) (determination of voluntariness should include consideration
of “the degree of education and intelligence of the consenting person”);
see also United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 558, 100 S. Ct.
1870, 64 L. Ed. 2d 497 (1980). See generally generally 4 Wayne R.
LaFave, Search and Seizure § 8.2(e) (5th ed. 2012). While the mental
condition of a defendant is a significant factor in determining voluntariness, the presence of mental illness itself is insufficient to render a consent to search invalid. See State v. Sondergaard, 86 Wn. App. 656, 662,
938 P.2d 351 (1997); see also Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 164,
107 S. Ct. 515, 93 L. Ed. 2d 473 (1986) (voices directing the psychotic
defendant to confess to murder were not the result of police coercion).
5.9(g) Police Deception as to Identity or Purpose
The use of deception by a police officer does not necessarily affect
the voluntariness of consent to a search. Police may use a ruse to gain
entry to a residence to conduct a criminal investigation if they have a
justifiable and reasonable basis to suspect criminal activity within the
residence. State v. Hastings, 119 Wn.2d 229, 233, 830 P.2d 658 (1992)
(the defendant had no constitutionally protected expectation of privacy in
the residence where undercover officers had purchased cocaine); State v.
Hashman, 46 Wn. App. 211, 216, 729 P.2d 651 (1986) (a police officer
disguised as a building contractor gained entry into a residence after another officer, who had lawfully been within the residence, reported evi-

2013]

Chapter 5: Warrantless Searches and Seizures

1719

dence of a marijuana-growing operation). See generally 4 Wayne R.
LaFave, Search and Seizure § 8.2(m)–(n) (5th ed. 2012).
5.10 SCOPE OF CONSENT
A consensual search must be limited to the area covered by the authority given by the consenting party. State v. Reichenbach, 153 Wn.2d
126, 133, 101 P.3d 80 (2004); State v. Davis, 86 Wn. App. 414, 423, 937
P.2d 1110 (1997). The consenting party, expressly or implicitly, may
limit the scope of consent by only consenting to a search with reduced
duration, area, or intensity. Davis, 86 Wn. App. at 423, 937 P.2d 1110.
Any search exceeding the scope of consent is invalid, because exceeding
the scope of consent is comparable to exceeding the scope of a search
warrant. Id. See generally 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure §
8.1(a) (5th ed. 2012).
“A general and unqualified consent to search an area for a particular
type of material permits a search of personal property within the area in
which the material could be concealed.” State v. Mueller, 63 Wn. App.
720, 722, 821 P.2d 1267 (1992). For example, in State v. Jensen, the defendant consented to a “complete” search of his vehicle for materials of
any evidentiary value. Officers conducting the search found cocaine in
the pocket of a jacket in the back seat of the defendant’s car. State v. Jensen, 44 Wn. App. 485, 486, 723 P.2d 443 (1986). The court held that the
officers had not exceeded the scope of consent since the defendant did
not expressly or implicitly limit his consent. Id. at 492, 723 P.2d 443.
Furthermore, the defendant consented to the search for evidence that
could have reasonably been kept in a jacket pocket. Id. A consensual
search is not invalidated if it results in the discovery of evidence that the
consenting party did not expect to be discovered. State v. Johnson, 40
Wn. App. 371, 382–83, 699 P.2d 221 (1985). A general, unqualified consent does not extend to locked containers, which have additional privacy
expectations under article I, section 7. State v. Monaghan, 165 Wn. App.
782, 791, 266 P.3d 222 (2012) (citing State v. Stroud, 106 Wn.2d 144,
720 P.2d 436 (1986)) (finding that the search of a locked container in the
trunk of defendant’s car was without warrant or the defendant’s consent
and was therefore without the authority of law required in Washington).
To determine whether consent to one search is extended to a later
search, courts consider: (1) whether the search is conducted by the same
officers; (2) whether the second search has the same objectives; and (3)
whether the time elapsed between the two searches suggests an abandonment or completion of the initial search. State v. Koepke, 47 Wn.
App. 897, 905−06, 738 P.2d 295 (1987) (citing State v. Gallo, 20 Wn.
App. 717, 725, 582 P.2d 558 (1978)).
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Lastly, consent to a search or seizure may be implied by statute. For
example, drivers of motor vehicles in Washington give implied consent
to a blood test if they are arrested for vehicular homicide. RCW
46.20.308(3); State v. Brokman, 84 Wn. App. 848, 850−51, 930 P.2d 354
(1997).
5.11 CONSENT BY THIRD PARTIES
In some situations, third parties may give consent for searches, and
evidence discovered as a result of such searches may be used against a
non-consenting defendant. See State v. Mathe, 102 Wn.2d 537, 543, 688
P.2d 859 (1984). The relationship between the defendant and the third
party, among other considerations, affects the validity of third-party consent.
Under both article I, section 7 and the Fourth Amendment, thirdparty consent may be valid under the “common authority,” or actual authority standard articulated in United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164,
170, 94 S. Ct. 988, 39 L. Ed. 2d. 242 (1974); Mathe, 102 Wn.2d at 543,
688 P.2d 859. Actual authority requires a sufficient relationship to, or
mutual use of, property by people with joint access or control. State v.
Rison, 116 Wn. App. 955, 961, 69 P.3d 362 (2003). Under this standard,
if the non-consenting party is absent, (1) the consenting party must be
able to permit the search in her own right, and (2) it must be reasonable
to find that the defendant had assumed the risk that a person with joint
control might permit a search. State v. Thompson, 151 Wn.2d 793,
803−04, 92 P.3d 228 (2004); Mathe, 102 Wn.2d at 543−44, 688 P.2d
859.
Under article I, section 7, if the person only appears to have authority to consent and in fact does not, the search is invalid. See State v.
Eisfeldt, 163 Wn.2d 628, 638−39, 185 P.3d 580 (2008) (repairman
lacked actual authority to consent to search of home, and police officers’
reasonable belief that he did was irrelevant); State v. Holmes, 108 Wn.
App. 511, 518–19, 31 P.3d 716 (2001). The Fourth Amendment imposes
a lesser standard, which is satisfied when consent is given by one who
only appears to have authority to consent, and so long as the police reasonably believe that the individual has this authority. See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 186, 110 S. Ct. 2793, 111 L. Ed. 2d 148 (1990).
This “apparent authority” doctrine is grounded in the reasonableness of
the search whereas the “common” or “actual authority” doctrine is
grounded in reasonable expectations of privacy and the appropriate scope
of the consent. State v. Morse, 156 Wn.2d 1, 8, 123 P.3d 832 (2005). See
generally 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 8.3(g) (5th ed.
2012).
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The following sections discuss the relationships between a defendant and a third party that may give rise to third-party consent, including
family members, co-tenants, landlords, employers, bailees, and guests.
5.11(a) Defendant’s Spouse
Washington cases involving spousal consent are consistent with the
“common authority” approach of State v. Mathe, 102 Wn.2d 537, 543,
688 P.2d 859 (1984). For example, a defendant’s spouse, having an equal
right to use an object or occupy the property, may consent to a search of
the object or premises, regardless of whether the area is kept for the exclusive use of the non-consenting spouse. See State v. Gillespie, 18 Wn.
App. 313, 317, 569 P.2d 1174 (1977). However, also consistent with the
“common authority” standard, the consent of a spouse is only valid
against the non-consenting spouse if the non-consenting spouse is not
present at the time of the search. State v. Walker, 136 Wn.2d 678, 679,
965 P.2d 1079 (1998). When police request entry pursuant to “knock and
talk” in conducting a search pursuant to a warrant, see supra § 3.7, either
spouse may validly allow police entry. State v. Hartnell, 15 Wn. App.
410, 417−18, 550 P.2d 63 (1976). See generally 4 Wayne R. LaFave,
Search and Seizure § 8.4(a) (5th ed. 2012).
5.11(b) Defendant’s Parents
A parent has authority over all rooms in his or her home and consequently can consent to a search of a dependent child’s room regardless of
whether the child is a minor. State v. Summers, 52 Wn. App. 767, 772,
764 P.2d 250 (1988); see also State v. Cotten, 75 Wn. App. 669, 685,
879 P.2d 971 (1994) (finding that the defendant’s mother could give valid consent to seizure of a shotgun found in defendant’s bedroom). Furthermore, an adult child living rent-free with his parents does not create
the type of relationship that would prevent his parents from consenting to
a search. State v. Thompson, 151 Wn.2d 793, 807, 92 P.3d 228 (2004)
(finding that police did not need defendant’s consent to search his parents’ boathouse, which he used while living with his parents rent-free).
However, when the child pays rent and the status of the parent is similar
to that of a landlord rather than a custodial parent, the relationship is
more akin to a landlord and tenant relationship, leaving the parent without authority to consent to a search of a child’s room. Summers, 52 Wn.
App. at 771−73, 764 P.2d 250.
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5.11(c) Defendant’s Child
The defendant’s child, in appropriate circumstances, may consent to
police entry of the parent’s home but not police search of the home. See,
e.g., State v. Jones, 22 Wn. App. 447, 451−52, 591 P.2d 796 (1979) (reasoning that a minor child may consent to entry but declining to rule on
the legal question of consent to search). For a general discussion of the
scope and limitations of a child’s consent to a search of the parent’s
house, see generally 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 8.4(c)
(5th ed. 2012).
5.11(d) Co-Tenant or Joint Occupant
A co-tenant or joint occupant of the defendant’s dwelling with
common authority over or other sufficient relationship to the premises or
effects sought to be inspected may give valid consent to a search of the
premises or effects. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171, 94 S.
Ct. 988, 39 L. Ed. 2d 242 (1974); see State v. Mathe, 102 Wn.2d 537,
543, 688 P.2d 859 (1984); see also State v. Jeffries, 105 Wn.2d 398, 414,
717 P.2d 722 (1986) (common authority rule applicable to validate consent to search a “hobo” camp located outside the city of Wenatchee). See
generally 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 8.5(c) (5th ed.
2012). But when the non-consenting cohabitant is actually present on the
premise, Washington courts have held that a cohabitant cannot give consent if the non-consenting cohabitant has equal or greater control over
the premises. State v. Morse, 156 Wn.2d 1, 13, 123 P.3d 832 (2005)
(“[T]hat consent remains valid against a cohabitant, who also possesses
equal control, only while the cohabitant is absent.” (quoting State v.
Leach, 113 Wn.2d 735, 744, 782 P.2d 1035 (1989))); State v. Floreck,
111 Wn. App. 135, 142−43, 43 P.3d 1264 (2002); see also Mathe, 102
Wn.2d at 541, 688 P.2d 859. Although a cohabitant cannot give valid
consent to bedrooms or private areas when a non-consenting cohabitant
is present, a cohabitant can give valid consent to police officers to enter
the living room or an area that customarily receives visitors. State v.
Hoggatt, 108 Wn. App. 257, 269, 30 P.3d 488 (2001); see Leach, 113
Wn.2d at 744, 782 P.2d 1035.
The courts have not extended the dual consent rule for cohabitants
to the common authority shared by a driver and passenger in an automobile. State v. Cantrell, 124 Wn.2d 183, 192, 875 P.2d 1208 (1994) (passenger’s consent to search automobile was sufficient to support warrantless search even though the defendant driver did not consent to the
search; the court noted that a situation where a co-occupant overtly objected to search was not before the court).
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5.11(e) Landlord, Lessor, or Manager
A landlord lacks authority to consent to a search when a tenant has
the sole or undisputed possession of leased premises. State v. Birdsong,
66 Wn. App. 534, 537−39, 832 P.2d 533 (1992). This rule also applies to
limited rental arrangements such as those found in motels, boarding
homes, and room rentals. State v. Mathe, 102 Wn.2d 537, 544, 688 P.2d
859 (1984); see also George L. Blum, Annotation, Admissibility of Evidence Discovered in Warrantless Search of Rental Property Authorized
by Lessor of Such Property—State Cases, 61 A.L.R. 5th 1, 124 (1998).
However, the lessor or manager of an apartment building may consent to
a search of an area that is not within the lessee’s exclusive possession.
State v. Talley, 14 Wn. App. 484, 487, 543 P.2d 348 (1975) (finding the
common areas of a property were not under exclusive control of the lessee-defendant). See generally State v. Kreck, 86 Wn.2d 112, 123, 542
P.2d 782 (1975) (finding that the rental manager could consent to a
search of an unrented half of a garage). Upon expiration of the tenancy, a
tenant abandons his or her interest in the property and, likewise, an expectation of privacy. State v. Christian, 95 Wn.2d 655, 659, 628 P.2d
806 (1981). See generally 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure §
8.5(a), at 279−80 (5th ed. 2012).
Tenants, conversely, may consent to searches of common areas under the “common authority” rule, even over the objection of the landlord.
State v. Cranwell, 77 Wn. App. 90, 103−04, 890 P.2d 491 (1995). For
additional discussion of consent by a lessee, see generally 4 LaFave, supra § 8.5(b).
5.11(f) Bailee
A bailee may consent to a search of the bailor’s belongings when
the bailee has a sufficient relationship to or degree of control over the
chattel. See State v. Smith, 88 Wn.2d 127, 139−40, 559 P.2d 970 (1977)
(when hospital had joint control over patient-defendant’s clothing, hospital ward clerk could consent to police seizure of the clothing); see also
State v. Bobic, 140 Wn.2d 250, 259, 996 P.2d 610 (2000) (manager of
storage units facility could give police permission to enter; officers subsequently viewed contraband through existing hole in container). See
generally 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 8.6(a), (5th ed.
2012). For a discussion of consent by a bailor, see generally id. § 8.6(b).
5.11(g) Employee and Employer
An employer may consent to a search of the place of employment,
even when the search would affect the belongings of an employee. Thus,
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under the common authority rule analysis, see supra § 5.11, an employer
may validly consent to a search of that portion of the employer’s premises used by an employee for personal purposes. State v. Kendrick, 47 Wn.
App. 620, 632−33, 736 P.2d 1079 (1987) (finding that the defendant
shared the area but knew that his employer had greater authority and access to the area, decreasing his expectation of privacy). Further, under
some circumstances, an employee may give consent to a search of an
employer’s premises. For a discussion of the rules governing consent
within the employer–employee relationship, see 4 Wayne R. LaFave,
Search and Seizure § 8.6(c)−(d) (5th ed. 2012).
5.11(h) Hotel Employee
A hotel or motel employee may not grant valid consent to a search
of a guest’s room because a motel guest generally has the same expectation of privacy during his or her tenancy as the renter of a private residence. State v. Davis, 86 Wn. App. 414, 419, 937 P.2d 1110 (1997).
However, the hotel guest’s expectation of privacy generally expires at
checkout time. See id. at 419, 937 P.2d 1110 (finding that a motel guest
loses expectation of privacy at the expiration of tenancy, unless late
payment has been accepted by the motel or the motel has tolerated previous overtime stays). In Washington, courts require particularized suspicion to search a hotel registry, even if the hotel employee consents to
such a search. See State v. Jorden, 160 Wn.2d 121, 130, 156 P.3d 893
(2007); see also In re Nichols, 171 Wn.2d 370, 376, 256 P.3d 1131
(2010); see supra § 1.3.
5.11(i) Host and Guest
Generally, a host has the authority to consent to a search of a
guest’s bedroom and any other room occupied by the guest. See State v.
Rodriguez, 65 Wn. App. 409, 414−15, 828 P.2d 636 (1992); State v.
Koepke, 47 Wn. App. 897, 903−04, 738 P.2d 295 (1987) (host–guest relationship found between lessee and defendant temporarily using one of
lessee’s rooms such that lessee’s consent to search the room was valid).
However, when numerous guests are present and police do not inquire
about ownership of property, a host’s consent to search may not be valid
against guests’ personal property. See State v. Rison, 116 Wn. App. 955,
962, 69, P.3d 362 (2003), review denied, 151 Wn.2d 1008, 87 P.3d 1184
(2004). For additional discussion, 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 8.5(e) (5th ed. 2012). See also supra § 5.11 (common authority
rule).
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5.12 EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES: INTRODUCTION
The exigent circumstances exception justifies a warrantless search
when law enforcement officers establish probable cause but have a pressing need for an immediate search or seizure that would be delayed by
securing a warrant. See State v. Cardenas, 146 Wn.2d 400, 405−06, 47
P.3d 127 (2002); State v. Hoffman, 116 Wn.2d 51, 101, 804 P.2d 577
(1991). Washington courts use the following six factors as a guide in determining whether exigent circumstances justify a warrantless entry and
search:
(1) the gravity or violent nature of the offense with which the suspect is to be charged;
(2) whether the suspect is reasonably believed to be armed;
(3) whether there is reasonably trustworthy information that the
suspect is guilty;
(4) whether there is strong reason to believe that the suspect is on
the premises;
(5) the likelihood that the suspect will escape if not swiftly apprehended; and
(6) whether the entry is made peaceably.

Cardenas, 146 Wn.2d at 406, 47 P.3d 127 (citing State v. Terrovona, 105
Wn.2d 632, 644, 716 P.2d 295 (1986)); see Hoffman, 116 Wn.2d at 101,
804 P.2d 577 (same factors used in determining justification of warrantless home arrest). Not every factor must be present to find that exigent
circumstances justified the officer’s entry, only those factors necessary to
show that the officer needed to act quickly. Cardenas, 146 Wn.2d at 408,
47 P.3d 127; see, e.g., State v. Patterson, 112 Wn.2d 731, 736, 774 P.2d
10 (1989) (no single factor is conclusive; weight varies with circumstances); State v. Flowers, 57 Wn. App. 636, 644, 789 P.2d 333 (1990)
(the fact that some factors are not present is not controlling).
The courts have identified five situations in which exigent circumstances support a departure from the warrant requirement: “(1) hot pursuit; (2) fleeing suspect; (3) danger to arresting officer or to the public;
(4) mobility of the vehicle; and (5) mobility or destruction of the evidence.” State v. Counts, 99 Wn.2d 54, 60, 659 P.2d 1087 (1983); State v.
Pressley, 64 Wn. App. 591, 598, 825 P.2d 749 (1992) (police may seize
evidence without a warrant if probable cause exists and the actions of the
detainee give rise to a reasonable suspicion that evidence is in danger of
loss or destruction); 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 4.1(b), at
566–73 (5th ed. 2012); see also State v. Carter, 151 Wn.2d 118, 128, 85
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P.3d 887 (2004) (no warrant needed to seize a gun placed in open view
because of exigent circumstances); Terrovona, 105 Wn.2d at 644–45,
716 P.2d 295. However, exigent circumstances are not created merely
because a serious offense has been committed. See State v. Stevenson, 55
Wn. App. 725, 732, 780 P.2d 873 (1989); see also Counts, 99 Wn.2d at
59−61, 825 P.2d 749.
When a crime is committed in an officer’s presence after the officer
has been admitted into a residence, exigent circumstances need not exist
in order for the officer to lawfully make a warrantless arrest in the residence. See State v. Dalton, 43 Wn. App. 279, 286−87, 716 P.2d 940
(1986). In Dalton, an officer who obtained entry into a student’s college
dormitory room under the pretense of buying drugs, but with the actual
intent of making an arrest, could make an arrest under RCW 10.31.100,
which permits an arrest without a warrant where the police officer has
reasonable cause to believe a felony was or is being committed. Id.
5.13 EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES JUSTIFYING WARRANTLESS
ENTRY INTO THE HOME
An arrest on the street does not create an exigent circumstance justifying a warrantless search of an arrestee’s house. See Vale v. Louisiana,
399 U.S. 30, 35, 90 S. Ct. 1969, 26 L. Ed. 2d 409 (1970). Both the
Fourth Amendment and article I, section 7 draw a firm line at the entrance of the house, and “that threshold may not reasonably be crossed
without a warrant.” State v. Holeman, 103 Wn.2d 426, 429, 693 P.2d 89
(1985) (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590, 100 S. Ct. 1371,
63 L. Ed. 2d 639 (1980)). Police may, however, make a warrantless entry
into a home under the following circumstances: (1) when they attempt to
arrest the suspect in a public place and the suspect retreats into the home;
and (2) when the police reasonably fear that delay will result in the suspect’s escape, in injury to the officers or to the public, or in the destruction of evidence. See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298–99, 87 S. Ct.
1642, 18 L. Ed. 2d 782 (1967); United States v. Weaklem, 517 F.2d 70,
72 (9th Cir. 1975) (injury); United States v. Bustamante-Gamez, 488
F.2d 4, 8−9 (9th Cir. 1973) (escape; destruction of evidence). While police are on the premises, the scope of the intrusion is limited to its purpose; if the purpose is to prevent escape or harm, for example, the search
is limited to finding the suspect or weapons that could be used against
the police. Hayden, 387 U.S. at 299, 87 S. Ct. 1642.
Washington courts hold that the location of the arrestee, not the location of the arresting officer, is critical in determining whether an arrest
takes place in a home. Holeman, 103 Wn.2d at 429, 693 P.2d 89. Accordingly, absent exigent circumstances such as hot pursuit, an officer
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may not arrest a suspect without a warrant—and, subsequently, conduct a
warrantless search incident to arrest—if the suspect is standing in the
doorway to his or her home. Id.; see also supra § 3.7 (knock and announce rule). The unenclosed front porch of a home, however, is a public
place for purposes of arrest once probable cause has been established.
State v. Solberg, 122 Wn.2d 688, 699, 861 P.2d 460 (1993). A police
officer can arrest a suspect who voluntarily exits his or her home onto the
unenclosed porch, even in the absence of exigent circumstances. See id.
at 700, 861 P.2d 460; see also State v. Bockman, 37 Wn. App. 474, 481,
682 P.2d 925 (1984).
5.13(a) Hot Pursuit
In determining whether a warrantless entry into a home is justified
by the exigent circumstance of hot pursuit, courts have focused on the
immediate need to continue a promising criminal investigation, in addition to the factors listed in Cardenas. State v. Patterson, 112 Wn.2d 731,
736, 774 P.2d 10 (1989); see supra § 5.13; see also Welsh v. Wisconsin,
466 U.S. 740, 752–53, 104 S. Ct. 2091, 80 L. Ed. 2d 732 (1984) (no hot
pursuit when police did not engage in immediate or continuous pursuit of
defendant from the scene of the crime); State v. Counts, 99 Wn.2d 54,
60, 659 P.2d 1087 (1983) (no hot pursuit when police stood outside defendant’s home for one hour after defendant retreated therein). Other
Washington cases involving hot pursuit include State v. Bessette, 105
Wn. App. 793, 21 P.3d 318 (2001); State v. Griffith, 61 Wn. App. 35,
808 P.2d 1171 (1991) (escape, destruction of evidence); State v. Hendricks, 25 Wn. App. 775, 610 P.2d 940 (1980) (escape); and State v. Gallo, 20 Wn. App. 717, 582 P.2d 558 (1978) (intent to kill).
5.13(b) Imminent Arrest
Even when a suspect has not been arrested, police officers may
make a warrantless entry into a home when they reasonably believe that
the suspect has been alerted to his or her imminent arrest and is likely to
destroy evidence or escape. United States v. Flickinger, 573 F.2d 1349,
1356 (9th Cir. 1978), overruled on other grounds by United States v.
McConney, 728 F.2d 1195 (9th Cir. 1984). The exception also applies
when the police reasonably believe that the suspect is either armed or
sought in connection with a violent crime. State v. Cardenas, 146 Wn.2d
400, 412, 47 P.3d 127 (2002) (holding that officers were excused from
complying with knock and announce statute where officers suspected
defendants were dangerous, evidence was easily destructible, and officers observed defendants rushing toward back of the motel room following their knock); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298–300, 87 S.
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Ct. 1642, 18 L. Ed. 2d 782 (1967). In addition, police officers may make
a warrantless entry when they believe a suspect has alerted another accomplice of the arrest and the crime was one of violence. State v. Reid,
38 Wn. App. 203, 209−10, 687 P.2d 861 (1984). Police may not, however, make a warrantless entry when the likelihood of escape is slight, the
offense is minor, and the police do not believe that the suspect is armed.
State v. Dresker, 39 Wn. App. 136, 139−40, 692 P.2d 846 (1984).
Probable cause to believe a home contains contraband does not
constitute an exigent circumstance justifying the absence of a warrant;
police must have reason to believe the contraband will be destroyed before they are able to obtain a warrant. See State v. Carter, 127 Wn.2d
836, 840, 904 P.3d 290 (1995) (exigent circumstances justified warrantless entry of motel room where there was a risk of drugs being destroyed if persons in motel room were alerted to police presence by noises and scuffle in hallway). A belief that contraband will be destroyed
must be based upon sounds or activities observed at the scene or specific
prior knowledge that a particular suspect has a propensity to destroy contraband; mere presence of easily disposable drugs does not by itself constitute an exigency. State v. Jeter, 30 Wn. App. 360, 362, 634 P.2d 312
(1981).
Police may enter a home without a warrant in response to an emergency (including the imminent destruction of evidence) so long as they
do not themselves create the exigency through conduct that violates the
Fourth Amendment. Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1859−60, 179 L.
Ed. 2d 865 (2011) (officers do not create an exigency by conducting a
knock and talk instead of obtaining a warrant even when it is reasonably
foreseeable that their investigative tactics would “lead a drug suspect to
destroy evidence”); see State v. Drumhiller, 36 Wn. App. 592, 596–97,
675 P.2d 631 (1984) (exigent circumstances existed when police observed occupants in the process of inhaling what police reasonably believed to be cocaine); see also supra § 3.7 (knock and announce rule).
5.13(c) Less Intrusive Alternatives
Courts have held warrantless home entries illegal when police officers could have kept the residence under surveillance until they obtained a warrant. State v. Bessette, 105 Wn. App. 793, 799−800, 21 P.3d
318 (2001). For example, exigent circumstances do not justify entry into
a home when there is no threat to the health, safety, and welfare of citizens, or no risk of escape by a suspect once the suspect enters his or her
home. State v. Werth, 18 Wn. App. 530, 536−37, 571 P.2d 941 (1977);
State v. Peele, 10 Wn. App. 58, 63–64, 516 P.2d 788 (1973) (search warrant necessary when the suspect was not fleeing, but might be expected
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to hide out on the premises until morning). See generally 3 Wayne R.
LaFave, Search and Seizure § 6.5(c) (5th ed. 2012) (discussing the impoundment alternative).
Similarly, police officers are sometimes required to keep the occupants of a home under surveillance, instead of searching them, until they
procure a warrant. See, e.g., United States v. Grummel, 542 F.2d 789,
791 (9th Cir. 1976); State v. Lewis, 19 Wn. App. 35, 40, 573 P.2d 1347
(1978). Police may use methods that do not involve a search in order to
secure premises in which they are legally present while awaiting the issuance of a search warrant. Non-search activity may include brief detention of a defendant while awaiting a warrant if there is sufficient probable cause and a risk that potential evidence would be destroyed. Illinois
v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 331−33, 121 S. Ct. 946, 148 L. Ed. 2d 838
(2001); see also State v. Terrovona, 105 Wn.2d 632, 645−46, 716 P.2d
295 (1986) (prior warrantless entry and arrest of defendant in his residence was justified by exigent circumstances; nothing observed by the
police contributed to the issuance of the search warrant, nor was anything
in “plain view” used as evidence).
5.14 EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES JUSTIFYING WARRANTLESS SEARCH
AND SEIZURE OF THE PERSON
Warrantless searches and seizures of persons may be justified by
the exigent circumstances exception when police reasonably fear injury
to themselves or the public, flight, or the destruction of evidence. With
regard to the officer and public safety exception, a pat-down search is
unconstitutional absent a reasonable belief that the suspect is armed and
currently dangerous. Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 92−93, 100 S. Ct.
338, 62 L. Ed. 2d 238 (1979); see, e.g., State v. Smith, 165 Wn.2d 511,
199 P.3d 386 (2009) (finding exigencies to justify detaining suspect upon
exiting home because of the grave and imminent safety risk posed by a
tanker truck filled with a dangerous chemical parked next to a house in
which a rifle had been seen). In addition, “even without probable cause
or reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, it is reasonable for an officer
executing a search warrant at a residence to briefly detain occupants of
that residence, to ensure officer safety and an orderly completion of the
search.” State v. King, 89 Wn. App. 612, 618−19, 949 P.3d 856 (1998).
Regarding the destruction-of-evidence exception, the brief seizure
of a person outside his home is permissible when police have probable
cause to believe that the home contains illegal drugs and a reasonable
belief that the person could destroy evidence before police could obtain a
search warrant. See State v. Carter, 127 Wn.2d 836, 840, 904 P.3d 290
(1995); see also Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 331−33, 121 S. Ct.
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946, 148 L. Ed. 2d 838 (2001); Michael Gall, Note, Illinois v. McArthur:
Forcing Consent and Creating a “Backdoor” to the Warrant Requirement for the Home, 35 U. Tol. L. Rev. 455 (2003). For a definition of
what constitutes a seizure, see supra § 1.4. As explained in section
5.12(b), the officers must have concrete facts to back up their belief that
the evidence is in fact in danger. State v. Jeter, 30 Wn. App. 360, 362,
634 P.2d 312 (1981).
As the following sections discuss, exigent circumstances are used to
justify the following three kinds of warrantless searches of persons: (1)
fresh pursuit of a suspect fleeing from police; (2) searches that penetrate
the body, such as blood tests and other invasive medical procedures; and
(3) searches of persons located on the premises being searched.
5.14(a) Hot Pursuit
The court in City of Wenatchee v. Durham, 43 Wn. App. 547, 718
P.2d 819 (1986), identified the five criteria to be used when analyzing
hot pursuit: (1) a felony must have occurred in the area; (2) the suspect
must be attempting to flee or know that he is being pursued; (3) the police must pursue the suspect without delay; (4) the pursuit must be continuous; and (5) there must be a relationship between the time the crime
was committed, the beginning of the pursuit, and the apprehension of the
suspect. Id. at 550−51, 718 P.2d 819. Although the statutory definition of
hot pursuit, or “fresh pursuit,” relies in part on the common law, City of
Tacoma v. Durham, 95 Wn. App. 876, 878−79, 978 P.2d 514 (1999),
“courts are not limited by the common law definition, but may consider
the Legislature’s overall intent to use practical considerations in deciding
whether a particular arrest across jurisdictional lines was reasonable.”
Vance v. Dep’t of Licensing, 116 Wn. App. 412, 416, 65 P.3d 668
(2003), review denied, 150 Wn.2d 1004, 77 P.3d 651 (2003).
Police officers in Washington may engage in fresh pursuit of anyone “who is reasonably believed to have committed a violation of traffic
or criminal laws.” RCW 10.93.070(6), 10.93.120. However, barring the
presence of exceptional circumstances, a passenger may walk away from
or stay at the traffic stop scene. State v. Rehn, 117 Wn. App. 142, 149, 69
P.3d 379 (2003).
5.14(b) Warrantless Searches Involving Intrusion into the Body
A medical procedure performed without a warrant under exigent
circumstances must be reasonable and performed in a reasonable manner.
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767−68, 86 S. Ct. 1826, 16 L.
Ed. 2d 908 (1966); see 3 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 5.3(c),
at 215−16 (5th ed. 2012). In addition, the state must show more than
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probable cause because of the intrusive nature of the search. Schmerber,
384 U.S. at 770−72, 86 S. Ct. 1826. The fact that evidence is likely to be
destroyed will not automatically justify an intrusive medical procedure;
the evidence must be essential to a conviction. See Winston v. Lee, 470
U.S. 753, 765−66, 105 S. Ct. 1611, 84 L. Ed. 2d 662 (1985) (no need to
retrieve bullet from defendant’s body where other substantial evidence
was available to convict him).
Where a serious crime involving intoxication is at issue, the natural
dissipation of alcohol in the blood of a suspect may be an exigent circumstance justifying the nonconsensual extraction of a blood sample to
determine the suspect’s blood alcohol level. See State v. Curran, 116
Wn.2d 174, 185, 804 P.2d 558 (1991); see also Schmerber, 384 U.S. at
770−71, 86 S. Ct. 1826. But see Missouri v. McNeely, No. 11–1425, slip
op. (U.S. Apr. 17, 2013) (dissipation of blood alcohol not sufficient per
se to conduct a warrantless blood draw). Blood tests without a warrant
have been upheld as reasonable searches under both the Fourth Amendment and article I, section 7 as long as a trained medic performs the test
in a reasonable manner. Curran, 116 Wn.2d at 185, 804 P.2d 558.
In Washington, blood tests for alcohol intoxication are also justified
by statutory implied consent under RCW 46.20.308(3). Curran, 116
Wn.2d at 185, 804 P.2d 558 (no violation of article I, section 7 when a
blood sample is taken pursuant to RCW 46.20.308(3)); see also State v.
Baldwin, 109 Wn. App. 516, 518, 37 P.3d 1220 (2001). Notably, the lawful arrest of a motorist is a prerequisite for operation of the implied consent statute; otherwise, express consent is required for the blood test of a
motorist who is not under arrest. State v. Wetherell, 82 Wn.2d 865,
870−71, 514 P.2d 1069 (1973). The exigent circumstance of dissipation
of blood alcohol has also been used to justify a warrantless and nonconsensual entry into a residence to arrest a suspect and seize a blood sample. State v. Komoto, 40 Wn. App. 200, 211−13, 697 P.2d 1025 (1985)
(officer used a passkey to enter an apartment and arrest suspect following
felony hit and run). But, as stated above, the natural dissipation of blood
alcohol does not provide an exigency per se in every case. See McNeely,
No. 11–1425.
In order to deter recidivism and identify persons who commit
crimes, no warrant is required under the Fourth Amendment to collect a
DNA sample from every adult or juvenile convicted of a felony, harassment, stalking, or communication with a minor for immoral purposes, or
adjudicated guilty of an equivalent juvenile offense. See RCW
43.43.754(1); State v. Surge, 122 Wn. App. 448, 450, 94 P.3d 345 (2004)
(holding that State v. Olivas, 122 Wn.2d 73, 856 P.2d 1076 (1993), is
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controlling on this issue); see also King v. State, 425 Md. 550, 42 A.3d
549 (2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 594, 184 L. Ed. 2d 390 (2012)
5.14(c) Warrantless Searches and Seizures of Persons Located on Premises Being Searched
In limited instances, police may conduct a search of a person on the
premises but not named in the warrant. State v. Broadnax, 98 Wn.2d 289,
301, 654 P.2d 96 (1982), abrogated on other grounds by Minnesota v.
Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 113 S. Ct. 2130, 124 L. Ed. 2d 334 (1993). To
detain or search an individual other than the occupant, there must be
“presence plus.” Id. In other words, the officers must have “reasonable
cause” to believe that the person is concealing evidence sought and immediate seizure is necessary to prevent its destruction. State v. Halverson, 21 Wn. App. 35, 38, 584 P.2d 408 (1978) (although a specific warrant to search premises cannot automatically be converted into a general
one to search individuals, defendant’s suspicious conduct gave the police
reasonable cause to search his person). “Reasonable cause” requires that
the person engage in some type of suspicious activity. Broadnax, 98
Wn.2d at 301, 654 P.2d 96. Officers may also conduct a limited search
for weapons to protect themselves during the execution of the warrant.
Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 93, 100 S. Ct. 338, 62 L. Ed. 2d 238
(1979); State v. Allen, 93 Wn.2d 170, 172, 606 P.2d 1235 (1980). For a
more complete discussion of when occupants may be searched during the
execution of a search warrant for premises, see supra § 3.8(b).
5.15 WARRANTLESS SEARCHES AND SEIZURES OF MOTOR VEHICLES:
INTRODUCTION
The court treats automobiles and other motor vehicles as a special
category in search and seizure law for two reasons. First, the reasonable
expectation of privacy in a vehicle is less than that in a home or an article
on a person. See Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 424, 124 S. Ct. 885,
157 L. Ed. 2d 843 (2004) (“The Fourth Amendment does not treat a motorist’s car as his castle.”). Second, the mobility of a vehicle may make
obtaining a warrant prior to a search or seizure impractical. See id.; State
v. Johnson, 128 Wn.2d 431, 449, 453−54, 909 P.2d 293 (1996). Under
both article I, section 7 and the Fourth Amendment, the fact that it is possible to sleep in a vehicle does not give rise to the same privacy rights
that attach to fixed dwellings. California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 393,
105 S. Ct. 2066, 2070, 85 L. Ed. 2d. 406, 414 (1985); Johnson, 128
Wn.2d at 449, 909 P.2d 293 (lessened privacy interest for sleeper compartment of a tractor-trailer rig); State v. Cantrell, 124 Wn.2d 183, 190,
875 P.2d 1208 (1994). The reasonable expectation of privacy in motor
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vehicles is discussed in section 1.3(e). See also 3 Wayne R. LaFave,
Search and Seizure § 7.2(b), at 731−49 (5th ed. 2012).
A vehicle may be the subject of a warrantless search when the circumstances of the search are consistent with other exceptions to the warrant requirement, such as the search incident to arrest or the Terry stopand-frisk exceptions. See 3 LaFave, supra § 7.1(b), at 673–96; see also 2
LaFave, supra § 4.9(d) (discussing the Terry stop-and-frisk search).
Courts have also held that police may enter a vehicle to aid a person in
distress or to seek information about a person in distress, United States v.
Haley, 581 F.2d 723, 725−26 (8th Cir. 1978), but no Washington case
has directly addressed the issue.
The search of a motor vehicle and its contents are treated differently
under the Fourth Amendment than they are under article I, section 7. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 351, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 173 L. Ed. 2d 485
(2009) (holding police may search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant’s arrest to obtain evidence of the crime of arrest), with State v. Valdez, 167 Wn.2d 761, 779, 224 P.3d 751 (2009) (holding that only preservation of evidence and officer safety are valid reasons to search a vehicle
incident to arrest). The next sections set forth the standards under article
I, section 7 and the Fourth Amendment. Then, the general principles
governing automobile impoundment and inventory searches are addressed.
5.16 WARRANTLESS SEARCHES OF A VEHICLE UNDER THE WASHINGTON
STATE CONSTITUTION
The warrantless search of a vehicle is much more restricted under
article I, section 7 than it is under the Fourth Amendment. First, Washington does not allow warrantless searches of vehicles on probable cause
grounds, the “automobile exception” applied in federal court. State v.
Patton, 167 Wn.2d 379, 397, 219 P.3d 651 (2009). Second, exigent circumstances will be found only where obtaining a warrant is not practical
because the delay inherent in securing a warrant would compromise officer safety, facilitate escape, or permit the destruction of evidence. State
v. Tibbles, 169 Wn.2d 364, 373, 236 P.3d 885 (2010). Lastly, search of a
vehicle incident to arrest is only proper if there are concerns for officer
safety or destruction of the evidence. State v. Snapp, 174 Wn.2d 177,
197, 275 P.3d 289 (2012); State v. Valdez, 167 Wn.2d 761, 779, 224 P.3d
751 (2009); State v. Glenn, 140 Wn. App. 627, 636, 166 P.3d 1235
(2007) (holding that a credible report that a gun has been displayed from
a vehicle justifies a search of that vehicle under the officer safety exception).
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Once the immediate danger of harm to police or destruction of evidence is removed by arrest and police control of the vehicle, police must
obtain a warrant or have another exception to search the vehicle. State v.
Afana, 169 Wn.2d 169, 179, 233 P.3d 879 (2010) (holding that the
search of a vehicle incident to the arrest of a recent occupant is unlawful
absent a reasonable basis to believe that the arrestee poses a safety risk).
In State v. Snapp, the court held that because the defendant was in custody and removed from the vehicle, there could be no concerns for officer
safety; therefore, the officers exceeded the scope of the search incident to
arrest when they searched the passenger compartment of the vehicle. 174
Wn.2d at 197, 275 P.3d 289.
Even if the officers may properly search the passenger compartment, they may not open locked containers. State v. Stroud, 106 Wn.2d
144, 152, 720 P.2d 436 (1986), overruled on other grounds by Valdez,
167 Wn.2d 761, 224 P.3d 751. This contrasts with the federal standard,
which permits the warrantless search incident to arrest of both locked
and unlocked containers. See 3 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure §
7.1(c), at 697−707 (5th ed. 2012). “The rationale for this departure from
the federal standard is that use of a lock demonstrates the individual’s
expectation of privacy and the presence of a lock minimizes the danger
of an arrestee gaining access to the contents of the container.” State v.
Johnson, 77 Wn. App. 441, 446, 892 P.2d 106 (1995), aff’d, 128 Wn.2d
431, 909 P.2d 293 (1996) (discussing Stroud, 106 Wn.2d 144, 720 P.2d
436). Therefore, police in Washington must obtain a search warrant prior
to searching any locked glove compartment or other locked container.
Police officers may make a limited entry and investigation into a
vehicle that they have probable cause to believe has been the subject of a
burglary, tampering, or theft. State v. Lynch, 84 Wn. App. 467, 477−78,
929 P.2d 460 (1996). Officers may search those areas they reasonably
believe to have been affected and those areas reasonably believed to contain some evidence of ownership. Id. at 477−78, 929 P.2d 460. Officers
may also make a warrantless entry into a vehicle to look in places where
registration papers might be kept if the driver has fled the vehicle and the
officer reasonably believed the vehicle had been stolen. State v. Orcut,
22 Wn. App. 730, 734−35, 591 P.2d 872 (1979).
5.17 WARRANTLESS SEARCHES OF A VEHICLE UNDER THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT
In contrast to article I, section 7, the Fourth Amendment includes
the “automobile exception,” which allows officers to search a vehicle
without a warrant so long as they have probable cause to believe that the
vehicle contains contraband. United States v. Johns, 469 U.S. 478, 483,
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105 S. Ct. 881, 885, 83 L. Ed. 2d 890 (1985) (citing Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132, 149, 162, 45 S. Ct. 280, 69 L. Ed. 543 (1925));
United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825, 102 S. Ct. 2157, 72 L. Ed. 2d
572 (1982). A warrant is not required because “the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be
sought.” Carroll, 267 U.S. at 153, 45 S. Ct. 280. Because the vehicle itself presents an exigency, the officers do not need a separate exigency to
perform a warrantless search. Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 467,
119 S. Ct. 2013, 144 L. Ed. 2d 442 (1999) (no need for a separate finding
of exigency in addition to probable cause); Chambers v. Maroney, 399
U.S. 42, 51−52, 90 S. Ct. 1975, 26 L. Ed. 2d 419 (1970) (actual exigent
circumstances not be necessary to justify warrantless probable cause
search).
A search may extend to a vehicle in its entirety, including any of
the vehicle’s contents, both locked and unlocked. Ross, 456 U.S. at 821,
825, 102 S. Ct. 2157; California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 579, 111 S.
Ct. 1982, 114 L. Ed. 2d 619 (1991); see also Illinois v. Caballes, 543
U.S. 405, 407, 125 S. Ct. 834, 160 L. Ed. 842 (2005) (warrantless search
of car trunk valid where narcotics-detection dog alerted on trunk when
police lawfully pulled the car over for a traffic stop). Furthermore, the
U.S. Supreme Court has held that, even prior to arrest, police officers
with probable cause to search a car may inspect passengers’ belongings
found in the car that are capable of concealing the object of the search.
Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 307, 119 S. Ct. 1297, 143 L. Ed.
2d 408 (1999). The scope of the permissible search is limited to the size
and shape of the items sought, and police may only search where it is
reasonable to believe the items sought may be hidden. See id. at 307, 119
S. Ct. 1297.
A warrantless search of a vehicle may occur even after the police
have taken the vehicle into custody and its contents are in no danger of
removal or disturbance. Carroll, 267 U.S. at 153−54, 45 S. Ct. 280; Florida v. Meyers, 466 U.S. 380, 382, 104 S. Ct. 1852, 80 L. Ed. 2d 381
(1984). The rationale is that the initial justification for the warrantless
search does not disappear after impoundment. Johns, 469 U.S. at 484,
105 S. Ct. 881. The vehicle, however, must have been initially mobile at
the time of impoundment for the Carroll rule to apply. Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 460–62, 91 S. Ct. 2022, 29 L. Ed. 2d 564
(1971) (holding that a warrant was required when defendant had been
arrested in his home and had no access to a vehicle after arrest); see also
California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 390–91, 105 S. Ct. 2066, 85 L. Ed.
2d. 406 (1985). As discussed in section 5.15, Washington State has rejected the “automobile exception.”
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Under the Fourth Amendment and article I, section 7, officers may
also search a vehicle absent probable cause incident to the lawful arrest
of an occupant. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 351, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 173
L. Ed. 2d 485 (2009). However, the difference between the Fourth
Amendment application and article I, section 7 is in the scope of the exception. Under the Fourth Amendment, officers may search the vehicle
when there are concerns for officer safety, when there are concerns for
destruction of the evidence, and when it is reasonable to believe that evidence relevant to the crime of arrest will be found in the vehicle. Id. The
first two instances apply when the arrestee is unsecured and within
reaching distance of the passenger compartment. Id. Thus, these two instances will rarely justify a search. The third prong, allowing officers to
search when evidence relevant to the crime of arrest may be found in the
vehicle, is allowed only under the Fourth Amendment, not under article
I, section 7. State v. Snapp, 174 Wn.2d 177, 197, 275 P.3d 289 (2012)
(allowing search incident to arrest only under the “unrestrained” exceptions).
5.18 WARRANTLESS VEHICLE SEARCHES BASED ON GENERALIZED
SUSPICION: SPOT CHECKS OF MOTORISTS
Under the Fourth Amendment, a reasonable vehicle roadblock, or
spot check, may be another exception to the warrant requirement. See
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663, 99 S. Ct. 1391, 59 L. Ed. 2d 660
(1979); see also Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444,
449−50, 110 S. Ct. 2481, 110 L. Ed. 2d 412 (1990); United States v.
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 555−56, 96 S. Ct. 3074, 49 L. Ed. 2d
1116 (1976). To determine the reasonableness of spot checks or vehicle
checkpoints, the court will weigh the government’s interest in the checkpoints, the extent to which the program advances the government’s goals,
and the amount of intrusion on the individual motorist. Illinois v. Lidster,
540 U.S. 419, 427, 124 S. Ct. 885, 157 L. Ed. 2d 843 (2004). For police
to institute general spot check procedures, the procedures must constitute
“a sufficiently productive mechanism to justify the intrusion.” State v.
Marchand, 104 Wn.2d 434, 437, 706 P.2d 225 (1985). In addition, the
spot check procedures must be such that “the exercise of discretion by
law enforcement officials [is] sufficiently constrained.” Id. at 438, 706
P.2d 225.
Article I, section 7 prohibits sobriety checkpoints that impose no
statutory constraints on officers’ discretion to conduct intrusive searches
involving extensive invasions of privacy, such as smelling suspect’s
breath, visual inspections of automobile, and tests of physical dexterity.
Seattle v. Mesiani, 110 Wn.2d 454, 459–60, 755 P.2d 775 (1988); see
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also City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 48, 121 S. Ct. 447,
148 L. Ed. 2d 333 (2000) (a highway drug checkpoint is unconstitutional
where officers and drug-detecting canine would examine, through open
view, a predetermined number of drivers). Lastly, roadblocks randomly
enforced or implemented to detect ordinary criminal wrongdoing are unreasonable. City of Indianapolis, 531 U.S. at 41, 121 S. Ct. 447. In the
absence of a valid spot check program, police officers may stop a motor
vehicle to check for valid registration or possible automobile violations
only when they have a reasonable suspicion of unlawful activity. Prouse,
440 U.S. at 663, 999 S. Ct. 1391 (randomly stopping drivers to check
registration violated the Fourth Amendment).
The Washington Supreme Court has held sobriety checkpoint programs unconstitutional under both article I, section 7 and the Fourth
Amendment. Mesiani, 110 Wn.2d at 458, 460, 755 P.2d 775. Relying on
article I, section 7’s explicit recognition of the privacy rights of the
state’s citizens and requirements that all searches be conducted under
“authority of law,” the court rejected the City’s argument that the stops
fell within an exception to the warrant requirement. Id. at 457–58, 755
P.2d 775. In one of the cases relied upon by the city, State v. Silvernail,
25 Wn. App. 185, 605 P.2d 1279 (1980), the court permitted a warrantless search when there was information that a serious felony had recently
been committed. Id. at 190, 605 P.2d 1279. The Mesiani court distinguished Silvernail, stating that notice that a felony had recently been
committed “is far different from an inference from statistics that there are
inebriated drivers in the area.” Mesiani, 110 Wn.2d at 458 n.1, 755 P.2d
775. This differs from the Fourth Amendment, which permits sobriety
checkpoints if all vehicles passing though are detained. Sitz, 496 U.S.
444, 110 S. Ct. 2481.
5.19 FORFEITURE OR LEVY
Courts in Washington, while recognizing that “searches and seizures of motor vehicles used in drug transactions are an everyday occurrence,” have held that warrantless inventory searches of vehicles forfeited under drug laws are permitted under article I, section 7. State v.
McFadden, 63 Wn. App. 441, 449, 820 P.2d 53 (1991), overruled on
other grounds, State v. Adel, 136 Wn.2d 629, 965 P.2d 1072 (1998). In
Lowery v. Nelson, the court held that, under the Fourth Amendment, police are not required to obtain a search warrant before exercising the authority granted by the Uniform Controlled Substances Act to seize a vehicle used to transport a controlled substance. 43 Wn. App. 747, 750, 719
P.2d 594 (1986) (discussing RCW 69.50.505(1)(d)); see also Rozner v.
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Bellevue, 116 Wn.2d 342, 350, 804 P.2d 24 (1991); State v. Gwinner, 59
Wn. App. 119, 123, 796 P.2d 728 (1990) (upholding seizure under Federal Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, 21
U.S.C. § 881 (2000)). Under both the Fourth Amendment and article I,
section 7, police may conduct a warrantless search of a vehicle seized
pursuant to the forfeiture statute on the theory that the search is a valid
inventory or evidentiary search. McFadden, 63 Wn. App. at 449, 820
P.2d 53; see 3 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 7.5(c), at 892−98
(5th ed. 2012).
5.20 IMPOUNDMENT
“Impoundment is a seizure because it involves the governmental
taking of a vehicle into its exclusive custody.” State v. Coss, 87 Wn.
App. 891, 898, 943 P.2d 1126 (1997). The facts of each case determine
the reasonableness of each particular impoundment. Id. A vehicle may be
impounded without a warrant in three circumstances: (1) when the vehicle itself is evidence of a crime; (2) when the removal of the vehicle is
necessary as part of “community caretaking”; and (3) when the driver
has committed one of the traffic infractions that authorizes impoundment. State v. Simpson, 95 Wn.2d 170, 189, 622 P.2d 1199 (1980); see
also State v. Lynch, 84 Wn. App. 467, 477−78, 929 P.2d 460 (1996). Officers do not need the defendant’s consent to conduct an inventory search
of an impounded vehicle. State v. Tyler, 166 Wn. App. 202, 205, 269
P.3d 379 (2012), review granted, 174 Wn.2d 1005, 278 P.3d 1112
(2012).
A vehicle lawfully parked at one’s home or even on a public street
may not be impounded simply because its owner has been arrested. Miranda v. City of Cornelius, 429 F.3d 858, 864−66 (9th Cir. 2005). Similarly, impoundment is improper when the arrestee’s release is imminent,
and the vehicle does not pose a safety hazard. See State v. Bales, 15 Wn.
App. 834, 836, 552 P.2d 688 (1976). Also, when police conduct warrantless impoundments and subsequent inventory searches, see generally 3
Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 7.5(e) (5th ed. 2012), the
searches may not form a pretext for a search that the police otherwise
could not have made. State v. White, 83 Wn. App. 770, 774−75, 924 P.2d
55 (1996), rev’d on other grounds, 135 Wn.2d 761, 958 P.2d 982 (1998).
5.20(a) Evidence of Crime
“A car may be lawfully impounded as evidence of a crime if an officer has probable cause to believe that it was stolen or used in the commission of a felony.” State v. Terrovona, 105 Wn.2d 632, 647, 716 P.2d
295 (1986). In Terrovona, the Washington Supreme Court held that po-
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lice properly impounded a vehicle that they had probable cause to believe was used in the commission of a felony, where the defendant had
lured the victim to the murder site by telephoning him and asking him to
bring gasoline to the defendant’s empty vehicle. Id. at 647−48, 716 P.2d
295. Furthermore, an officer who has probable cause to believe a vehicle
contains contraband or evidence of a crime may seize and hold the car
for the reasonable time needed to obtain a search warrant, and the car
may be towed to an impound yard during seizure. State v. Huff, 64 Wn.
App. 641, 653, 826 P.2d 698 (1992).
5.20(b) Community Caretaking Function
The “community caretaking function” permits impoundment when
an abandoned vehicle impedes traffic, poses a threat to public safety and
convenience, or is itself threatened by vandalism or theft of its contents.
South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 368−69, 96 S. Ct. 3092, 49 L.
Ed. 2d 1000 (1976); State v. Sweet, 44 Wn. App. 226, 236, 721 P.2d 560
(1986). For example, in State v. Sweet, the court held that impoundment
was proper under the community caretaking exception when the arrestee
was unconscious, items of value were visible inside the vehicle, and the
vehicle was in a high-crime area. 44 Wn. App. at 236−37, 721 P.2d 560.
Under the community caretaking exception, police do not need to
have a reasonable belief that the vehicle is connected with criminal activity. See State v. Chisholm, 39 Wn. App. 864, 866−67, 696 P.2d 41
(1985). However, police should first make an inquiry as to the availability of the owner or the owner’s spouse or friends to move the vehicle.
See State v. Williams, 102 Wn.2d 733, 743, 689 P.2d 1065 (1984); State
v. Houser, 95 Wn.2d 143, 153, 622 P.2d 1218 (1980). Police should also
consider the alternative of parking and locking the car. Williams, 102
Wn.2d at 743, 689 P.2d 1065.
5.20(c) Enforcement of Traffic Regulations
Officers may impound a vehicle as part of enforcing traffic regulations only when constitutionally reasonable and necessary to prevent a
continuing violation of a traffic offense for which the legislature has specifically authorized impoundment. See State v. Hill, 68 Wn. App. 300,
305, 842 P.2d 996 (1993). Impoundment is unreasonable and improper if
a reasonable alternative to impoundment exists, such as when the owner
of the vehicle, or a passenger in the vehicle, is available to transport it.
Id. at 306, 842 P.2d 996. Police officers are to use discretion when deciding to impound a vehicle and, while an officer need not exhaust all possibilities, the officer must at least consider alternatives to impoundment.
State v. Coss, 87 Wn. App. 891, 899, 943 P.2d 1126 (1997) (impound-

1740

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 36:1581

ment improper where officer failed to consider alternatives to impoundment; a validly licensed passenger could have driven vehicle from scene
of traffic stop); see also State v. Reynoso, 41 Wn. App. 113, 119, 702
P.2d 1222 (1985).
5.20(d) Warrantless Detention
Officers may make a warrantless detention of a vehicle by deflating
its tires during the time when officers are in pursuit of a suspect. State v.
Burgess, 43 Wn. App. 253, 259, 716 P.2d 948 (1986). In Burgess, the
court held that, because the detention was unaccompanied by an exploratory search, the detention was reasonably restricted in time and
place and was necessary to prevent the suspect’s flight from the scene.
Id.
5.21 INVENTORY SEARCHES OF IMPOUNDED VEHICLES
When a vehicle is lawfully impounded, police are permitted to conduct a warrantless inventory search. Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367,
371, 107 S. Ct. 738, 93 L. Ed. 2d 739 (1987) (inventory searches are a
well-defined exception to the warrant requirement); State v. Morales,
154 Wn. App. 26, 48, 225 P.3d 311 (2010), rev’d in part on other
grounds, 173 Wn.2d 560, 269 P.3d 263 (2012); State v. White, 135
Wn.2d 761, 766−67, 958 P.2d 982 (1998) (limiting scope of inventory
search to those areas necessary to fulfill its purpose). Routine inventory
searches are reasonable under the Fourth Amendment when police follow standard practices and the search is not a pretext for obtaining evidence the police would not be able to obtain otherwise. South Dakota v.
Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 375, 96 S. Ct. 3092, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1000 (1976);
State v. White, 83 Wn. App. 770, 775, 958 P.2d 982 (1996), rev’d on
other grounds, 135 Wn.2d 761, 958 P.2d 982 (1998). The officer does
not need to obtain the defendant’s consent before performing an inventory search. State v. Tyler, 166 Wn. App. 202, 205, 269 P.3d 379 (2012),
review granted, 174 Wn.2d 1005, 278 P.3d 1112 (2012).
Washington courts have long held that a non-investigatory inventory search of an automobile is proper when conducted in good faith for
the purposes of (1) finding, listing, and securing property from loss during detention that belongs to a detained person and (2) protecting police
and temporary storage bailees from liability due to dishonest claims of
theft. State v. Houser, 95 Wn.2d 143, 154, 622 P.2d 1218 (1980); White,
83 Wn. App. at 777, 958 P.2d 982. An inventory search does not violate
the owner’s Fourth Amendment rights when the search follows written,
standardized inventory procedures. State v. Mireles, 73 Wn. App. 605,
612−13, 871 P.2d 162 (1994).
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The scope of an inventory search is “limited to those areas necessary to fulfill its purpose”—that is, “limited to protecting against substantial risks to property.” Houser, 95 Wn.2d at 155, 622 P.2d 1218. For
example, police in Washington may not open and examine a locked trunk
“absent a manifest necessity for conducting such a search.” Id. at 156,
622 P.2d 1218 (no great danger of theft to property left in trunk); White,
135 Wn.2d at 765−67, 958 P.2d 982 (police may not search a locked
trunk, despite the fact that the trunk could be opened by a switch located
inside the passenger compartment). Police also may not open luggage located in an impounded vehicle absent consent or exigent circumstances.
Houser, 95 Wn.2d at 158, 622 P.2d 1218.
In State v. Williams, 102 Wn.2d 733, 689 P.2d 1065 (1984), the
court suggested that police must obtain the owner’s consent before conducting an inventory search of an impounded vehicle pursuant to the
community caretaking exception. 102 Wn.2d 733, 743, 689 P.2d 1065
(1984). However, an inventory search of a vehicle impounded pursuant
to the community caretaking exception without the owner’s consent was
held to be valid in State v. Sweet, 44 Wn. App. 226, 721 P.2d 560 (1986).
In Sweet, the owner was unconscious and unable to either give or withhold his consent; there was also no evidence suggesting that the search
was conducted in bad faith or that it was a mere pretext for an investigatory search. Id. at 237, 721 P.2d 560. The court is revisiting the issue in
Tyler, 166 Wn. App. at 205, 269 P.3d 379, review granted, 174 Wn.2d
1005, 278 P.3d 1112.
5.22 WARRANTLESS SEARCHES IN SPECIAL ENVIRONMENTS
The court has permitted warrantless searches in special environments when the danger to the public is severe and the degree of intrusion
small. For example, the court permitted warrantless magnetometer (metal
detector) searches at airports to prevent hijackings and bombings. United
States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955, 960 (9th Cir. 2007). Conversely, the
Washington Supreme Court has rejected as unconstitutional the warrantless pat down of patrons at rock concerts. Jacobsen v. Seattle, 98 Wn.2d
668, 673−74, 658 P.2d 653 (1983). The court reasoned that there is a
greater risk of danger at airports and courthouses than at rock concerts,
and pat-down searches constitute a higher degree of intrusion than magnetometer and typical courthouse searches. Id. For a discussion of warrantless searches in other special environments, see infra § 6.

1742

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 36:1581

5.23 WARRANTLESS SEARCHES AND SEIZURES OF OBJECTS IN THE
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE MAILS
Law enforcement officers may seize first-class mail and packages
transported by private carriers when they have probable cause to believe
that the mail or packages contain contraband. See United States v. Van
Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249, 251−52, 90 S. Ct. 1029, 25 L. Ed. 2d 282
(1970); see also United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 121−22, 104 S.
Ct. 1652, 80 L. Ed. 2d 85 (1984). The contents of such mail or packages
may not be examined without a warrant, however, unless the reasonable
expectation of privacy in the contents no longer exists, or the examination consists of a test that will only disclose the presence of the contraband. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 121−22, 104 S. Ct. 1652; see also State v.
Wolohan, 23 Wn. App. 813, 820, 598 P.2d 421 (1979). A canine sniff
may be used to establish probable cause that a package lawfully held by
police contains contraband. State v. Jackson, 82 Wn. App. 594, 606, 918
P.2d 945 (1996).

CHAPTER 6
Special Environments
This chapter first discusses the differences in reasonable expectations of privacy, burdens of proof, and warrant requirements in three
special environments: (1) public schools, (2) detention and correctional
facilities, and (3) international borders. Next, it discusses special considerations in administrative searches.
6.1 SCHOOLS
A student’s legitimate expectation of privacy must be balanced
against the school’s legitimate need to provide an environment conducive to learning. Consequently, schools are considered a special environment in which the usual burdens of proof and warrant requirements are
slightly relaxed. Section 6.1(a) discusses how this balance permits a
school official to search a student without a warrant or even probable
cause so long as a reasonable suspicion exists. Section 6.1(b) discusses
this standard in the context of drug-testing programs for athletes.
6.1(a) Burden of Proof and Warrant Requirements
Under both the Fourth Amendment and article I, section 7, school
authorities may conduct a warrantless search of a student without probable cause if, under all of the circumstances, the school official has a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S.
325, 341, 105 S. Ct. 733, 83 L. Ed. 2d 720 (1985); State v. Meneese, 174
Wn.2d 937, 943, 282 P.3d 83 (2012). School officials may search a student with less than probable cause because their “primary duty [is] to
maintain order and discipline at school, not discover and prevent crime
like a police officer.” Meneese, 174 Wn.2d at 943, 282 P.3d 83. However, if the search is conducted by a police officer and not a school official,
the school exception does not apply and the officer must have a warrant.
Id. (finding search of student’s backpack by officer on school grounds
unconstitutional without warrant or other exception). Of course, the
school official still must have particularized suspicion with respect to

1745

1746

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 36:1581

each individual searched. Kuehn v. Renton Sch. Dist. No. 403, 103
Wn.2d 594, 599, 694 P.2d 1078 (1985) (individualized suspicion required for search of school band members’ luggage). See generally 5
Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 10.11(b), at 491−513 (5th ed.
2012).
A search is reasonable if (1) it is justified at its inception and (2) it
is reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the interference in the first place. State v. B.A.S., 103 Wn. App. 549, 553, 13 P.3d
244 (2000) (citing T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341, 105 S. Ct. 733). Additionally,
there must be a nexus between the item sought and the infraction being
investigated. Id. at 554, 105 S. Ct. 733 (holding that no connection existed between school’s closed campus policy that provided for searches of
students found violating the policy and the likelihood that a student was
bringing contraband onto school property). A search is unconstitutional if
it exceeds the scope of initial reasonable suspicion. Safford Unified Sch.
Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 375, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 174 L. Ed. 2d
354 (2009) (holding that a strip search of a 13-year-old student suspected
of possessing illegal drugs was excessively intrusive).
Although Washington allows for school searches on less than probable cause, the Washington State Supreme Court has not adopted a “special needs” exception as appears under the Fourth Amendment. Compare
York v. Wahkiakum Sch. Dist. No. 200, 163 Wn.2d 297, 312, 178 P.3d
995 (2008) (no general special needs exception under article I, section 7),
with Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873, 107 S. Ct. 3164, 97 L. Ed.
2d 709 (1987), and Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602,
109 S. Ct. 1402, 103 L. Ed. 2d 639 (1989) (drug testing under special
needs exception). Thus, the court has “not created a general special needs
exception or adopted a strict scrutiny type analysis that would allow the
State to depart from the warrant requirement whenever it could articulate
a special need beyond the normal need for law enforcement.” York, 163
Wn.2d at 314, 178 P.3d 995. Thus, a school cannot conduct a general,
suspicionless search. Id.
6.1(b) Drug Testing of Student Athletes
The Washington Supreme Court has held that random and
suspicionless drug testing of student athletes is not permissible under
article I, section 7 of the Washington State Constitution. York v. Wahkiakum Sch. Dist. No. 200, 163 Wn.2d 297, 310, 178 P.3d 995 (2008). Conversely, the Fourth Amendment allows random drug testing without individualized suspicion. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646,
664−65, 115 S. Ct. 2386, 132 L. Ed. 2d 564 (1995); see also Bd. of Educ.
of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 838, 122 S. Ct. 2559,
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153 L. Ed. 2d 735 (2002) (holding mandatory drug testing as a condition
of participating in extracurricular sports is constitutional).
Specifically, the Washington State Supreme Court held that a student athlete’s fundamental privacy interest in controlling his or her bodily functions required school officials to meet a “reasonableness” or “individualized” suspicion standard. York, 163 Wn.2d at 308, 178 P.3d 995
(citing State v. McKinnon, 88 Wn.2d 75, 558 P.2d 781 (1977) (holding
school officials must have some “reasonable” or “individualized” suspicion to protect students from unreasonable searches)). In State v. McKinnon, the court set forth several factors for determining the reasonableness
of a search: “the child’s age, history, and school record, the prevalence
and seriousness of the problem in the school to which the search was directed, the exigency to make the search without delay, and the probative
value and reliability of the information used as a justification for the
search.” 88 Wn.2d at 81, 558 P.2d 781 (citations omitted). Because
Washington has not adopted any general special needs exception, a
search without reasonable and individualized suspicion is unconstitutional. York, 163 Wn.2d at 308, 178 P.3d 995.
6.2 PRISONS, CUSTODIAL DETENTION, AND POST-CONVICTION
ALTERNATIVES TO PRISON
Incarceration affects all aspects of an individual’s search and seizure protections: the reasonable expectation of privacy, the levels of
proof required for intrusions, and warrant requirements. This section
provides a sampling of some of the ways incarceration or even conviction alone alters search and seizure protections.
6.2(a) Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
Prisoners are not accorded the same expectations of privacy in their
cells and effects that citizens generally enjoy in their homes and effects.
Matter of Personal Restraint of Benn, 134 Wn.2d 868, 909, 952 P.2d 116
(1998) (holding convicted “prisoners have no legitimate expectation of
privacy and . . . the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable
searches does not apply [to] prison cells” (quoting Hudson v. Palmer,
468 U.S. 517, 530, 104 S. Ct. 3194, 82 L. Ed. 2d 393 (1984))). Pretrial
detainees, like prisoners, may be subjected to unannounced searches of
their living areas. Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 589−91, 104 S. Ct.
3227, 82 L. Ed. 2d 438 (1984); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 555−57, 99
S. Ct. 1861, 60 L. Ed. 2d 447 (1979). Additionally, jailed suspects have
no expectation of privacy in property located in the property room at the
prison. State v. Cheatam, 112 Wn. App. 778, 785−87, 51 P.3d 138
(2002), aff’d, 150 Wn.2d 626, 81 P.3d 830 (2003). This holds true when
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the defendant is transferred to a hospital along with his personal effects.
State v. Puapuaga, 164 Wn.2d 515, 523−24, 192 P.3d 360 (2008) (no
privacy interest in personal effects when transferred to mental institution).
A convicted sex offender has only a minimal expectation of privacy
in personal body fluids; thus, the State may remove blood for testing
without the defendant’s consent. In re Juveniles A, B, C, D, E, 121
Wn.2d 80, 92−93, 96, 847 P.2d 455 (1993) (upholding constitutionality
of RCW 70.24.340, which mandates HIV testing for adults and juveniles
who have been convicted of a sexual offense under RCW 9A.44). Additionally, under RCW 43.43.754, the state may obtain blood samples and
perform DNA tests without the defendant’s consent following conviction. State v. Olivas, 122 Wn.2d 73, 98, 856 P.2d 1076 (1993) (upholding
the statute’s constitutionality upheld under Fourth Amendment).
After a defendant has been convicted of an offense and released, his
or her privacy interests remain diminished. For example, the warrantless
search of the home of a convict released pending appeal does not violate
constitutional protections. State v. Lucas, 56 Wn. App. 236, 240−41, 783
P.2d 121 (1989) (“[O]ne released pending appeal . . . should expect close
scrutiny.”). And, as discussed below, police may search a parolee’s vehicle based on a “well-founded” suspicion of criminal activity. State v.
Coahran, 27 Wn. App. 664, 666, 620 P.2d 116 (1980).
6.2(b) Warrantless Searches and Seizures
Warrants are not required for searches of prisoners or pretrial detainees. See Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 591, 104 S. Ct. 3227, 82
L. Ed. 2d 438 (1984); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526, 104 S. Ct.
3194, 82 L. Ed. 2d 393 (1984). Probable cause and individualized suspicion are also not required for such searches. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S.
520, 555−60, 99 S. Ct. 1861, 60 L. Ed. 2d 447 (1979) (pretrial detainees); State v. Baker, 28 Wn. App. 423, 424−25, 623 P.2d 1172 (1981)
(prisoners). Permitting routine and warrantless searches of inmates’ cells
is reasonable because security interests of the correctional institution
outweigh the minimal intrusion into inmates’ privacy. State v. Rainford,
86 Wn. App. 431, 438, 936 P.2d 1210 (1997) (“Washington courts have
held that an inmate’s expectation of privacy is necessarily lowered while
in custody and that warrantless searches may be conducted if reasonable.”).
Warrants are also not required for searches of parolees, probationers, work release inmates, and convicts released pending appeal, or for
any of these groups’ homes and effects. See generally United States v.
Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 122 S. Ct. 587, 151 L. Ed. 2d 497 (2001) (dis-
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cussing whether a parole condition permitting the search of the “person,
property, place of residence, vehicle, [and] personal effects . . . with or
without a search warrant” satisfies the Fourth Amendment); see also
Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 857, 126 S. Ct. 2193, 165 L. Ed. 2d
250 (2006) (neither probable cause nor warrant required for search of
parolee stopped by police officer in public); State v. Campbell, 103
Wn.2d 1, 22–23, 691 P.2d 929 (1984); State v. Lucas, 56 Wn. App. 236,
243−44, 783 P.2d 121 (1989). Furthermore, persons residing with prisoners who are released to a home-detention program are required to sign
consent forms that allow for warrantless searches and seizures of the
property where the person and the prisoner reside. State v. Cole, 122 Wn.
App. 319, 323, 93 P.3d 209 (2004).
6.2(c) Strip and Body Cavity Searches of Arrestees and Detainees
In Washington, routine strip searches are governed by statute and
administrative regulation. See RCW 10.79.060−170; WAC §§ 289-02020, -100, -200. A defendant’s state protections from a strip search under
article I, section 7 are coextensive with the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights. State v. Audley, 77 Wn. App. 897, 904, 908, 894 P.2d 1359
(1995) (holding that RCW 10.79.130(1)(a) is constitutional under article
I, section 7 and the Fourth Amendment and that such searches are permissible where they are supported by reasonable suspicion that an arrestee is concealing contraband that poses a threat to jail security). Only
a reasonable suspicion is required to conduct a “dry cell search” of a
prisoner. State v. Rainford, 86 Wn. App. 431, 433, 435 n.1, 936 P.2d
1210 (1997) (“dry cell search” typically involves placing prisoner in private room under 24-hour observation until prisoner has undergone three
bowel movements and then examining the feces for signs of drug use).
For strip and body cavity searches conducted prior to a detainee’s
first court appearance, probable cause and a warrant are required unless
(1) the detainee is charged with a violent offense; (2) the detainee is
charged with an offense involving escape, burglary, use of a deadly
weapon, or contraband; or (3) police have a reasonable suspicion that the
detainee is concealing on his or her person contraband, weapons, or fruits
or instrumentalities of crime. WAC §§ 289-16-100 to -200; cf. State v.
Brown, 33 Wn. App. 843, 848, 658 P.2d 44 (1983) (reasonable suspicion
for strip search of prisoner found after prisoner had personal contact with
visitor); State v. Hartzog, 96 Wn.2d 383, 396−97, 635 P.2d 694 (1981)
(visual and body cavity searches of prisoners leaving penal institution for
court appearance are permissible). A pending U.S. Supreme Court case
may shed further light on this issue. See King v. State, 425 Md. 550, 42
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A.3d 549 (2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 594, 184 L. Ed. 2d 390 (U.S.
Nov. 9, 2012).
6.3 INTERNATIONAL BORDERS
Searches and seizures of travelers at or near the international borders fall within the scope of the Fourth Amendment and article I, section
7, but courts generally do not require such intrusions to meet the strict
levels of proof and warrant requirements of ordinary searches and seizures. This section briefly describes some of the situations in which traditional proof and warrant requirements have been relaxed.
6.3(a) Permanent Border Checkpoints
Customs officials may search persons and vehicles crossing the
border at permanent checkpoints into the United States under 19 U.S.C. §
1467. See United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 154, 124 S.
Ct. 1582, 158 L. Ed. 2d 311 (2004) (“[A]utomobiles seeking entry into
this country may be searched.”); see also United States v. MartinezFuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 566, 96 S. Ct. 3074, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1116 (“[S]tops
for brief questioning routinely conducted at permanent checkpoints are
consistent with the Fourth Amendment and need not be authorized by
warrant.”); York v. Wahkiakum Sch. Dist. No. 200, 163 Wn.2d 297, 345,
178 P.3d 995 (2008) (recognizing border exception). Although border
agents do not need a warrant to conduct a search at a border crossing, the
statute does not obviate the requirement that a particular search or seizure be reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. See
Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 272, 93 S. Ct. 2535, 37
L. Ed. 2d 596 (1973) (holding that although a statute authorizes customs
searches without probable cause or mere suspicion, no act of Congress
can authorize a violation of the Constitution). Race or color is not a sufficient basis for making an investigatory stop by border patrol agents. See
State v. Almanza-Guzman, 94 Wn. App. 563, 567, 972 P.2d 468 (1999).
The scope of a Terry stop at the border may be relatively intrusive
when smuggling of narcotics is suspected. See United States v. Montoya
de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 544, 105 S. Ct. 3304, 87 L. Ed. 2d 381
(1985) (individual fitting courier profile of alimentary canal smuggler
may be detained for 16 hours pending bowel movement). But if the
search is intrusive—for example, as intrusive as a body cavity search—
the Ninth Circuit requires a showing of “a real suspicion, directed specifically to that person,” supported by specific and articulable facts before
the officials may search the suspect. United States v. Guadalupe-Garza,
421 F.2d 876, 879 (9th Cir. 1970); Henderson v. United States, 390 F.2d
805, 808 (9th Cir. 1967). If agents have only reasonable suspicion, they
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may not hold the suspect for an unreasonable amount of time. Florida v.
Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 502−03, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 75 L. Ed. 2d 229 (1983)
(officers who had only reasonable suspicion that airport traveler was
smuggling narcotics could not detain traveler in a special room and seize
his tickets and luggage); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 709−10,
103 S. Ct. 2637, 77 L. Ed. 2d 110 (1983) (90-minute detention of luggage at international airport unreasonable when law enforcement officers
had only reasonable suspicion of smuggling).
6.3(b) Roving Patrols: Illegal Aliens and Searches Away from the Border
To stop a vehicle, officers conducting roving patrols near borders
must have a reasonable suspicion, based on “specific articulable facts,”
that the vehicle contains illegal aliens. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce,
422 U.S. 873, 884, 95 S. Ct. 2574, 45 L. Ed. 2d 607 (1975). Washington
has declined to follow the Fourth Amendment jurisprudence on this matter, allowing a search away from a border only with probable cause. See
York v. Wahkiakum Sch. Dist. No. 200, 163 Wn.2d 297, 312, n. 19, 178
P.3d 995 (2008) (discussing State v. Quick, 59 Wn. App. 228, 232, 796
P.2d 764 (1990), and its deviation from the Brignoni–Ponce federal
standard).
6.4 ADMINISTRATIVE SEARCHES
The Fourth Amendment governs searches conducted for administrative purposes, regardless of whether criminal prosecution is anticipated. See, e.g., Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287, 291−93, 104 S. Ct. 641,
78 L. Ed. 2d 477 (1984) (determining that Fourth Amendment applies to
inspection of home that was partially damaged by fire, even when purpose of inspection is to determine fire’s origin and no criminal conduct is
suspected); Bosteder v. City of Renton, 155 Wn.2d 18, 35, 117 P.3d 316
(2005) (superseded by statute on other grounds); Dodge City Saloon, Inc.
v. Washington State Liquor Control Bd., 168 Wn. App. 388, 288 P.3d
343 (2012), review denied, 290 P.3d 994 (2012).
The following sections examine the reasonable expectation of privacy the subject of a warrantless search has, the warrant requirements in
administrative searches, and the various level of proof requirements.
6.4(a) Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
An individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy is not affected by
the fact that a search is part of an administrative or regulatory program or
has a purpose other than criminal prosecution. See Camara v. Mun.
Court, 387 U.S. 523, 532−33, 87 S. Ct. 1727, 18 L. Ed. 2d 930 (1967)
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(search of home for housing code violations); See v. City of Seattle, 387
U.S. 541, 545−46, 87 S. Ct. 1737, 18 L. Ed. 2d 943 (1967) (search of
commercial premises for fire code violations). As with other searches,
however, if there is no expectation of privacy in the area searched, the
search does not fall under Fourth Amendment protections. Centimark
Corp. v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 129 Wn. App. 368, 375, 119 P.3d 865
(2005) (no expectation of privacy in roofing job site when inspector
could readily see that the workers were not wearing fall protection). An
administrative search would also not fall under constitutional protections
if those conducting the search are not state actors. See City of Pasco v.
Shaw, 161 Wn.2d 450, 166 P.3d 1157 (2007) (finding that neither the
Fourth Amendment nor article I, section 7 is violated when a landlord
and a privately engaged inspector inspect a rental property for code violations that impact health and safety).
Although a few pervasively regulated industries are not permitted
reasonable expectations of privacy, the Fourth Amendment protects
against civil and criminal searches as well as commercial and residential
premises. See Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 313, 98 S. Ct.
1816, 56 L. Ed. 2d 305 (1978) (except for particular industries, such as
those involving liquor and firearms where no reasonable expectation of
privacy exists, the Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable administrative searches of commercial premises); see also Michigan v.
Clifford, 464 U.S. 287, 291, 104 S. Ct. 641, 78 L. Ed. 2d 477 (1984). If
the industry is granted only a limited expectation of privacy, that interest
must be balanced against the need for a particular administrative search.
See Murphy v. State, 115 Wn. App. 297, 313, 62 P.3d 533 (2003) (holding a patient has a limited expectation of privacy in prescription records
that is outweighed by the government’s statutorily mandated interest in
monitoring the flow of drugs from pharmacies to patients). However,
there is no general “heavily regulated industry” exception in Washington.
See State v. Miles, 160 Wn.2d 236, 248–51, 156 P.3d 864 (2007); see
also Bosteder v. City of Renton, 155 Wn.2d 18, 29, 117 P.3d 316 (2006).
Finally, certain government employees have a reduced expectation
of privacy given the special needs and legitimate workplace purpose. See
City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 177 L. Ed. 2d 216 (2010)
(holding that a police officer’s Fourth Amendment rights were not violated when a supervisor read his personal text messages on a departmentissued pager).
6.4(b) Warrant Requirements
Warrants generally are required for administrative searches of both
private and commercial premises. See Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S.
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523, 532−33, 87 S. Ct. 1727, 18 L. Ed. 2d 930 (1967). When the traditional exceptions to the warrant requirement apply, however, a warrant is
unnecessary. See Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287, 294−95, 104 S. Ct.
641, 78 L. Ed. 2d 477 (1984) (warrant not required for entry onto premises when consent given or exigent circumstances present because “evidence of criminal activity . . . discovered during the course of a valid
administrative search . . . may be seized under the ‘plain view’ doctrine”
(citation omitted)).
Warrants are not required in certain limited situations when the
searches are made pursuant to comprehensive and predictable legislative
schemes. See Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 598−99, 101 S. Ct. 2534,
69 L. Ed. 2d 262 (1981). Such situations are characterized by a substantial federal interest in inspection, as in the case of hazardous industries,
and by the necessity of a warrantless inspection to enforce the legislative
purpose. See id. at 598−99, 101 S. Ct. 2534 (congressional scheme authorizing warrantless inspections of mines found constitutional); see also
Murphy v. State, 115 Wn. App. 297, 307−08, 62 P.3d 533 (2003) (state
statute requiring pharmacies to keep records of dispensed prescriptions
and to make them available for inspection by state pharmacy board or
other law enforcement officer does not violate search and seizure provisions of either state or federal constitutions). In addition, the scheme
must prove to be an adequate substitute for a warrant by imposing certainty and regularity in the inspections and by accommodating special
privacy concerns. Donovan, 452 U.S. at 603, 101 S. Ct. 2534.
In Washington, there is no general administrative search warrant
exception for “heavily regulated industries”; instead, any administrative
exception must be expressly stated in an applicable statute or regulation.
See State v. Miles, 160 Wn.2d 236, 248–51, 156 P.3d 864 (2007); see
also Bosteder v. City of Renton, 155 Wn.2d 18, 29, 117 P.3d 316 (2006)
(holding that administrative warrants are not constitutional under the
Fourth Amendment except when made pursuant to an authorizing statute
or rule).
Warrants are also not always required for license, registration, and
equipment spot checks of vehicles. Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz,
496 U.S. 444, 455, 110 S. Ct. 2481, 110 L. Ed. 2d 412 (1990) (holding
that a highway sobriety checkpoint program, under which all motorists
passing through the checkpoint were stopped and examined for signs of
intoxication, did not violate the Fourth Amendment). Some random spot
checks, however, require warrants if the officer has discretion over which
vehicles to stop. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663, 99 S. Ct. 1391,
59 L. Ed. 2d 660 (1979) (warrant required for random spot check of vehicles). Importantly, Washington has held sobriety checkpoints to be un-
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constitutional. City of Seattle v. Mesiani, 110 Wn.2d 454, 456, 755 P.2d
775 (1988). Additionally, Washington courts found a statute unconstitutional because it allowed state patrol officers to stop any motor vehicle
and require the driver to display his or her driver’s license and submit the
vehicle to an inspection to ascertain whether the vehicle complied with
minimum requirements. State v. Marchand, 104 Wn.2d 434, 441, 706
P.2d 225 (1985).
6.4(c) Level of Proof Requirements
To obtain an administrative warrant to search commercial or residential premises, law enforcement officers must either offer specific
proof of a violation, or show that “reasonable legislative or administrative standards for conducting an . . . inspection are satisfied with respect
to a particular [establishment].” Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S.
307, 320−21, 98 S. Ct. 1816, 56 L. Ed. 2d 305 (1978) (brackets in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523,
538, 87 S. Ct. 1727, 18 L. Ed. 2d 930 (1967)). When an administrative
warrant, however, is sought to determine the recent cause of a fire, “fire
officials need show only that a fire of undetermined origin has occurred
on the premises, that the scope of the proposed search is reasonable and
will not intrude unnecessarily on the fire victim’s privacy, and that the
search will be executed at a reasonable and convenient time.” Michigan
v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287, 294, 104 S. Ct. 641, 78 L. Ed. 2d 477 (1984).
When officers seek a warrant based on a general administrative
program, they must set forth sufficient details of the program to enable
the magistrate to determine whether the program is reasonable. Seattle v.
Leach, 29 Wn. App. 81, 85, 627 P.2d 159 (1981). Conclusory statements
are inadequate. Id.

CHAPTER 7
The Exclusionary Rule
Under the exclusionary rule, evidence obtained in violation of a
person’s constitutional rights must be suppressed in a defendant’s criminal trial. State v. Duncan, 146 Wn.2d 166, 176, 43 P.3d 513 (2002); State
v. Kinzy, 141 Wn.2d 373, 393, 5 P.3d 668 (2000). The exclusionary rule
applies both to federal and state violations of the Fourth Amendment, see
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660, 81 S. Ct. 1684, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1081
(1961), as well as violations of article I, section 7, State v. Winterstein,
167 Wn.2d 620, 633, 220 P.3d 1226 (2009) (the general rule is that “violation of a constitutional immunity automatically implies exclusion of the
evidence seized” (quoting State v. Boland, 115 Wn.2d 571, 800 P.2d
1112 (1990))).
This chapter addresses five topics: first, general considerations of
the exclusionary rule; second, the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule; third, the rule’s operation in different, non-trial settings; fourth,
searches by private individuals; and finally, exclusion of evidence as
fruit of the poisonous tree and various exceptions to the rule.
7.0 INTRODUCTION
As stated above, the exclusionary rule operates to suppress any evidence found as a result of unconstitutional government action. State v.
Duncan, 146 Wn.2d 166, 176, 43 P.3d 513 (2002). The exclusionary rule
also prohibits the use of “derivative evidence,” real or testimonial, that is
the “fruit,” or product, of the illegally obtained evidence. Murray v.
United States, 487 U.S. 533, 536, 108 S. Ct. 2529, 101 L. Ed. 2d 472
(1988); State v. Smith, 165 Wn. App. 296, 309, 266 P.3d 250 (2011); see,
e.g., State v. Faford, 128 Wn.2d 476, 488, 910 P.2d 447 (1996); State v.
Salinas, 121 Wn.2d 689, 697, 853 P.2d 439 (1993). If the evidence,
however, will be used only as impeachment evidence and not in the government’s case-in-chief, the evidence may be admissible for the limited
purpose of impeachment. Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 64–65,
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74 S. Ct. 354, 98 L. Ed. 503 (1954); State v. Simpson, 95 Wn.2d 170,
179–80, 622 P.2d 1199 (1980); see also United States v. Havens, 446
U.S. 620, 627–28, 100 S. Ct. 1912, 64 L. Ed. 2d 559 (1980) (defendant’s
statements in cross-examination also subject to impeachment by illegally
obtained evidence that is inadmissible as substantive evidence of guilt).
Although most of the discussion in this section centers upon the exclusion of evidence when compelled by the federal or state constitutions,
statutory law can also provide the basis for exclusion of evidence. See,
e.g., State v. Williams, 94 Wn.2d 531, 541, 617 P.2d 1012 (1980) (recordings made in violation of Washington privacy statute, although permitted under federal wiretap statute, are inadmissible in state court proceedings); see 1 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 1.5(b) (5th ed.
2012) (state may compel exclusion of illegally seized evidence even
when the federal constitution does not require such exclusion).
7.1 GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
This section first explores the standing requirements under article I,
section 7. Next it examines the broad differences between the application
of the exclusionary rule under the Fourth Amendment and the rule under
article I, section 7. Lastly, the section discusses the criticisms of a broadreaching exclusionary rule.
7.1(a) Difference in Purpose Between the Fourth Amendment and
Article I, Section 7
The differences between the federal and state exclusionary rules are
largely based on the difference in wording and intent between the Fourth
Amendment and article I, section 7. Historically, the exclusionary rule
served (1) to deter unreasonable searches and seizures, Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643, 656, 81 S. Ct. 1684, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1081 (1961); (2) to preserve judicial integrity by preventing courts from becoming accomplices
to the willful disobedience of the Constitution, id. at 659, 81 S. Ct. 1684;
and (3) to sustain the public’s belief that the government will not profit
from lawless behavior. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 357, 94
S. Ct. 613, 38 L. Ed. 2d 561 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Currently,
the U.S. Supreme Court considers deterrence of police misconduct to be
the most important justification to the rule. United States v. Leon, 468
U.S. 897, 916−18, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 82 L. Ed. 2d 677 (1984).
Conversely, the primary purpose of article I, section 7 underlying
the exclusionary rule is the protection of individual privacy interests
against unreasonable governmental intrusions. See State v. Winterstein,
167 Wn.2d 620, 631−32, 220 P.3d 1226 (2009); see also State v. Afana,
169 Wn.2d 169, 180, 233 P.3d 879 (2010); State v. Duncan, 146 Wn.2d
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166, 176–77, 43 P.3d 513 (2002); State v. Rife, 133 Wn.2d 140, 148, 943
P.2d 266 (1997). As a secondary concern, the rule also deters unlawful
police activity and preserves the integrity of the judiciary by excluding
evidence that has been obtained through illegal means. See Afana, 169
Wn.2d at 180, 233 P.3d 879; Rife, 133 Wn.2d at 148, 943 P.2d 266.
Thus, while the Fourth Amendment is primarily concerned with deterrence of police conduct, article I, section 7 is more concerned with individual privacy. Compare State v. Crawley, 61 Wn. App. 29, 35, 808 P.2d
773 (1991), and State v. White, 97 Wn.2d 92, 109–12, 640 P.2d 1061
(1982), with Leon, 468 U.S. at 916−18, 104 S. Ct. 3405.
7.1(b) Standing
A defendant must have standing to object to a search or seizure, but
while the U.S. Supreme Court has abandoned the automatic standing
doctrine, United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 100 S. Ct. 2547, 65 L.
Ed. 2d 619 (1980), a Washington defendant may rely on automatic standing if the challenged police action produced the evidence sought to be
used against him. See State v. Jones, 146 Wn.2d 328, 331–35, 45 P.3d
1062 (2002); State v. Williams, 142 Wn.2d 17, 21–23, 11 P.3d 714
(2000). Still, a defendant asserting automatic standing must assert his
own rights, not those of a third party. State v. Libero, 168 Wn. App. 612,
619, 277 P.3d 708 (2012) (holding that while a defendant could challenge the legality of a search through asserting automatic standing, he
still must show a violation of his own rights to suppress the challenged
evidence). For a general discussion of standing, see supra § 1.6.
To invoke the exclusionary rule, a defendant must make a timely
objection. State v. Valladares, 31 Wn. App. 63, 76, 639 P.2d 813 (1982),
rev’d in part on other grounds, 99 Wn.2d 663, 664 P.2d 508 (1983).
7.1(c) Criticism of the Exclusionary Rule
A number of judges and legal scholars have opposed a broadreaching exclusionary rule. See generally 1 Wayne R. LaFave, Search
and Seizure § 1.2(a) (5th ed. 2004). First, commentators argue that the
rule handcuffs the police by handicapping the detection and prosecution
of crime. Id. § 1.2(a), at 27. The counterargument is that the Fourth
Amendment itself, not the rule, has that effect. Id. This very argument
was rejected when the Amendment was adopted. See id. In fact, commentators suggest that illegally issued warrants cause the loss of only a
negligible portion of felony arrests. See id. § 1.3(c), at 61.
Second, commentators argue that the rule aids only the guilty and
does not deter illegal police action. Id. § 1.2(b), at 29−32. After the rule’s
creation, however, there was a dramatic increase in the number of war-
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rant applications as well as the number of police academy classes offering instruction on obtaining evidence in a manner that does not violate
the Fourth Amendment. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 492, 96 S. Ct.
3037, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1067 (1976). As a result of the rule’s deterrent effect,
innocent persons are spared intrusive, illegal police procedures. 1
LaFave, supra § 1.2(a). Suggested alternatives to the exclusionary rule
include providing civil damages as the sole remedy, limiting the rule to
knowing violations, or limiting the rule to minor crimes. See generally
id. § 1.2(a)−(f), at 26–54; see also Samuel Estreicher & Daniel P. Weick,
Opting for a Legislative Alternative to the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule, 78 UMKC L. REV. 949 (2010) (proposing legislation
providing for comprehensive overview by the Department of Justice of
agency-by-agency constitutional compliance programs); L. Timothy Perrin, If It’s Broken, Fix It: Moving Beyond the Exclusionary Rule, 83
IOWA L. REV. 669 (1998) (providing an empirical study of the exclusionary rule and suggesting a civil administrative remedy to partially replace
the rule); Christopher Slobogin, Why Liberals Should Chuck the Exclusionary Rule, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 363 (1999) (suggesting an administrative damages regime wherein Fourth Amendment violations could be
brought directly against police).
7.2 UNLAWFUL SEARCHES AND SEIZURES CONDUCTED IN GOOD FAITH
While federal courts have adopted a good-faith-reliance exception
to the exclusionary rule, Washington courts have rejected such an exception. See State v. Afana, 169 Wn.2d 169, 184, 233 P.3d 879 (2010); State
v. Huft, 106 Wn.2d 206, 212, 720 P.2d 838, 844 (1986) (declining to apply “good faith” exception under the Washington constitution). This distinction stems from the fact that, unlike the Fourth Amendment, article I,
section 7 of the Washington State Constitution “clearly recognizes an
individual’s right to privacy with no express limitations.” Afana, 169
Wn.2d at 180, 233 P.3d 879 (quoting State v. White, 97 Wn.2d 92, 110,
640 P.2d 1061 (1982)). Thus, even if an officer acts in good faith reliance on an invalid warrant, the evidence must be suppressed. State v.
Crawley, 61 Wn. App. 29, 35, 808 P.2d 773 (1991).
Under the federal good-faith exception, the exclusionary rule does
not apply when evidence is seized in reasonable, good faith reliance on a
search warrant that the court later finds to be unsupported by probable
cause. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 919–21, 104 S. Ct. 3405,
82 L. Ed. 2d 677 (1984). This good-faith exception applies because “the
marginal or nonexistent benefits of suppressing evidence obtained in objectively reasonable reliance on a subsequently invalidated search warrant cannot justify the substantial costs of exclusion.” Id. at 922, 104 S.
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Ct. 3405. Likewise, if the warrant is technically invalid, the evidence
may be admitted when the police reasonably believed that the search was
valid. Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981, 987–88, 104 S. Ct.
3424, 82 L. Ed. 2d 737 (1984). Moreover, when police mistakes are the
result of negligence rather than systemic error or reckless disregard, the
exclusionary rule does not dictate suppression. Herring v. United States,
555 U.S. 135, 129 S. Ct. 695, 172 L. Ed. 2d 496 (2009).
7.3 APPLICATIONS OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE IN CRIMINAL
PROCEEDINGS OTHER THAN TRIALS
During a trial, the exclusionary rule applies in full force. State v.
Duncan, 146 Wn.2d 166, 176, 43 P.3d 513 (2002); State v. Kinzy, 141
Wn.2d 373, 393, 5 P.3d 668 (2000). The rule, however, is likely not to
apply in other portions of the trial process. The following sections discuss applications of the exclusionary rule in criminal proceedings other
than trials. The next section examines both pre- and post-trial applications.
7.3(a) Application of the Exclusionary Rule to Pre-Trial Matters
A person testifying before a grand jury may not refuse to answer
questions on the ground that the questions are based on evidence derived
from an illegal search. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 349–50,
94 S. Ct. 613, 38 L. Ed. 2d 561 (1974). The exclusionary rule is not applied to grand jury proceedings because its application would have only a
marginal deterrent effect. Id. at 351–52, 94 S. Ct. 613. In determining
whether to employ the rule, courts weigh the deterrent value of applying
the rule against the costs of excluding the type of evidence in question.
Id. at 349, 94 S. Ct. 613.
The exclusionary rule does not apply to indictments based on illegally obtained evidence. Lawn v. United States, 355 U.S. 339, 350, 78 S.
Ct. 311, 2 L. Ed. 2d 321 (1958). Again, excluding the evidence, even if it
means dismissing an indictment, would have only marginal deterrent
value. Calandra, 414 U.S. at 351–52, 94 S. Ct. 613.
Illegally seized evidence may be considered in determining whether
there is probable cause to believe that the accused committed the crime
charged. Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480, 488, 78 S. Ct. 1245,
2 L. Ed. 2d 1503 (1958) (holding that it would not be sound judicial administration to send the case back to the district court for a special hearing regarding probable cause because illegally seized evidence was introduced at trial). For example, recordings made by federal agents in a
matter inconsistent with state law, and are therefore inadmissible at trial,
nevertheless may be used to furnish probable cause for a court-

1760

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 36:1581

sanctioned search. State v. O’Neill, 103 Wn.2d 853, 867–72, 700 P.2d
711 (1985).
The Washington Supreme Court has not yet decided whether illegally obtained evidence must be suppressed at a bail hearing. Other jurisdictions that have considered the issue suggest that the evidence may
not be suppressed. See State v. Tucker, 101 N.J. Super. 380, 383, 244
A.2d 353 (1968) (no need to go into detail concerning admissibility of
the evidence for purposes of bail application when state makes prima
facie showing of admissibility); Steigler v. Super. Ct., 252 A.2d 300, 305
(Del. 1969).
7.3(b) Application of the Exclusionary Rule to Post-Trial Matters
Washington’s Sentencing Reform Act of 1981, which became effective July 1, 1984, structured, but did not eliminate, discretionary decisions affecting sentencing. RCW 9.94A.010. Under this provision, the
sentencing process is limited to the present conviction and the defendant’s prior convictions. As a result, there is no question as to whether
illegally obtained evidence may be admitted. This contrasts slightly to
sentencing under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, which remain
slightly unsettled. The majority of circuits have maintained that the exclusionary rule does not apply in sentencing hearings. See United States
v. Kim, 25 F.3d 1426, 1432–36 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Montoya-Ortiz, 7 F.3d 1171, 1181–82 (5th Cir. 1993); United States v. Jenkins, 4 F.3d 1338, 1344–45 (6th Cir. 1993); United States v. Tejada, 956
F.2d 1256, 1260–61 (2d Cir. 1992); United States v. Lynch, 934 F.2d
1226, 1234 (11th Cir. 1991); United States v. Torres, 926 F.2d 321, 324–
25 (3d Cir. 1991).
Washington courts are divided on whether article I, section 7 requires the application of the exclusionary rule to probation revocation
hearings. State v. Murray, 110 Wn.2d 706, 708−09, 757 P.2d 487 (1988)
(recognizing the division and uncertainty that exists around article I, section 7’s exclusionary rule in revocation hearings, but not resolving the
uncertainty). Compare, e.g., State v. Kuhn, 7 Wn. App. 190, 194, 499
P.2d 49 (1972) (rule excluding evidence obtained as result of an illegal
search is not applicable to probation revocation hearings), with State v.
Lampman, 45 Wn. App. 228, 232, 724 P.2d 1092 (1986) (requiring application without exception to probation revocation proceedings). Notably, because of the lower expectation of privacy that a parolee experiences, less evidence will be illegally obtained while the parolee is on release.
State v. Parris, 163 Wn. App. 110, 117, 259 P.3d 331 (2011).
Under the Fourth Amendment, the exclusionary rule does not apply
to parole revocation hearings. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524
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U.S. 357, 365–66, 118 S. Ct. 2014, 141 L. Ed. 2d 344 (1998). The Court
has reasoned that applying the exclusionary rule would both hinder the
functions of the state parole systems and alter the traditionally flexible
administrative nature of parole revocation proceedings, while providing
only minimal deterrence benefits. Id. at 364, 118 S. Ct. 2014.
7.4 APPLICATION OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE IN QUASI-CRIMINAL
AND ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS
While Washington courts have rarely addressed the matter, the exclusionary rule has been applied in quasi-criminal and administrative
proceedings as well. First, the exclusionary rule has generally been applied in juvenile delinquency proceedings. In Washington, criminal court
rules are automatically applied to juvenile proceedings. JuCR 1.4(b)
(“Criminal Rules. The Superior Court Criminal Rules shall apply in juvenile offense proceedings when not inconsistent with these rules and
applicable statutes.”). Other jurisdictions have also taken this approach.
See In re Robert T., 8 Cal. App. 3d 990, 993, 88 Cal. Rptr. 37 (1970); In
re Marsh, 40 III. 2d 53, 55, 237 N.E.2d 529 (1968). It might be, however, unwise to apply the rule in dependency hearings based on the possible
damage to the child. See, e.g., In re Christopher B., 82 Cal. App. 3d 608,
615, 147 Cal. Rptr. 390 (1978). Along the same reasoning, the rule has
not been applied to other conservatorship proceedings because of concern for the individual’s well-being and society’s safety. See Conservatorship of Susan T., 8 Cal. 4th 1005, 1019–20, 884 P.2d 988, 40 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 40 (1994).
Second, whether the exclusionary rule is applied in an administrative proceeding depends on the nature of the proceeding. If the proceeding is closer to criminal in nature, then the rule will be applied. For example, the exclusionary rule is applied in forfeiture proceedings, requiring the suppression of any illegally seized evidence used to prove the
criminal violation justifying the forfeiture. See, e.g., One 1958 Plymouth
Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 702, 85 S. Ct. 1246, 14 L. Ed. 2d
170 (1965) (exclusionary rule is applicable to forfeiture proceedings);
Deeter v. Smith, 106 Wn.2d 376, 378−79, 721 P.2d 519 (1986) (holding
that the exclusionary rule applies because civil forfeitures are quasicriminal in nature).
Courts have also applied the exclusionary rule when the disposition
is relatively significant and when application of the rule is likely to deter
unlawful searches and seizures. See New Brunswick v. Speights, 157 N.J.
Super. 9, 20−21, 384 A.2d 225 (1978) (policy of deterring unlawful governmental conduct may be significant when subsequent disciplinary hearing directed at police officer charged with criminal violations was fore-
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seeable at time of search or seizure). In contrast, the exclusionary rule is
generally not applied to administrative proceedings. I.N.S. v. LopezMendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1050, 104 S. Ct. 3479, 82 L. Ed. 2d 778 (1984)
(exclusionary rule not applied in civil deportation hearings held by INS);
see also Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 365, 118 S. Ct.
2014, 141 L. Ed. 2d 344 (1998) (exclusionary rule incompatible with
traditionally flexible administrative procedure). However, in the Ninth
Circuit, “administrative tribunals are still required to exclude evidence
that was ‘obtained by deliberate violations of the Fourth Amendment or
by conduct a reasonable officer should know is in violation of the Constitution.’” Lopez-Rodriguez v. Mukasey, 536 F.3d 1012, 1016 (9th Cir.
2008).
7.5 SEARCHES BY PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS
Both article I, section 7 and the Fourth Amendment apply only to
searches that are conducted by government actors. Thus, evidence gained
during a search by a private actor need not be excluded if the search fails
to conform to constitutional requirements. Burdeau v. McDowell, 256
U.S. 465, 475, 41 S. Ct. 574, 65 L. Ed. 1048 (1921) (papers obtained
through theft by a private individual and delivered to federal prosecutors
admissible against defendant); State v. Clark, 48 Wn. App. 850, 855, 743
P.2d 822 (1987). But the evidence must have come from an actively conducted search; if the private individual merely observes incriminating
evidence, article I, section 7 protection will apply. See State v. Eisfeldt,
163 Wn.2d 628, 635–39, 185 P.3d 580 (2008) (rejecting the private
search doctrine under article 1, section 7); State v. Faford, 128 Wn.2d
476, 488–89, 910 P.2d 447 (1996) (independent basis required for police
search made pursuant to information obtained by the police from a nosey
neighbor who was eavesdropping on the defendant’s cordless telephone
conversations).
Importantly, once the evidence is given to the government, the government search may not exceed the scope of the search previously conducted by the private party. In re Teddington, 116 Wn.2d 761, 766, 808
P.2d 156 (1991) (police properly read letter when sergeant had inventoried defendant’s locker and turned over incriminating letter to police);
State v. Walter, 66 Wn. App. 862, 866, 833 P.2d 440 (1992) (no violation
when photo lab turns pictures over to police). The intrusion is considered
of the same scope even if officers test a substance that was merely
looked at by the private party. State v. Bishop, 43 Wn. App. 17, 20, 714
P.2d 1199 (1986) (no violation when police reopened packets and tested
substance that was found by private security guard in the telephone
mouthpiece of defendant’s hospital room).
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7.5(a) Government Involvement
For a search to be truly “private” and therefore not subject to constitutional limitations, the actor must not be a government actor and must
not be acting under the authority of the state. Kuehn v. Renton Sch. Dist.
No. 403, 103 Wn.2d 594, 600, 694 P.2d 1078 (1985) (when private person acts under authority of state, Fourth Amendment applies; thus,
school search of students’ luggage must conform to constitutional requirements). If the actor is a private individual, the defendant has the
burden of proving that he or she conducted the search as an agent or instrumentality of the state. State v. Swenson, 104 Wn. App. 744, 754, 9
P.3d 933, 938 (2000); State v. Clark, 48 Wn. App. 850, 856, 743 P.2d
822 (1987).
Under an agency theory, a search is not private if ordered or requested by a government officer. Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465,
474−75, 41 S. Ct. 574, 65 L. Ed. 1048 (1921). For example, a search by
an airline employee was not private when conducted at the request and
under the supervision of government agents. Corngold v. United States,
367 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1966); see also New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325,
336, 105 S. Ct. 733, 83 L. Ed. 2d 720 (1985) (holding that school officials act as representatives of the state and as such are government actors). No agency relationship exists unless the state actively encourages
or instigates the citizen’s actions. See Clark, 48 Wn. App. at 855−56, 743
P.2d 822. Courts consider the State’s knowledge of and acquiescence in
the search and whether the citizen’s intent was to assist law enforcement
efforts or to further his or her own end as factors. Swenson, 104 Wn.
App. at 753, 9 P.3d 933 (father intended to assist police by obtaining defendant’s phone records, and although police knew of the father’s efforts,
there was no evidence that they instigated, encouraged, counseled, or
directed the father to obtain the phone records).
Under a joint endeavor theory, when the police accompany a citizen
on a search, the search becomes a government search. Corngold, 367
F.2d at 5−6 (contraband discovered by airline agents inadmissible when
government agents actively joined in search). “It is immaterial whether
the official originates the idea, or simply joins the search while it is in
progress.” Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74, 79, 69 S. Ct. 1372, 93 L.
Ed. 1819 (1949). But even if the police are summoned before the search
begins and are present as it occurs, the search may still be considered
private if a private purpose is served. United States v. Lamar, 545 F.2d
488, 490 (5th Cir. 1977) (heroin admissible when discovered by airline
agent who opened unclaimed bag to determine its owner, because it was
a private search even though a police officer was present during search).
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The fact that the person conducting the search may be a public employee does not lend an element of state action to the search if the search
is not related to the employee’s official duties and is undertaken solely in
his capacity as a private citizen. State v. Ludvik, 40 Wn. App. 257, 263,
698 P.2d 1064 (1985) (state game warden, residing across the street from
defendant, observed suspected drug transactions and informed police).
Searches by off-duty police officers are considered private if the officers
acted as private citizens and if the search or seizure was unconnected
with their duties as police officers. People v. Wachter, 58 Cal. App. 3d
911, 920–21, 130 Cal. Rptr. 279 (1976) (deputy sheriff acted as private
citizen when he notified law enforcement officials of defendant’s marijuana plants). When a private party, however, acts as a police officer, has a
strong interest in obtaining convictions, and is familiar with search and
seizure law, the purposes of the exclusionary rule are served by suppression and the rule will apply. See Commonwealth v. Eshelman, 477 Pa.
93, 100, 383 A.2d 838 (1978).
Lastly, a majority of jurisdictions have decided that when evidence
is seized to aid the government and the government had prior knowledge
that the seizure would occur, the taint of the illegal action is transferred
to the government. See United States v. Mekjian, 505 F.2d 1320, 1327–
28 (5th Cir. 1975) (copies of fraudulent claims allowed into evidence
because defendant failed to prove that federal investigators knew nurse
had illegally copied records for government use).
7.6 VIOLATION OF WARRANT PROCEDURE
“[A]bsent a showing of prejudice to the defendant, procedural noncompliance does not compel invalidation of an otherwise sufficient warrant or suppression of its fruits.” State v. Aase, 121 Wn. App. 558, 567,
89 P.3d 721 (2004). For example, when a defendant resident was not
given a copy of the warrant before commencing an otherwise lawful
search, the evidence was still admissible because the defendant was not
prejudiced by receiving the warrant several minutes after the search began, and the search would not have been less intrusive had the defendant
been able to immediately see the warrant. State v. Kern, 81 Wn. App.
308, 311, 914 P.2d 114 (1996).
7.7 DERIVATIVE EVIDENCE AS “FRUIT OF THE POISONOUS TREE”:
GENERAL RULE
The extent to which evidence related to an illegal search or seizure
may be suppressed depends on the extent to which the evidence derives
from exploitation of the illegality. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S.
471, 488, 83 S. Ct. 407, 9 L. Ed. 2d 441 (1963) (“[T]he . . . question . . .
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is whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence
to which instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation of
that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be
purged of the primary taint.” (internal quote omitted)); Silverthorne
Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392, 40 S. Ct. 182, 64 L. Ed.
319 (1920); State v. Byers, 88 Wn.2d 1, 10, 559 P.2d 1334 (1977) (defendants’ confessions inadmissible when obtained as a result of defendants being in custody after an unlawful arrest and being confronted with
illegally obtained evidence); State v. McReynolds, 104 Wn. App. 560,
571, 17 P.3d 608 (2002) (court remanded for lack of findings regarding
whether subsequently obtained evidence from valid warrants was tainted
by an illegal search); State v. Magneson, 107 Wn. App. 221, 226–27, 26
P.3d 986 (2001) (evidence was not admissible under the plain view doctrine when officers entered home with what was later determined to be an
invalid search warrant and seized drugs from a third person in the home
at the time of the search). The “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine is not
limited to violations of the Fourth Amendment; it has been applied to
violations of Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. Nix v. Williams, 467
U.S. 431, 442, 104 S. Ct. 2508, 81 L. Ed. 2d 377 (1984). The following
sections discuss three exceptions that have been used to determine
whether a given piece of evidence constitutes derivative “fruit of the poisonous tree” and should therefore be suppressed. See generally 6 Wayne
R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 11.4 (5th ed. 2004).
7.7(a) Attenuation Test
The attenuation test suggests that where there are intervening independent factors along the chain of causation, the taint of illegally obtained evidence becomes so dissipated as to preclude suppression of derivative evidence as “fruit” of the illegal police action. State v. Warner,
125 Wn.2d 876, 888, 889 P.2d 479 (1995) (remanded for determination
of whether both sources of information were compelled; if only one was
compelled, other would constitute independent source and any “fruits”
need not be excluded); 6 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 11.4
(5th ed. 2012). Put another way, the detrimental consequences of excluding the evidence become so attenuated that the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule no longer justifies its cost. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S.
590, 608−09, 95 S. Ct. 2254, 45 L. Ed. 2d 416 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring); State v. Spotted Elk, 109 Wn. App. 253, 262, 34 P.3d 906
(2001) (finding that the defendant’s and parole officer’s testimony was
insufficiently attenuated from a law enforcement officer’s Miranda violation because the defendant’s improperly admitted incriminatory statements regarding heroin compelled her to explain and later testify about
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why she was carrying the substance); State v. Reid, 38 Wn. App. 203,
213, 687 P.2d 861 (1984).
For example, in Reid, the police arrested the defendant shortly after
he emerged from his apartment building and got into a car. 38 Wn. App.
at 205, 687 P.2d 861. When the defendant refused to identify which
apartment unit he had exited, police seized the defendant’s keys from the
car, entered the building, and used the keys to unlock the door to one of
the apartments. Id. at 205−06, 687 P.2d 861. The police then entered the
apartment, observed evidence in plain view, and later returned and seized
the evidence pursuant to a warrant. Id. at 206, 687 P.2d 861. The court
reasoned that even if the initial seizure of the keys was unlawful, the evidence taken from the apartment would be admissible because the seizure
of the evidence “was so attenuated that the taint of the seizure of the keys
had dissipated.” Id. at 208–09, 687 P.2d 861. “Bystanders had identified
the door through which the defendant had often entered and exited.
[Thus,] the keys were not utilized in the manner of a divining rod to locate [the defendant’s] apartment but rather to facilitate access to [the]
residence and to confirm from which door the defendant had exited.” Id.
at 209, 687 P.2d 861.
Washington courts have not explicitly adopted the attenuation doctrine, but they have applied it. See State v. Eserjose, 171 Wn.2d 907, 919,
259 P.3d 172 (2011) (evaluating the challenged evidence to see if it was
“fruit of the poisonous tree” or so “attenuated as to dissipate the taint”).
The court in Eserjose held that the defendant’s confession obtained at the
sheriff’s office following an illegal arrest at the defendant’s home was an
act of free will sufficient to purge the primary taint of the illegal arrest.
Id. at 929, 259 P.3d 172.
7.7(b) Independent Source Test
Under the independent source exception, illegally obtained evidence is not suppressed under the exclusionary rule when the evidence
was ultimately obtained pursuant to a valid warrant or other lawful
means independent of the unlawful government action. State v. Gaines,
154 Wn.2d 711, 718, 116 P.3d 993 (2005). Thus, “where an unlawful
[action] has given investigators knowledge of facts x and y, but fact z has
been learned by other means, fact z can be said to be admissible because
[it is] derived from an ‘independent source.’” Murray v. United
States, 487 U.S. 533, 538, 108 S. Ct. 2533, 101 L. Ed. 2d 472 (1988). Put
another way, when evidence is lawfully obtained, the fact that police also
came by the evidence unlawfully does not make the evidence suppressible. State v. O’Bremski, 70 Wn.2d 425, 429−30, 423 P.2d 530 (1967) (a
missing child’s testimony was admissible because she was not dis-
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covered solely as a result of unlawful search). The underlying policy is
that although the government should not profit from illegal activity, it
should not end up in a worse position than it otherwise would have been
if it had not performed the illegal activity. Murray, 487 U.S. at 542, 108
S. Ct. 2533.
The independent source exception has been held to comply with article I, section 7 of the Washington State Constitution. Gaines, 154
Wn.2d at 722, 116 P.3d 993 (probable cause existed to search trunk independent of initial, illegal search and police would have sought a warrant for the trunk even absent the initial, illegal search). Under the exception, unlawful police activity does not invalidate a later search if (1) the
search warrant was based on independently obtained information, and (2)
the police were not motivated by the prior unlawful activity in seeking
the search warrant. State v. Miles, 159 Wn. App. 282, 284, 244 P.3d
1030 (2011); see also State v. Smith, 165 Wn. App. 296, 266 P.3d 250
(2011), review granted, 173 Wn.2d 1034, 277 P.3d 669 (2012) (police
entry into motel room was based on independent information because
victim sought police assistance as community caretakers and the emergency need was an intervening factor that allowed emergency aid exception to the warrant requirement).
7.7(c) Inevitable Discovery Doctrine
The last exception to the exclusionary rule is the inevitable discovery doctrine. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444, 104 S. Ct. 2501, 81 L.
Ed. 2d 377 (1984). Unlike federal courts, Washington courts do not recognize the inevitable discovery doctrine. State v. Winterstein, 167 Wn.2d
620, 220 P.3d 1226 (2009). This is attributed to article I, section 7’s express protection of individual privacy and the Washington State Supreme
Court’s dislike of the doctrine’s speculative analysis. See id. at 635, 220
P.3d 1226; State v. Hilton, 164 Wn. App. 81, 91−92, 261 P.3d 683
(2011) (“Washington courts will not entertain the speculative question
about whether the police ultimately would have obtained the same information by other, lawful means.”).
Under the federal exception, the inevitable discovery doctrine is an
extrapolation of the independent source doctrine: if evidence is admissible because it was discovered through an independent source, then it
should be admissible if it would have inevitably been discovered through
an independent source. Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 539, 108
S. Ct. 2535, 101 L. Ed. 2d 472 (1988); see also Nix, 467 U.S. at 444, 104
S. Ct. 2501 (location of murdered child’s body derived from coerced
statement was not suppressed when searchers would have located child
anyway). Under the doctrine, originally tainted evidence is admissible if
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the police, while following routine procedure, would inevitably have uncovered the evidence. United States v. Young, 573 F.3d 711, 721 (9th
Cir. 2009). This reasoning requires a “speculative analysis” of police
behavior. State v. Smith, 165 Wn. App. 296, 310, 266 P.3d 250 (2011).
Specifically, the doctrine examines the police’s actions and their motivations to take such actions. Hilton, 164 Wn. App. at 92, 261 P.3d 683. The
doctrine, however, does not excuse police failure to obtain a search warrant where the police had probable cause but simply did not seek to obtain a warrant. Young, 573 F.3d at 723 (inevitable discovery doctrine did
not apply when police failed to secure a warrant to search defendant’s
hotel room after defendant was arrested, but before defendant had
checked out).
7.8 EVIDENCE DISCOVERED AS A RESULT OF ILLEGAL ARREST OR
DETENTION
7.8(a) Confession as Fruit of Illegal Arrest
Generally, when a defendant confesses voluntarily, a court may
admit the defendant’s confession into evidence consistent with the Fifth
Amendment. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 379, 84 S. Ct. 1774, 12 L.
Ed. 2d 908 (1964). When a confession, however, is the fruit of an illegal
seizure, the court must ensure that the confession is admissible despite
the constitutional violation. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 600−03, 95
S. Ct. 2254, 45 L. Ed. 2d 416 (1975); see State v. Dane, 89 Wn. App.
226, 233−34, 948 P.2d 1326 (1997). In many cases, the temporal location
of the illegal arrest in relation to the confession will be a deciding factor.
For example, a confession made immediately upon an illegal entry and
arrest is excludable, but when a suspect is released after an illegal arrest
and later returns to the police station to make a confession, the confession is admissible because its taint has dissipated. Wong Sun v. United
States, 371 U.S. 471, 491, 83 S. Ct. 407, 9 L. Ed. 2d 441 (1963).
There are three other factors to determine whether the taint of a
confession has dissipated. Brown, 422 U.S. at 603−05, 95 S. Ct. 2254.
First, the giving of Miranda warnings may indicate sufficient attenuation. Id. However, the fact that a defendant received and understood Miranda warnings is not sufficient by itself to purge the taint of an illegal
seizure. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 216−17, 99 S. Ct. 2248, 60
L. Ed. 2d 824 (1979). When a person is unlawfully detained because
probable cause is lacking, but is not formally arrested, the confession is
inadmissible even if the person was first given Miranda warnings so long
as his or her confession is causally connected to the detention. Id. at 117–
18, 99 S. Ct. 2248.
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Second, the presence of any intervening circumstances may provide
sufficient attenuation. The court in State v. Eserjose, 171 Wn.2d 907,
919−29, 259 P.3d 172 (2011), held that the defendant’s confession obtained at the sheriff’s office following an illegal arrest at the defendant’s
home was an act of free will sufficient to purge the primary taint of the
illegal arrest. Id. The arrest was illegal because of lack of consent, but the
defendant only confessed later at the police station upon hearing that his
co-conspirator had implicated him. Id. Thus, the fact that the confession
was elicited due to his co-conspirator’s confession, and not the illegal
arrest, was an intervening circumstance sufficient to purge the taint of the
illegal arrest. Id.
Lastly, the officer’s purpose and the level of the constitutional violation are also instructive in determining whether the confession should
be suppressed. Brown, 422 U.S. at 603−05, 95 S. Ct. 2254; see also State
v. Johnston, 38 Wn. App. 793, 800−01, 690 P.2d 591 (1984).
7.8(b) Search as Fruit of Illegal Arrest or Detention
When a search is incidental to an illegal arrest, the fruits of the
search are suppressible unless intervening factors, such as a valid arrest,
occur between the illegal arrest and the search. United States v. Walker,
535 F.2d 896, 898−99 (5th Cir. 1976). The search may also be purged of
the taint by voluntary consent to the search; the voluntariness of the consent may be determined by reference to the Brown factors, as outlined in
section 7.8(a) above. See generally 6 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 11.4(b) (5th ed. 2012); see also State v. Shoemaker, 85 Wn.2d
207, 212, 533 P.2d 123 (1975).
Voluntariness of consent, however, is not proven by the mere fact
that the defendant voluntarily made the statement. State v. Avila-Avina,
99 Wn. App. 9, 15–16, 991 P.2d 720, 724 (2000), abrogated on other
grounds by State v. Winterstein, 167 Wn.2d 620, 220 P.3d 1226 (2009);
4 LaFave, supra § 8.1(a)−(c). Washington courts have considered the
totality of the circumstances to determine whether consent to a search
incident to arrest was voluntary. State v. O’Neill, 148 Wn.2d 564,
588−89, 62 P.3d 489 (2003) (stating that repeated requests for consent is
one factor to consider); State v. Tagas, 121 Wn. App. 872, 876, 90 P.3d
1088 (2004) (agreeing that totality of circumstances is normally the appropriate test); cf. supra § 5.9−5.10 (Ferrier warnings).
7.8(c) Identification of the Suspect as Fruit of Illegal Arrest
Whether illegally obtained evidence may be used to identify the defendant varies based on the means of identification. Washington courts
have rarely considered the issue, but courts in other jurisdictions have
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excluded evidence of post-arrest identifications, at-trial identification,
photo identification, and fingerprinting. First, in Washington, a court has
found that a post-arrest identification by one officer immediately after a
warrantless arrest was not sufficiently attenuated from the illegal arrest
and therefore had to be suppressed. State v. Le, 103 Wn. App. 354,
362−65, 12 P.3d 653 (2000) (admitting the identification would “conveniently assum[e] that the police would eventually effect a lawful arrest of
the defendant . . . . [S]uch a result would eviscerate the exclusionary rule
by readily excusing police failure to obtain a warrant”). Under the Fourth
Amendment, the evidence may be admitted if, under the Brown factors,
see supra § 7.8(a), the link between the illegal action and the identification is broken. See Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 365, 92 S. Ct.
1620, 32 L. Ed. 2d 152 (1972) (defendant may consent to lineup and
hence purge taint of illegal action). See generally 6 Wayne R. LaFave,
Search and Seizure § 11.4(a)−(j) (5th ed. 2012). Of course, if police
make flagrantly illegal arrests for the purpose of securing identifications
that otherwise could not have been obtained, the identifications are inadmissible. United States v. Edmons, 432 F.2d 577, 584 (2d Cir. 1970).
The second issue arises when a witness identified the defendant in
court but had also previously identified the defendant at a line-up following the illegal arrest. Because the arrest was illegal, the initial line-up
identification was illegal. If both the police officer’s knowledge of the
accused’s identity and the victim’s independent recollection of the accused predate the unlawful arrest, the victim’s in-court identification of
the accused is untainted by either the arrest or the pretrial identification
arising therefrom. State v. Mathe, 102 Wn.2d 537, 546−47, 688 P.2d 859
(1984). A basic attenuation test is applied but with additional factors specific to in-court identification. United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 474,
100 S. Ct. 1244, 63 L. Ed. 2d 537 (1980). The court should also consider
(1) the witness’s prior opportunity to observe the criminal act; (2) any
discrepancy between the defendant’s pre-lineup description and the defendant’s actual description; (3) the identification of someone else prior
to the lineup; (4) identification of the defendant’s picture before the
lineup; (5) failure to identify the defendant on a prior occasion; and (6)
the time between the criminal act and the lineup identification. United
States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 241, 87 S. Ct. 1926, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1149
(1967).
Courts have excluded other types of evidence identifying the defendant if the evidence was associated with an unlawful arrest. A photo
identification produced by an unlawful arrest is not admissible. Crews,
445 U.S. at 474, 100 S. Ct. 1244. And fingerprints must be suppressed
when the suspect was unlawfully arrested for the purpose of obtaining
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the suspect’s fingerprints so as to prosecute the suspect for the crime of
arrest. Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 727, 89 S. Ct. 1394, 22 L. Ed.
2d 676 (1969).
7.9 TYPES OF EVIDENCE DISCOVERED AS A RESULT OF AN ILLEGAL
SEARCH
7.9(a) Confession as Fruit of Illegal Search
Attenuation, including the Brown factors, see supra § 7.8(a), does
not apply to a confession following an unlawful search, as opposed to
one following an unlawful arrest, because a suspect is more likely to confess as a result of a search. People v. Robbins, 54 Ill. App. 3d 298,
304−05, 369 N.E.2d 577, 12 Ill. Dec. 80 (1977); see also State v.
Eserjose, 171 Wn.2d 907, 259 P.3d 172 (2011) (defendant’s confession
following illegal arrest not suppressed “since ‘[a]n illegal arrest, without
more, has never been viewed as a bar to subsequent prosecution, nor as a
defense to a valid conviction.’” (quoting United States v. Crews, 445
U.S. 463, 474, 100 S. Ct. 1244, 63 L. Ed. 2d 537 (1980))). Thus, a confession is suppressible if it would not have been made but for the illegal
search. See State v. White, 97 Wn.2d 92, 102−04, 640 P.2d 1061 (1982).
7.9(b) Search or Arrest as Fruit of Illegal Search
When a search warrant or arrest warrant is based upon untainted evidence, the fact that an illegal search took place prior to securing the valid warrant will not invalidate the execution of that warrant, and evidence
seized during the execution will be admissible. Segura v. United States,
468 U.S. 796, 814, 104 S. Ct. 3380, 82 L. Ed. 2d 599 (1984) (second
search of home is not tainted by prior illegal entry). But if the search
warrant for the second search is supported by both tainted and untainted
evidence, and the untainted evidence alone does not establish probable
cause, evidence seized pursuant to the warrant must be excluded. State v.
Ross, 141 Wn.2d 304, 314−15, 4 P.3d 130 (2000); see also United States
v. Marchand, 564 F.2d 983, 1001−02 (2d Cir. 1977); United States v.
DiMuro, 540 F.2d 503, 515 (1st Cir. 1976); United States v. Nelson, 459
F.2d 884, 889 (6th Cir. 1972).
7.9(c) Testimony of Witness as Fruit of Illegal Search
Testimony and physical evidence are treated differently for purposes of the exclusionary rule. United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268,
277−79, 98 S. Ct. 1054, 55 L. Ed. 2d 268 (1978). Verbal testimony carries with it an exercise of free will, and the costs of excluding the evidence are great. Consequently, the ability to suppress a derivative wit-
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ness’s testimony depends on several of the following factors. First, suppression depends on whether the search and testimony were close in
time. See id. at 277−78, 98 S. Ct. 1054 (witness testimony not excluded
where “substantial periods of time” had elapsed between the illegal
search and the government’s first contact with the witness).
Second, suppression depends on whether the witness testified
freely. See United States v. Karathanos, 531 F.2d 26, 35 (2d Cir. 1976)
(testimony by illegal aliens obtained as result of illegal search inadmissible because testimony was prompted by government statements concerning future prosecution). This may also depend on whether the fruits of
the illegal search were used in questioning the witness. See State v. Rogers, 27 Ohio Op. 2d 105, 198 N.E.2d 796, 806 (1963) (testimony about
gun suppressed because witness would not have been questioned about
gun but for unlawful search). Testimony concerning an object seized during an illegal search is inadmissible when the identification of the object
is established by use of the illegally seized object. State v. Swaite, 33
Wn. App. 477, 484 n.4, 656 P.2d 520 (1982).
Third, suppression may depend on the officer’s intent and prior
knowledge of the existence of the witnesses. If the intent of an illegal
search was to find witnesses, the evidence should be excluded. See People v. Martin, 382 Ill. 192, 201, 46 N.E.2d 997 (1942) (testimony of witnesses suppressed when witness’s names were obtained from papers
found during illegal search). See generally Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 98 S.
Ct. 1054. Admission of the testimony is also more likely if the officers
knew of the witness’s existence before the search. See State v. O
‘Bremski, 70 Wn.2d 425, 429−30, 423 P.2d 530 (1967) (although girl
was found during illegal search, her testimony was admissible because
her whereabouts were discovered through independent information).
7.10 CRIME COMMITTED DURING ILLEGAL ARREST OR SEARCH
Generally, evidence that the defendant attempted to bribe or attack
an officer is admissible even if the arrest was illegal. State v. Mierz, 127
Wn.2d 460, 473−475, 901 P.2d 286 (1995). In addition, evidence of a
suspect speeding away from an unlawful traffic stop has been found admissible at trial because it is considered sufficiently distinguishable from
the unlawful intrusion. State v. Owens, 39 Wn. App. 130, 135, 692 P.2d
850 (1984).
The rationale for admitting this evidence is that acts of free will
purge the taint of the illegal police activity; thus, the application of the
exclusionary rule would only marginally deter illegal police behavior. In
addition, exclusion would permit persons unlawfully arrested to assault
officers without risk of criminal liability. Mierz, 127 Wn.2d at 474, 901
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P.2d 286. The evidence would be inadmissible, however, if it were the
product of questionable police action. See id. at 475, 901 P.2d 286.
7.11 WAIVER OR FORFEITURE OF OBJECTION
A defendant may waive or forfeit his or her constitutional objection
and thus render the objectionable evidence admissible in three ways: (1)
by failing to make a timely objection, (2) by testifying at trial about the
evidence, and (3) by entering a guilty plea. See 6 Wayne R. LaFave,
Search and Seizure §§ 11.1(a), (c)−(d) (5th ed. 2012).
7.11(a) Failure to Make a Timely Objection
Jurisdictions have different rules for what constitutes a timely objection. Washington court rules provide that a defendant’s failure to object at the omnibus hearing may constitute a waiver of the objection if
the party had knowledge of the illegality of the search or seizure prior to
the hearing. See Wash. CrR 4.5(d); see also State v. Lee, 162 Wn. App.
852, 857, 259 P.3d 294 (2011), review denied, 173 Wn.2d 1017, 272
P.3d 247 (2012) (“Under RAP 2.5(a), a party may raise manifest error
affecting a constitutional right for the first time on appeal. ‘A failure to
move to suppress evidence, however, constitutes a waiver of the right to
have it excluded.’” (footnote omitted) (quoting State v. Mierz, 72 Wn.
App. 783, 789, 866 P.2d 65, 875 P.2d 1228 (1994))). Thus, a defendant’s
failure to move to suppress evidence at trial that he later contends was
illegally gathered constitutes a waiver of any error associated with the
admission of the evidence. Mierz, 127 Wn.2d at 468, 875 P.2d 1228.
Importantly, a defendant may only appeal suppression issues on
the bases raised during the trial. State v. Garbaccio, 151 Wn. App. 716,
731, 214 P.3d 168 (2009), review denied, 168 Wn.2d 1027, 230 P.3d
1060 (2010) (because a defendant’s “present contention was not raised in
his suppression motion, and because he did not seek a ruling on this issue
from the trial court, we will not consider it for the first time on appeal.”).
7.11(b) Testimony by Defendant Concerning Suppressed Evidence
A defendant may not raise a Fourth Amendment claim on appeal
challenging the admission of evidence, notwithstanding a timely objection, if the defendant gave testimony at trial admitting to the possession
of that evidence. See State v. Peele, 10 Wn. App. 58, 67, 516 P.2d 788
(1973). A claim may be raised, however, if the defendant’s testimony
was induced by the erroneous admission of the evidence. Id. at 67–68,
516 P.2d 788; see also Harrison v. United States, 392 U.S. 219, 224−25,
88 S. Ct. 2008, 20 L. Ed. 2d 1047 (1968). The rationale for the general
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rule is that the testimony may make the admission of the illegal evidence
harmless error. See Peele, 10 Wn. App. at 66, 516 P.2d 788. See generally 6 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 11.1(c) (5th ed. 2004).
7.11(c) Guilty Plea
A defendant who has knowingly and voluntarily entered a guilty
plea may not thereafter obtain post-conviction relief on Fourth Amendment grounds even though he or she made a timely motion to suppress
the evidence in advance of the plea. See Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S.
258, 267, 93 S. Ct. 1602, 36 L. Ed. 2d 235 (1973). Courts recognize this
limitation because “[w]hen a criminal defendant has solemnly admitted
in open court that he is in fact guilty of the offense with which he is
charged, he may not thereafter raise independent claims relating to the
deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of the
guilty plea.” State v. Butler, 17 Wn. App. 666, 676, 564 P.2d 828 (1977)
(citing Tollett, 411 U.S. at 267, 93 S. Ct. 1602). But if the plea itself can
be characterized as the fruit of illegally obtained evidence and, consequently, should have been suppressed upon the defendant’s timely motion, then the plea was not entered voluntarily or knowingly. See Tollett,
411 U.S. at 267, 93 S. Ct. 1602 (defendant may attack the voluntariness
of the plea under the factors set forth in McMann v. Richardson, 397
U.S. 759, 90 S. Ct. 1441, 25 L. Ed. 2d 763 (1970)); see also State v. Wilson, 162 Wn. App. 409, 414–15, 417, 253 P.3d 1143 (2011) (“[A] ‘guilty
plea waives or renders irrelevant all constitutional violations that occurred before the guilty plea, except those related to the circumstances of
the plea or to the government’s legal power to prosecute regardless of
factual guilt.’” (quoting State v. Brandenburg, 153 Wn. App. 944, 948,
223 P.3d 1259 (2009))).
7.12 HARMLESS ERROR
Even when illegally seized evidence has been improperly admitted
at trial, a conviction will not be reversed if the defendant would have
been convicted without its admission. See State v. Smith, 93 Wn.2d 329,
352−53, 610 P.2d 869 (1980); State v. Flicks, 91 Wn.2d 391, 396, 588
P.2d 1328 (1979). Where an error infringes on a constitutional right, the
error is presumed prejudicial, and the State bears the burden of proving
the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Thompson, 151 Wn.2d 793, 808, 92 P.3d 228 (2004); State v. McReynolds, 117
Wn. App. 309, 326, 71 P.3d 663 (2003); State v. Spotted Elk, 109 Wn.
App. 253, 261, 34 P.3d 906 (2001). A constitutional error is harmless if
the appellate court is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that, in light
of the overwhelming untainted evidence, a jury would have reached the
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same result in the absence of the error. State v. Guloy, 104 Wn.2d 412,
425, 705 P.2d 1182 (1985).
CONCLUSION
Particulars of search and seizure law may change based upon the
circumstances of each case, but the types of issues raised and considered
are likely to remain much the same. This survey attempts to expand upon
basic search and seizure issues by referencing recent Washington search
and seizure cases. While this survey is not comprehensive and will require continual updating, we hope it will continue to be a useful tool for
practitioners and judges who must assess the scope of protection that the
Washington State Constitution and the U.S. Constitution afford persons
against unlawful searches and seizures.
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in open fields, wooded areas, 1592
open view and plain view, doctrine affecting, 1589, 1707, 1709
of passenger, 1595
in personal characteristics, 1596
in personal effects and papers, 1597
of prisoners, 1747
reasonableness of, 1584
in residential premises, 1588
in telephone and telephone records, 1598
in vehicles, 1595
See also constitutionally protected areas
expertise of officer
as establishing probable cause in search for illegal substances, 1612
federal officers
compliance with state protections, necessity for, 1608
feel
See plain view, smell and hearing
fellow officer rule
See stop-and-frisk
felony arrest
See warrantless arrest
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fences
effect on curtilage, 1591
effect on open fields doctrine, 1593
fingerprints and nail scraping
as fruit of illegal arrest, 1770
pursuant to Terry stop, 1685
fire scenes
See inspection of fire scenes
flashlight
as aid to observation, 1589
flight
See furtive gestures and flight
force
use of in arrest, 1677
forfeiture of objection
See waiver of objection
forfeiture or levy of vehicles
seizure without warrant, propriety of, 1737, 1738
fresh pursuit
See exigent circumstances; warrantless searches
frisk
See stop-and-frisk
fruit of the poisonous tree
arrest as fruit of illegal search, 1771
attenuation test, as exception to application of, 1765
confession as fruit of illegal arrest, 1768
confession as fruit of illegal search, 1771
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crime committed during illegal arrest or search as constituting, 1772
failure to make timely objection, as waiver to, 1773
fingerprints as fruit of illegal arrest, 1770
generally, 1764
guilty pleas based on, 1774
harmless error as grounds for affirming conviction based on, 1774
identification of suspect as fruit of illegal arrest, 1769
independent source test as exception to application of, 1766
inevitable discovery test as exception to application of, 1767
search as fruit of illegal arrest or detention, 1769
testimony by defendant concerning suppressed evidence as waiver
of, 1773
testimony of witness, standards in applying as, 1771
violation of warrant procedures, standards in applying as, 1764
waiver or forfeiture of objection based on, 1773
furtive gestures and flight
observation of, as probable cause, 1621
garbage
expectation of privacy in, 1598
glove compartment
See containers
global positioning system (GPS)
See vehicles
good faith
as limitation to exclusionary rule, 1758
searches, community caretaking function as exception to warrant
requirement, 1703, 1704
guilty pleas
as fruit of poisonous tree, 1774
handwriting
expectation of privacy in, 1596
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harmless error
fruit of poisonous tree, discounted in affirming conviction based on,
1774
hearing
See plain view, smell, and hearing
hearsay
as basis of knowledge, 1625
as evidence to corroborate probable cause, 1615
police information, use of multiple hearsay, 1630
probable cause, as basis for, 1615
homes
See premises
host
consent by to search guest’s room, 1724
hotels
consent to search room by employee of, 17214
expectation of privacy in, 1589
lobby area, expectation of privacy in, 1594
hot pursuit
See exigent circumstances, premises, warrantless searches
houses
See premises
identification
fingerprints as fruit of illegal arrest, 1770
as fruit of illegal arrest, 1769
photo montage as fruit of illegal arrest, 1770
refusal to supply, 1622, 1623
request for as seizure, 1602
Terry stops, legislation regarding, 1689
See also lineup or photo montage
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immediate control standard
search incident to arrest, application of, 1698
implied consent
arrest as prerequisite for, 1731
statutes governing, 1720, 1731
impoundment
use of enforcement of traffic regulations, 1739, 1740
inventory searches, pursuant to, 1740
vehicles, community caretaking function use of, 1739, 1741
vehicles, evidence gathering, use of, 1738, 1739
vehicles, warrantless, 1740
independent source test
See fruit of the poisonous tree
individualized suspicion
at checkpoints, lack of requirement of, 1736
exceptions to requirement of, 1614
prisoners or pre-trial detainees, lack of requirement of, 1748
probable cause, requirement of, 1613
students, generally, requirement of, 1746
student athletes, lack of requirement of, 1746
inevitable discovery test
as exception to fruit of the poisonous tree, 1767
informants
admissions against interest by, 1626
Aguilar-Spinelli test, applied to, 1623, 1624
anonymous or unknown, tests for reliability, 1626, 1630
basis of knowledge by, 1624, 1627, 1629
citizens as, 1627
corroboration of by independent investigation, 1624
hearsay, use of by, 1615, 1625
identity, challenge to, 1661
named but unknown, reliability of, 1630
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nature of (criminal, citizen, or police), 1623
partial corroboration of information supplied by, 1628
police as, 1629
stops based on probable cause, information from, 1682, 1683
sufficiency of information supplied by, 1629
veracity of, 1626, 1628, 1629
inspection of fire scenes
administrative searches, level of proof required for, 1751
warrantless entry, fireman’s discovery pursuant to, 1706
“in the presence” requirement
See arrest
Internet
computer, privacy interest in, 1599
instant messaging, 1586
interrogation
See questioning
inventory searches
of impounded vehicles, 1740
post detention use of, 1702, 1703
scope of, 1701, 1702
without probable cause, 1632
joint occupant
consent to search by, 1722
judges
See magistrate
judicial review
of arrests, 1678
jurisdiction
court boundary, warrant issued outside of, 1636
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juvenile delinquency proceedings
exclusionary rule, applicability to, 1761
Katz test
See expectation of privacy; constitutionally protected areas
knock and announce requirement
See search warrants
knock and wait rules
See search warrants
landlord
consent to search given by, 1723
lessor
consent to search given by, 1723
lie detectors
See polygraphs
lineup or photo montage
as fruit of illegal arrest, 1770
as evidence for probable cause, 1629
luggage
See containers
magistrate
burden of proof as to neutrality, 1639
district court (state) judge’s jurisdiction, 1636
issuance of warrant by, 1636
neutrality of, 1637
prosecutor or investigator as, 1638
qualifications of, 1637
requirements for, 1636
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mails
expectation of privacy in, 1599
warrantless searches of, 1742
manager, apartment, building, or motel
consent to search, 1723
marital privilege
statements supporting probable cause, 1614
Miranda warnings
necessity for, 1680
misdemeanor arrest
See warrantless arrest
mistake or omission
affecting findings of probable cause, 1608, 1609
issuance of warrant based on, 1608, 1609
motels
registry, expectation of privacy in, 1598
See hotels
motive
informant’s in establishing probable cause, 1626
neutral and detached magistrate
See magistrate
“no trespassing” signs
effect on open fields doctrine, 1593
nongovernmental searches
See private searches
nonsuspect
search warrant for evidence in possession of, 1666
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notice of authority requirement
See search warrants; execution; notice requirement
oath
See affidavit for search warrant
objections
exclusionary rule, failure to make, 1773
objective test
See probable cause
odor
See plain view, smell, and hearing
open fields
as constitutionally protected area, 1592
business and commercial premises, doctrine applied to, 1594
expectation of privacy in, 1593
open view
See plain view, smell, and hearing
papers
See private papers
parents
consent to search given by, 1721
parolees and probationers
expectation of privacy for, 1748
revocation hearing, exclusionary rule applicability for, 1760
revocation hearing, exclusionary rule, Washington applications for,
1760, 1761
search and seizure of, 1748
partial corroboration
informant’s credibility, supported by, 1628
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particularity
See search warrants, generally
passengers and passenger compartments
consent to search vehicle given by, 1722
detention of pursuant to Terry stop, 1687
expectation of privacy in vehicle by, 1595
frisk of, 1692
ordered to exit vehicle, 1692
passenger compartment search, legality of, 1693
request for identification of, 1632
search incident to arrest of, 1700, 1734
search of, generally, 1595
search of, Washington applications for, 1734
search with probable cause, federal law, applications for, 1734
seizure of, 1603
past performance
by informants, 1626
pen registers
as constituting search, 1598
defined, 1598
for computer, 1599
personal characteristics
expectation of privacy in, 1596
personal effects
expectation of privacy in, 1597
search warrants for, 1659
personal privacy interest
generally, 1606
pharmacy records
administrative searches of, 1753
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phone
See telephone
photo montage
See lineup or photo montage
plain hearing
See plain view, smell, and hearing
plain smell
See plain view, smell, and hearing
plain touch
generally, 1713
plain view, smell, and hearing
constitutionally protected areas, entry into based on, 1709
of curtilage, 1591
enhancement devices, used pursuant to, 1712
feel, generally, 1713
hearing, generally, 1712
immediate knowledge of officer, application to, 1710, 1711
inadvertent discovery, lack of requirement for, 1709
incriminating discovery in constitutionally protected area,
application of, 1709
justification of intrusion for application of, 1709, 1710
odor as probable cause, 1619
odor, generally, 1712, 1713
plain view and open view distinguished, 1707
premises, application of, 1589
privacy interest relinquishment based on, 1589
seizure based on, 1709
seizure of unnamed items based on, 1660
smell, generally, 1712, 1713
poisonous tree
See fruit of the poisonous tree
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police
action by as affecting consent, 1714, 1715
as informants, 1629
business premises, investigative entry by, 1594
claim of authority by to search, 1715
deception in obtaining consent, 1718
plain view doctrine, utility by, 1709
police information, multiple hearsay, use of, 1630
seizure of unnamed items by, 1660
See also expertise of officer
polygraphs
use of to establish probable cause, 1617
power consumption
See electrical consumption
premises
and adjoining lands, expectation of privacy in, 1590
administrative searches of, privacy expectation in, 1752
buildings within curtilage open to public by implication, 1591
circumstances of warrantless arrest at, 1672
curtilage, factors used to determine, 1591
detention of persons on, 1655, 1656
exigent circumstances justifying warrantless entry of, 1726, 1727
homes
as constitutionally protected areas, 1587
consent searches of, 1714
expectation of privacy in, 1588
plain view at, 1589
search of absent less intrusive alternatives, 1728
seizure within, 1601
warrantless arrest at, 1672
invitation to enter, 1590
pre-Katz, applications to, 1583
search incident to arrest at, 1698
search of persons on, 1655
search under warrant
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area included at, 1658
scope and intensity at, 1657
search warrants
description in, 1643
vehicles at, search of, 1646, 1660
warrantless entry at
community caretaking function, 1704, 1706
exigent circumstances, 1726, 1728
warrantless search at
community caretaking function, 1704
exigent circumstances, 1725, 1726
See also business and commercial premises; inspection of fire
scenes; expectation of privacy; search warrants
pretext
arrest to obtain evidence of different offense as, 1678, 1698
community caretaking or emergency as, 1704
inventory search as, 1740, 1741
traffic stops as, 1688
prior arrests and convictions
consideration of in probable cause determination, 1616
prisoners or pre-trial detainees
bodily intrusions of, 1666, 1748, 1749
expectation of privacy by, 1747
parole hearing for application of exclusionary rule, 1761
searches, level of proof for, 1748
warrantless searches or seizures of, 1748
privacy
See expectation of privacy
private papers
expectation of privacy in, 1597
private searches
exclusionary rule, application generally to, 1762

1839

1840

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 36:1581

joint endeavor theory in, 1763
agency theory in, 1763
security officers, as constituting, 1762
probable cause
administrative searches, necessity for, 1631
affidavit requirements for, 1611, 1612
Aguilar-Spinelli test for, 1623
anonymous or unknown informants as supporting, 1630
arrest, need for, 1609
association, persons and places, as constituting, 1620
bodily intrusions, need for, 1632
characteristics of, 1607, 1611
citizen informant, basis of knowledge supporting, 1627
criminal reputation establishing, 1616
electrical consumption as evidence of, 1616
firsthand observation, stolen property, as evidence of, 1618
flight or furtive gesture as element of, 1621
generally, 1607
hearing, application of exclusionary rule to, 1759
hearsay supporting, 1615
illegal substance detection as supporting, 1619
individualized suspicion, necessity for, 1613
informant’s information, as evidence of
admissions against interest, 1626
basis of knowledge, 1624, 1627, 1629
corroboration by independent investigation, 1625
partial corroboration, 1628
past performance, 1626
photo identification, 1629
sufficiency of information, 1629
generally, 1623
needed to support, veracity, 1623, 1626, 1628
information considered in determining, 1614, 1639, 1640
inventory searches, necessity for, 1632
judicial review of, 1678
mistake or omission of facts as evidence of, 1608, 1609
objective test for, 1611
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observations by law enforcement officer as evidence of, 1618
odor of illegal substance as evidence of, 1619
police informants, generally, 1629
police information, multiple hearsay, used to establish, 1630
polygraphs, used to establish, 1617
post-detention searches, necessity of, 1702
power consumption establishing, 1616
presence in high-crime area as evidence of, 1621
prior arrests and convictions as evidence of, 1616
quantum of evidence required to establish, 1612
questioning, responses to as evidence of, 1622
racial incongruity as evidence of, 1621
reputation as evidence of, 1616
requirements for, 1607
search and arrest compared, necessity of, 1609
staleness of information used to establish, 1639
Terry stop-and-frisk, necessity for, 1632, 1679
totality of the circumstances standard used to establish, 1620, 1623
vehicle search at border crossing, necessity of, 1750
vehicle search under federal law, necessity of, 1734, 1735
vehicle search under Washington Constitution, 1733, 1734
victim-witness information, generally, 1627
victim-witness information, sufficiency of evidence to establish,
1629
warrantless arrest, generally, 1671
See also informants
probationers
See parolees and probationers
property
expectation of privacy in, 1597
seizure of, 1603, 1697
protected areas and interests
commercial property as, 1593
homes, generally, 1587
open fields as, 1592
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protective searches
See stop-and-frisk
purses
See containers
questioning
compulsion to answer during Terry stop, 1689
responses to as probable cause, 1622
race
as evidence of probable cause, 1621
as basis for border stop, 1750
as basis for reasonable suspicion, 1684
reasonable belief standard
See stop-and-frisk
reasonable expectation of privacy
See expectation of privacy
reasonable suspicion standard
See stop-and-frisk
recording of conversation
as constituting search, 1585
reputation
consideration of in probable cause determination, 1616
residence
See premises
roadblock
as seizure 1603
roommate
See co-tenant
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schools
expectation of privacy in, 1745
school officials as state agents, 1763
warrantless searches at, 1745
scope of consent
See consent searches
scrupulous exactitude standard
See search warrants, targets to be seized
search incident to arrest
bodily intrusions as, 1700
containers, applicability of, 1700, 1702
custodial requirement for, 1697
defined, 1696
generally, 1695, 1696
“immediate control” standard used in, 1698
inventory searches as, 1702, 1703
lawful arrest requirement for, 1696
permissible scope of, 1698
post-detention searches as, 1701, 1702
premises, applications of in, 1698
property seized, use of in, 1697
scope of Washington applications, 1696, 1697, 1700
“second look” searches as, 1702
strip or body cavity search as, 1749
test for, 1696
vehicles and containers within, applicability of, 1700
search warrants
administrative searches, requirements for, 1642, 1753
affidavit supporting, 1639
affidavit supporting, challenging content for, 1661
bodily intrusions, probable cause for, 1664
burden on party challenging, 1643
content of, 1639
description of place or target of, generally, 1643
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documents, necessity for, 1658
area, covered by, 1658
consent to enter, 1651, 1652
delivery of warrant, 1660
detention of persons on, 1655
entry by ruse or deception, 1652
notice requirements, 1650, 1651
personal effects, 1655ԟ1657
reasonableness in, 1653
scope and intensity, 1657
search of persons on premises, 1655, 1656
time of, 1641
unnamed items, seizure of, 1660
generally, 1635
information considered in obtaining, 1639
items searchable under, 1636
exceptions, “knock and announce”
exigent circumstances, 1654
necessity of covert entry, 1654, 1655
useless gesture, 1654
execution of, “knock and announce,” 1650
requirement, “knock and announce,” 1650
purposes, “knock and announce,” 1650
location, description of, 1643
location, particularity of description and exceptions, 1645
mere evidence as object under, 1636
nonsuspects possessing evidence under, 1666
oath or affirmation in, 1639
oral and telephonic warrants as, 1641
particular searches, exceptions, 1645
persons, particularity of description in, 1646
purposes of, 1635
requirements for, 1635
severability of multiple locations, 1644, 1645
staleness of information in, 1639, 1641
targets to be seized under
documents or electronic communications, 1658
generally, 1647, 1648
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particularity of description, 1647
particularity of description, First Amendment applications,1663
scrupulous exactitude requirement, 1663, 1664
time of execution of, staleness, 1639
vehicles at premises, applicability to, 1646, 1660
vehicles, travel patterns of, GPS, 1643
See also administrative searches; affidavit for search warrant;
neutral and detached magistrate
searches
bodily intrusions as, 1664
bodily intrusions of prisoners, 1666, 1749
bodily intrusions of sex offenders, 1748
border crossing as, 1750
defined
pre-Katz, 1583
post-Katz, 1584
constitutionally protected areas, 1587
as fruit of illegal arrest, 1769
as fruit of illegal search, 1771
of prisoners, 1747
prisoners, bodily intrusions of, 1666, 1749
reasonable expectation of privacy, pursuant to, 1584
at schools, 1745
in special environments, 1745
standing to raise claim, challenging, 1604
strip searches, execution of, 1666
See also search warrants; protected areas and interests; warrantless
searches
searches, unlawful
See exclusionary rule
secondary evidence
See fruit of the poisonous tree
security officers
public function theory as applied to, 1762
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seizure
constitutionally protected areas, when plain view used as basis for,
1709
forfeiture as basis for, 1737, 1738
of items unnamed in search warrant, 1660
lawful, factors, 1671, 1676
of person, generally, 1600, 1669
of person in automobile, 1602
of person in home, 1601
of person, what constitutes seizure, 1600
plain view as basis for, 1709
of prisoners, 1748, 1749
of property, possessory interest defined, 1603
within special environments, 1745
spoliation of evidence as basis for, 1691
standing to raise claim, challenging, 1604
of vehicles, 1602
warrantless, plain view as basis for, 1709
within homes, 1601
See also arrest; protected areas and interests; warrantless searches
sensory-enhanced searches
use of analysis, 1585
use of hearing, generally, 1712
thermal imaging device used in home, 1588
sentencing
exclusionary rule, applicability to hearings, 1760
shared living quarters
search of, 1589
silence or inaction
evidence for probable cause, 1622
smell
See plain view, smell, and hearing
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spouses
consent to search given by, 1721
standing
automatic standing in Washington, 1604
search and seizure claims, generally, 1604
stolen property possession
probable cause based on, 1618
stop-and-frisk
additional actions extending Terry search beyond, 1693
compelled response to, 1689
danger as factor in, 1689, 1691
duration of, 1685
individualized suspicion, reasonable suspicion standard required
for, 1682
“fellow officer” rule, in applying to, 1683
fingerprinting during, 1686
community caretaking function as grounds for, 1705
grounds for, 1689
proximity to suspect as grounds for, 1692
scope of, 1691
spoliation of evidence as grounds for, 1691
Washington applications for, 1690
generally, 1679
incidental to premises search, 1655
individualized suspicion requirement for, 1682
individualized suspicion, exceptions to requirement, 1682
information from informants as basis for, 1682, 1683
intrusiveness of, 1679, 1683, 1685
investigatory stop, generally, 1679
level of proof required, 1632
nature of the offense, applications to, 1681
passenger compartment search, pursuant to, 1693
of persons within suspect’s proximity, 1687, 1692
probable cause considerations in, 1679
protective measures other than frisk, 1692
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proximity to suspect as grounds for detention, 1687
purpose of rule, 1679
reasonable suspicion standard for, 1680, 1681, 1683
scope of permissible frisk, 1691
self-protective alternative to frisk, 1692
standards generally, 1632
time, place, and method, 1685
traffic violations, detention related to, 1687
transporting suspect, during, 1686

store
See business and commercial premises; premises
street encounters
See stop-and-frisk
students
See schools
suppression of confessions and admissions
See exclusionary rule
telephone
answering service, expectation of privacy in, 1587
phone numbers, privacy interest in, 1598
text messages, 1586, 1598, 1599
See also pen registers
Terry stop
See stop-and-frisk
testimony
defendant’s as fruit of poisonous tree, 1771, 1773
as fruit of illegal search, 1771
thermal imaging device
See sensory-enhanced searches
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text messages
expectation of privacy in, 1586, 1598, 1599
touch
See plain touch
traffic violations
pursuant to
custodial arrest,1678, 1697
detention, 1688
impoundment of vehicle, 1739, 1740
search incident to arrest, 1696, 1697
hot pursuit following, 1730
trespass
effect on validity of police search, 1587, 1589, 1590
trunk
search of, 1741
urine samples
expectation of privacy in, 1596
useless gesture exception
See search warrants, knock and announce
vehicles
administrative searches, level of proof requirement for, 1753
checkpoints, 1736, 1737, 1753
checkpoints, level of proof for, 1750, 1753
containers in, 1596, 1734
exigent circumstances to search, 1735
expectation of privacy in, 1595
impounded auto, inventory search of, 1703, 1740, 1741
impoundment, enforcement of traffic regulations as grounds for,
1739, 1740
impoundment, warrantless search of, 1738
inventory searches of, 1703, 1740, 1741
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motor home, search of, 1589
mobile home as, 1595
personal privacy interest in, 1606
scope of warrantless search of
under Washington law, 1733
under federal law, 1734
global positioning system (GPS), 1585
search of, 1595
probable cause, 1733, 1734
incident to arrest, 1700
under warrant for premises, 1646, 1660
seizure of persons in, 1602
spot checks of, 1736, 1753
spot checks of, administrative requirements for, 1753, 1754
subject of criminal activity, warrantless search of, 1734
trunk, search of, 1741
warrantless detention, 1740
warrantless impoundment of, community caretaking function, 1739
warrantless impoundment of for evidence, 1738
warrantless searches of
generally 1732, 1733
scope, Washington law, 1733
scope, federal law, 1734
warrantless seizure of, for forfeiture or levy, 1737
See also search warrants; passengers
veracity
of anonymous or unknown informants, 1630
as evidence of
informants’ admissions against interest and motive, 1626
informants’ past performance, 1626
informants’ partial corroboration, 1628
police informants 1629
victim-witness information
probable cause, basis for knowledge of, 1627
probable cause, generally, 1627
probable cause, sufficiency of information by, 1629
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view
See plain view, smell, and hearing
voice exemplars
expectation of privacy in, 1596
voluntariness
awareness of right to refuse as affecting, 1717
coerciveness in obtaining, 1716
consent searches based on, 1713
consent searches, police claim of authority, as affecting, 1715
mental or emotional state in evaluating, 1718
police deception as to identity or purpose as affecting, 1718
prior cooperation or refusal as affecting, 1715
waiver
invitation to enter premises as, 1590
waiver of objection
failure to make timely objection as constituting, 1773
guilty plea as, 1774
testimony by defendant concerning suppressed evidence as, 1773
warrantless arrest
emergency exception as basis for, 1673
requirements for
misdemeanor arrest, 1674
felony arrest, 1674
premises, residence, 1672
vehicle, detention of, pursuant to, 1740
when permissible, 1671
warrantless searches
bodily intrusions, exigent circumstances for, 1700, 1730
use of border crossing, 1750
use of checkpoints, 1736, 1753
community caretaking and medical emergency as basis for, 1703
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defined, 1695
of DNA, 1702, 1731
generally, 1695
hot pursuit as basis for, 1726, 1727, 1730
imminent arrest as exigent circumstance supporting, 1727
inventory searches as, 1701, 1702
mail inspections as, 1742
of person based on exigent circumstances, 1729, 1732
plain view, seizure based on, 1709
post-detention, 1701
premises
community caretaking and emergency as basis for, 1704
exigent circumstances justifying, 1726
home, absence of less intrusive alternatives, 1728
premises search, search of person in context of, 1732
prior to arrest, 1701
of prisoners or pre-trial detainees, 1747
at schools, 1745
as “second look” searches, 1702
as search incident to arrest, 1695, 1696
at special environments, 1741, 1745
of vehicles
generally, 1732
inventory search, 1740
federal law governing
vehicles, probable cause, 1734
vehicles, scope of search, 1735
vehicles, subject of criminal activity, 1739
vehicles, Washington applications in, 1733
See also consent searches; exigent circumstances; search incident to
arrest; stop-and-frisk; plain view, smell and hearing
warrants
execution of, 1676, 1677
invalid, effect of, 1676
issuance of, 1607
violations of procedure in obtaining, 1764
See also arrest warrants; search warrants

2013]

Washington Search and Seizure

wiretapping
as evidence, 1710
witness-victim information
See victim-witness information
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